COLUMN: NATO in Ankara without the U.S. — Europe must finally carry its own weight

Introduction: A historic summit in a symbolic city

Ankara, July 7-8, 2026 — what the stakes truly represent

The NATO summit of July 7 and 8, 2026 in Ankara resembles no other. It takes place in a context of accelerated rearmament, a war in Ukraine entering its fourth year, and an American partner sending contradictory signals about its future commitment to European defense. Secretary General Mark Rutte, in an address at the Atlantic Council on June 25, 2026, announced tens of billions in new defense contracts — a strong signal that something is shifting in the depths of the Alliance.

The choice of Ankara as host city is itself laden with meaning. Turkey, a NATO member since 1952, plays an increasingly ambiguous geopolitical role: it maintains commercial relations with Russia while hosting negotiations between Kyiv and Moscow, welcomes Ukrainian refugees while selling Bayraktar drones to Ukraine. Keeping it at the center of allied dialogue is as much a constraint as an opportunity.

The figure that sums it all up: $1.2 trillion in ten years

Rutte cited a striking figure in his June 25 speech: since 2016, European NATO members and Canada have increased their defense spending by $1.2 trillion cumulatively relative to pre-Cardiff pledge trajectories. In 2025 alone, this increase amounted to $139 billion — a 20% rise in a single year. These figures are real, verifiable, and impressive. They tell a story of Europe's strategic awakening after decades of complacent underinvestment.

But they also tell another story: why did it take Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, two Trump terms, and the explicit threat of American disengagement for Europe to begin taking its own defense seriously? That question deserves a candid answer — because the response will determine whether this rearmament is a lasting turning point or a cyclical surge.

European defense spending: the figures behind the speeches

Poland at 4.3% of GDP — the model everyone cites

In the landscape of European rearmament, Poland has become the most frequently cited example — and for good reason. With defense spending reaching 4.3% of its GDP in 2026, it not only surpasses the 2% target set by NATO in 2014, but also the 3% target for 2035 defined at The Hague summit. Poland does not merely talk about security: it is massively investing in anti-missile defense systems, American Abrams tanks, F-35 fighter jets, and a modernized infantry.

This posture is directly correlated with geography and history. Poland shares a border with Russia through the Kaliningrad enclave and a border with Belarus. It lived under Soviet occupation for 45 years. For Poles, rearmament is not an abstract budgetary debate — it is a question of national survival. That is what Western European countries are still slow to understand viscerally.

Germany and the goal of doubling its budget by 2029

Germany's case is particularly symbolic. For decades, the doctrine of Wandel durch Handel — change through trade — had convinced Berlin that economic interdependence with Russia would make war impossible. Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 killed that doctrine. Since then, Germany has been engaged in a process of Zeitenwende — an epochal turning point — aiming to double its defense budget by 2029 to reach 150 billion euros per year.

In 2026, Germany devotes approximately 2.1% of its GDP to defense — below the 3% target it has committed to, but growing rapidly. The 100-billion-euro special fund created in 2022 has enabled orders for F-35s, modernization of Leopard tanks, and strengthened air defense. Germany is progressively becoming what it should always have been: a major security actor at the heart of Europe.

Rutte, Zelensky, and the 70-billion package for Ukraine

An unprecedented aid package for Ukraine

One of the key moments of the Ankara summit should be the announcement of a 70-billion-euro aid package for Ukraine — the largest since the war began. This package, structured by NATO members at Rutte's initiative, combines military equipment deliveries, support for rebuilding Ukrainian air defense, and a multi-year financing mechanism allowing Ukraine to plan its weapons purchases over the long term.

The importance of this package lies as much in its structure as in its size. A multi-year mechanism sends Kyiv a message of continuity: the West is in this for the long haul, not just until the next election. That is precisely what Zelensky has demanded from the start — not promises of conditional support, but structural commitments that enable multi-year defense planning.

Zelensky's presence in Ankara — symbol and substance

Volodymyr Zelensky is expected in Ankara — which, given that Ukraine is not a NATO member, is a politically significant decision. His presence signals that the Alliance formally acknowledges that Ukraine's survival is an existential question for its own security. It is not yet an invitation to membership — the political obstacles, notably American and Hungarian reluctance, remain immense. But it is a step.

For Zelensky, Ankara is an opportunity to argue directly before the 32 allied leaders for additional deliveries of air defense systems, for a more precise NATO membership timeline, and for more explicit support in the face of Belarusian co-belligerence. He arrives with evidence, data, and a determination that few leaders in the world can match. He deserves to be heard with equal force.

The 5% GDP target by 2035 — realistic or fantasy?

Where this target comes from and what it covers

The debate over a 5% of GDP defense target by 2035 has been circulating in NATO corridors since Trump floated that figure as a demand upon returning to the White House. For reference: the United States currently devotes approximately 3.5% of its GDP to defense — and even they do not reach 5%. Poland at 4.3% is the only NATO member approaching that threshold.

For Germany, reaching 5% of GDP by 2035 would mean approximately 200 billion euros per year — double what the Zeitenwende envisions. For France, it would be approximately 130 billion per year — compared to 45 billion today. These figures are astronomical in a context where European governments are simultaneously managing energy crises, industrial competitiveness pressures, and social pressures on public budgets.

The political obstacles to massive rearmament

European rearmament faces real political resistance in several member states. In Italy, successive governments struggle to justify significant defense spending increases before a public opinion that prefers social investments. In Spain, the coalition government includes pacifist parties that oppose any exceeding of the 2% target. In Belgium, budget discussions on defense regularly generate internal political crises.

These resistances are not anecdotal: they reflect political cultures that formed during 70 years of relative peace in Western Europe. Convincing French or Italian citizens that their country must devote 4 or 5% of its GDP to tanks and missiles requires political pedagogy that few European leaders are prepared to undertake. That is the fundamental challenge of Ankara: translating summit commitments into budgets voted in sometimes reluctant parliaments.

The United States and NATO: the great unknown of the summit

Trump, NATO, and the question of American reliability

The great absent figure of the Ankara summit — at least symbolically — is the guarantee of long-term American engagement. Donald Trump has repeatedly stated that the United States would not defend NATO members who do not pay their fair share. This rhetoric, even if used as a negotiating lever, has sown a seed of doubt that successive summits have not entirely dispelled.

The United States still accounts for approximately 60% of NATO's total defense budget. This asymmetry is not sustainable in the long run — and this is precisely what Europeans are beginning to realize. But reducing dependence on the American shield without weakening the Alliance in the transition is an extraordinarily delicate balancing act. Ankara must chart this course without signaling to Russia or China that NATO is fracturing.

The European pillar of NATO: construction or illusion?

The question of an autonomous European defense pillar has been debated in diplomatic circles since at least 1999, during the Franco-British Saint-Malo summit. Twenty-seven years later, that pillar remains incomplete. The EU's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) is minimalist compared to real needs. European commands lack integration. Defense industries remain fragmented by national interests.

But something is changing in 2026. The European Defense Fund, the ReArm Europe initiative with its 800-billion-euro financing capacity, joint programs for developing weapons systems — these elements are progressively sketching a more credible European defense architecture. It is not yet ready to operate without NATO and the United States. But it is beginning to exist in reality, not just as a summit slogan.

Turkey at the heart of the game — ally, arbiter, or troublemaker?

Erdogan between NATO and Moscow — a calculated balancing act

The decision to hold the NATO summit in Ankara places Turkey at the geopolitical center of the event. It is at once a diplomatic gift for Recep Tayyip Erdogan and a test of his management of contradictions. Turkey is a founding NATO member and hosts Incirlik air base — one of the Alliance's most strategic. It sold Bayraktar TB2 drones to Ukraine that were decisive in the early stages of the war.

But Turkey also refused to join Western sanctions against Russia, maintained its commercial exports to Moscow, and for a long time blocked Sweden and Finland's NATO accession. Erdogan plays all sides — a strategy that earns him considerable diplomatic influence but deeply irritates certain allies, notably the Baltic states and Poland.

Incirlik base and American tactical nuclear weapons

Incirlik base houses approximately fifty American B61 tactical nuclear weapons under NATO's nuclear-sharing arrangements. In crisis scenarios with Russia, this base is strategically crucial — and its security depends on Turkey's reliability as an ally. Some analysts have expressed legitimate concerns about the security of these weapons in a context where Turkey maintains ambiguous relations with Moscow.

These underlying tensions will probably not be addressed directly during the Ankara summit — summit diplomacy prefers consensual communiqués to uncomfortable topics. But they form the context in which all decisions unfold. A NATO summit in Ankara is also a symbolic signal: Turkey is with us, even if sometimes only halfway. That may be the best definition of an imperfect alliance in an imperfect world.

What the summit must concretely deliver for Ukraine

Air defense systems: the absolute priority

Ukraine's list of needs for the Ankara summit is long but can be prioritized. At the very top: more air defense systems. Ukraine needs additional interceptor missiles for its Patriot batteries, more IRIS-T SLM systems, and the radar coverage missing to protect its northern flank against threats from Belarus. These needs have been documented, quantified, and communicated to allies for months.

Allied responses have been progressive but insufficient. Several countries have drawn down their own stocks — sometimes at the expense of their own national defense — to feed Ukrainian batteries. The fundamental problem is industrial: the missile production lines for Patriot, IRIS-T, and NASAMS cannot keep pace with front-line consumption. Ankara must deliver not only immediate delivery commitments, but also agreements on accelerating industrial production.

NATO membership — when and how

The question of Ukraine's NATO membership will be at the heart of Ankara's discussions, even if public statements will probably remain ambiguous. France and Germany remain cautious about a precise timeline, fearing that promising membership during the war would escalate the conflict. The Baltic states and Poland are pushing for a formal invitation.

A NATO invitation could be the best geopolitical deterrent against any future Russian aggression — but it requires a unanimous vote from all members, including Orbán's Hungary and, to a degree, Erdogan's Turkey. Both countries maintain ambiguous positions that complicate any formal consensus. The likely Ankara outcome: wording slightly more committed about Ukraine's path to NATO, without a fixed timeline. Insufficient, but not nothing.

The rise of European defense industry

Rearmament as an industrial opportunity

European rearmament is not only a security imperative — it is also a massive industrial opportunity. The defense contracts announced by Rutte represent tens of billions of euros injected into European defense industries. Companies like Rheinmetall (Germany), BAE Systems (UK), KNDS (France-Netherlands), and Leonardo (Italy) are in accelerated growth mode.

This industrial dynamic creates its own political pressures in favor of maintaining defense budgets: jobs, industrial regions dependent on military contracts, powerful lobbies. This is a mechanism Americans have understood since the Second World War — the defense industry generates its own security policy. In Europe, this mechanism is beginning to operate the same way, which is both good and bad news at once.

Transatlantic industrial cooperation and its tensions

The acceleration of European rearmament is creating transatlantic tensions over procurement. Europe is massively buying American systems — F-35s, Patriots, Abrams — but delivery timelines are long and American production lines are saturated. The alternative — developing sovereign European systems — is slower and more expensive in the short term.

The Ankara summit will need to address this tension between buying available capabilities now (American) and investing in European industrial sovereignty for the long term. These two approaches are not incompatible — but they require coordinated planning that Europe has not yet fully developed. That may be the most important project of the coming years: not buying weapons, but building the capacity to produce them.

Conclusion: does Ankara truly mark a turning point?

The markers of summit success or failure

How will the success of the Ankara summit be judged? Several concrete markers: a Ukraine aid package exceeding 70 billion euros with a multi-year mechanism, more precise wording on Ukraine's accession path, air defense delivery commitments with firm dates, and an agreement on accelerating industrial production to end the shortfall in interceptor missiles.

If these markers are met, Ankara will be a historic success. If the summit produces a vague communiqué with general commitments, it will have missed the chance to transform quantitative rearmament into qualitative rearmament. The history of recent NATO summits is not reassuring on this point — the tendency is toward ambitious declarations followed by laborious implementation. But the 2026 context is different: the war is real, threats are documented, and European public opinion has shifted.

Europe without the United States — possible or impossible?

At bottom, the question the Ankara summit raises is this: can Europe imagine its defense without the American guarantee? The honest answer is: not yet, but it must start working on it now. Not to prepare for a divorce with Washington — but to no longer be held hostage to the moods of the White House. A militarily stronger Europe is a freer Europe, and a more credible partner for the United States itself.

That is the message Rutte is trying to convey, between the lines, in each of his interventions. It is the message that Zelensky embodies through his very presence in Ankara: a nation fighting alone, overperforming against an adversary with infinitely superior resources, and asking not to be saved, but to have the tools to save itself. Europe must draw inspiration from this.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

Sources and method

This column relies on the public transcript of Mark Rutte's speech at the Atlantic Council on June 25, 2026, official NATO defense spending data published by the Alliance, IISS and IRIA reports, and Reuters and Washington Times articles on European rearmament. No access to confidential documents or NATO insider sources. Analyses of Zelensky's, Erdogan's, and Trump's positions are publicly documented inferences.

The columnist holds a pro-NATO, pro-Ukraine position. Zelensky is regarded as an exceptional leader in exceptional circumstances. Calls for stronger European rearmament reflect a personal strategic conviction. These convictions did not distort the figures or reported facts.

Limits of the analysis

The final results of the Ankara summit (July 7-8, 2026) were not yet known at the time this column was written (June 26, 2026). Projections about commitments and communiqués are anticipations based on preparatory signals — not accomplished facts. Summit reality could differ from expectations described here. The columnist commits to a post-summit follow-up if the results significantly contradict the prior analysis.

No financial conflicts of interest with the defense industries mentioned. Budget figures cited (1.2 trillion cumulative, 139 billion in 2025, 4.3% Polish GDP, 2.1% German GDP) come from official NATO statements and are verifiable in the Alliance's annual reports.

Sources

Primary sources

NATO — Transcript of Mark Rutte's Atlantic Council conversation — June 25, 2026

Reuters — NATO Ankara summit, European defense spending and rearmament — June 25, 2026

Washington Times — 70-billion Ukraine aid package and NATO Ankara summit — June 25, 2026

Secondary sources

Anadolu Agency — NATO Ankara summit preview, Turkey's role — June 2026

IRIA — Analysis of the Ankara summit and the European defense pillar — June 2026

Kyiv Independent — Zelensky at the NATO Ankara summit, Ukrainian membership question — July 2026