ESSAY: The North Korean 155mm howitzer and the war of attrition — Pyongyang arms Putin for eternity

Introduction: Kim tests, Putin receives — the axis of evil consolidates

The weapons tests of June 25, 2026

On June 25, 2026, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un personally oversaw a series of weapons tests whose results were broadcast by the official KCNA agency. On the agenda: an upgraded 240mm rocket launcher, tactical ballistic missiles, and — most significant — a 155mm self-propelled howitzer fitted with extended-range shells reaching 65 kilometers. This last system represents a major qualitative leap in North Korean artillery capabilities — and a threat directly relevant to the Ukrainian front.

These tests are not mere internal demonstrations. They fit within a Russia-North Korea military relationship that has deepened considerably since 2024. According to American and South Korean intelligence services, North Korea sent approximately 14,000 soldiers to Russia to fight alongside Russian forces in Ukraine. Of that number, approximately 6,000 were killed — an enormous human cost for Pyongyang, but one that Kim clearly judged acceptable.

The tacit deal: munitions and technology in exchange for combat experience

The military relationship between Moscow and Pyongyang rests on a pragmatic exchange of brutal clarity. North Korea supplies artillery munitions — notably 122mm and 152mm shells compatible with the Soviet-era systems inherited by the Russian army — as well as soldiers trained for trench warfare. In return, Russia shares its most sensitive technologies: submarines, air defense systems, electronic warfare. Kim Jong-un obtains what no international embargo had ever offered him: an open-air Russian military university, financed with the blood of his own soldiers.

The transaction value of this deal is colossal. Estimates range between 7 and 13.8 billion dollars for North Korean deliveries to Russia since the intensive cooperation began. That is money — and above all technology — flowing directly into the weapons program of a regime developing nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles. The West indirectly subsidizes this transfer every time it hesitates to sanction Russo-North Korean commercial exchanges more severely.

The 155mm howitzer: a technological leap that changes the game

Why 155mm is the standard caliber of modern artillery

The 155mm caliber is the heavy artillery standard for all modern NATO armies. This is not arbitrary: it offers the best balance between explosive power, range, and transport logistics. The American M109 Paladin, France's Caesar, Germany's PzH 2000 — all fire 155mm. It is also the caliber of shells that Ukraine received from its Western partners for its counteroffensives.

Until now, North Korea had primarily mastered inherited Soviet calibers — 122mm, 130mm, and 152mm. Developing a 155mm self-propelled system with extended-range shells at 65 km represents a significant technological breakthrough. This means Pyongyang has either independently developed a capability matching NATO standards, or has benefited from technology transfers from partners — with Russia as the prime suspect.

The 65 km range: a strategic capability on the Ukrainian front

A range of 65 kilometers for a 155mm artillery shell is remarkable. For comparison, standard M795 shells fired by the Caesar have a range of 30 km, and M982 Excalibur GPS-guided shells reach 40 km. The Extended Range Munition (ERM) tested by North Korea would thus rival some of the West's most advanced artillery systems.

On the Ukrainian front, such range would allow strikes against command, logistics, and supply targets far behind the front line — targets until now relatively protected by the range limits of conventional Russian artillery. If these munitions are delivered in Ukraine, they would significantly change the depth of Russian strikes into Ukrainian rear areas. The threat is documented, concrete, and imminent.

The 14,000 North Korean soldiers in Russia: assessment and strategy

A massive deployment, a gradual integration

The deployment of 14,000 North Korean soldiers to Russia constitutes one of the most unusual military operations of the war in Ukraine. Initially sent as support labor — equipment maintenance, logistics, depot security — these soldiers were gradually integrated into combat infantry units, notably in the Kursk region where Ukraine launched a cross-border incursion in August 2024.

According to South Korean (NIS) and American (DIA) intelligence agencies, North Korean soldiers suffered disproportionate losses due to their unfamiliarity with drones and modern trench warfare tactics. Their personal equipment, adapted to Cold War scenarios on the Korean Peninsula, was ill-suited to the Ukrainian warzone. The result: approximately 6,000 deaths — a casualty rate approaching 40% of the total contingent.

What these deaths represent for Kim Jong-un

A 40% casualty rate would be catastrophic for any democratic army. For Kim Jong-un, it is an acceptable cost in the strategic calculus. The deaths of North Korean soldiers in Russia generate no domestic political pressure in North Korea — there is no opposition, no free press, no protesting families. These losses are managed as state secrets, with families receiving discreet compensation and no information about the circumstances.

In exchange for those 6,000 deaths, North Korea obtained: access to Russian submarine technologies, transfers on S-400 air defense systems, information on the electronic warfare systems Russia uses in Ukraine, and enhanced international legitimacy as a viable military partner. It is a brutal but coherent strategic investment in the survival logic of the regime.

The reverse technology transfer: what Russia gives to Pyongyang

Submarines, missiles, and air defense: the deal's menu

The Russia-North Korea military cooperation is not one-directional. Russia provides North Korea with technologies that directly advance its long-range missile program and naval projection capability. The British government officially documented in a joint statement of June 2026 the transfer of submarine-related technologies — alarming information given North Korea's efforts to develop ballistic submarines capable of launching nuclear missiles.

The sharing of S-400 air defense technologies is particularly significant. The S-400 is the most advanced surface-to-air system in the Russian arsenal, capable of intercepting short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. If North Korea masters the technologies associated with this system, it considerably strengthens its ability to protect its nuclear sites against preemptive strikes — which alters the American and South Korean strategic calculus in any future confrontation.

Electronic warfare: a hands-on education in the Ukrainian trenches

The North Korean combat experience in Ukraine offers something invaluable that no simulated training can replace: exposure to real electronic warfare. North Korean soldiers who survived deployment in Ukraine gained practical knowledge of drones, jamming systems, and communications in hostile environments — skills that simply do not exist in an army that has not fought since the Korean War.

This experience will be systematically analyzed and integrated by the North Korean military upon their return. That is why some analysts — notably at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies — estimate that even if North Korea took enormous losses in Ukraine, the accumulated strategic experience would be worth the cost. The North Korean army of 2030 will be fundamentally different from that of 2020 — and more dangerous for the Korean Peninsula.

Implications for the war of attrition in Ukraine

Artillery as the decisive weapon of the war of attrition

The war in Ukraine is fundamentally a war of attrition — a battle where the ability to maintain a continuous flow of artillery munitions is often more decisive than tactical breakthroughs. Artillery accounts for approximately 80% of casualties on both sides according to ISW estimates. That is why North Korean munitions deliveries to Russia are so critical: they directly extend Russian combat capability at a time when Russian defense industries alone cannot keep pace with consumption.

Russia currently fires between 10,000 and 15,000 shells per day on the Ukrainian front. Ukraine, despite Western deliveries, fires approximately 2,000 to 5,000 shells per day — a heavily unfavorable artillery ratio. North Korean deliveries — estimated at several million shells since 2023 — have filled a critical gap in Russian stocks. Without them, Russia would have had to slow its offensive operations.

The impact on Ukrainian defensive capabilities

For Ukraine, the upgrading of North Korean artillery — notably if the 155mm system at 65 km is actually deployed — represents a serious defensive challenge. Ukrainian air defense systems are designed to intercept missiles and drones — not high-velocity artillery shells. And the counter-battery radars Ukraine possesses have limited range.

Ukraine has repeatedly asked its Western partners for access to long-range counter-battery radar systems and more long-range artillery — notably ATACMS systems with ranges exceeding 300 km to strike North Korean artillery depots deployed on Russian soil. These requests still run up against Western hesitancy over escalation. Meanwhile, North Korean artillery keeps falling on Ukrainian cities.

North Korea as a new-tier global geopolitical actor

From international pariah to strategic partner — Pyongyang's trajectory

In the space of three years, North Korea has achieved a remarkable geopolitical leap. Until 2022, it was a pariah state, economically isolated, subject to near-universal international sanctions, cut off from global trade by its own choices and UN embargoes. Today it is a crucial military supplier for the second-largest army in the world — Russia — and receives in return technologies that advance its nuclear and ballistic program.

This transformation was made possible by three converging factors: the war in Ukraine, which created an urgent Russian need for munitions; the Sino-American rift, which freed China from any temptation to maintain pressure on Pyongyang; and the personality of Kim Jong-un himself — an autocratic strategist who turned his country's isolation into a bargaining lever.

The implications for nuclear non-proliferation

North Korea's participation in the war in Ukraine sends a devastating message to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. The message is: having the bomb and being willing to do anything to keep it eventually turns you into a pivotal player — even for great powers. If this model holds, other states — in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa — will draw the obvious conclusions.

Iran observes this dynamic with interest. North Korea, which endured thirty years of sanctions without breaking, is today a military partner of Russia. Iran is at the threshold of nuclear weaponization. If the North Korean model demonstrates that the bomb confers immunity and influence that sanctions cannot destroy, Iranian negotiators in Geneva are legitimately entitled to factor that into their calculations. That is the most dangerous geopolitical contagion of this war.

Responses from the international community: insufficient and belated

UN sanctions: effective on paper, circumvented in practice

The UN Security Council has adopted several rounds of sanctions against North Korea since the first nuclear tests of 2006. These sanctions target imports of refined oil, exports of coal and fishery products, and military technology transfers. But Russia and China, which hold veto power in the Security Council, have systematically blocked any tightening of sanctions since 2022.

In practice, UN sanctions are now hollow shells on the North Korean file. Russia openly buys North Korean munitions in violation of resolutions it voted for itself. China turns a blind eye to cross-border commercial flows. The multilateral mechanism of collective pressure on Pyongyang is functionally dead — and everyone knows it, even if no one wants to admit it officially.

American and European secondary sanctions: an insufficient lever

The United States and the European Union have imposed secondary sanctions targeting entities that facilitate arms transfers between Russia and North Korea. Chinese banks, shipping companies, and Turkish intermediaries have been targeted. These sanctions had a marginal impact: they complicate transfers but do not prevent them. Alternative payment networks — cryptocurrencies, direct barter, third-party intermediaries — allow financial restrictions to be bypassed.

The British government, in its AUKUS joint statement of June 2026, specifically mentioned Russia-North Korea cooperation as a direct threat to Indo-Pacific security. But mention in a policy document does not equate to concrete action. Without a coordinated response that truly isolates military technology flows — including through direct pressure on China — Russo-Pyongyang cooperation will continue to advance.

What the June 25 tests mean for the rest of the conflict

A signal sent to Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo

The weapons tests overseen by Kim Jong-un on June 25, 2026 are not merely a technological showcase — they are coded diplomatic messages sent to multiple audiences simultaneously. To Washington: North Korea is upgrading, sanctions are not stopping it. To Seoul: the new 155mm system can strike far deeper into South Korean territory. To Tokyo: the tactical ballistic missiles tested the same day cover distances that include American bases in Japan.

These tests occur in a context of growing tension on the Korean Peninsula. South Korea has stepped up its joint military exercises with the United States in 2026. American naval presence in the Yellow Sea has intensified. And information about Russian technology transfers to Pyongyang has alarmed both Seoul and Tokyo, who see North Korea modernizing at a previously unmatched pace.

Toward an accelerated rearmament of the Korean Peninsula

South Korea has accelerated its own rearmament program in response to Pyongyang's upgrading. Seoul is developing its own long-range ballistic missiles (Hyunmoo), autonomous strike drones, and anti-missile defense systems. The South Korean defense budget was increased by 26% between 2024 and 2026. This arms race on the Korean Peninsula is a direct consequence of Russo-North Korean cooperation — a regional instability that the war in Ukraine has generated far beyond the Ukrainian theater itself.

Japan, for its first time since 1945, has decided to equip itself with a preemptive strike capability against adversary bases — a doctrinal revolution made politically possible by the North Korean threat. If Kim Jong-un wanted to destabilize the security order of Northeast Asia, he could not have done better. That is the geopolitics of contagion: one conflict in Europe reshaping balances at the other end of the world.

Conclusion: the Russo-North Korean axis and the limits of the free world

An axis that challenges the liberal international order

The Russia-North Korea axis forged in the crucible of the war in Ukraine represents a fundamental challenge to the liberal international order. This is not simply an arms exchange — it is the formation of a revisionist bloc that rejects the norms of non-proliferation, territorial sovereignty, and humanitarian law that the West defends. China observes and facilitates without directly participating — maintaining a strategic ambiguity that allows it to profit from the turbulence without bearing the costs.

Against this axis, the West needs a response commensurate with the stakes. That means: supporting Ukraine with long-range counter-battery artillery systems, severely sanctioning entities that facilitate Russo-North Korean transfers, and reinforcing the security architecture in Northeast Asia to deter Pyongyang from going further in its arms race. It is not simple. But complexity is not an excuse for inaction.

What the June 25 tests tell us about the future

Kim Jong-un tested a 155mm howitzer at 65 km on June 25, 2026. That test means North Korea will soon be able to deliver to Russia munitions that exceed in range much of the Western artillery provided to Ukraine. It is an alarm signal the West cannot afford to ignore. Zelensky knows it. ISW analysts know it. It remains to be hoped that policymakers in Washington, Paris, and Berlin understand it too, before these shells land on Ukrainian positions.

History remembers nations that responded to geopolitical challenges in time. It also remembers those that waited too long. The Moscow-Pyongyang axis is currently testing the West's resolve. The response — or absence of response — will define the world order of the coming decades.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

Sources and analytical method

This essay relies on public sources: KCNA reports translated by Western agencies, ISW analyses, statements by the American, British, and South Korean governments, and reports from research organizations such as the FDD and ASPI. The figures on North Korean casualties (14,000 soldiers deployed, 6,000 killed) are estimates from official South Korean and American intelligence services — not certified data. Transaction amounts for Russo-North Korean dealings (7 to 13.8 billion) are ranges drawn from journalistic and analytical estimates.

Interpretations of Kim Jong-un's motivations are analyses based on observed behavior, not certainties about his real intentions. No invented scenarios, no fabricated quotes. The columnist acknowledges his limits: analyzing North Korea from the outside necessarily involves a degree of inference.

Editorial position

The columnist is pro-Ukrainian, pro-Western, and regards the Russia-North Korea-Iran-China axis as an existential threat to the democratic world order. This position did not distort the reported facts but clearly informs the editorial judgments. Zelensky is a hero of democratic resistance. The regimes of Kim Jong-un and Putin represent authoritarian models that the West must actively counter.

No financial conflicts of interest with any of the parties mentioned. The analysis is independent of any government or think tank. The organizations cited — FDD, ISW, ASPI — hold their own positions that are not wholly endorsed by the columnist.

Sources

Primary sources

US News / Reuters — Kim Jong-un oversees weapons tests including the 155mm howitzer — June 25, 2026

Al Jazeera — North Korean weapons tests and Russia-North Korea military cooperation — June 25, 2026

British Government — AUKUS statement on Russia-North Korea technology transfers — June 2026

Secondary sources

Foundation for Defense of Democracies — Impact of NK-Russia arms transfers on the Ukrainian front — June 24, 2026

Yonhap News Agency — South Korean analysis of North Korean weapons tests on June 25, 2026

Institute for the Study of War — North Korean artillery and the war of attrition in Ukraine — June 2026