PROFILE: Kim Jong-un Under Fire — On June 25, He Is Not Commemorating, He Is Threatening

Introduction: The Anniversary as a Political Weapon

June 25, 1950 and June 25, 2026

Seventy-six years ago, on June 25, 1950, North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel to launch the Korean War — a conflict that would kill more than 2.5 million people, including 36,574 American soldiers, and end in 1953 without a peace treaty, only an armistice. On June 25, 2026, Kim Jong-un was standing in a firing range somewhere in North Korea, watching rockets cross the sky. He was not commemorating the war. He was announcing it.

This is not a calendar coincidence. In North Korean regime rhetoric, every gesture is coded. Every test, every parade, every official photograph carries a message addressed to multiple simultaneous audiences: Seoul, Washington, Tokyo, Beijing. Choosing the anniversary of the Korean War to personally oversee tests of advanced precision artillery systems is a political declaration as much as a military one.

What was fired — and what it means

The official KCNA agency reported on June 26 that Kim Jong-un had overseen tests of an upgraded 240mm 24-tube multiple rocket launcher equipped with an autonomous precision guidance system and an extended range of 90 kilometers. He also oversaw tests of tactical ballistic missiles and a 155mm self-propelled howitzer with extended-range shells capable of reaching 65 kilometers. Kim expressed satisfaction with the results.

Translated from military language: these systems are designed to strike targets in deep South Korea — air bases, ports, power installations. The tested tactical ballistic missile carries a special warhead designed for the lethal destruction of critical targets. Kim's phrase was clear: «The objective is to ensure defense along its southern border.» Read: all of South Korea is in his sights.

The Portrait of a Man Who Never Improvises

Forty years in the system, twelve years at the top

Kim Jong-un was born in 1984, son of Kim Jong-il and grandson of Kim Il-sung, the regime's founder. He assumed power in December 2011, at age 27 or 28, after his father's death. In twelve years of rule, he has executed his own uncle (Jang Song-thaek, in 2013), carried out regular purges within the military elite, and led his country through more than 100 missile tests and several nuclear tests. He does not improvise. He plans.

The decision to personally test weapons systems on the precise anniversary of the Korean War is not the whim of a dictator — it is the staging of a national narrative. The Pyongyang regime has built its entire legitimacy on resistance to American imperialism and the memory of the 1950-1953 war. June 25 is the most politically charged day in the North Korean calendar. Placing a missile test there fuses historical memory and contemporary demonstration of power.

The five-year military modernization plan

The June 2026 tests fit within a five-year national defense modernization plan launched in 2021. Kim has set precise objectives: automation, long range, ultra-precision. By May 2026, Pyongyang had already tested a mix of tactical ballistic missiles, artillery rockets, and AI-guided cruise missiles. The progression is coherent and methodical.

Professor Lim Eul-chul, from the Institute for Far Eastern Studies at Kyungnam University, is direct: «The intention is to fully establish tactical nuclear and precision strike capabilities in front-line units, placing all of South Korea within range.» This is not alarmist analysis — it is a cold-eyed description of a program advancing on schedule.

The Geography of the Threat: All of South Korea in the Crosshairs

90 kilometers — the distance to Seoul from the border

Seoul, the South Korean capital with its 10 million inhabitants, sits less than 50 kilometers from the demilitarized zone. The 240mm rocket launcher tested on June 25 has a range of 90 kilometers. That means that from positions at the northern border, the system can strike not only Seoul, but much of the metropolitan region that concentrates a quarter of the population and an even larger share of South Korea's GDP.

This is not a future hypothetical scenario. It is a present reality. The combination of rocket launcher, tactical ballistic missile, and self-propelled howitzer tested creates a short-to-medium range precision strike triad capable of saturating South Korean and American air defenses. This is a profound doctrinal challenge for the Allied Forces Command based in Seoul.

Tactical nuclear integration

Professor Lim's analysis points to something even more alarming: Pyongyang is not only building more precise conventional weapons. It is building an infrastructure to integrate tactical nuclear capabilities into its front-line units. A 240mm rocket launcher with autonomous precision guidance could theoretically be adapted to carry miniaturized nuclear warheads — a capability North Korea has been developing for years.

Official North Korean state media images from Kim's factory visits in December 2025 and June 2026 showed approximately 90 Hwasong-11A missiles without warheads fitted. These missiles are stacked in factories. This is not decoration. It is mass production. And mass production precedes deployment.

Kim, Trump, and the Diplomacy That No Longer Rings

Singapore, Hanoi, and the silence since 2019

In 2018, Trump and Kim met in Singapore for a historic summit. In 2019, they met again in Hanoi, where negotiations collapsed over the sanctions question. Since then, the diplomatic silence between Washington and Pyongyang has been almost total. Kim has refused any serious communication channel. North Korea has developed its nuclear and ballistic capabilities at an accelerated pace while Washington was absorbed by Ukraine, Iran, and American domestic politics.

Trump, in his first term, had bet on spectacular personal diplomacy with Kim — the «deal-maker» approach applied to denuclearization. It did not work. In his second term, North Korea is treated as a second-tier priority, absorbed into the broader concerns of the «axis of evil» formed by Russia, Iran, and China. Pyongyang has understood this — and is exploiting the lack of attention to advance its program.

China and Beijing's shield

The North Korean equation cannot be resolved without China. Beijing represents more than 90% of North Korea's foreign trade and provides most of its energy. Without effective Chinese sanctions, any international economic pressure on Pyongyang remains limited. And China has no interest in seeing the North Korean regime collapse — which serves as a strategic buffer against American forces in South Korea.

Kim knows this. It is the foundation of his survival strategy: as long as Beijing refuses to join any serious economic pressure, and as long as Washington is distracted by other crises, North Korea can continue testing, producing, and deploying. The June 25 tests are the practical demonstration of that strategy.

What Seoul and Tokyo Must Do

The response of the regional democracies

South Korea captured the June 25 launches on its radars. The South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff condemned the tests. Tokyo issued a diplomatic protest. These reactions are ritual. What matters is the strategic response: South Korea and Japan have both reinforced their investments in anti-missile systems such as THAAD and PAC-3, and maintained close security cooperation with the United States.

But the June 25 exercise raises a profound doctrinal question: how do you defend a city of 10 million inhabitants against simultaneous saturation from precision rockets, tactical ballistic missiles, and long-range artillery? The honest answer is that complete defense is impossible. The objective is deterrence — making the cost of a North Korean first strike sufficiently catastrophic for Pyongyang that Kim never pushes the button.

The stakes of American extended deterrence

American extended deterrence — the guarantee that Washington will defend Seoul and Tokyo including with its own nuclear weapons if necessary — has been the cornerstone of regional security since 1953. That guarantee has never been tested. But as North Korea develops direct strike capabilities against American territory — its Hwasong intercontinental missiles can theoretically reach the U.S. West Coast — the question arises: would an American president risk Chicago to defend Seoul?

This is the question Kim poses, implicitly, with every test. He does not need an answer now. He needs the question to remain open — so that uncertainty itself becomes a strategic factor. On that ground, the June 25, 2026 tests have fulfilled their mission.

North Korea and the War in Ukraine: A Rearmament Axis

Shell deliveries: an openly assumed military cooperation

North Korea and Russia have developed significant military cooperation since 2022. According to estimates from American, European, and South Korean intelligence services, Pyongyang has delivered to Moscow several million 152mm artillery shells — Soviet-compatible munitions for Russian weapons systems, whose arsenals had been seriously depleted by the massive consumption of the war in Ukraine. These deliveries have allowed the Russian army to maintain an intense rate of fire on the eastern Ukrainian front.

In exchange, North Korea has received from Russia sensitive military technologies — particularly in the fields of long-range ballistic missiles, submarines, and satellite reconnaissance. These technology transfers are precisely accelerating the military modernization program that Kim oversaw on June 25. The Moscow-Pyongyang axis is not merely opportunistic — it is structural, and it serves the strategic needs of both parties.

Sanctions: an exhausted mechanism

The sanctions regime against North Korea — maintained for decades through the UN Security Council — is imploding. Russia and China, two permanent members with veto rights, have been blocking any sanctions reinforcement since 2022. Russia — now a trade and military partner of Pyongyang — obviously cannot vote for sanctions against a weapons supplier it depends on. This UN vacuum frees Kim from the constraint that had the most bite on his regime.

The United States, Japan, and South Korea maintain their own bilateral sanctions — but without the multilateral lock of the UN, their effectiveness is reduced. Beijing still represents 90% of North Korea's foreign trade and remains the primary energy supplier. As long as China chooses to preserve the North Korean regime as a strategic buffer, the sanctions of other nations can only erode the margins — they cannot shatter the system.

The Korean Peninsula in 2026: A Façade Stability

Persistent tensions despite the absence of open conflict

The Korean Peninsula maintains a surface-level stability that regular missile tests permanently threaten. The 1953 armistice still holds — but it has never been replaced by a peace treaty. The two Koreas remain technically at war. The demilitarized zone (DMZ) is one of the most militarized borders in the world, with hundreds of thousands of soldiers deployed on both sides along a 250-kilometer front.

Relations between the two Koreas are at their lowest point in years. Kim Jong-un officially proclaimed South Korea as a «hostile state» in the 2023 constitutional amendments, abandoning any reunification objective. North Korea has blown up cross-border roads and railways. The direct communication lines between Seoul and Pyongyang — the emergency «hotlines» — are closed. Non-communication is now the established norm.

The role of NATO and the United States in regional security

The United States maintains approximately 28,500 soldiers in South Korea under the bilateral defense alliance. These troops — deployed since the Korean War — remain the cornerstone of American extended deterrence on the peninsula. The combined U.S.-South Korean command regularly trains for conflict scenarios on the peninsula. The Ulchi Freedom Shield military exercises were relaunched in 2023 following a diplomatic pause.

But the question of American reliability — exacerbated by Trump's statements about deployment costs and his past discussions with Kim — remains a deep source of anxiety in Seoul. South Korea is investing massively in its own capabilities: development of a long-range ballistic missile, improvement of preemptive strike systems, reinforcement of the conventional nuclear triad. This is not an abandonment of the American alliance — it is comprehensive insurance against a possible defection.

Kim Jong-un and International Opinion: The Weight of a Watching World

The gaze of democracies facing a performative dictatorship

Kim Jong-un is one of the most photographed heads of state in the world — and yet one of the most opaque. Every official image is a meticulous construction: Kim in front of missiles, Kim with generals, Kim smiling in front of test explosions. These images are diplomatic messages disguised as press photos. The June 25 test, with the photos published by KCNA showing Kim in front of the systems tested, follows precisely this protocol.

The international community has developed a certain anesthesia to North Korean provocations. Missile tests, threatening declarations, images of Kim overseeing launches — all of this has become predictable background noise. This anesthesia is dangerous. It normalizes what should not be normalized. North Korea is a regime that has reduced its own people to economic and political servitude to fund a program of weapons of mass destruction. That fact should never be trivialized.

Human rights in North Korea: the forgotten dimension

While the world debates missiles and ranges, 25 million North Koreans live under one of the most absolute dictatorships in the world. Forced labor camps — the kwan-li-so system — hold tens of thousands of political prisoners in conditions documented by the UN Commission of Inquiry Report as constituting crimes against humanity. Periodic famine kills entire populations while the regime funds its missiles.

Kim can test his missiles with impunity in part because the international community has separated the human rights question from the nuclear security question. We negotiate with Pyongyang on missiles while setting aside the crimes committed against North Koreans. This separation is understandable tactically — but it sends a message: regimes that commit systemic crimes against their own people need not fear sanctions related to those crimes if their nuclear value makes them indispensable to negotiations.

Conclusion: A Portrait for What He Really Is

Kim Jong-un is not mad — that is the problem

The Western narrative likes to portray Kim Jong-un as an unpredictable, irrational dictator — a dangerous madman with whom you cannot negotiate. This caricature is reassuring but false. Kim is a cold strategist who has consolidated his internal power, developed an operational nuclear arsenal, survived decades of sanctions, and kept his regime alive despite every prediction of collapse.

He chose June 25, 2026 for his tests with surgical precision. He selected weapons systems that send clear messages: precision, range, mass. He declared a doctrine — «automation, long-range capability, ultra-precision» — and he executes it. This is not madness. It is strategy. And it is infinitely more dangerous than madness.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

Editorial positioning

This profile analyzes Kim Jong-un through his actions and public statements, without caricatural demonization and without minimizing the real threat. Technical weapon specifications are drawn directly from KCNA reports and open-source analyses. Strategic analyses are attributed to named experts. No fact has been invented.

Acknowledged limitations

North Korea's internal dynamics are among the most opaque in the world. Kim Jong-un's precise motivations are inferred from his observable actions, not from confirmed internal sources. Missile production estimates come from satellite imagery and North Korean state media reports, whose reliability is partially constrained by official propaganda.

Sources

Primary sources

US News / Reuters — North Korean leader Kim oversees weapons tests, KCNA reports — June 25, 2026

Yonhap News Agency — N. Korea tests key weapons seen as aimed at S. Korea — June 25-26, 2026

Yeni Şafak / AA — North Korea tests upgraded artillery and missile systems — June 26, 2026

Secondary sources

Aju Press — Kim Jong Un Observes New Rocket and Missile Tests on Korean War Anniversary — June 26, 2026

Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation — Fact Sheet: North Korea Missile Launch Activity — updated 2026

Wikipedia — Hwasong-11A missile system — consulted June 2026