ANALYSIS: Kim calls for a destructive posture — the authoritarian axis hardens

ANALYSIS: Kim calls for a destructive posture — the authoritarian axis hardens

Introduction: June 25, a date loaded with intent

An anniversary transformed into a show of force

The 25th of June, 2026 marks the 76th anniversary of the start of the Korean War — that invasion of the South by the North that began in 1950 and killed millions. Kim Jong-un chose precisely this date to personally oversee a series of major weapons tests and to deliver a message that is anything but ambiguous: Pyongyang intends to strengthen its "offensive, deadly, and destructive posture." The official state news agency KCNA reported the following day that the North Korean leader had "expressed great satisfaction" with the results.

The systems tested that day are concrete and terrifying in their implications: an upgraded 240mm 24-tube multiple rocket launcher equipped with an autonomous precision guidance system and an extended range of 90 kilometers; a special-mission warhead for a tactical ballistic missile; and extended-range shells for a 155mm self-propelled howitzer reaching 65 kilometers. Taken together, these systems place all of Seoul squarely within their strike envelope.

Kim's words: a declaration of permanent cold war

KCNA quoted Kim declaring: "Our self-defense policy is not simply the reinforcement of mere defensive functions. It is a policy for elevating a deadly and destructive offensive posture so that no enemy dares to confront us." He added: "Keeping our enemies in constant anxiety and fear is itself an important aspect of exercising war deterrence." These formulations are not empty — they reflect a military doctrine that Pyongyang is methodically putting into practice.

Professor Lim Eul-chul of Kyungnam University analyzed this sequence for Reuters: these moves reflect "acceleration efforts to fortify the southern border and integrate nuclear and conventional forces." The declared objective is to bring all of South Korea within striking range of North Korean forward units.

The arsenal in detail: what Kim was testing

The rocket launcher: 90 km toward the South

The upgraded 240mm multiple rocket launcher represents a significant evolution. Its range has been extended to 90 kilometers from the Military Demarcation Line. For context: the distance from the DMZ to the center of Seoul is approximately 50 kilometers. At 90 km, this system reaches Pyeongtaek in Gyeonggi Province, where American soldiers are based, and Cheonan in South Chungcheong Province. The entire 25-million-person Greater Seoul metropolitan area falls within that strike envelope.

The key element is the autonomous precision guidance integrated into the system. Rockets of this category were traditionally not highly accurate. This upgrade fundamentally changes their operational utility: they can now target specific critical infrastructure — military bases, power facilities, ports — with increased precision.

The special-mission warhead: targeting US bases

The special-mission warhead tested for tactical ballistic missiles was described by KCNA as designed for "lethal destruction of critical targets, including enemy airfields, ports, and power facilities." This description matches the infrastructure of American military bases in South Korea, most notably Camp Humphreys — the largest US military base outside the United States. The 155mm self-propelled howitzer at 65 km completes this anti-force arsenal with plunging and direct fire capability.

As early as May 2026, Pyongyang had tested a mix of tactical ballistic missiles, artillery rockets, and AI-guided cruise missiles. This is not an isolated series of tests — it is a methodical program of modernization of conventional and tactical-nuclear strike capabilities, advancing according to a five-year defense development plan.

The lesson of Ukraine: the return of soldier-instructors

10,000 soldiers trained on a real battlefield

The context in which this North Korean military build-up is unfolding is unique in recent history. According to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, approximately 10,000 North Korean soldiers are currently deployed in Russia — and they are learning 21st-century warfare techniques at a pace no simulated exercise could replicate. They are gaining experience with FPV drones, long-range precision strikes, electronic warfare, and Russian air defense systems.

Zelensky warned in an interview with Kyodo News in February 2026: "It is extremely dangerous that they are acquiring knowledge of modern hybrid warfare. They are learning how to counter missiles and drones, from FPVs to long-range. They will bring these skills back to North Korea at a minimum." According to South Korean intelligence, approximately 3,000 soldiers have already returned to North Korea and become military instructors, spreading this expertise throughout the North Korean army.

Casualties and rapid adaptation

North Korean soldiers have suffered considerable losses in Russia — approximately 2,000 killed and 4,000 to 5,000 wounded according to South Korean and Ukrainian estimates cited by the ISW. Initially disoriented by Ukrainian drones in open terrain, they progressively adapted their tactics: better dispersion, camouflage, anti-drone measures. This adaptation under real-world conditions is precisely what the North Korean army could not have acquired any other way. Moscow is providing Pyongyang with a free training ground, paid for with Ukrainian blood.

The ISW, in its February 17, 2026 report on the Korean Peninsula, noted that North Korean troops in Kursk had transitioned to a fire support role — artillery, MLRS, aerial reconnaissance — while continuing to "acquire modern combat experience that North Korea will seek to integrate into its military training programs."

The authoritarian axis: Moscow, Pyongyang and their accomplices

A mutual defense treaty now operational

The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty signed on June 19, 2024 between Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un in Pyongyang fundamentally reconfigured the regional and global security dynamic. This treaty included a mutual defense clause obligating each party to provide military assistance "without delay" in the event of aggression. It is now operational, proven by the facts: thousands of North Korean soldiers are fighting alongside the Russian army.

In April 2026, during the visit of Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov to Pyongyang, the two countries agreed to place their military cooperation on a "stable and sustainable" footing for the period 2027–2031. This is a long-term commitment, extending well beyond the Ukrainian conflict. The Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) has documented in detail the technology transfers from Russia to North Korea: electronic warfare systems, air defense systems, support for satellite launches, and assistance for the missile program, including upgrades to the KN-23.

Iran and North Korea: the nexus of sanctioned partners

The authoritarian axis is not limited to Moscow and Pyongyang. Iran has supplied Shahed drones to Russia — drones that have struck Ukraine by the hundreds. Russia in turn has shared military technologies with Tehran. Pyongyang has supplied artillery shells, KN-23 missiles, multiple rocket launchers, and now troops. These countries form a mutual support network that circumvents international sanctions and multiplies their respective capabilities.

South Korea estimates that it needs to train approximately 500,000 "drone warriors" in response to this growing threat — a decision announced on June 26, 2026 by Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back. This massive plan, including the acquisition of more than 20,000 low-cost drones, is a direct response to the military doctrine Kim is imposing on the region.

Zelensky and the global alert

"Incredibly dangerous": the repeated warning

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has repeatedly stated since late 2024 that the North Korean presence in Russia is "incredibly dangerous" — not only for Ukraine, but for global security. His primary concern is less about the number of soldiers than the technology transfers that accompany this alliance.

In return for the deployment of its troops, Pyongyang is receiving, according to analysts: financial assistance circumventing sanctions, advanced military technologies — particularly in the fields of missiles and electronic warfare — food and energy, and above all that irreplaceable combat experience. The BBC estimated approximately 2,300 North Korean soldiers killed since the start of the deployment — a price that Pyongyang evidently considers acceptable given the benefits obtained.

Seoul requests the prisoners, Moscow resists

Ukraine currently holds two North Korean soldiers captured in Kursk in January 2025. Ri (27 years old) and Paek (22 years old) have expressed their desire to go to South Korea. Seoul officially signaled on June 23, 2026 that it would accept all North Korean prisoners of war who wish to do so, opposing any forced repatriation to Russia or North Korea. Russia, for its part, has quietly but systematically included these two men on its lists of prisoners to be recovered during exchanges with Ukraine.

This diplomatic mini-crisis reveals the internal tensions within the Russian-North Korean alliance: Moscow must manage Pyongyang's demands regarding the fate of its captured soldiers, while managing its relationship with Kyiv in the context of prisoner exchanges. The situation is without precedent in the annals of international humanitarian law.

The response of the international community

The UN powerless, allies fragmented

The UN Security Council is structurally blocked on the North Korean question. Russia and China — permanent members with veto power — oppose any meaningful condemnation resolution. Moscow has even begun rhetorically opposing sanctions against North Korea, while simultaneously intensifying its cooperation with Pyongyang in flagrant violation of those same sanctions.

The United States, South Korea, Japan, and their allies are imposing their own bilateral sanctions and coordinating responses, but without the UN multilateral framework, these measures have limited reach. Russia on June 25, 2026 expressed its "concern" over joint US-South Korean activities — a cynical inversion of responsibility that reflects the brazenness of the Moscow regime.

The FDD sounds the alarm

The Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), in its analysis published on June 25, 2026, documented in detail how Russian security assistance is creating problems on the Korean Peninsula. Russia began using North Korean KN-23 missiles against Ukraine in late 2023 and subsequently improved their terminal maneuverability and survivability — improvements whose "production know-how" was then transferred back to Pyongyang. This mutually beneficial improvement cycle is deeply troubling.

The FDD highlights that Pyongyang has already tested more ballistic missiles in 2026 than throughout all of 2025 — an acceleration rate that exceeds previous assessments and signals a political intent to raise the stakes ahead of any resumption of dialogue.

South Korea facing the acceleration: adapting deterrence

Camp Humphreys and American vulnerability

Camp Humphreys, the largest American military base outside the United States, is located in Pyeongtaek — approximately 70 kilometers from the Military Demarcation Line (DMZ). With the systems tested on June 25, 2026 — notably the multiple rocket launcher with a range of 90 km — this base enters the direct North Korean strike envelope. The 28,500 American soldiers stationed in South Korea are simultaneously a collective defense commitment and a potential target in any conflict scenario.

South Korea is responding to this growing vulnerability with a multilayered approach. The KAMD (Korea Air and Missile Defense) program integrates PATRIOT, THAAD, and domestic systems such as the Cheongung. The goal is to create an in-depth defense capable of intercepting North Korean ballistic missiles at different altitudes and flight phases. The improved terminal maneuverability of the KN-23 — made possible by Russian assistance — is putting these systems to a significant test.

Seoul's offensive deterrence

Alongside missile defense, South Korea has developed a preemptive strike capability against North Korean launchers and command sites — the "Kill Chain" doctrine. This approach rests on early detection of launch preparations and the elimination of threats before they are fired. The announcement on June 26, 2026 of training 500,000 drone warriors fits this logic: the Ukrainian drone war has shown that low-cost drones can neutralize costly weapons systems with devastating effectiveness.

This combination of active defense and preemptive strike — complemented by American extended deterrence, including the nuclear umbrella — forms Seoul's comprehensive defense doctrine. The real test will be whether these capabilities evolve as rapidly as the threats documented by June 25, 2026. The North Korean acceleration, combined with Russian technology transfers, demands an equally dynamic response.

Pyongyang's agenda: modernize, deter, negotiate from strength

Kim Jong-un's long-term strategy

The events of June 25, 2026 fit into a coherent long-term strategy of Kim Jong-un. Since assuming power in 2011, Kim has pursued with remarkable consistency a dual objective: develop a credible nuclear arsenal to guarantee regime survival, and modernize conventional forces to maximize strike power in any limited conflict scenario. These two objectives reinforce each other: precise conventional weapons make any "surgical" strike possible, while the nuclear threat discourages any disproportionate response.

Pyongyang's five-year defense development plan, progressively revealed since 2021, calls for the development of hypersonic missiles, tactical nuclear-propulsion submarines, advanced reconnaissance drones, and miniaturized nuclear warheads to equip a broader range of delivery vehicles. Each public test — such as the one on June 25, 2026 — is a demonstration of progress toward these objectives, addressed simultaneously to the United States, South Korea, and the North Korean population itself.

The potential negotiation window

Kim Jong-un is not only seeking to deter — he is seeking to negotiate from a position of strength. Historically, North Korean escalation phases often precede calculated diplomatic openings. The question is not whether Pyongyang will engage in dialogue with Washington or Seoul again, but on what terms. With a modernized conventional arsenal, soldiers hardened to modern warfare techniques, and Russian technology transfers accelerating its programs, Kim is in a position to demand more than he could in 2018–2019 during the summit period with Donald Trump.

The international community must decide whether it prefers to manage a stronger North Korea within a dialogue framework, or whether it allows the status quo of permanent escalation to continue. This question is uncomfortable, and there is no easy answer. What the events of June 25, 2026 make clear is that the status quo option is becoming increasingly costly as Pyongyang improves its capabilities.

Conclusion: The axis does not stop itself

Systematic hardening, not accidental

The events of June 25, 2026 are not an isolated episode. They fit into a coherent and deliberate trajectory: Kim Jong-un is modernizing his arsenal, forging an operational military alliance with Moscow, integrating lessons from the Ukrainian conflict, and categorically refusing any dialogue with Seoul or Washington. Meanwhile, Putin fuels this axis with technology, experience, and legitimacy. Iran watches and participates in its own way. China maintains a benevolent complicity.

Democracy must respond with coherence

Seoul's response with its 500,000 drone warriors is an encouraging sign of strategic seriousness. NATO allies must understand that the threats in Europe and in East Asia are now structurally linked — North Korean weapons are killing Ukrainians, North Korean soldiers are learning to fight in Europe. A region-by-region fragmented response is a losing response. The authoritarian axis must be countered with a cohesion equal to its own.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Positioning and method

I am a geopolitical columnist with a firm conviction: authoritarian regimes that threaten international peace must be named and analyzed without euphemism. My coverage of North Korea rests exclusively on open sources — international news agencies, think tank reports (ISW, FDD, CSIS), official statements. I have no direct government sources.

Limits of my analysis

Information about North Korea's military capabilities and about Russian-North Korean cooperation is, by nature, partial. Some of it comes from intelligence services whose assessments are not always independently verifiable. North Korean casualty figures in Russia vary across sources. I have cited the most documented ranges, without claiming absolute precision. The internal dynamics of Pyongyang remain largely opaque — I freely acknowledge that.

Sources

Primary sources

Washington Post — Kim Jong Un watches weapons tests and calls for deadly and destructive military posture — June 25, 2026

US News & Reuters — North Korean Leader Kim Oversees Weapons Tests — June 26, 2026

Chosun Ilbo — Kim Jong-un Tests New Rocket, Missile Systems on 6·25 Anniversary — June 26, 2026

Foundation for Defense of Democracies — Russian security assistance creates problems on Korean Peninsula — May 7, 2026

Secondary sources

Institute for the Study of War — Korean Peninsula Update, February 17, 2026

Ukrinform — Ten thousand North Korean soldiers in Russia, Zelensky says — February 20, 2026

New Indian Express/AP — North Korea conducts major weapons tests, Kim calls for stronger offensive posture — June 26, 2026