OPEN LETTER: Macron, Merz, Starmer — Europe must say no to American disengagement on Ukraine

The E5 format: a structured response to Trump

On June 24, 2026, the leaders of Europe's five largest powers gathered in Berlin in what is called the E5 format: German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, French President Emmanuel Macron, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer. They collectively reaffirmed their commitment to continuing support for Ukraine and to "presenting a united front at the NATO Ankara summit."

This meeting is not one more symbolic gesture. It occurs in a precise context: American policy toward Ukraine remains ambiguous under Donald Trump, and Europe is building an architecture of support for Kyiv that cannot wait on the moods of the White House. The E5 format is the institutional expression of this reality: when Washington wavers, Berlin, Paris, London, Rome, and Warsaw must hold.

Macron and convergence with Washington

What drew attention was Macron's declaration: "after the G7 summit, there is a convergence of positions between the United States and European partners." This is a positive signal — and an intentionally measured one. After the G7 at Évian, where Trump and Zelensky met and allies put Ukraine back at the top of the American agenda, the atmosphere is less hostile than it was a few weeks earlier.

But "convergence" is not "alignment." Europe must remember that Trump's positions fluctuate — sometimes within hours. The lesson of the past two years is that European support for Ukraine must be built on structural foundations — legal commitments, multi-year funding, long-term weapons deliveries — that cannot be overturned by a tweet or an off-the-cuff statement from Mar-a-Lago.

I address the leaders gathered in Berlin: momentary convergence with Trump is not enough. Ukraine needs certainties, not convergences. It needs arms contracts, not communiqués. And it needs Europe capable of acting alone if Washington decides, tomorrow morning, to change course again.

The clear signal to send Moscow

Chancellor Merz declared that the allies intended to "send a clear signal to Russia regarding continued aid to Kyiv." He added that Moscow "must understand that the moment has come to return to negotiations, on the basis of the strength of Ukraine and its partners." These are well-chosen words — and they carry a precise message: there will be no peace dictated by Russia. There will be a peace negotiated from a position of Ukrainian and Western strength.

Merz also detailed five key signals that European countries intend to convey at the NATO Ankara summit: support for a strong and united Alliance, increased defense spending, strengthened transatlantic cooperation, and long-term support for Ukraine. These five points form a coherent European doctrine — one that deserves support not only in words, but in concrete action.

Tusk: Polish solidarity as the anchor of eastern Europe

The presence of Donald Tusk in the E5 format is particularly significant. Poland is the country with the most to lose from a Ukrainian defeat — geographically, strategically, historically. It now devotes more than 4% of its GDP to defense, the highest percentage in NATO. It has hosted hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian refugees. It supplies weapons, logistical support, access to its ports and infrastructure. Tusk said what mattered: "Poland will not abandon its support for Kyiv despite the disputes between the two countries," and called for maintaining the unity of the European and transatlantic community in the face of the Russian threat.

That declaration carries all the more weight because Polish-Ukrainian relations are navigating historical and political tensions — particularly on questions of complex memorial history. The fact that Tusk explicitly chose to set those tensions aside in order to affirm solidarity with Kyiv is a rare act of statesmanship in today's political landscape.

Tusk says Poland will not drop Ukraine despite the disputes. Merz says Russia must negotiate from Ukrainian strength. Macron says there is convergence with Washington. These are good words. My question is simple: how many additional missiles, munitions, artillery systems were put in motion toward Ukraine from Berlin that evening?

The war in Ukraine is Europe's security war

I write this open letter with a conviction that has not wavered since 2022: the war in Ukraine is not Ukraine's war. It is Europe's security war. If Russia were to prevail in Ukraine — if it managed to impose a peace agreement allowing it to consolidate its territorial gains, absorb Donbas and Crimea, and maintain an army capable of striking again in a few years — it would be Europe that pays the next price.

The Baltic states, Poland, Finland, Sweden — countries that have recently joined or reinforced their position in NATO — know this. Their military planning treats this scenario as a probability, not a theoretical exercise. Defending Ukraine is therefore, concretely, defending NATO's eastern flank. And everything that weakens Ukraine weakens NATO.

European strategic autonomy: now or never

This war has also illuminated something many European leaders refused to admit: Europe's structural dependence on the United States for collective security is strategically dangerous. When Washington decides to reduce its support — for domestic political reasons that have nothing to do with European security — Europe finds itself in an unacceptable position of vulnerability.

The answer is not anti-Americanism — the United States remains an indispensable ally. The answer is strategic autonomy: developing European defense capabilities robust enough for Europe to act independently when necessary. The British missiles Crossbow, Tigershark, and SkyLance — deliberately designed without American components — are a symbol of this direction. Berlin must be the political catalyst for that shift.

Europe took thirty years to build its security dependence on the United States. It will not undo it in thirty months. But it can begin now — with concrete decisions, real budgets, mobilized industries. The Berlin meeting was a signal. The question is whether that signal becomes a program.

First demand: binding, multi-year commitments

Support for Ukraine must be structured as binding, multi-year commitments — bilateral treaties, long-term arms agreements, EU financing facilities that cannot be reversed by a change of government in any member state. The model of the ten-year security agreements signed by several European countries with Ukraine in 2024 is the right one. It must be extended and reinforced.

These commitments are not only a guarantee for Ukraine — they are a clear signal to Moscow that Western support does not weaken with time. Russia is betting on Western fatigue. Binding, multi-year commitments demonstrate that this bet has already been lost.

Second demand: munitions now, not in five years

Ukraine is consuming munitions at a rate that European arsenals are struggling to match. Investment decisions in production capacity for artillery munitions, air-to-ground missiles, and air defense systems made since 2022 must translate into concrete deliveries as fast as possible. Every month of delay costs lives at the front. The E5 leaders must apply real pressure on their respective defense industries to accelerate production and delivery rates.

Third demand: integrate Ukrainian lessons into European weapons development programs. Ukrainian officers, military engineers, and weapons system operators must be systematically consulted in the development processes of European defense industrialists. This is not charity — it is strategic intelligence.

Five demands for five leaders. Binding commitments. Munitions now. Ukrainian lessons integrated. A European reconstruction fund. And a Ukrainian voice in peace decisions. These are not idealistic demands — they are the minimum conditions of a coherent European policy toward the war at its doorstep.

Fourth demand: no peace without real security guarantees

The temptation of a quick peace — even an insufficient one — is understandable. European populations are exhausted. Defense budgets are running deficits. Elections are approaching everywhere. But a peace that froze current contact lines, allowed Russia to keep its conquered territories, and left Ukraine without binding security guarantees would be a long-term catastrophe. It would be a repetition of the Minsk Agreements — a pause to let Moscow rearm.

The minimum conditions for an acceptable peace must include: security guarantees equivalent to NATO membership or a bilateral collective defense agreement, a roadmap for the restoration of Ukrainian territorial integrity, Russian reparations for Ukraine's reconstruction, and robust verification mechanisms for any ceasefire. Without these conditions, any peace is simply the next war in preparation.

Fifth demand: a central Ukrainian voice in every decision

The E5 format in Berlin brought together five European leaders. Not a single Ukrainian was at the table. I understand the diplomatic reasons and established formats. But I raise the question that must be raised: how can five leaders decide the future of support for Ukraine without Zelensky in the room? Future peace negotiations, decisions on ceasefire conditions, the contours of a political agreement — all of this must be decided with Ukraine, not for Ukraine.

This is the lesson of every war in history: peace agreements imposed from outside on peoples who did not participate in their negotiation generate resentments that fuel the next conflicts. If Europe wants a lasting peace, it must ensure that Ukraine is an actor, not an object, in any negotiation.

Five European leaders deciding Ukraine's future with not a single Ukrainian in the room. I am not saying this is ill-intentioned. I am saying it is structurally insufficient. Ukraine has the right to speak for itself in every decision that concerns it. That is not a demand — it is a principle.

Munich 1938 as a permanent warning

Historians following this conflict closely all point to a parallel no one should ignore: Munich 1938. At the time, Western democracies believed they could buy peace by ceding part of a neighboring state's territory to Hitler — Czechoslovakia. That concession did not buy peace — it weakened resistance and emboldened the aggressor. The result, everyone knows.

I am not drawing easy historical comparisons. Every era is unique. But the basic logic — that appeasing a territorial aggressor does not produce lasting peace — is a sufficiently well-established historical lesson that ignoring it is a choice, not an oversight. Any concession to Russia on Ukrainian territory, without real security guarantees, without robust verification mechanisms, without a binding commitment of future non-aggression, is an invitation to the next war.

Ukraine as a test of global democracy

This conflict is also a test of democracies' capacity to defend their core values when doing so costs something. Supporting Ukraine costs money, weapons, diplomatic energy, and sometimes difficult internal political compromises. The easy path would be to grow weary, to find rationalizations for reducing aid, to seek a way out that avoids directly confronting Russian aggression.

But that ease has a deferred price — a price the Baltic states, Poland, and Finland know by heart. That price is the next war. And next time, it may not take place in a country conveniently situated to the east — it could happen east of Germany, east of France, or directly on the doorstep of those who thought they could stand aside.

Ukraine is fighting for its land, its independence, its survival. It is also fighting to ensure that the basic rule of the international order — that you do not conquer a neighbor's territory by force — remains a rule. Defending that rule is defending the foundations of peaceful coexistence. The leaders in Berlin know this. Now they must embody it.

Merz's five signals for Ankara

Chancellor Merz announced that European countries intend to convey five key messages at the NATO Ankara summit: support for a strong and united Alliance, increased defense spending, strengthened transatlantic cooperation, and long-term support for Ukraine. The fifth signal was not publicly specified — but it likely concerns the conditions of a possible ceasefire or security guarantees for Ukraine.

Ankara will be a crucial test. If Europe arrives united, with coordinated positions and concrete commitments, it will reinforce its credibility as an autonomous security actor. If it arrives divided — with capitals pulling in different directions on the conditions of a possible peace — it will be weakened in the face of both Moscow and Washington. The Berlin meeting was the rehearsal. Ankara is the performance.

Defense spending: a commitment that must translate into capabilities

The commitment of NATO members to devote 2% of their GDP to defense — long theoretical for many European members — is now widely exceeded in some countries. Poland is above 4%. The Baltic states exceed 3%. Germany carried out its Zeitenwende with a substantial special defense fund. France has significantly increased its military spending.

These figures matter — but they do not automatically translate into immediately usable capabilities. There is a gap of several years between the budget decision and the delivery of a weapons system. It is this gap that Ankara must address. Rapid acquisition mechanisms, capability-sharing between allies, and the prioritization of current Ukrainian needs must be institutionalized — not merely announced.

4% of Polish GDP on defense. German special funds. Ambitious French military programming laws. These figures are real — and they are good. But a missile that takes three years to build and deliver does not protect Ukraine today. Speed is the only metric that counts. And on speed, Europe still has significant ground to cover.

The Ukrainian Marshall Plan: a necessity, not an option

Rebuilding Ukraine after the war — whatever form the end of the conflict takes — will be one of the most significant economic challenges in recent European history. Damage estimates run to hundreds of billions of euros: infrastructure, housing, industries, energy networks, hospitals, schools. An economically devastated Ukraine is an unstable Ukraine — and an unstable Ukraine is a security risk for all of Europe.

The smart decision is to begin planning this reconstruction now — not after the war ends, but during it. European reconstruction funds, loan guarantees, bilateral investment programs must be structured today, ready to deploy the moment conditions allow. This planning is also a signal to Ukraine: Europe believes in its future, not only in its present resistance.

EU membership as a concrete horizon

Ukraine's accession process to the European Union has seen significant advances since 2022. Candidate status was granted. Accession negotiations were opened. But obstacles remain — particularly questions of rule-of-law reform, anti-corruption efforts, and resistance from certain current members. The Berlin meeting did not directly address Ukrainian accession to the EU — but it forms the context.

Accelerating Ukraine's EU accession process — while maintaining reform requirements and recognizing the exceptional circumstances of the war — is one of the most important strategic investments Europe can make. A Ukraine anchored in the EU is an economically and institutionally stabilized Ukraine. It is also a durable answer to Russian imperial ambition.

Rebuilding Ukraine is not charity — it is strategic investment. A rebuilt, stable Ukraine integrated into the EU and NATO is a permanent buffer against Russian expansionism. Every euro invested in that reconstruction is a euro that avoids a euro of military defense spending in ten years. This logic should drive every reasonable European decision-maker.

A step in the right direction

The E5 meeting in Berlin on June 24, 2026 is a step in the right direction. Five leaders publicly committing to continue supporting Ukraine, to present a united front to NATO, to send a clear signal to Russia — this is better than silence or division. After the turbulences of Trump-era politics, after doubts about Western cohesion, this meeting says: Europe is holding.

But holding is not enough. Ukraine needs Europe to advance. To advance in its defense capabilities. To advance in its weapons deliveries. To advance in building a security architecture that does not depend exclusively on the goodwill of a single unpredictable American leader. The NATO Ankara summit will be the next test.

History will judge

In ten years, historians will write about this moment. They will note that Europe chose to support Ukraine in its struggle for survival. Or they will note that it hesitated, dithered, then capitulated to fatigue and short-term pressures. I believe — I want to believe — that the first version of history will be written. And meetings like the one in Berlin on June 24, 2026 are its foundations.

This open letter has no single addressee. It speaks to each of the five Berlin leaders, to every parliamentarian who votes on defense budgets, to every European citizen wondering whether this war concerns them. It does. It concerns all of us. And how we respond will define who we are — and what our values are actually worth when times are hard.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

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