PROFILE: Kim Jong-un, engineer of destruction — DPRK tests the artillery of the future

Introduction: The man who watches his missiles with a smile

June 25, 2026 — Kim inspects, Kim approves

On June 25, 2026, Kim Jong-un personally inspected the latest North Korean conventional weapons tests, according to the official KCNA agency. Images circulated: the leader standing before artillery systems, surrounded by generals in uniforms covered with medals, watching the fire demonstrations with satisfaction. This is not a casual photo opportunity — it is a calculated political message addressed to Seoul, Washington, and the world.

The systems tested that day represent the culmination of a five-year military modernization plan launched by Pyongyang and structured around three axes: automation, long range, and ultra-precision. This program is not an improvised response to current tensions. It is a deliberate strategy of transforming North Korea's conventional forces into something qualitatively new.

The portrait of a leader building his military legend

Kim Jong-un is not a battlefield commander — he has never led forces in combat. But he is methodically building an image as a visionary military commander, present at tests, personally validating results, claiming the technological successes as his own. This identity construction is essential in a militarized dictatorship where the legitimacy of power rests on the demonstration of force.

Inspection images are carefully staged by North Korean state media. Kim watching, Kim approving, Kim smiling in front of explosions — each photograph is an act of political communication aimed at a domestic audience first, an international one second. The leader and the weapon are inseparable in the DPRK's official narrative.

The 240mm MLRS — full automation and a 90 km range

The multiple rocket launcher that covers all of South Korean territory

The most formidable system tested is the 24-tube 240mm multiple rocket launcher. According to data reported by Chosun Biz and Yonhap, this system is now fully automated with autonomous precision guidance, and its range reaches 90 km. This range is not an abstract figure — it means that from North Korean positions beyond the reach of South Korean artillery, this system can strike any point on the territory of the Republic of Korea.

Seoul, which sits less than 50 km from the demilitarized zone, is in direct range of this system. The capital of 10 million people is exposed to automated artillery capable of saturating a zone with improved precision. This is the most immediate conventional threat North Korea poses to its southern neighbor — before even considering nuclear weapons.

Automation as a tactical revolution

The most significant aspect of this development is not the range — it is the automation. An autonomously guided rocket launcher system considerably reduces the need for qualified personnel to operate effectively. It allows for faster fire rates, real-time trajectory corrections, and a reduction in human error. For a North Korean military that suffers from training gaps due to limited resources, automation is a way to maximize effectiveness with human resources of variable quality.

KCNA specifies that these systems target "changes in the firing posture of the southern border" — a diplomatically vague formulation that clearly means: these weapons are designed to strike South Korea. The automation of this threat is a qualitative leap that South Korean and American defense planners must integrate into their calculations.

The 155mm self-propelled howitzer — ground power projection

A system tested satisfactorily at 65 km

The second system validated during the June 25 tests is a 155mm self-propelled howitzer equipped with long-range munitions reaching 65 km. Kim personally declared the tests "satisfactory" and that they "prove the technological advances" of the five-year plan. The self-propelled howitzer combines mobility — it can move quickly to avoid counter-battery fire — and long-range firepower.

The range of 65 km for this system places a significant number of South Korean targets within reach, including military installations, logistics bases, and urban areas. Combined with the 240mm MLRS, the DPRK is developing an ecosystem of long-range precision artillery that qualitatively transforms the conventional threat bearing down on the Korean Peninsula.

The 155mm caliber — a standard shared with the West

It is notable that the DPRK chose the 155mm caliber — the NATO and American artillery standard. This choice is not necessarily a coincidence. It theoretically allows logistical compatibility with ammunition from external sources. We know the DPRK has supplied 152mm ammunition to Russia for the war in Ukraine. Development of the 155mm suggests an interoperability capability with other partners.

The industrial dimension of these developments deserves attention: the DPRK produces these systems under severe international sanctions, with limited resources and restricted access to high-technology components. The fact that these tests are deemed satisfactory indicates a defense industrial base more resilient than some analysts estimated. The regime has been able to compartmentalize its priorities — armaments above all.

The special-mission warheads — infrastructure destruction

Airfields, ports, power grids — the declared targets

Among the systems tested were special-mission warheads for tactical ballistic missiles (TBM). KCNA describes their objective with chilling precision: "fatal destruction of airfields, ports, power grids." These three targets are not chosen randomly — they represent the pillars of an adversary's response capability.

Destroying airfields prevents the rapid deployment of air reinforcements and aerial power projection. Neutralizing ports blocks maritime reinforcements. Cutting power grids paralyzes communications, command and control systems. These three objectives combined aim to blind and paralyze an adversary in the opening hours of a conflict — a decapitating pre-emptive strike doctrine.

North Korea's first-strike doctrine

This target list reveals an offensive military doctrine. The DPRK is not developing these systems solely for defensive or deterrence purposes. It is building a conventional first-strike capability that would aim to rapidly degrade South Korean and American response capability before a counteroffensive could be effectively organized.

This doctrine is consistent with the strategic logic of an asymmetric military power: not seeking to match the adversary at every point, but identifying its vulnerabilities and exploiting them within a short time window. North Korean planners know that in a prolonged conflict, the logistical and technological superiority of the American-South Korean coalition would prevail. Their wager is to create an irreversible situation before that superiority can be deployed.

The five-year plan — Kim Jong-un's method

Rigorous military planning

What distinguishes the DPRK under Kim Jong-un is the systematic planning of its weapons program. The five-year plan is real — it is not merely a bureaucratic slogan. It has precise technical objectives, development schedules, validation criteria. The way Kim personally oversees tests and validates results reflects a management discipline that contrasts with the image of chaos sometimes projected onto authoritarian regimes.

This planning rigor is, paradoxically, a sign of additional danger. A well-managed weapons program progresses more effectively than a dispersed effort. The milestones of the five-year plan seem to be being met — KCNA itself confirms it by reporting Kim's satisfied declarations. This is not hollow propaganda: the real tests and demonstrated capabilities attest to it.

Automation as compensation for human resources

The "automation" axis of the five-year plan is not trivial. It reveals a sharp awareness of the structural limits of the North Korean military. Decades of undernourishment and deprivation have produced soldiers in worse physical condition than their South Korean counterparts. Advanced training is costly in resources that the regime prefers to devote to priority weapons programs.

By automating its artillery systems, Kim Jong-un seeks to compensate for quality with technology. An autonomously guided self-propelled howitzer does not suffer from combat fatigue, does not lose precision under stress, does not desert. It is a pragmatic way to maximize the firepower of an army that, despite its considerable size, has real operational vulnerabilities.

The soldiers in Ukraine — the unexpected return on investment

Combat experience as curriculum

There is one aspect of the North Korean weapons program that deserves mention: the deployment of North Korean soldiers alongside Russian forces in Ukraine. These soldiers — some of whom were captured and received by South Korea — returned with something invaluable: real combat experience against modern armed forces using drones, precision counter-battery fire, and advanced electronic systems.

This experience is an unexpected return on investment for the North Korean military program. It directly feeds the development of the systems tested on June 25 — automation, precision, special warheads. The lessons from the Ukrainian front feed into the requirements formulated for the five-year plan. This is a direct connection between the conflict in Ukraine and North Korean military reinforcement that the West cannot afford to ignore.

Kim and Putin — partners in a disordered world

The Kim-Putin partnership is now documented, tested by events, and mutually beneficial in the short term for both regimes. The DPRK supplies ammunition and soldiers to Russia. Russia offers in return space and military technologies and diplomatic protection at the Security Council. It is an exchange of resources between two regimes that the international order seeks to isolate.

This de-facto alliance between Pyongyang and Moscow is one of the most concrete manifestations of the emergence of a coordinated revisionist bloc — Russia, China, Iran, North Korea — that challenges the Western order on multiple fronts simultaneously. Zelensky and his allies have understood this. Supporting Ukraine is not merely a matter of principle — it is also a way of indirectly degrading North Korean military capability by consuming the ammunition Pyongyang had stockpiled for other uses.

North Korean artillery and the Ukrainian lesson — after-action report

North Korean shells tested on the Ukrainian front

The DPRK has supplied significant quantities of artillery ammunition to Russia since 2023. These 152mm shells have been used massively on the Ukrainian front, allowing Russia to maintain a firing rate that its own industries struggle to sustain. Debris of North Korean origin found on Ukrainian lines has been documented by demining teams and weapons experts.

For Pyongyang, the deployment of its ammunition in real conditions is an involuntary but valuable testing laboratory. The deficiencies detected in North Korean shells against Ukrainian weather conditions, the observed failure rates, the performance compared to Russian or Western ammunition — all this data feeds back to North Korean military engineers and informs improvements to ongoing programs, notably those tested on June 25, 2026.

The impact on Ukrainian forces

North Korean logistical support to Russia has had a real impact on Ukraine's capacity for resistance. Millions of additional shells available for Russian artillery mean more Ukrainian casualties, more infrastructure destruction, greater pressure on defensive lines. Zelensky and his allies have clearly identified this — the Pyongyang-Moscow connection is a direct dimension of the war in Ukraine.

This is why Western support for Ukraine is also, indirectly, a response to the North Korean threat. Every shell used by Ukraine to neutralize Russian artillery is potentially one fewer North Korean shell on the battlefield. And a Ukrainian victory that demonstrates that military aggression carries a high cost sends a message to Kim Jong-un's strategic calculations, even if it is not his immediate priority.

The Korean Peninsula — the balance of terror revisited

The American extended deterrence in South Korea

Facing the North Korean military advances documented on June 25, 2026, the United States maintains in South Korea a military presence of 28,500 soldiers and an extended deterrence that includes the nuclear option. This commitment is regularly reaffirmed in American-South Korean bilateral consultations — the Ulchi Freedom Shield exercises, the rotational deployments of B-52 bombers and nuclear-powered submarines, and operational plans updated in response to evolving North Korean capabilities.

The question arising in 2026 is that of the credibility of this extended deterrence in the face of a Kim Jong-un whose ICBMs can now reach the American mainland. If an American president must choose between defending South Korea and risking a nuclear attack on Los Angeles, extended deterrence rests on the conviction that Washington will make that choice — even at the ultimate risk. This conviction must be maintained through constant signals.

South Korean nuclear rearmament — a taboo crumbling

The North Korean military buildup and concerns about the reliability of the American guarantee are fueling a debate in South Korea about the possibility of an autonomous nuclear program. Opinion polls show that a majority of South Koreans would favor an independent nuclear capability — a remarkable shift of opinion in a country that has always supported non-proliferation.

This debate remains hypothetical for now — such a decision would violate the Non-Proliferation Treaty and provoke a crisis in the alliance with the United States. But its very existence reveals the deep strategic anxiety running through South Korean society in the face of the growing North Korean threat. A Kim Jong-un who possesses automated 240mm MLRS at 90 km and nuclear ICBMs has managed to make his adversaries doubt the sufficiency of existing security guarantees. That is in itself a strategic success.

Conclusion: Kim Jong-un has built an army that nobody can easily ignore

A program advancing on its own schedule

The tests of June 25, 2026 confirm that the North Korean five-year plan is advancing according to its own objectives. The automated 240mm MLRS at 90 km, the 155mm howitzer at 65 km, the special TBM warheads — these systems are no longer projects. They have been tested, validated by the Supreme Commander in person, and are on their way to operational integration. The North Korean conventional threat has made a qualitative leap that allied planners must integrate.

The international community finds itself facing a DPRK that is progressing simultaneously on all fronts — nuclear, conventional, and now autonomous precision conventional. Every additional sanction, every UN resolution, has not prevented this program from advancing. One must have the honesty to recognize that international pressure policy on North Korea has not delivered the hoped-for results.

Deterrence as the only language understood

Facing this reality, the only credible response remains reinforced deterrence. Maintaining allied forces in South Korea and Japan, strengthening anti-missile defense capabilities, deepening the integration of Asian allies — these measures do not solve the North Korean problem but manage its risks in the absence of eliminating them. In a world where perfect solutions do not exist, this may be the best available option. Not brilliant. But realistic.

Kim Jong-un is not mad. He is rational within the framework of his own logic of survival and power. That is precisely why he is difficult to deal with. One can negotiate with someone one understands. One can deter someone who calculates. The difficulty is that his calculations and ours rest on fundamentally incompatible values and priorities.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

Sources and fact verification

This profile relies on sources published on June 25 and 26, 2026: Chosun Biz, Yonhap, Anadolu Agency, Straits Times, Manila Bulletin/AP, Washington Post. Technical data on weapons systems comes from KCNA official reports carried by these media. I have no independent source for verifying the exact technical capabilities claimed — the range and precision figures come from North Korean declarations as relayed.

Kim Jong-un's quotes are reproduced as broadcast by KCNA and picked up by the cited media. I have no access to the original Korean transcripts. It should be noted that official North Korean statements may contain an element of staging.

Editorial positioning

This profile adopts a critical perspective toward the North Korean regime, considered a militarized dictatorship that oppresses its own people. Analysis of Kim Jong-un's strategic logic implies no moral approval of his methods or his regime. Understanding is not approving — it is a necessary condition for developing effective response policies.

I favor robust deterrence and solid alliances in Northeast Asia. I support Ukraine in its resistance to Russia, which is indirectly linked to the North Korean issue through documented arms flows. This analytical consistency is stated openly.

Sources

Primary sources

Chosun Biz — Technical details of North Korean weapons tests of June 25 — June 26, 2026

Yonhap — Kim Jong-un inspects weapons tests of June 25 — June 25, 2026

Secondary sources

Anadolu Agency — North Korea tests upgraded artillery and missile systems, Kim vows stronger strike capability — June 26, 2026

Straits Times — Kim oversees weapons tests according to KCNA — June 26, 2026

Manila Bulletin/AP — Kim watches tests and calls for deadly and destructive military posture — June 26, 2026

Washington Post — North Korea, Kim, weapons, missiles, South Korea — June 25, 2026