FACT-CHECK: Kim Jong Un modernizes his arsenal — what the June 25, 2026 tests actually reveal

FACT-CHECK: Kim Jong Un modernizes his arsenal — what the June 25, 2026 tests actually reveal

Introduction: The 76th anniversary of the war, celebrated with missiles

June 25 — a date chosen to signal intent

June 25, 2026 marked the 76th anniversary of the start of the Korean War, when North Korean forces invaded South Korea in 1950. Kim Jong Un chose that precise date to personally oversee a major weapons test session — including an upgraded 240mm multiple rocket launcher with an extended range of 90 kilometers, the propulsion system of a special-mission tactical ballistic warhead, and a long-range 155mm self-propelled howitzer reaching 65 kilometers. All framed within what the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) described as a modernization plan to replace all of the North Korean military's long-range strike systems with upgraded versions as soon as possible.

The choice of date is not incidental — it is an act of political communication as much as a military one. Kim is signaling to his enemies, to his own population, and to the world: "The North Korean military is stronger than it was during the war it started 76 years ago. And it keeps getting stronger." Kim expressed "great satisfaction" with the tests and declared that Pyongyang was pursuing "automation, long range, and ultra-precision" in its weapons programs. He also stated he wanted his enemies to "feel constant anxiety and fear." That is not rhetoric — it is operational doctrine.

What KCNA confirms and what analysts add

The information presented in this fact-check draws primarily from reports by KCNA, analyses from the Straits Times and the Chosun Ilbo (English edition), and military assessments from Seoul. I will clearly distinguish between what is officially confirmed by North Korean sources, what has been assessed by independent sources, and what remains uncertain or independently unverifiable.

It is important to note that information published by KCNA represents the official communications of an authoritarian state and serves internal and external propaganda objectives. They are not independent journalistic reports. I use them because they are the only direct source for North Korean claims about these tests — but I read them with the appropriate skepticism for data that cannot be independently verified.

CLAIM #1 — The upgraded 240mm rocket launcher reaches 90 km

What KCNA confirms about this system

CONFIRMED by KCNA, corroborated by independent military analysis. The June 25, 2026 tests included the upgraded 24-tube 240mm multiple rocket launcher system. According to KCNA, "all elements of the firepower service system are automated, and an autonomous precision guidance system has been introduced." The range is described as extended to 90 kilometers. The Straits Times, citing military sources and the KCNA analysis, confirms these technical specifications. A range of 90 km reaches Pyeongtaek in Gyeonggi Province in South Korea, and Cheonan in South Chungcheong Province — well beyond the distance between the Military Demarcation Line and the center of Seoul, roughly 50 km.

What remains uncertain: precise performance assessments (accuracy, combat reliability) of these systems. Controlled test demonstrations do not necessarily reflect performance under real combat conditions. North Korean systems have a mixed reliability record outside of official demonstrations. Nevertheless, the development direction — automation, precision guidance, extended range — is consistent with what North Korea has progressively demonstrated over the years.

The strategic significance of a 90 km range

A range of 90 km is not an abstract technical data point — it is a concrete geopolitical fact. The distance between the Military Demarcation Line and Camp Humphreys, the headquarters of US Forces Korea (USFK), is approximately 80 km. This system is therefore theoretically capable of striking the primary American military hub in South Korea. That is not coincidence — it reflects North Korea's logic over the years: develop precise conventional systems capable of threatening US forces deployed in South Korea in order to complicate any American military response to a North Korean act of aggression.

The Chosun Ilbo notes that a range of 65 km for the 155mm howitzer reaches areas like Bundang-gu in Seongnam, Dongtan New City in Hwaseong, and Osan in Gyeonggi Province. At 90 km, the rocket launcher reaches even deeper into South Korea. These figures speak to the real depth of the threat these upgraded systems represent.

CLAIM #2 — The special-mission tactical ballistic warhead

What KCNA says about this system

CONFIRMED by KCNA, interpretation contested. According to KCNA reports from June 26, 2026, the tests included evaluation of the "special-mission warhead of a tactical ballistic missile," described as targeting "the lethal destruction of critical targets, including enemy airfields, ports, and electrical facilities." The phrase "special mission" is a standard euphemism in North Korean military rhetoric for a warhead with potential nuclear capability or specialized high-yield conventional capability.

What is uncertain and highly debated: whether this constitutes a tactical nuclear warhead or an enhanced precision conventional warhead. Independent analysts lean toward the latter interpretation for this specific test, but North Korea has explicitly stated since 2023 that Hwasan-31 nuclear warheads can be mounted on some of its tactical ballistic missiles. The distinction between a "special mission" conventional warhead and a nuclear one is therefore not always clear in North Korean terminology — and that ambiguity may well be deliberate.

North Korea's strategic ambiguity architecture

North Korea deliberately maintains ambiguity about which systems are nuclear-capable and which are not. This ambiguity is a strategic doctrine — it forces American and South Korean military planners to treat every tactical ballistic missile as potentially nuclear, which complicates and slows decision-making processes during a crisis. It is a zero-cost deterrence multiplier: by not clarifying the nuclear capability of each system, North Korea makes all its systems partially nuclear in the calculus of its adversaries.

This strategy has been documented by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) in its June 2026 analysis, which notes that the modular launcher presented in May 2026 resembles the American HIMARS and can "blur American and South Korean efforts to neutralize North Korean nuclear strike capabilities" due to its hybrid conventional-nuclear architecture.

Kim's three principles — automation, long range, ultra-precision

A doctrine in three words that explains everything

In his statements during the June 25, 2026 tests, Kim Jong Un articulated three guiding principles for the North Korean armament program: automation, long range, and ultra-precision. This triad is consistent with the developments observed in tests over the past 18 months and constitutes a clear doctrine for what North Korean military modernization is aiming at. Automation reduces dependence on vulnerable human operators and increases engagement speed. Long range pushes North Korean systems beyond the immediate strike zones of American and South Korean forces. Ultra-precision enables the targeting of high-value assets — infrastructure, bases, command centers — with the accuracy previously associated only with major military powers.

This doctrine is not theoretical — it is materializing in real systems. In May 2026, North Korea had already tested what it describes as a "lightweight versatile tactical weapon system" and a 22-tube tactical cruise missile launch system with a range of 100 km. In June, the modular launcher comparable to HIMARS. Each test is part of a coherent progression toward this triple doctrine.

The stated objective: rendering the enemy incapable of surviving

In his speeches during the tests, Kim used particularly explicit language: he cited the need for the army to have destructive power "sufficient to render any enemy force encountered theoretically incapable of surviving." That formulation — "incapable of surviving" — is not a metaphor. It is the description of a military objective. The systems tested on June 25 are explicitly designed to "inflict fatal damage on enemy airfields, ports, and electrical facilities."

The coherence between the stated doctrine and the systems being developed suggests a clear military vision and a development program that follows it with remarkable discipline. This is not theater — or at least, it is not only theater. It is the implementation of a military strategy that has materialized in concrete tests and real deployments.

The 9th Central Committee Plenum — the meeting that preceded the tests

Decisions taken three days before the tests

The June 25, 2026 tests took place three days after the close of the 9th Plenum of the Central Committee, held from June 20 to 22, 2026. According to official North Korean reports, at that meeting, Kim criticized South Korea's pursuit of nuclear-powered submarines and joint South Korean-American military exercises, accusing them of "seriously aggravating the situation on the Korean Peninsula." He pledged to "develop without letup our formidable defense assets, aiming to reach a level that can crush the whole world."

The precision here matters: Kim declared after the tests that they demonstrated progress achieved in line with the announcements from the 9th Plenum of the Central Committee. The tests are therefore directly linked to political decisions taken at the highest level of the regime — they are not autonomous military actions or opportunistic provocations. They are programmed demonstrations of the execution of a plan approved by the governing bodies of the Workers' Party of Korea.

Pyongyang's first naval destroyer — another front of modernization

The June 25 weapons tests fit within a broader modernization context that includes the naval domain. The week before these tests, North Korea had commissioned its first naval destroyer — a capability previously absent from the North Korean arsenal. Cruise missile tests from this destroyer had been supervised by Kim Jong Un in March 2026. The integration of naval cruise missiles with land-based long-range missile systems creates a multi-directional threat architecture that complicates the defense of South Korea.

The Washington Post had noted during these naval developments that Kim's progression was "in line with his push to strengthen both nuclear and conventional capabilities while refusing to return to discussions with South Korea and the United States." That dual orientation — armament and refusal of dialogue — is both consistent and deliberate.

What Kim actually wants — total deterrence as the objective

Kim's logic: the bomb as the regime's life insurance

To understand the June 25, 2026 tests, you need to understand what Kim Jong Un fundamentally wants. His objective is not to invade South Korea — such an invasion would trigger an American response that would destroy his regime. His objective is to make any aggression against North Korea costly enough to deter adversaries from even contemplating regime change by force. This is the pure logic of deterrence — the same logic that guided Soviet nuclear strategy throughout the Cold War.

Within that framework, every additional long-range missile, every improved precision warhead, every automated system adds another element to the deterrence architecture. Kim invests in fear as an instrument of international governance. And it is a policy that has worked so far: North Korea is more economically isolated than it has ever been, but it is also more heavily armed — and none of its adversaries has attempted to overthrow the regime by force.

The Russia connection — soldiers and technology

The context of North Korean armament in 2026 cannot be analyzed without addressing the connection with Russia. Since 2022, North Korea has supplied Russia with considerable quantities of artillery ammunition used in the war in Ukraine. In exchange — according to many analysts — it has likely received technological assistance and military know-how transfers. South Korean military analysts have expressed concern that Russia may have provided Pyongyang with missile and guidance technologies that are accelerating its capability development.

This connection creates a triangle of threats: Russia uses North Korean ammunition to strike Ukraine, and in return, North Korea upgrades its military capabilities with Russian technologies. The democracies pay an indirect price: every North Korean shell that falls on Ukraine is financed, in terms of technological transfers, by enhancements that strengthen the threat in Northeast Asia. It is a perfect illustration of the interconnectedness of the threats the West is facing simultaneously.

Seoul's response — drone warriors and reinforced deterrence

South Korea builds its own asymmetric response

The South Korean response to the June 25, 2026 tests was not limited to diplomatic statements. The following day, Seoul announced the creation of an army of "drone warriors" — an initiative to build a dedicated force for the offensive and defensive use of drones as an asymmetric response to the growing North Korean threat. It is a symbolically eloquent reply: against upgraded rocket and missile systems, South Korea is investing in the capacity to neutralize or outpace those systems through low-cost, high-density technologies.

Drones demonstrated in Ukraine their capacity to neutralize weapons systems far more expensive than themselves. South Korea, which closely tracks the operational lessons of the Ukrainian war, is integrating this doctrine into its response to North Korean modernization. It is a sign that the armament logic of the Korean Peninsula has entered the same asymmetric innovation dynamic we observe in Europe.

US-South Korea joint exercises — deterrence through presence

The joint US-South Korea military exercises that Kim criticized at the 9th Plenum are precisely the primary instrument of conventional deterrence on the Peninsula. These exercises — notably the annual Freedom Shield exercises — demonstrate the combined operational capability of American and South Korean forces to respond to North Korean aggression. North Korea labels them provocations — but their very existence is a rational response to the military build-up in Pyongyang.

The unpredictability of the Trump administration's stance on joint exercises — some were reduced or cancelled during Trump's first term as part of negotiation attempts with Kim — is a risk factor that Seoul watches carefully. If exercises are scaled back again as part of a dialogue restart, North Korea will interpret that as a concession and intensify its provocations accordingly.

The North Korean nuclear program — beyond conventional tests

What the IAEA and analysts say about the nuclear arsenal

The June 25, 2026 tests primarily concerned upgraded conventional systems — rockets, howitzers, tactical ballistic warheads. But they cannot be analyzed independently from North Korea's nuclear program, which represents the gravest strategic threat. Analyst estimates place the North Korean nuclear arsenal at between 50 and 70 nuclear warheads, with sufficient fissile material to produce between 40 and 80 more. The IAEA has noted a "very serious increase in capabilities" in North Korea's nuclear weapons production domain.

The link between the conventional systems tested on June 25 and the nuclear arsenal is direct: the delivery systems — ballistic missiles, rocket launchers, cruise missiles — can theoretically carry nuclear warheads. The precision and long range that Kim is developing are not merely conventional capabilities: they also increase the credibility and employment flexibility of his nuclear arsenal.

North Korea as a de facto nuclear power

North Korea is, de facto, a nuclear power. It has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It possesses intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States. Its intermediate-range missiles cover Japan and all of South Korea. The international community has not found a way to reverse this reality since North Korea's first nuclear tests in 2006.

The Trump administration attempted new approaches during his first term — the Singapore and Hanoi summits with Kim — without producing lasting results. During his second term, Trump has mentioned the possibility of resuming contacts, including through the dispatch of envoys to Moscow for discussions potentially including the North Korea question. But Pyongyang has clearly signaled it will not surrender its nuclear capability — it has become the very constitutional foundation of the regime.

Implications for Northeast Asia's security architecture

Japan under direct pressure

The June 25, 2026 tests do not only threaten South Korea — they concern Japan directly. Japan has been within range of North Korean intermediate-range ballistic missiles since the 2010s. In 2022, North Korea fired missiles that flew over Japanese territory, triggering civilian alerts. The Japanese response was to revise its constitutional interpretation to allow pre-emptive strikes on enemy bases capable of attacking Japan — a strategic revolution for a country that had adopted a strictly defensive posture since 1945.

The North Korean modernization of June 2026 reinforces the logic behind these Japanese changes. A Japan that is re-arming, developing long-range missiles, strengthening its cyber and space capabilities is in part a direct response to the North Korean threat. That Japanese reaction creates new dynamics across Northeast Asia — including tensions with South Korea (a country victimized by Japanese colonialism) and Chinese concerns about Japanese rearmament. The security spiral generated by North Korea reaches well beyond the Korean Peninsula.

The United States and the trinity of Asia-Pacific engagement

The United States maintains approximately 28,500 soldiers in South Korea and a significant military presence in Japan. This presence is the cornerstone of regional security. It is complemented by alliance treaties with both countries and by the American extended nuclear deterrence capability. The credibility of these commitments is tested constantly by North Korean provocations.

One source of concern in this context is the Trump administration's rhetoric on the cost of American deployment in South Korea — during his first term, he had demanded massive increases in South Korean financial contributions, threatening to reduce the military presence. If that pressure resumes, it will generate signals of uncertainty that Pyongyang will exploit to probe new boundaries. This is a structural vulnerability in the American security architecture in Asia when American domestic politics intrude into deterrence calculations.

The next six months — the calendar of foreseeable provocations

The seasonal pattern of North Korean tests

Analysts who have tracked North Korea for years have documented a seasonal pattern in its provocations: an intensification around American-South Korean military exercises (typically in March and August-September), demonstrations around symbolic anniversaries (like June 25), and periods of relative calm that can precede strategic surprises. The June 25, 2026 tests fit squarely within this pattern.

Over the next six months, several factors could trigger further provocations: the Freedom Shield exercises if maintained at full format, the potential American response to any restart of diplomatic contacts, and any event perceived as a threat to regime security. North Korea does not need pretexts to test its systems — it does so according to its own development schedule. But external events provide useful political cover to justify tests to domestic and international audiences alike.

What 2026 signals for 2027 and beyond

If the trends observed in 2026 continue, 2027 will see a North Korea even more heavily armed: rocket systems with a 90 km range deployed in mass along the border, a fully operational naval destroyer with cruise missiles, and potentially new advances in intercontinental ballistic missiles. The trajectory is clear: each year, the North Korean arsenal is denser, more precise, and harder to neutralize.

This is not inevitable — disruptions to development programs are possible. But the current dynamic, without substantive negotiations and without significantly reinforced pressure measures, points in one unambiguous direction. What the West does today in response to this reality will determine the room for maneuver it has tomorrow.

North Korean soldiers in Ukraine — the lesson learned

What Pyongyang learned from the Ukrainian front

The deployment of North Korean soldiers to Russia since the autumn of 2024, confirmed by multiple Western intelligence agencies and documented on the ground in Ukraine, provided North Korea with something invaluable: real combat experience against modern forces. North Korean soldiers fought in the Kursk region, were exposed to Ukrainian drones, precision-guided missiles, and modern electronic warfare. Those who came back — those who survived — returned with a practical understanding of the 21st-century battlefield that simulated exercises cannot provide.

That experience is directly applicable to North Korean armament programs. The systems tested on June 25, 2026 — autonomous precision guidance, automation, long range — are precisely the types of capabilities that North Korean soldiers witnessed being decisive in Ukraine. The failures of Russian systems were also observed, providing negative lessons just as useful as the positive ones.

Pyongyang's school textbooks and the militarization of youth

Alongside the technical military modernization, North Korea is conducting a militarization of its youth that ensures the continuity of the regime and its war doctrine. North Korean school textbooks have been documented as including references to soldiers fighting alongside Russians in Ukraine, presented as heroes defending the anti-imperialist cause. This propaganda embedded in formal education creates generations conditioned to view armed conflict as a legitimate expression of national power.

That may be the most disturbing dimension of the North Korean threat over the long term: not the current missiles, which can be countered by improved defenses, but the militarist culture that guarantees future generations of North Korean leaders will maintain this armament and confrontation doctrine.

What the West can do — and what it is not doing enough of

Insufficient economic pressure

Sanctions against North Korea are among the most comprehensive ever imposed on a sovereign state — but their effectiveness is limited by several factors. China, which accounts for more than 90% of North Korea's foreign trade, does not apply them consistently, preferring to maintain a strategic buffer between itself and American forces in South Korea rather than exerting maximum pressure on Pyongyang. Russia, which had previously cooperated on sanctions in some contexts, now has political reasons to support North Korea after benefiting from its ammunition. This imbalance in sanctions enforcement makes any economic pressure strategy only partial.

More targeted measures could be more effective: secondary sanctions on Chinese entities facilitating the circumvention of North Korean sanctions, pressure on North Korean cybercrime networks that generate revenues in cryptocurrency (estimated at billions of dollars annually), and strengthened export controls on actors likely to transfer technologies to Pyongyang.

Dialogue as a tool — its limits and its necessity

Dialogue with North Korea is not an enthusiastic option — it is a strategic necessity for maintaining communication channels that allow crises to be managed before they become wars. The Trump-Kim summits of the first term produced no lasting agreement, but they established a minimal mutual understanding about the limits each side considers inviolable.

Relaunching such dialogue in the current context — with American envoys expected in Moscow for discussions that could include the Korean question — could be productive if conducted with realistic expectations: not North Korean nuclear disarmament, but a moratorium on intercontinental tests in exchange for measured economic concessions. That is insufficient — but it may be the realistic maximum in a context where Kim considers his nuclear arsenal a life insurance policy.

The Beijing-Pyongyang axis — the silent partner who changes everything

China as Kim's diplomatic shield

China is the structural element that Western analyses mention in a footnote when it should be in the opening paragraph. Without Beijing's diplomatic shield at the UN Security Council, international sanctions against North Korea would bite far harder. Xi Jinping has chosen, deliberately, to preserve the survival of Kim Jong Un's regime — not out of ideological sympathy, but out of strategic calculation: a nuclear buffer state is worth more to Beijing, in its estimation, than a reunified Korean Peninsula under a pro-Western government.

Trade between China and North Korea resumed significantly from 2023 onward, after the freeze imposed by the pandemic. Estimates indicate that Beijing accounts for more than 90% of Pyongyang's external trade. This dependence is a leash — but one that China has never been willing to pull hard enough to genuinely constrain the North Korean nuclear program. By sustaining this ambiguity, Beijing maintains a permanent destabilization option against American alliances across the Asia-Pacific.

What Chinese complicity costs regional stability

South Korea, Japan, and the United States know this perfectly well: any serious negotiation on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula runs through Beijing. Xi Jinping holds the key. He has chosen not to use it. Meanwhile, Pyongyang develops launchers with a 90 km range, special-mission warheads, and a strike automation doctrine that makes every American base in Northeast Asia more vulnerable than it was five years ago.

The cost of Chinese complacency is measured in missiles tested, capabilities accumulated, and margins of maneuver that are shrinking for the democracies. The West must hold China accountable as a permanent member of the Security Council — not naively, but publicly, systematically, and with real economic consequences for those who help Pyongyang advance toward a first-strike capability against American allies.

Economic warfare as a pressure tool — what has failed and why

The history of sanctions and their structural limits

The international sanctions against North Korea are among the most severe ever imposed on a sovereign state. Since the UN Security Council resolutions of 2016 and 2017, they cover exports of coal, iron ore, seafood, and limit oil imports. On paper, this represents economic strangulation. In reality, the North Korean nuclear program has continued to advance, weapons tests have multiplied, and Kim Jong Un has never signaled any intention to yield.

Why do sanctions fail to produce the desired behavior? First, because China and, to a lesser extent, Russia permit a systematic leakage of the restrictions. Second, because the North Korean regime has demonstrated a capacity to impose on its population levels of deprivation that would topple democratic governments. Third, because nuclear deterrence is perceived by Kim as his survival guarantee — an absolute priority over any economic consideration.

The alternative tools the West is underusing

Faced with the relative failure of traditional sanctions, alternatives exist but are systematically underexploited. Secondary sanctions — targeting foreign entities that do business with North Korea — have far greater potential than direct restrictions. They would allow real pressure to be placed on the Chinese and Russian intermediaries who feed the regime's survival economy. The obstacle is political: seriously targeting Chinese entities means accepting a deterioration in Washington-Beijing relations, a cost successive administrations have judged too high to pay.

Offensive cyber warfare is another tool that democracies deploy with far more restraint than Pyongyang. North Korean hackers from the Lazarus Group have stolen more than a billion dollars in cryptocurrency since 2017, directly financing the ballistic program. An aggressive cyber response targeting the nuclear program's funding circuits would be legally and morally justifiable — but the democracies hesitate before escalation. Meanwhile the program advances, partly financed by these uncontested thefts.

Fact-check verdict — what is true, what is uncertain

What is confirmed

CONFIRMED: Kim Jong Un supervised weapons tests on June 25, 2026, including an upgraded 240mm multiple rocket launcher with a 90 km range, a 155mm self-propelled howitzer with a 65 km range, and a special-mission tactical ballistic warhead. These tests took place on the 76th anniversary of the start of the Korean War, three days after the close of the 9th Plenum of the Central Committee. Kim expressed satisfaction and articulated three guiding principles for modernization: automation, long range, ultra-precision. He declared wanting his enemies to "feel constant anxiety and fear." These facts come from KCNA reports and are confirmed by independent sources.

UNCERTAIN: The precise nature of the "special mission" warhead — nuclear or advanced conventional. The real-world performance of these systems under combat conditions. The precise details of the remaining capabilities in the North Korean nuclear program. The exact content of Russian-North Korean technology transfers.

What is fundamentally true beyond the technical details

Beyond the technical details, what is fundamentally true is this: North Korea is engaged in an accelerated, deliberate, and systematic military modernization. Every upgraded test is a step in a progression toward strike capability that is longer in range, more precise, and harder to counter. This progression will not stop in the absence of international pressure sufficient to halt it. In that context, the democracies must invest in their own defensive response and in deterrence architectures that remain credible against systems that are continuously improving.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Sources and limitations

This fact-check draws on KCNA reports as cited by the Straits Times (June 26, 2026), the Chosun Ilbo (English edition, June 26, 2026), and the ISW (Institute for the Study of War) analysis on the Korean Peninsula. Technical data on ranges and system specifications comes from these sources. Estimates on the nuclear arsenal are drawn from SIPRI and other open-source military analysis. I do not have access to classified information or direct access to American, South Korean, or Japanese intelligence assessments. Information published by KCNA represents official communications of an authoritarian state and must be read with appropriate skepticism.

What I do not know: the real performance of these systems outside controlled demonstrations, the precise nature of Russian-North Korean technology transfers, and the exact timeline for potential operational deployment of these upgraded systems.

Stated biases

I consider North Korea a real regional and global threat that cannot be ignored. I support the maintenance of American defensive alliances in Northeast Asia. I am critical of American unpredictability on these alliances under the Trump administration. These positions are editorial judgments that are distinct from the factual analyses presented above.

Sources

Primary sources

Straits Times — Kim Jong Un oversees weapons tests, KCNA reports — June 26, 2026

Chosun Ilbo — Kim Jong-un tests new launchers and missiles on 6·25 anniversary — June 26, 2026

Al Jazeera — North Korea conducts major weapons tests, South trains drone warriors — June 26, 2026

Secondary sources

ISW — Korean Peninsula Update, June 2026 — June 2, 2026

Washington Post — Kim oversees weapons tests and calls for lethal military posture — June 25, 2026

19FortyFive — Regular analyses on North Korea's military program — June 2026