ANALYSIS: Kim Jong Un Tests Missiles on the 76th Anniversary of the Korean War

June 25, 1950 as operational memory

June 25, 2026. Seventy-six years to the day since North Korean forces crossed the 38th Parallel to ignite a war that would kill 5 million people on the Korean peninsula. Kim Jong Un chose this date — precisely this date — to personally oversee tests of a new generation of weapons systems. This is not a coincidence. In Pyongyang, nothing ever is.

North Korean state news agency KCNA reported the following day — June 26, 2026 — that leader Kim Jong Un had supervised the test of an upgraded 240mm 24-tube multiple launch rocket system, a special mission warhead for a tactical ballistic missile, and a 155mm long-range self-propelled howitzer. All under the framework of a five-year artillery and missile modernization program. Kim reportedly described the objective as building a « deadly and destructive offensive posture » built on principles of automation, long range, and ultra-precision.

Seoul and Washington record, analyze, worry

South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff detected the launches. The Pentagon confirmed analyzing the data. Al Jazeera reported that Seoul was simultaneously announcing it was training an army of « drone warriors » to respond to growing North Korean capabilities. On the Korean peninsula, every Kim Jong Un test is a message. Decoding that message requires understanding what was tested, why now, and what it reveals about Pyongyang's real intentions and capabilities.

This is the purpose of this analysis. Not a rhetorical condemnation — which would serve no purpose against a regime that has learned to absorb them without effect — but a rigorous attempt to understand what these tests mean about North Korea's military evolution, the security of the peninsula, and the challenges this poses to Seoul, Washington, and regional stability in the Indo-Pacific.

Every Kim Jong Un test is a military history lesson disguised as a provocation. June 25 is not just an anniversary for internal propaganda. It is a message addressed to Seoul and Washington: we remember 1950, we remember the line that was crossed, and we are technically capable of doing it again at a different scale.

The 240mm 24-tube MLRS: mass artillery made precise

The first system tested — the 240mm 24-tube multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) — is a significant evolution of a capability North Korea has possessed for decades. Pyongyang's long-range artillery is one of the most direct threats to Seoul, whose northern districts sit less than 60 kilometers from the demilitarized zone. Thousands of North Korean artillery pieces are deployed in tunnels and fortified positions along the DMZ, capable of striking the South Korean capital within minutes.

The novelty of the June 25, 2026 test: the upgraded version of the 240mm MLRS integrates an autonomous precision guidance system and has an extended range of 90 kilometers. This combination — mass fire from a 24-tube MLRS, plus autonomous precision guidance, plus 90km range — qualitatively transforms the threat. This is no longer merely a saturation weapon for striking an urban area. It is a system capable of precisely targeting specific infrastructure: airports, ports, fuel depots, command centers. KCNA explicitly mentioned that the warheads aim to « inflict lethal damage on key enemy targets, including airfields, ports, and power facilities ».

The special mission warhead for tactical ballistic missile

The second system tested is more opaque but potentially more troubling: a special mission warhead for a tactical ballistic missile. North Korean official communications deliberately vague on « special mission » terminology, but defense analysts generally interpret this as either warheads capable of dispersing submunitions (cluster-bomb type), or — more troubling hypothesis — warheads that can be fitted with a tactical nuclear charge.

In April 2026, North Korea had already tested Hwasong-11 missiles equipped with « fragmentation-head » and « fragmentation mine » warheads, striking a target at approximately 136 km in a 12 to 13 hectare zone — demonstrating concentrated suppression capability. The June 25 test appears to represent a further step in the development of these specialized warheads. Without access to full technical data, the exact nature of the warhead cannot be confirmed — but the combination with precision guidance suggests a deliberate effort to make North Korean tactical ballistic missiles capable of striking high-value targets with sufficient precision for a mission against critical infrastructure.

The term "special mission" in Pyongyang's language is designed to be ambiguous. It allows North Korea to maximize psychological effect — leaving open the nuclear possibility — without making a declaration that would force a formal international response. It is rhetoric perfectly calibrated to maximize deterrence at minimum diplomatic cost.

Extended range to 65 kilometers: a threat beyond the DMZ

The third system tested — the 155mm long-range self-propelled howitzer at 65 kilometers range — represents a new capability in North Korea's artillery arsenal. 155mm howitzers are the standard caliber of NATO heavy artillery and most modern armies, including South Korea's. KNDS's Caesar, used by Ukraine, is a 155mm howitzer. The American M109 Paladin as well. North Korea's development of a 155mm self-propelled howitzer at 65km range suggests several things.

First, a standardization effort toward a caliber more common to international standards — which could potentially facilitate ammunition procurement or technology transfer. Second, a 65km range that places within engagement range military installations well south of the DMZ, including American bases like Camp Humphreys — the largest American military hub abroad, located approximately 70km south of Seoul. The precision of the long-range shells tested suggests North Korea seeks to combine range with precision to threaten specific high-value targets, not merely general urban areas.

The combination of three systems: a massive initial offensive strategy

The combination of the three systems tested on June 25, 2026 — precision-autonomous MLRS at 90km range, special mission warhead for tactical ballistic missile, long-range self-propelled howitzer — reveals a coherent strategy. Kim Jong Un is not developing defensive capabilities. These systems are optimized for opening war strikes: saturating enemy defenses, neutralizing critical infrastructure, destabilizing command centers — all within the first hours of a conflict.

Military analysts at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) noted in June 2026 that North Korean modernization explicitly targets « South Korean facilities — air bases, ports, logistics depots ». These targets are precisely those that would allow South Korea and the United States to rapidly reinforce their forces in the event of conflict. By neutralizing them in the first hours, North Korea would seek to pin Southern and American forces in place, reducing their capacity to counterattack effectively.

I look at these three systems together and see a doctrine, not three disparate tests. Kim Jong Un is not testing military toys. He is developing an opening-of-conflict capability aimed at destabilizing South Korean and American defenses in the first hours. This is a deliberate offensive strategy. And it should be taken far more seriously than the habitual "condemnation + waiting" cycles.

The 2021-2025 five-year defense plan and its extensions

The June 25, 2026 test program fits within a five-year military modernization plan that Kim Jong Un launched at the 8th Congress of the Korean Workers' Party in January 2021. This plan calls for: the development of multi-warhead intercontinental missiles, solid-propellant missiles (harder to detect before launch), hypersonic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and tactical artillery modernization. The tests of 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, and 2026 all fall within systematic execution of this plan.

What is notable in the 2026 tests — including January 25, 2026 with an MLRS striking at 358.5km, the March 14, 2026 tests with about ten ballistic missiles, and now the June 25 tests — is the growing emphasis on precision rather than simply range. The plan's early years were dominated by raw power tests — intercontinental missiles, theoretical nuclear warheads. The 2025-2026 phase seems more focused on tactical precision systems — the weapons that would actually be used in a peninsula conflict.

The first naval destroyer: a forgotten dimension

The June 25 tests come shortly after North Korea commissioned its first naval destroyer, named Choe Yon Ho — a development recently reported by North Korean state media. This destroyer represents a qualitative leap in Pyongyang's naval capabilities, which had until now essentially focused on a light surface fleet and conventional submarines. A destroyer capable of launching cruise or ballistic missiles from the sea — and potentially carrying nuclear warheads — adds an important dimension to North Korea's deterrence strategy.

All these developments together — precision MLRS, specialized warheads, long-range howitzers, naval destroyer — paint the portrait of a country not simply testing weapons for internal propaganda. It is building a qualitatively different military force from five years ago. The American intelligence community estimates North Korea now possesses approximately 50 nuclear warheads, with enough fissile material to produce about forty more according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Associating this nuclear capability with improved precision delivery systems is not a reassuring trend.

A North Korean naval destroyer and autonomous-precision MLRS systems: this is no longer the army of an isolated state compensating its weakness through nuclear threat. It is a military force modernizing coherently, rationally, and dangerously effectively. Ignoring this evolution because the topic is uncomfortable would be a grave strategic mistake.

The May 2026 modular launcher and the explicit HIMARS reference

In May 2026, during a test supervised by Kim Jong Un on May 26, North Korea tested what the ISW describes as a « modular missile launcher » resembling the American HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System). HIMARS is precisely the system that contributed to transforming Ukraine's long-range artillery capabilities since 2022, enabling strikes on Russian ammunition depots and command centers dozens of kilometers deep. North Korea has evidently studied HIMARS effectiveness on the Ukrainian theater and seeks to develop an equivalent.

This modular system is capable of firing nine 240mm rockets or a single short-range ballistic missile. The ISW also noted it can potentially be configured for nuclear-capable weapons, complicating efforts by Seoul and Washington to neutralize North Korean nuclear strike capabilities in the event of conflict. The same May 26 test session included AI-guided tactical cruise missiles — another troubling direction, as AI-guided cruise missiles can adapt their trajectory in real time to evade defenses.

The Ukrainian battlefield experience as a modernization manual for Pyongyang

There is a bitter irony in the fact that the conflict in Ukraine — pitting the West against Putin's expansionism — serves as a military modernization manual for North Korea. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated with brutal clarity what works on the modern battlefield: reconnaissance and attack drones, long-range precision artillery, cruise missiles against infrastructure, anti-missile defenses. Pyongyang has observed, learned, and is adapting its armaments program accordingly. This is the institutional learning capacity of an authoritarian state that has been operating for 80 years on the basis of a military survival doctrine.

The relationship between Russia and North Korea adds an additional dimension. Pyongyang has been delivering artillery shells to Moscow since 2023 — a military commercial relationship that has provided precious hard currency to a severely sanctioned regime. In return, it is reasonably suspected — though not publicly confirmed — that Russia shares military technologies with North Korea, particularly in the areas of reconnaissance satellites and potentially missile guidance systems. If true, the modernization observed in the 2026 tests would not be solely the product of North Korean ingenuity, but also of Russian-Korean technology transfer.

North Korea is studying the war in Ukraine as a masterclass in modern warfare. And one must acknowledge that it is an intelligent reading: if long-range precision artillery changed front lines in Ukraine, why not develop the equivalent? The problem is that the lessons Kim Jong Un draws from the Ukrainian conflict are not the ones the West hoped he would draw.

The South Korean "drone warriors"

South Korea's military response to the June 25 tests is revealing of the evolution of its defense doctrine. Al Jazeera reported that Seoul was simultaneously announcing the creation of a « drone warriors » unit — soldiers specially trained in the use of military drones for reconnaissance, strikes, and electronic warfare. This announcement is no coincidence of timing. It reflects South Korea's military recognition that drones — again, the lesson from the Ukrainian theater — have become an essential force multiplier on the modern battlefield.

South Korea possesses one of Asia's best-equipped armies, with approximately 600,000 active-duty soldiers, modern tanks, an air force equipped with F-35 aircraft, and a multilayered missile defense system including PAC-3 Patriot batteries and the American THAAD system deployed on its soil. But the multiplication and diversification of North Korean threats — precision MLRS, short-range ballistic missiles, AI-guided cruise missiles, potentially tactical nuclear warheads — tests the limits of this defensive architecture.

THAAD and missile defenses under pressure

The THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) system deployed in South Korea since 2017 is designed to intercept short, medium, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in their terminal phase. It represents one of the most advanced available missile defense capabilities. But it has limits: it is less effective against low-trajectory missiles, cruise missiles, and precision-guided artillery rockets. These are precisely the types of systems North Korea is developing with the greatest intensity.

North Korea's military doctrine seems to have taken note of these limits. Rather than continuing to invest massively in intercontinental ballistic missiles that dominated previous test cycles, the 2025-2026 programs show a pivot toward systems that complicate missile defense: precision artillery rockets (too numerous and too fast to be individually intercepted), cruise missiles with variable trajectory (no predictable ballistic phase), and special mission warheads (uncertainty about the explosive payload). This is a saturation and diversification strategy deliberately designed to overcome current interception capabilities.

THAAD is an excellent system against classic ballistic missiles. Kim Jong Un has understood that he needs to diversify his delivery vehicles to bypass that defense. The June 25 tests are a direct response to South Korean and American defenses. This is not blind provocation. It is calculated strategic adaptation.

Trump and Kim: an ambiguous relationship

The Trump administration, at the time of the June 25, 2026 tests, is absorbed in nuclear negotiations with Iran and internal budget arbitrations for its legislative program. North Korea is not at the top of the White House's priority pile right now. Which is paradoxically a window of opportunity for Pyongyang: testing military systems during a period of relative American inattention.

Trump had two summits with Kim Jong Un during his first term — in Singapore in 2018 and in Hanoi in 2019 — without reaching a substantive agreement. He has maintained informal communications with Kim but without resuming structured negotiations. His foreign policy doctrine regarding North Korea remains vague: neither the « maximum pressure » of his first term's early years, nor a genuine strategic dialogue. This political void leaves Pyongyang free to accelerate tests in a relatively unconstrained environment.

The absence of dialogue as structural permissiveness

The historical cycles of North Korean nuclear policy show a repetitive pattern: Pyongyang accelerates tests when it perceives American inattention or strategic incoherence. The 2006-2009 period, the 2012-2017 period: every major acceleration of the North Korean nuclear and missile program has coincided with administration transitions in Washington or moments of American attention directed elsewhere. The 2026 tests fit this pattern.

That does not mean dialogue would solve the problem. The two Trump-Kim summits demonstrated that North Korea uses negotiations to buy time and diplomatic recognition without ever substantively committing to denuclearization. Kim Jong Un has no intention of denuclearizing. Nuclear weapons are the guarantor of his regime's survival — the lesson he drew from the fates of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, two dictators who renounced their weapons of mass destruction programs and were overthrown and killed. For Kim, denuclearization is an announced death.

Kim Jong Un's logic is perversely coherent: the leaders who renounced nuclear weapons are dead. Those who kept them are still alive and in power. In this logic, negotiating with Washington on denuclearization only makes sense as a delaying tactic — buying time to perfect capabilities while talks proceed. This is brutal. It is also rational.

Legitimizing the regime through military capability

The domestic political dimension of the June 25 tests should not be underestimated. In North Korea, June 25 — anniversary of the outbreak of the 1950 war — is commemorated not as a tragedy or a military adventure that nearly destroyed the Kim Il Sung regime (saved only by China's intervention), but as the start of a resistance war against « American aggression ». This is the official narrative of a regime whose legitimacy rests largely on the posture of a besieged nation, heroically resisting more powerful enemies.

In this narrative framework, missile and artillery tests on the war anniversary are a celebration and a demonstration: see how powerful our defense is, see how vigilant our leader is. They serve to reinforce internal cohesion around Kim Jong Un in a difficult economic context — international sanctions have severely limited North Korean imports, and living conditions for the population remain precarious. Military successes are one of the few forms of national pride the regime can offer without risking comparison with South Korea's living standards.

Kim Jong Un and succession: an unknown variable

Kim Jong Un, born around 1984 by most estimates, is approximately 42 years old. He has led North Korea since 2011 — fifteen years of power with no apparent sign of internal instability. But the succession question — who will lead this country and its nuclear arsenals after him? — is a blind spot that preoccupies analysts. His sister Kim Yo Jong is considered the regime's second most powerful figure. His daughter, seen at his side during several military tests since 2022, has been increasingly presented to the public — which some analysts interpret as preparation for dynastic succession.

This succession question is relevant to the analysis of military tests because it suggests the ongoing modernization program is not a personal policy of Kim Jong Un likely to change with his successor. It is an institutionalized state strategy, anchored in the Korean Workers' Party doctrine, that would likely survive any leadership change within the current regime framework. Nuclear North Korea is a permanent reality, not a contingent condition tied to one individual.

Kim Jong Un's daughter at her father's side during military tests: this is a carefully constructed image for dynastic succession. The Kims have governed North Korea since 1945. This three-generation longevity in a modern state is a historical anomaly. And the fourth generation appears already in preparation. The North Korean nuclear question is structurally deeper than a question of leadership personality.

Beijing and the North Korean dilemma

It is impossible to analyze the North Korean question without discussing China. Beijing is the only actor with substantial influence over Pyongyang — it represents over 90% of North Korean foreign trade and is the regime's primary oil supplier. In theory, if Beijing decided to fully exercise its economic leverage, it could force North Korea into significant nuclear concessions.

In practice, China does not do this. Not for lack of power, but from strategic calculation. A North Korean economic collapse would create a refugee influx at the Sino-Korean border that Beijing does not want to manage. A reunification of the peninsula under Seoul's leadership — a democracy allied with the United States — would place American troops at China's border, a prospect unacceptable to Beijing. And a nuclear North Korea, while destabilizing, also serves as a tool to distract American attention toward Northeast Asia rather than toward Taiwan.

The consequences of the Russia-North Korea relationship on regional dynamics

The relationship between Russia and North Korea — formalized through deliveries of North Korean shells to the Russian army engaged in Ukraine and Kim Jong Un's visit to Moscow in September 2023 — has significantly modified regional dynamics. It has provided Pyongyang with precious financial resources in a context of sanctions. It has possibly provided military technologies. And it has, symbolically, reinforced the North Korean sense of being part of an axis resisting « Western hegemony ».

This new trilateral relationship — Russia-China-North Korea — creates troubling synergies from Seoul's, Tokyo's, and Washington's perspectives. It is not formalized into an alliance in the classical sense, but it creates an environment where international sanctions are less effective (Russia and China are both permanent Security Council members and veto any tightening of sanctions), where informal technology transfers are possible, and where Pyongyang has a commercial network enabling circumvention of restrictions.

China could solve the North Korean problem if it wanted to. It does not want to. That is a truth that Western diplomacy struggles to articulate publicly, because admitting it also means admitting that solutions based on Beijing's pressure are fundamentally limited. North Korea is a problem that will not resolve itself as long as China finds more advantages in maintaining it than in solving it.

Japan in the crosshairs

The Japanese archipelago is directly in the line of fire of North Korean military modernization. Japan is within range of many Pyongyang ballistic missiles, and recurring North Korean missile tests that fly over or pass above its airspace — though less frequent recently — have generated significant psychological trauma and political pressure to strengthen Japanese defenses. The Japanese prime minister has committed to a massive rearmament program, with a doubling of the defense budget to reach 2% of GDP by 2027, including acquisition of long-range counter-strike missiles.

These developments — Japanese rearmament, South Korean defense reinforcement, maintained American military presence on the peninsula — form a security triangle that China watches with growing suspicion. For Beijing, Japanese rearmament and the strengthening of the American-Korean alliance are consequences directly attributable to North Korean provocations — but they are also consequences that frustrate its own regional ambitions. There is a geopolitical irony here: Kim Jong Un's tests accelerate precisely the military developments of his neighbors that China seeks to contain.

The Indo-Pacific as a theater of systemic competition

The June 25, 2026 tests must finally be read within the broader context of systemic competition in the Indo-Pacific. North Korea is not an isolated actor. It is an element of a security environment that includes China's ambitions over Taiwan, American military presence in South Korea, Japan, and Guam, the strengthening of regional alliances (Quad, AUKUS), and the mutual surveillance of actors who perceive their fundamental interests as incompatible. In this context, every North Korean provocation is a test not only of Pyongyang's technical capabilities, but also of the cohesion and resilience of America's security architecture in the region.

The question for Washington is not simply: how to respond to the June 25 tests? It is: how to maintain a credible deterrence architecture against a threat that is systematically modernizing, in a context where American attention is dispersed between Ukraine, Iran, China, and domestic challenges? Deterrence is only credible if it is perceived as such by the adversary. And Pyongyang regularly tests that credibility.

The Indo-Pacific is becoming a theater of military and technological competition of an intensity that the post-Cold War decades never accustomed us to. North Korea is a second-tier actor in this competition — but its provocations constrain American attention and resources disproportionately to its size and economy. That may be its most valuable contribution to the global strategy of its circumstantial allies.

The options to choose between

Facing North Korean military modernization, the options available to the West and its regional allies are limited and none is satisfactory. Sanctions are in place and partially effective — they keep North Korea under economic pressure — but they have not stopped the nuclear and missile program. Diplomatic dialogue has proven its limits during previous negotiation cycles. Direct military pressure risks escalation toward a conflict nobody wants. China's engagement on the question is structurally constrained.

What remains: strengthening deterrence, maintaining the credibility of alliance commitments, and investing in missile defenses and precision long-range strike capabilities that modify Pyongyang's cost-benefit calculation. South Korea is developing its own long-range missile capabilities, reducing its dependence on American systems. Japan is investing in counter-strike missiles. The United States is maintaining and reinforcing its regional presence.

Accepting an uncomfortable reality

There is also an intellectual honesty required in recognizing an uncomfortable reality: North Korea is and will remain a nuclear state for the foreseeable future. The options for returning to a nuclear-free Korean peninsula — which were theoretically possible in the 1990s — are no longer realistic today. The practical question is not denuclearizing North Korea. It is containing its capabilities, maintaining deterrence, preserving the security of South Korea and Japan, and preventing nuclear technology proliferation to other actors.

This is a policy of managing a bad situation, not resolving a problem. It is unsatisfying. It makes no good headlines. And it is probably the only realistic policy available. The June 25, 2026 tests do not change this fundamental reality. They simply remind us, with the regularity of a clock, that this reality does not disappear on its own.

Saying North Korea will remain nuclear is politically incorrect in almost every Western capital. But I am not trying to get elected. I am analyzing a situation honestly. And the honest situation is this: Kim Jong Un will not dismantle his nuclear weapons. Realistic policy begins with accepting this reality, not denying it.

Two wars, a common dynamic

There is an instructive parallel between the Ukrainian situation and the Korean situation. In both cases, democracies face authoritarian neighbors with significant military capabilities and the will to use them. In both cases, Western powers provide military and economic support without direct engagement in the conflict. In both cases, the question of adequacy between security commitments and the means provided is at the heart of strategic debates.

The fundamental difference: Ukraine is at war now. South Korea is in a fragile peace maintained by deterrence. The June 25 tests serve as a reminder that this deterrence must be actively maintained — through investments in military capabilities, credible alliance commitments, and permanent vigilance. Zelensky would probably tell Seoul: do not assume that security guarantees are sufficient without the concrete means to enforce them. The cost of deterrence that fails is infinitely higher than the cost of maintaining it.

Arsenals converging toward the same targets

The systems tested on June 25, 2026 — precision MLRS, long-range howitzers, specialized warheads — are exactly the type of weapons that transformed the Ukrainian conflict. HIMARS changed the dynamic in Ukraine. North Korea is developing an equivalent. Russia has drawn lessons from its losses against precision artillery and is investing in countermeasures. China is observing all this, drawing its own conclusions about modern high-intensity warfare. We are in a period of global rearmament and accelerated military learning of which North Korean tests on June 25 are merely one symptom among others.

This reality — a world where multiple revanchist or autocratic powers simultaneously rearm, drawing lessons from ongoing conflicts, developing systems precisely designed to overcome Western defenses — is the fundamental strategic constraint of our era. Responding requires not only military investment but diplomatic coherence, alliance solidity, and clarity in commitments that democracies sometimes struggle to maintain over time. June 25, 2026 is a reminder of this obligation.

A North Korean precision MLRS, a Ukrainian Caesar, an American HIMARS: three systems sharing the same logic — long-range artillery, high precision, mobility. The war in Ukraine validated this logic at scale. Kim Jong Un draws the conclusions. The West should also draw conclusions — notably about the urgency of maintaining its own precision artillery capabilities at adequate levels.

Pyongyang and Moscow: a mutually profitable interests alliance

The June 25, 2026 weapons tests cannot be analyzed in isolation from the growing relationship between Pyongyang and Moscow. Since 2023, North Korea has supplied Russia with millions of 152mm and 122mm artillery shells to fuel its war machine in Ukraine. In return, American, South Korean, and Ukrainian intelligence reports indicate that Russia has provided North Korea with advanced military technologies — particularly in the areas of precision guidance systems, ballistic missile engines, and potentially space propulsion subsystems. The autonomous precision guidance system tested on June 25 with the 240mm MLRS could directly result from this technology transfer.

This dynamic of techno-military exchanges between two pariah regimes is one of the most dangerous and least discussed consequences of the war in Ukraine. By engaging in this partnership, Russia has helped create a technologically more capable North Korea — with repercussions that will extend well beyond the Korean peninsula for decades. This is a strategic debt that the West will have to manage, whose full cost is not yet visible.

UN inspections: a paralyzed verification architecture

The United Nations Panel of Experts on North Korea — which was tracking North Korean arms transfers to Russia and Ukraine — was dissolved in March 2024 after Russia's veto at the Security Council on renewal of its mandate. This dissolution is not a bureaucratic detail — it is the deliberate elimination of the independent verification mechanism that documented North Korean sanctions violations by Russia. Without this expert group, the international community navigates blind on actual arms flows between Pyongyang and Moscow. The June 25 tests are visible — but what happens in warehouses and freight rail between the two countries remains largely in the dark.

This UN institutional paralysis is one of Putin's major strategic victories in managing the North Korean file. By destroying the monitoring mechanism, he created an operational space for technology exchange with Kim Jong Un that can no longer be independently documented. The West must develop alternative monitoring mechanisms — satellite intelligence, exchanges between allied services, analysis of commercial data — to fill this verification void.

The dissolution of the UN expert group on North Korea by Russian veto is a maneuver that I consider, technically, an act of complicity in arms proliferation. That is an opinion, not a legal fact. But when a permanent Security Council member deliberately destroys an arms transfer monitoring mechanism to protect its own violations, it is hard to call it anything else. Russia has chosen Kim Jong Un as a strategic partner. We will all pay the price.

Freedom Shield exercises and their evolutions

Facing accelerated modernization of the North Korean arsenal, American-South Korean allies have considerably intensified their joint exercises since 2023. The annual Freedom Shield exercise, bringing together tens of thousands of American and South Korean soldiers, has been expanded to integrate response scenarios to improved ballistic missiles, long-range MLRS, and new North Korean naval platforms. Simultaneously, American-Japanese-South Korean trilateral exercises have multiplied, reflecting the recognition that any conflagration on the Korean peninsula necessarily involves Japan — where major American forces are based and whose territorial waters are within range of North Korean missiles.

These exercises fulfill two simultaneous functions: they maintain the operational readiness of allied forces, and they send a political signal to Pyongyang (and Beijing) that any North Korean military aggression would face a coordinated and prepared response. But there is a limit to what exercises can accomplish without a corresponding modernization of allied capabilities — particularly in the areas of missile defense and long-range precision strike that Seoul has now incorporated into its response doctrine.

The Kill Chain doctrine: countering before launch

South Korea has officially adopted its so-called Kill Chain doctrine — a system of detection and pre-emptive neutralization of North Korean missiles before their launch. This doctrine, which involves pre-emptive strikes on North Korean launchers and command sites when imminent attack is detected, is legally and politically controversial but militarily logical facing an adversary developing missiles of increasing range and precision guides. The June 25 tests with autonomous guidance systems considerably complicate the Kill Chain: mobile launchers with autonomous guidance are much harder to pre-emptively target than fixed installations.

The evolution of deterrence doctrine on the Korean peninsula is therefore in real time a technological race between North Korean offensive capabilities and South Korean and American defensive/pre-emptive capabilities. Every North Korean test is an update of the parameters of this race. Every guidance system improvement, every range increase, every new delivery vehicle modifies the strategic calculations of military planners in Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington. We are witnessing, in real time, the evolution of a war doctrine that could one day be put into practice with apocalyptic consequences.

I analyze this military data with deliberate intellectual detachment. But sometimes, when I list the ranges, the precisions, the payloads of North Korea's new systems, the reality of what all this means for millions of people living within range of these weapons strikes differently. These are not numbers in a spreadsheet. They are mass destruction capabilities deliberately developed by a regime that recognizes no moral limits. The lucidity of analysis must not extinguish the ethical horror of what we are analyzing.

What June 25, 2026 tells us

The June 25, 2026 tests do not represent a sudden turn in North Korean military policy. They fit within a coherent, systematic, and deliberately provocative modernization trajectory. Kim Jong Un chose the date — the anniversary of the 1950 war's outbreak — with precision. He personally supervised the tests; the images are broadcast on state media. The message is clear: North Korea is modernizing, it remembers history, and it wants its adversaries to take note.

Vigilance as the only durable response

The adequate response to this reality is not panic or resignation. It is lasting strategic vigilance — maintaining alliances, strengthening defenses, maintaining credible deterrence — combined with honesty about the limits of what is diplomatically achievable with a regime whose survival depends on its nuclear arsenal. The June 25 tests do not change the fundamental equation. They remind us of it. And in the field of international security, short memory is the greatest danger.

I have been analyzing North Korean military behavior for years. The pattern is always the same: provocations timed for political effect, weapons tests calibrated to send messages, and a regime that has mastered the art of extracting concessions from the international community through controlled escalation. June 25 was another chapter in that playbook. The appropriate response is not alarm — it is sustained, clear-eyed vigilance. Kim is predictable precisely because he is rational. And that rationality is what deterrence must address.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

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Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a critical, contextual synthesis based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.