REPORT: The E5 of Berlin Charts the Road to Ankara — Europe Finally Takes Its Destiny in Hand

The Berlin summit of June 24: a full dress rehearsal for Ankara

On June 24, 2026, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz welcomed the leaders of Europe's four other largest military powers to the Federal Chancellery in Berlin: French President Emmanuel Macron, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, and outgoing British Prime Minister Keir Starmer. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte joined the meeting by video link from Washington, where he was simultaneously meeting President Donald Trump. This was not a courtesy call. It was the final strategic coordination before the NATO summit of July 7–8 in Ankara.

The context is loaded. Starmer has just announced his resignation — he remains in office for the coming months, but his political authority is diminished. The war in Ukraine is entering its fifth year. The conflict in the Middle East is disrupting energy markets and weighing on European economic prospects. And Trump's United States continues to send contradictory signals about its commitment to European collective defense. In this context, the E5 meeting was not optional — it was a necessity.

Five messages, one European voice

At the conclusion of discussions, Merz summarized the common position in five messages that the E5 countries intend to send to the Ankara summit: support for a strong and united NATO, strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance, accelerated defense industrial cooperation, firm support for Ukraine, and support for the June 17 US-Iran agreement. The joint statement published on the UK government website details these commitments with unusual precision and clarity for multilateral diplomacy.

The statement confirms that the five leaders commit to jointly developing and procuring deep precision strike capabilities, to cooperating on air defense, unmanned systems, and military artificial intelligence. These are not wishful thinking — they are written, signed commitments that defense ministers and chiefs of staff must now translate into budgets, contracts, and real capabilities. That is where the real challenge begins.

There is something remarkable about this image: five European leaders sitting together in Berlin — the city that symbolized the continent's division for 40 years — deciding together on European defense policy. Merz is right to see it as a historic moment. A Europe that owns its security responsibilities is not the Europe of 1990s idealists — it is the Europe of a world that has become dangerous, adapting or disappearing. I prefer the Europe that adapts.

Deep precision strike: closing the capability gap

The most significant — and the hardest to deliver — commitment from the E5 meeting concerns the joint development and European procurement of deep precision strike capabilities. These capabilities allow an armed force to strike targets hundreds or even thousands of kilometers behind enemy lines — ammunition depots, command centers, logistics nodes — with enough precision to limit collateral damage.

Europe currently depends primarily on the United States for these capabilities — the ATACMS missiles, JDAM-guided bombs, and other systems whose delivery to Ukraine has often been conditioned on American political approvals. Developing an autonomous European capability in this domain is a major defensive sovereignty objective. Existing programs — the French-British SCALP/Storm Shadow cruise missile, the German Taurus — exist but are limited in quantity and range. An E5 next-generation deep strike program is an industrial ambition worth several tens of billions over 10 years.

Military AI and drones: the technological shift that Berlin has endorsed

The E5 statement explicitly cites unmanned systems and artificial intelligence as priority industrial cooperation domains. This is no accident — the war in Ukraine demonstrated that drones, drone swarms, loitering munitions, and automated target identification systems are irreversibly transforming land and maritime warfare. European armies that fail to invest massively in these technologies risk finding themselves in the same situation as Poland in 1939 — well equipped for the previous war, unprepared for the next.

In June 2026, the European defense industry is beginning to organize around these priorities. French-German consortia for future precision munitions, Polish-British partnerships for drone systems, Italian initiatives on electronic countermeasures — the industrial map of European defense is being redrawn. But the pace is still too slow given Ukraine's immediate needs and the ambitions of collective rearmament.

Military AI is one of the domains where I have serious ethical questions. Automated target identification systems raise fundamental questions about accountability for lethal decisions. Europe has an interest in developing these capabilities — but it also has an interest in doing so while maintaining ethical guardrails that neither Russia nor China imposes on itself. This is an asymmetry I accept: the West should be slower to kill and more precise in its targeting. That is not weakness — it is a value.

3.5% of GDP: a major commitment, persistent reservations

At the end of the E5 summit, Merz announced that the five countries collectively commit to reaching a target of 3.5% of GDP for defense spending — in line with the commitments made at The Hague summit in June 2025. Germany, according to Merz, aims to reach this target as early as 2027. This is a seismic shift for a country that long kept defense spending at 1–1.5% of GDP under the "Zeitenwende" (turning point of an era) doctrine proclaimed by Olaf Scholz in 2022.

The budgetary reality is more complex. 3.5% of German GDP represents roughly €150 billion per year — compared to roughly €90 billion currently. A near-doubling over a few years requires sustained political will across electoral cycles, reform of Germany's constitutional debt brake (Schuldenbremse) — already partially loosened in 2025 — and a domestic defense industry capable of absorbing these orders without prohibitive delivery delays. None of these obstacles is insurmountable, but none of them is automatically resolved by a declaration in Berlin.

France, Italy, Poland, UK: diverging trajectories

France already spends approximately 2.1% of GDP on defense and benefits from a domestic defense industry (Thales, MBDA, Airbus Defence, Naval Group) that is among the most complete in the world. Its trajectory toward 3.5% is realistic — but costly in a context where France's structural budget deficit remains persistently high. Poland stands out with spending already close to 4% of GDP — Poland understands better than anyone that the Russian threat is existential, not abstract. The United Kingdom, despite Starmer's resignation, maintains a commitment toward 2.5% with a promise of gradual increases. Italy lags furthest behind: it struggles to exceed 1.5% despite Meloni's commitments.

The consistency of these trajectories will be the real test of the E5 commitment's solidity. Because the shared industrial ambitions — joint missile development, drone cooperation — can only be funded if member states honor their national budgetary pledges. Without real credits, statements of intent remain statements of intent. And statements of intent do not stop Russian tanks.

I respect Poland for its consistency: it is the country spending the most proportionally on its defense, and the one that understands best what Putin represents. Meloni's Italy, on the other hand, presents a coherence problem for me: how can you deliver forceful pro-NATO speeches while maintaining some of the Alliance's lowest defense spending? Military credibility is measured in euros spent, not in fiery declarations. That is a criticism Meloni deserves to hear directly.

€70 billion in military aid — the figure to be confirmed at Ankara

The five leaders expressed their commitment to "substantially support Ukraine" in its defense against Russian aggression. Behind the scenes, negotiations center on a €70 billion military aid package that NATO is expected to announce in Ankara — of which approximately €30 billion in EU-guaranteed loans backed by frozen Russian assets. Secretary General Rutte confirmed that Zelensky will attend the Ankara summit in person.

This package is critical for several reasons. First, because Ukraine's Crimea strike campaign (a 40-day operation announced by Zelensky on June 25) requires continued support in ammunition, spare parts, and intelligence. Second, because every additional month of conflict costs Ukraine irreplaceable human and material resources in the short term. Third, because the message to Putin must be unambiguous: Western support for Ukraine is not conditional on the internal political moods of democracies — it is institutional, structural, and durable.

The conditions for a just peace: what the E5 demands

The E5 statement is explicit on the conditions for an acceptable peace: the leaders are "aligned on the conditions for a just and lasting peace" and support proposals for direct dialogue between Ukraine and Russia — with active US and European participation. This is not disguised capitulation — it is a position that acknowledges peace will have to come through negotiations, but refuses to have those negotiations conducted under Russian military pressure.

The difference between a just peace and an imposed ceasefire is fundamental. A ceasefire that left Russia in possession of occupied territories — and allowed Putin to reconstitute his forces for a new offensive — would not be peace. It would be a temporarily disguised defeat. The E5 is right to maintain clear conditions: Russian troop withdrawal, credible security guarantees for Ukraine, reparations. These conditions are ambitious. They are also the only basis for a peace that lasts.

I welcome the clarity of the E5 statement on peace conditions. There are voices, in Europe and elsewhere, pressing us to accept a quick peace at any cost — to end the suffering, to stabilize energy markets. I understand that pressure. I do not accept it. A peace that rewards Putin for his aggression is not peace — it is an invitation to the next aggression. Zelensky knows it. The E5 leaders know it. Everyone must accept it.

The UK-France naval mission: the E5's conditional commitment

The E5 statement includes a commitment to a multinational military mission led by the United Kingdom and France in the Strait of Hormuz — an initiative designed to secure commercial shipping and verify the demining of the strait under the June 17 US-Iran memorandum of understanding. The five leaders confirmed their "commitment to participate" in this mission "as soon as conditions allow" and in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

That nuance — "as soon as conditions allow" — reflects the fragility of the situation. On June 26, 2026, the United States struck Iranian sites in response to an Iranian drone attack on a commercial vessel in the Strait of Hormuz — an incident that seriously undermines the 17-day ceasefire. If the situation stabilizes and the memorandum holds, the E5 naval mission will give substance to Europe's commitment to freedom of navigation. If conditions deteriorate, the conditional commitment could become an embarrassing non-commitment.

Hormuz as a test of Atlantic cohesion

The Iran question is the one that most divides the E5 format internally. Poland, focused on the Russian threat to the East, sees Middle East engagement as a distraction of precious military resources. The United Kingdom and France, global naval powers with extensive commercial interests, view freedom of navigation in Hormuz as a non-negotiable red line. Italy and Germany are positioned in the center, supporting the mission while insisting on the conditional nature of their participation.

This diversity of positions is not a sign of weakness — it is the reality of five democracies with distinct geographic and historical interests trying to build common policy. What is remarkable is that they manage it, even imperfectly. The E5 statement is a compromise — but it is a compromise that commits, sets priorities, and creates political obligations. That is infinitely better than silence or vague declarations.

The naval mission in Hormuz perfectly illustrates the European strategic dilemma: staying focused on the primary threat (Russia) while maintaining global commitments (freedom of navigation, energy market security). This is not a contradiction — it is the complexity of being a great power. Europe is beginning to accept that. It is real progress compared to the NATO subsidiary posture it maintained just five years ago.

The stakes of July 7–8: well beyond the communiqués

The NATO Ankara summit of July 7–8, 2026 is the 36th official summit of Alliance heads of state and government. Rutte has invited 10 non-member partner nations, including Ukraine, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Japan, and Gulf states. Expectations are high: €70 billion in military aid for Ukraine, new defense contracts worth tens of billions of dollars, and a reaffirmation of collective commitment in the face of the Russian threat.

Trump's presence at the summit is the central unpredictable factor. The American president showed at the G7 in France a willingness to maintain support for Ukraine — but his conditions remain unclear and his patience for insufficient European contributions is limited. Rutte spent several days in Washington the previous week meeting Trump to prepare the ground. The quality of that preparation will determine whether Ankara is a success or another missed opportunity for the Alliance.

"NATO 3.0" and European strategic autonomy

Rutte has raised the concept of "NATO 3.0" — an Alliance where Europeans assume greater responsibility for the conventional defense of the continent, with the United States maintaining its long-term conventional presence and guaranteeing the nuclear umbrella, but progressively reducing its leadership role in European conventional defense. This is a vision that aligns with what Trump is demanding — and that Europe can accept, provided it commits the necessary budgets.

The Berlin E5 agreement of June 24 is a step toward this NATO 3.0. The five countries together represent two-thirds of European NATO defense capabilities. Their convergence on priorities — deep strike, air defense, military AI, support for Ukraine — creates a core of common spending and capabilities that can structure the entirety of Europe's NATO contribution. It is not perfect. It is a serious beginning.

I am struck by the mention of Starmer at this press conference. He just announced his resignation, and yet he is there in Berlin, affirming defense commitments that bind his successor more than himself. That is the dignity of a statesman in a difficult situation — finishing his mandate by shouldering his responsibilities rather than dodging them. Macron was right to salute his "judicious strategic choices." History may record that Starmer participated in one of the founding moments of European defense just days before leaving office.

Why military AI has become an E5 priority

The E5 statement of June 24, 2026 in Berlin included for the first time a dedicated paragraph on military artificial intelligence — a signal that all five leaders unanimously recognize the strategic importance of this technology for European armed forces. Image recognition systems for drones, logistical supply chain optimization for military operations, predictive analysis of adversary movements, quantum-encrypted secure communications: AI is transforming every dimension of modern warfare, and Ukraine has been the first theater of that transformation at industrial scale.

Ukrainian forces have been using AI systems developed by Palantir, Clearview AI, and Ukrainian startups since 2022 to analyze intelligence data in real time and target strikes with increased precision. These capabilities have constituted a significant asymmetric advantage against a more conventional Russian army. For E5 countries, watching Ukraine use these technologies successfully has been a strategic shock: military AI is no longer a prospective research domain — it is a contemporary operational reality.

The obstacles to a unified European military AI

Despite the political agreement in principle, the development of a coherent European military AI capability faces considerable structural obstacles. The training datasets for military AI models contain classified information — complicating sharing between allies, even within NATO. Interoperability standards between AI systems from different member nations do not yet exist. Legal frameworks on the lethal autonomy of weapons systems vary considerably from country to country, with unresolved ethical and legal questions about accountability for decisions made by automated systems.

The European Defence Agency (EDA) is working on a military AI standardization framework, but its work advances at a pace that geopolitical reality regularly outpaces. Between the moment the E5 formulates an ambition on military AI and the moment operational, interoperable systems are deployed, the timeline is measured in years, not months. That timeline is fundamentally incompatible with the dynamics of an ongoing war less than 2,000 kilometers from E5 capitals.

Ukraine has been using military AI in real time for two years. Europe is debating standards and legal frameworks. I am not saying ethical questions do not matter — I am saying the window within which answers must be found is shorter than the usual timelines of European bureaucracy. The urgency is structural.

The E5 as a negotiating bloc within NATO

The E5 joint statement published on June 24, 2026 is not only an internal European political signal. It is a position document that the five countries will bring to the NATO Ankara summit on July 7–8, 2026, to frame negotiations among the 32 Alliance members. By coordinating their positions in advance, the five most powerful countries in Western Europe are collectively seeking to shape Alliance decisions, particularly on spending targets, operational readiness standards, and support for Ukraine.

This pre-coordination strategy is new. Traditionally, NATO negotiations happen in a 32-country format, with all the ambiguities and compromises that entails. The E5 introduces a dominant European bloc logic within NATO — a logic that can accelerate decision-making on issues where the five are aligned, but that can also generate friction with other members, notably Central and Eastern European states that have their own security priorities vis-à-vis Russia.

What the Ankara summit must resolve

The Ankara summit must address several critical items that the E5 statement has put on the table. First: the level of the defense spending target. The current 2% of GDP target, adopted in 2014, is now judged insufficient by almost all European allies given the Russian threat. The E5 statement proposes a 3% target. But several allies — notably smaller countries and the Baltic states whose GDP is limited — face different constraints. Finding consensus on a new figure without fracturing the Alliance is the summit's first diplomatic challenge.

Second: ammunition for Ukraine. The E5 statement reaffirms support for Ukraine, but concrete needs in ammunition, missiles, and heavy equipment continue to exceed European and American production capacities. The Ankara summit must produce a concrete plan to scale up defense industrial capacities — or publicly acknowledge the Alliance's inability to meet its own commitments. Neither option is satisfactory; the second would be catastrophic for NATO's credibility.

Five leaders meeting in Berlin to coordinate positions before the NATO summit. That is real progress. But the real question is not whether Europe can agree on a communiqué — it is whether it can deliver what it promises. Words do not replace shells, missiles, and voted budgets. Ankara will settle that question.

From dependency to autonomy — the road traveled

In 2022, when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Europe woke from its security sleepwalking with the shock of a cold shower. Four years later, the ground covered is impressive: defense budgets rising in almost every member state, accelerated defense industrial cooperation, coordinated support for Ukraine, and now an E5 format that prefigures the strong European NATO pillar that strategic theory had been calling for over decades.

This is not yet a "European defence" in the institutional sense — the European treaties have not changed, and defense policy remains a national competence. But it is something more solid than previous formats: a coalition of will among the five most significant military powers on the continent, with a concrete agenda, quantified budgetary commitments, and an industrial roadmap. This is real politics, not institutional rhetoric.

What Ankara must confirm — and what Europe can no longer afford to delay

The Ankara summit must confirm that the Alliance remains united, that support for Ukraine is institutional and not conditional on internal political whims, and that Europeans are ready to take responsibility for the defense of their own continent. These are necessary but not sufficient conditions. Europe can no longer afford to delay difficult decisions: on defense budgets, on common industrial development, on autonomous capabilities. The rearmament window is open — it will not be open indefinitely.

The E5 Berlin meeting of June 24, 2026 may one day be cited as the moment when the five main military powers of Europe collectively accepted that their security was their responsibility — not a subcontract to Washington. This is not an anti-American manifesto. It is the strategic maturity of a continent that finally understands that defensive autonomy is a precondition of real sovereignty. Two weeks later, in Ankara, we will know whether that maturity translates into concrete commitments. Ukraine is waiting.

I end this report with mixed feelings: satisfaction that Europe is finally moving, impatience at the slow pace of budgets and industrial implementation, and worry for Ukrainians who are waiting for Berlin's decisions to translate into ammunition on the ground. Summits produce declarations. Declarations must produce actions. And actions must arrive before the next Russian offensive tests the solidity of all these fine commitments. I hope they do. Sincerely.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

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