COMMENTARY: Belarus is a co-belligerent — and NATO must finally admit it

Introduction: ISW said it, Zelensky proved it — Minsk is at war

The ISW verdict of June 23, 2026

On June 23, 2026, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) published an assessment that deserves to be read as a statement of the obvious: Belarus is effectively a co-belligerent in the war Russia is waging against Ukraine. This is not a hypothesis. This is not speculative inference. It is the result of meticulous analysis of military, logistical, and electronic activities conducted from Belarusian territory — activities that directly contribute to Russian offensive operations against Ukrainian civilians.

Two days before that report, on June 21, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky had provided the ground-level proof: four Russian relay stations installed in the Belarusian oblasts of Gomel and Brest were actively guiding strike drones toward the Ukrainian regions of Zhytomyr, Rivne, and Volyn. The geolocation data were clear. The chain of command was identifiable. The complicity of Lukashenko was documented.

A complicity that dates back to day one

It must be recalled what is too often passed over in silence: from February 24, 2022, Russia used Belarusian territory as a launchpad for invasion toward Kyiv. Russian armored columns crossed the Ukrainian border from the north, via Belarus, hoping to take the capital within 72 hours. That plan failed thanks to the heroic resistance of Ukrainian forces. But Belarusian complicity never ended — it simply evolved in form.

Since then, Belarus has served as a storage zone for Russian missiles, a launch platform for Shahed drones, and now a network of electronic relay stations to guide strikes against Ukrainian civilian areas. The Lukashenko regime is not a passive spectator of this conflict — it is an active and deliberate participant, even if it carefully avoids acknowledging this publicly.

The drone relay stations in the Gomel and Brest oblasts

How a guidance relay network works

A drone guidance relay is a transmitter-receiver station that amplifies and relays navigation signals sent to a drone in flight. In the case of Shahed drones and their derivatives used by Russia, these relays allow a guidance link to be maintained over distances far exceeding the direct range of forward transmitters. Installed on Belarusian territory at strategic altitude and position, these relays make it possible to direct strikes against targets in western Ukraine — regions otherwise out of logistical reach from Russian positions inside Ukraine.

Zelensky provided, in his June 21 statement, precise coordinates and technical data on the four identified stations. He also issued an implicit ultimatum to Minsk: dismantle these installations or face the consequences. According to sources from Euromaidan Press and Militarnyi, three of these stations went silent on June 22 — exactly three days after the public release of the coordinates. A result suggesting that the pressure worked, or that the Russians redeployed the equipment elsewhere.

The strategic significance of the silent relays

The fact that the stations went silent within 72 hours reveals several important things. First, the operators — Russian or Belarusian — know that these installations are vulnerable once located. Second, Zelensky's public disclosure created sufficient diplomatic pressure for someone to decide to cut the signal. Third, and perhaps most concerning, the cessation of emissions does not mean the network has disappeared — it simply means its quiet redeployment.

Analysts from United24 Media noted that Russia has rapid repositioning capabilities for its electronic warfare equipment. Dismantling four known stations is a tactical victory for Ukraine — but it is not the end of the Belarusian problem. It is simply one episode in an electronic war being waged above the officially neutral borders of Lukashenko's territory.

Lavrov's response and the rhetoric of the union treaty

The Russian threat and the specter of the Union Treaty

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was quick to react to Zelensky's statement. He threatened to take all measures provided for under the Russia-Belarus Union Treaty if Ukraine attempted to target installations on Belarusian territory. This treaty, signed in 1999 and progressively strengthened since, theoretically creates a mutual defense obligation between Moscow and Minsk — a sort of Russian Article 5, but for an authoritarian duopoly.

Lavrov's threat is calculated: it aims to deter Ukraine from striking targets in Belarus by invoking the specter of formal escalation. If Kyiv strikes the relays on Belarusian soil, Moscow could invoke the treaty to justify an even broader military response. It is the same intimidation mechanism Russia uses when threatening NATO with its nuclear doctrine: creating an asymmetric cost for any defensive action by the adversary.

Lukashenko, Putin's willing hostage

Alexander Lukashenko is in a particular position: he is at once a willing accomplice and a structural hostage of Vladimir Putin. After the fraudulent 2020 elections and the brutal crackdown on pro-democracy protests, Lukashenko owes his hold on power exclusively to Russian support. Without Putin, he is politically — and perhaps physically — finished. This total dependence strips him of any real capacity to say no to Russian military demands.

But it also grants him a convenient geopolitical alibi: by claiming he has no choice, Lukashenko attempts to minimize his moral and legal responsibility for the war crimes committed from his territory. It is a defense that international tribunals have learned to recognize — and reject. Compelled complicity is still complicity. And the outcomes of strikes guided from Belarusian soil — dead Ukrainian civilians — are very real, whatever pressure was exerted on Lukashenko.

NATO facing the challenge of Belarusian co-belligerence

Why NATO avoids the term co-belligerent

NATO has not officially designated Belarus as a co-belligerent, despite the accumulated evidence. The reason is diplomatic and strategic: such a designation would raise questions about the Alliance's obligations toward Ukraine — which is not a member — and about the limits of Western engagement in this conflict. It would also set a precedent for other peripheral actors in the conflict (North Korea, Iran) who could in turn be classified as co-belligerents.

But this rhetorical caution comes at a price. By refusing to name reality, NATO allows Belarus to keep operating as a Russian rear base without suffering the diplomatic consequences that should flow from that status. The Ankara summit of July 7-8, 2026 will be an opportunity — perhaps the last one for a long time — to formally settle this question.

The Baltic states and Poland demand a firm response

Not all NATO members share this caution. The Baltic states — Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania — and Poland have been calling for a firmer response to Belarusian co-belligerence for months. Their argument is simple: if Belarus can help Russia strike Ukraine from its soil without consequences, the precedent opens the door to other forms of indirect aggression against NATO members themselves.

Poland, which shares a long border with Belarus and hosts NATO deployments, is particularly exposed. The Belarusian relays identified by Zelensky are geographically close to that border. If tomorrow drones guided from Belarus were to strike — accidentally or deliberately — Polish territory, NATO's Article 5 would be triggered. The logic of escalation is there, latent, underlying every decision avoided in Brussels.

Implications for electronic warfare and air defense

Electronic warfare, the invisible and decisive front

The episode of the Belarusian relay stations illustrates a dimension of the Ukrainian conflict that receives far too little attention in mainstream media: electronic warfare. Russian drone strikes against Ukraine are not simple operations — they rely on complex chains of guidance, jamming, and counter-jamming involving equipment deployed across multiple countries. Belarus has become a key piece of this electronic architecture.

Ukraine has developed remarkable capabilities in drone detection and neutralization. Its electronic warfare systems — partially fed by Western technologies and intelligence — have allowed it to intercept a growing proportion of Shahed drones. But the relays in Belarus partially circumvent these defenses by enabling approach trajectories from angles not covered by Ukrainian radars oriented east and south.

The need to extend air defense coverage to the west

The revelation of the Belarusian relay stations immediately raised the question of air defense coverage for western Ukraine. The Patriot, IRIS-T, and NASAMS systems supplied by the West are mainly deployed to protect Kyiv and the eastern front zones. The regions of Zhytomyr, Rivne, and Volyn — targets of drones guided from Belarus — are less well covered.

Ukraine has repeatedly requested additional air defense systems to protect its western territory. The NATO summit in Ankara should be an opportunity to respond concretely to this demand. But for that to happen, Alliance members must first accept seeing reality as it is: Belarus is at war against Ukraine, and the consequences of that reality demand a proportional response.

Lukashenko and international law: responsibility and immunity

The legal framework of co-belligerence in international law

Under international humanitarian law, the notion of co-belligerence carries specific consequences. A co-belligerent state can legitimately be targeted militarily by the party it helps attack. Its military nationals can be treated as enemy combatants. Under certain conditions, its leaders can be brought to justice for their participation in unlawful military operations.

The International Criminal Court (ICC), which issued an arrest warrant against Vladimir Putin in 2023 for the deportation of Ukrainian children, could theoretically extend its inquiry to the acts of Lukashenko relating to the facilitation of war crimes from Belarusian territory. This is a legal avenue that several NGOs and international jurists are actively exploring — but one that runs up against the de facto immunity enjoyed by sitting leaders.

Lukashenko's diplomatic immunity and its limits

Belarus is not a member of the ICC — it has not ratified the Rome Statute. This formally limits the Court's direct jurisdiction over Lukashenko. But several ICC member states have national laws on universal jurisdiction that could allow prosecution if Lukashenko were to set foot on their territory — which he carefully avoids since 2020. International legal pressure on Minsk therefore remains asymmetric: real in principle, limited in enforcement mechanisms.

This partial legal vacuum sends a dangerous message: one can facilitate war crimes from one's territory as long as one stays home and does not formally declare war. That is precisely the strategy of Lukashenko — and in a sense, that of Iran with its proxies and of North Korea with its munitions. Co-belligerence must become a category with real consequences, not merely nominal ones.

What this means for the security of NATO countries

The Belarusian border as a new flashpoint

Poland shares 418 kilometers of border with Belarus. Lithuania and Latvia also share borders with Minsk. These borders are NATO borders — meaning everything happening on the Belarusian side has direct implications for the Alliance's collective security. The presence of drone guidance relay stations near these borders is not only a Ukrainian problem. It is a NATO problem.

Baltic state intelligence services have repeatedly alerted their NATO partners to Russian and Belarusian military activities along their shared borders. The Poland-Belarus border, already tense since Lukashenko's orchestrated migration crisis in 2021, has become an area of permanent surveillance and tension. The recent deployment of additional Polish troops to this zone in recent months is telling.

The Suwalki Corridor, the point of maximum vulnerability

The Suwalki Corridor — the 104-kilometer strip of Polish and Lithuanian territory separating Belarus from the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad — remains NATO's point of maximum strategic vulnerability in the region. If Russia, with Belarusian assistance, sought to cut this corridor, it would isolate the Baltic states from the rest of the Alliance. That nightmare scenario is one that NATO military planners have been studying intensively since 2022.

Belarusian co-belligerence increases the risk that this scenario may no longer be theoretical. A Belarus actively integrated into Russian military operations is a Belarus that could, on Moscow's instructions, participate in an action against the Suwalki Corridor. NATO must plan accordingly — and to do that, it must first name reality: Minsk is at war.

Response options: sanctions, isolation, reinforced support for Ukraine

Targeted sanctions against Belarusian relay operators

The first concrete response to Belarusian co-belligerence involves targeted sanctions against individuals and entities involved in deploying and operating the guidance relays. Sanctions against Belarusian military officers involved, state-owned companies providing the infrastructure, and civil servants who authorized these installations would send a clear signal that co-belligerence carries a personal and institutional price.

The European Union has already adopted several rounds of sanctions against Belarus since 2020. A new package specifically targeting military activities linked to the war in Ukraine would be politically feasible — provided member states agree on the co-belligerence designation, something that some, like Hungary, still resist.

Strengthening Ukraine against strikes from the north

Beyond sanctions, the most effective response is military and defensive: providing Ukraine with the air defense systems and electronic warfare capabilities needed to neutralize threats from the north. That means radars oriented toward the Belarusian border, additional interception systems for the Zhytomyr and Rivne regions, and enhanced intelligence-sharing on Belarusian electronic activities.

These are the kind of concrete, pragmatic, and defensively justified measures the Ankara summit should announce. Not as escalation — but as a proportionate response to a documented reality. Belarusian co-belligerence is no longer an open question. The only remaining open question is whether the West will have the courage to acknowledge it and act accordingly.

Conclusion: naming reality in order to respond to it

Why the word co-belligerent changes everything

Words have consequences in diplomacy. Officially designating Belarus as a co-belligerent creates legal obligations, opens sanction avenues, and modifies rules of engagement. That is precisely why NATO hesitates — not because it fails to see reality, but because it fears the implications of naming it. This hesitation is understandable. It is not, however, indefinitely acceptable.

ISW told the truth on June 23. Zelensky proved it on June 21. Four relay stations on Belarusian soil guiding drones toward Ukrainian civilians — that is direct participation in acts of war. To call it anything else is to participate in a convenient lie. And convenient lies in wartime have a way of turning against those who propagate them.

What history will retain from this sequence

In ten years, when historians analyze this period, they will note that the West knew exactly what Belarus was doing in June 2026 — and still hesitated to draw the necessary diplomatic and military consequences. They will also note that Zelensky — alone, without the formal backing of the Alliance — did what the major powers were avoiding: publicly naming the threat, providing the evidence, demanding a response.

That is the portrait of a man leading his country under siege with more moral clarity than the world's best-funded chancelleries. And it is also an implicit rebuke to all those in Brussels and Washington who continue to treat Belarusian co-belligerence as a diplomatically sensitive question rather than what it is: a documented act of aggression requiring a response.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

Sources and method

This commentary draws on the published assessments of the ISW (June 23, 2026), the public statements of Zelensky (June 21, 2026), and reports from Euromaidan Press, Militarnyi, and United24 Media. Information on the relay stations is based on published geographic and electronic data — not confidential sources. Legal interpretations on co-belligerence are analyses grounded in international law, not formal legal opinions.

The columnist is pro-Ukrainian and regards Zelensky as a courageous leader. This position is assumed and did not distort the reported facts. Lavrov's threats and Lukashenko's actions are reported as documented, without exaggeration or minimization.

Limits of the analysis

The analysis of Lukashenko's intentions — willing accomplice vs. captive — is an analytical inference, not a certainty. The exact reason why the stations fell silent (dismantlement, redeployment, Ukrainian jamming) is not known with certainty. The columnist used appropriate conditional phrasing in those passages. No invented facts, no fabricated quotes.

The columnist's pro-Western position is consistent throughout: the West must defend Ukraine, name its enemies, and act with the moral clarity the situation demands. Russia, Belarus, Iran, China, and North Korea represent the central threats to the democratic world order.

Sources

Primary sources

Institute for the Study of War — Russian offensive campaign assessment, Belarus co-belligerent designation — June 23, 2026

Euromaidan Press — Belarusian relay stations silenced after Zelensky's ultimatum — June 22, 2026

Militarnyi — Signal relays in Gomel and Brest oblasts guiding drones — June 2026

Secondary sources

United24 Media — Zelensky reveals four Russian relay stations in Belarus — June 21, 2026

Kyiv Independent — Belarus co-belligerent, NATO response — June 2026

Ukrainska Pravda — Lavrov's threat, Union Treaty, and potential escalation — June 23, 2026