REPORT: Kim Jong Un's nuclear programme accelerates at a pace that seriously alarms Washington

Introduction: Pyongyang on the launch pad

A carefully choreographed show of force

On June 25, 2026, the 76th anniversary of the start of the Korean War, Kim Jong Un personally oversaw a series of weapons tests of considerable strategic scope. This was no calendar coincidence. The date was chosen to send an unambiguous message to Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo: North Korea is transforming its arsenal into a qualitatively new threat — more precise, longer-range, harder to counter. The official North Korean agency KCNA reported the tests in detail — which is unusual and deliberate.

The systems tested that day include a "special mission" warhead for tactical ballistic missiles, an improved 240mm multiple-launch rocket system with an extended range of 90 kilometres and an autonomous precision guidance system, as well as a 155mm self-propelled howitzer with extended-range shells reaching 65 kilometres. If these figures are accurate — and analysts at Kyungnam University consider them plausible — Seoul and its 10 million inhabitants now fall within the direct range of North Korean units stationed near the border, without those units needing to reposition.

An unprecedented pace of expansion

Kim Jong Un is demanding a "deadly and destructive" posture for his army — his own words during his speech to troops on June 25. He demands "ultra-high precision and long-range capabilities" across all weapons programmes. This rhetoric is alarming not because it is new, but because it now corresponds to real, measurable technical capabilities. As early as May 2026, Pyongyang had tested tactical ballistic missiles, artillery rockets, and cruise missiles guided by artificial intelligence.

North Korea's nuclear arsenal in 2026: a state of play

Nuclear warheads multiplying rapidly

North Korea's nuclear programme is described as "exponential" by experts at The Guardian in an article published on June 24, 2026. The most recent estimates place Pyongyang's operational nuclear warheads at between 40 and 60, with a production capacity that would allow it to manufacture 6 to 7 new ones per year. At this rate, by 2030, North Korea could possess an arsenal of 70 to 90 nuclear weapons — firepower comparable to some official members of the nuclear club.

Even more concerning: miniaturisation. For a nuclear arsenal to constitute a credible intercontinental threat, it must be possible to place a sufficiently compact and light nuclear warhead on an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Kim declared in June 2026 that his navy would be equipped with nuclear weapons and larger ships — a declaration signalling the desire for multidimensional deployment of nuclear capability, not merely a land-based one.

ICBMs and the continental American threat

The Hwasong-17 and Hwasong-18, North Korea's most recent ICBMs, have demonstrated during previous tests a theoretical range capable of reaching the continental United States. The question is no longer whether Pyongyang can launch a missile toward California — it is whether the warhead can survive atmospheric re-entry and reach its target with sufficient precision. On this point, analyses diverge, but the technological trajectory is clearly ascending. The June 25 test of "special mission" warheads fits squarely within this objective of perfecting the terminal strike component.

New conventional weapons: Seoul in the crosshairs

The 240mm rocket system reprogrammed for precision strikes

The most immediately alarming announcement from June 25 concerns the improved 240mm multiple-launch rocket system. With a range extended to 90 kilometres and an autonomous precision guidance system, this weapon positioned near the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) can now strike virtually any target in the greater Seoul metropolitan area without requiring launcher repositioning. Analysts at Kyungnam University confirmed to Yonhap that these tests are "specifically designed to directly threaten Seoul."

The psychological dimension is as significant as the technical one. Kim Jong Un wants the 30 million inhabitants of the Seoul metropolitan area — and their governments — to understand that they now live under the permanent threat of a precision strike. The "special mission" warhead tested is aimed, according to KCNA, at "inflicting fatal damage on enemy airstrips, ports, and electrical installations." This vocabulary clearly designates the civilian and military infrastructure of South Korea.

Seoul's response: 500,000 "drone soldiers"

South Korea's response was swift. On Friday, June 26, Defence Minister Ahn Gyu-back announced that South Korea plans to train 500,000 "drone soldiers" capable of using drones as "personal weapons." This initiative represents a major doctrinal transformation of the South Korean military, which anticipates that future conflicts on the Korean peninsula will be dominated by drone swarms, in a manner similar to what is unfolding in Ukraine.

Naval nuclear power: a new dimension of the threat

Kim wants to arm his navy with nuclear weapons

The most recent — and most alarming — declaration from Kim Jong Un concerns his navy. In early June 2026, he announced that the North Korean navy will be equipped with nuclear weapons and larger ships, to guarantee "multidimensional and effective" operations. This announcement, reported by Al Jazeera on June 26, means that Pyongyang is seeking to deploy a nuclear strike capability from the sea — a potential second-strike even if land-based installations were destroyed.

This concept of naval nuclear deterrence is particularly destabilising in the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan. A submarine or surface vessel carrying short-range nuclear missiles creates a diffuse threat — difficult to locate, difficult to neutralise. Tokyo, Seoul, and Washington must now integrate this dimension into their deterrence calculations.

The time factor: within what timeframe can Kim threaten the continental United States?

Assessments from the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) — never released in full — generally estimate that North Korea already possesses a limited nuclear strike capability against the continental United States. The real question is one of reliability and volume. Ten nuclear missiles capable of reaching the US West Coast create a different deterrence from fifty accurate ones. At the current pace of expansion, some analysts estimate that Pyongyang could achieve credible first-strike capability against American targets by 2028–2030 — but this projection remains highly uncertain.

The role of Russia and China in accelerating the programme

Russo-North Korean military cooperation: a technological accelerator

The deployment of North Korean troops to Russia and the supply of missiles and ammunition to Moscow for its war against Ukraine have come at a price: a transfer of Russian military technology to Pyongyang. Ukraine has documented the spectacular improvement in the precision of North Korean missiles used by Russia: in 2024, the margin of error was approximately 1 kilometre; in 2026, it had dropped to 1 to 5 metres. This qualitative leap can only be explained by an external technological contribution — and Russia is the most obvious candidate.

This cooperation creates a geopolitical vicious cycle: Russia gets ammunition for its war, North Korea gets technology for its nuclear and ballistic build-up, and all Western allies find themselves financing two simultaneous fronts of threat. Kim Jong Un's calculation is cynical but rational: the war in Ukraine has offered him a real-world laboratory and a valuable technological partner.

Beijing's calculated ambiguity

China observes this North Korean build-up with an ambiguity analysts have been unable to dispel. Beijing has never genuinely enforced sanctions against Pyongyang. Officially, it opposes nuclearisation of the peninsula. Unofficially, a nuclear North Korea that occupies and distracts the United States, Japan, and South Korea suits China's geostrategic interests reasonably well. This passive complicity has real consequences for regional security.

The humanitarian impact: a population held hostage by the regime

The North Korean paradox: missiles and famine

While Kim Jong Un invests billions of dollars in ballistic and nuclear missile programmes, the North Korean population continues to suffer from chronic malnutrition. The United Nations estimates that more than 40% of the North Korean population suffers from food insecurity. International sanctions, designed to deprive the regime of resources, have a perverse effect: they hit the most vulnerable first, not the military elites who control the distribution of resources.

This reality creates a moral dilemma for sanctions policy designers. Strengthening economic pressure on Pyongyang is necessary to limit weapons programmes, but it worsens the suffering of a population that has no control over its government's decisions. North Korea actually uses this situation as a diplomatic lever: in every round of negotiations, the regime demands humanitarian concessions as a precondition — a way of turning its own population's distress into a geopolitical bargaining chip.

North Korean missiles supplied to Russia: a valuable technological laboratory

The war in Ukraine as a ballistic testing ground

One of the most troubling developments of 2025–2026 is the deployment of North Korean ballistic missiles by Russian forces in Ukraine. These missiles — KN-23 and KN-24 — have been used in dozens of attacks on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. What makes this deployment particularly alarming for non-proliferation analysts is what it gives Pyongyang: real-combat performance data, feedback on the weaknesses and successes of guidance systems, and information on how Western defences respond to these missiles.

Ukraine has documented a spectacular improvement in the precision of these missiles: the margin of error fell from approximately 1 kilometre in 2024 to just 1 to 5 metres in 2026. This qualitative leap can only be explained by a transfer of precision guidance technology from Russia to North Korea — a transaction that violates all UN Security Council resolutions on Pyongyang sanctions, but that neither Russia nor North Korea will ever officially acknowledge.

North Korean diplomacy: why Pyongyang refuses to negotiate

The lessons of 2019 and the fait accompli strategy

Since the failure of the Hanoi summit in February 2019 between Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump, North Korea has adopted a clear strategy: develop nuclear and ballistic capabilities until achieving de facto recognition as a nuclear power, then negotiate from that position of strength. Kim drew the lesson from Hanoi — he did not obtain the lifting of sanctions in exchange for partial denuclearisation — and concluded that the only viable posture was the refusal of any unilateral concession.

Kim Jong Un has responded to recent American attempts to resume diplomacy by demanding that the United States abandon its denuclearisation demand. This is a condition Washington cannot accept without demolishing its entire non-proliferation architecture. This diplomatic deadlock is deliberate on North Korea's part: every month without negotiations is a month of technological progress. North Korea uses time as a weapon.

Conclusion: A threat requiring a coordinated response

The urgency of a coherent strategy

Faced with North Korean nuclear expansion, the international community lacks a coherent response. Sanctions are being circumvented. Diplomacy has been frozen since 2019. Security consultations between Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo are advancing, but the controversial deployment of the THAAD system remains a sensitive issue. The South Korean drone response is promising, but insufficient to counter a nuclear threat.

What the international community must understand

North Korean nuclear expansion is not a regional problem — it is a global threat under construction. If Pyongyang achieves a credible intercontinental strike capability by the end of the decade, this will fundamentally alter American deterrence calculations in the Asia-Pacific, weaken security guarantees extended to South Korea and Japan, and could encourage other states to reassess their own abandonment of nuclear programmes. This is a proliferation dynamic that deserves far more serious attention from Western capitals.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

My sources and their limits

This report draws on public sources: KCNA, Al Jazeera, Yonhap, The Guardian, Straits Times, SFGate, and analyses from Kyungnam University. Figures on North Korea's nuclear arsenal are estimates from specialist organisations — the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Arms Control Association — none of which can be verified with certainty in the absence of direct access. I state this clearly to avoid any illusion of precision.

What I don't know

I do not know whether the capabilities claimed by KCNA correspond to technical reality — North Korean declarations are often exaggerated for domestic and international propaganda purposes. I also do not know the precise timeline within which Pyongyang could achieve a reliable strike capability against the continental United States. I acknowledge a pro-Western bias: I believe the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula is a legitimate and necessary goal.

Sources

Primary sources

Al Jazeera — North Korea conducts major weapons tests; South training 'drone warriors' — June 26, 2026

Yonhap — N. Korea's Kim oversees tests of key weapons seen as aimed at S. Korea — June 26, 2026

The Guardian — North Korea nuclear program Kim Jong Un — June 24, 2026

US News — North Korean leader Kim oversees weapons tests, KCNA reports — June 25, 2026

Secondary sources

Straits Times — North Korean leader Kim oversees weapons tests, KCNA reports — June 26, 2026

SFGate/AP — North Korea's Kim watches weapons tests and calls for 'deadly and destructive' military posture — June 25, 2026