TESTIMONY: Ukraine glide-bombs Russia — in pairs, exactly as Russia did for three years

TESTIMONY: Ukraine glide-bombs Russia — in pairs, exactly as Russia did for three years

Introduction: The reversal of the air war

Three years of taking the hits — now striking back

For three years, Russia pounded Ukraine with glide bombs — KABs of various calibers dropped by Su-34s and Su-30s flying in paired formations, with a cover fighter protecting the bomb carrier against Ukrainian interceptors. Hundreds of bombs per month, against cities, military positions, supply lines. A doctrine of systemic terror that Ukraine long lacked an effective answer to.

Now, according to Russian military sources themselves, cited by Euromaidan Press on June 23, 2026, Ukraine has adopted exactly the same doctrine. Ukrainian MiG-29s and Su-27s fly in paired formations in contested airspace near the front lines. One flies low with a payload of precision glide bombs — American, French, and soon Ukrainian. The other flies high, ready to fire an air-to-air missile against any Russian aircraft that attempts to intercept the bomber. A complete reversal of the dynamic that had prevailed since the start of the war.

The sources: Moscow's involuntary testimony

What makes this information particularly credible and fascinating is its source: the Telegram channel "The Commander Speaks" (Говорит командир), which appears to have close ties to the Russian Air Force. This channel, analyzed by defense journalist David Axe for Euromaidan Press, described the new Ukrainian tactic with a precision that betrays genuine concern. The Russians documented what they are fighting — and what they documented shows they are struggling to counter it.

"The tactics remain the same," writes the Russian channel. "A single aircraft approaches aggressively, pulls up, and drops its payload." This profile of flying low then pitching up is typical of Ukrainian and Russian jets seeking to avoid enemy air defenses on approach, while maximizing the kinetic energy of satellite-guided glide bombs at the moment of release.

The escort pair mechanic: fly low to drop, fly high to protect

How the escort formation works

The pair tactic is elegant in its simplicity. The first aircraft — the bomber — flies low to stay beneath enemy air defense radar during its approach. At the moment of release, it briefly pitches up to give its glide bombs energy, then descends and egresses. The second aircraft — the escort — flies high, at distance, ready to clear the lane. If a Russian fighter attempts to intercept the bomber, the escort fires an air-to-air missile — an AIM-120 for an F-16, or an R-27 for a Su-27.

That missile may not down the Russian interceptor — but it forces a decision. According to the Russian channel itself: "As soon as our fighters launch, they immediately abandon their mission and flee the battlefield." The Ukrainians have "good situational awareness" and track the incoming Russian missile throughout their retreat. This is tactical survival elevated to doctrine.

The munitions: American, French, and soon Ukrainian

Ukraine's glide bomb portfolio has expanded considerably. American GBU-39 Small Diameter Bombs, launched by aircraft close enough that the limited range (40 to 90 km in practical conditions, according to Defense Express) is sufficient to strike Russian depots and troop concentrations. French AASM HAMMER rounds — a pair destroyed a building housing Russian soldiers in a recent MiG-29 strike. And soon the Ukrainian Vyrivniuvach, which its manufacturer DG Industries claims can reach 130 km — though military analysts estimate the real effective range at between 60 and 90 km.

For context: Russia fires approximately 100 KAB bombs per day at cruising pace — and Russian industry produces thousands per month. Ukraine is still far from that volume. France has promised 50 HAMMER rounds per month. American deliveries of GBU-39s are limited. But the gap is narrowing — and it is precisely this shift in dynamics that the pair tactic seeks to amplify.

The F-16 as ideal escort — and what the Gripen will bring

The F-16: modern radar, long-range AIM-120

Among Ukrainian aircraft available for the escort role, the F-16 is currently the best. Its modern radar, effective electronic warfare systems, and above all its AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles — in the latest AIM-120C-8 version that Ukraine now possesses, with a range that can reach 160 km — give it a tactical edge over Russian fighters that approach.

The Russian channel "The Commander Speaks" admits it: the Ukrainians maintain "a second aircraft, usually an F-16, at distance." That F-16 is difficult to approach without risking an AIM-120 head-on. Even if the missile misses, it forces the Russian interceptor to maneuver defensively, lose its interception window, and leave the Ukrainian bomber to return to base with its pilots intact.

The Gripen and its Meteors: the next revolution

But it is the arrival of Swedish JAS 39 Gripens — ordered by Ukraine and in the process of delivery — that could take the pair tactic to a higher level. The Gripen will be armed with Meteor active-radar-guided missiles, capable of engaging targets at 200 km in optimal configuration. Against a Russian Su-35 or Su-30, a Meteor launched from 150 km is virtually impossible to outrun — it accelerates throughout its approach and maintains its energy all the way to terminal guidance.

In practical terms: the greater the escort's reach, the farther the bomber can advance into contested territory, and the deeper its glide bombs land inside Russian lines. With Gripen/Meteor escorts, Ukrainian glide bombs could potentially reach targets 200 km or more from the front line — logistics depots, command hubs, troop concentrations that Russia had considered safely out of reach.

What this tactic reveals about Ukraine's military evolution

From a defense force to an operations force

Adopting the pair tactic for glide bomb strikes marks a significant doctrinal evolution for the Ukrainian Air Force. At the start of the war in 2022, Ukrainian aviators flew primarily defensive missions — intercepting Russian missiles and drones, protecting urban areas. The number of available aircraft was limited, offensive sorties were risky, and offensive doctrine was underdeveloped.

Four years later, the Ukrainian Air Force is a transformed force. It has integrated Western F-16s, French Mirage 2000s, and maintains its Su-27s and MiG-29s adapted with Western weapons. It has developed doctrines for deep strikes, suppression of enemy air defenses, and now escorted strikes. This evolution is not only technological — it is institutional. It is proof that Ukraine can absorb complex weapons systems and develop innovative doctrines in wartime.

Lessons for Western forces

What NATO air forces are watching closely in the Ukrainian pair tactic is its relevance to their own doctrines for contested-environment operations. In a potential future conflict with a top-tier adversary fielding robust air defenses — a scenario factored into NATO planning against Russia or China — similar tactics would apply. Ukraine is testing and refining them under real combat conditions, producing an operational experience corpus that years of exercises would not have generated.

Officers from the US Air Force, the Royal Air Force, and the Luftwaffe are in close contact with their Ukrainian counterparts. Lessons on the use of AIM-120s under real jamming conditions, on flight profiles to maximize glide bomb range, on escort survival tactics — all of this is entering the doctrinal databases of Western air forces. This is a tactical return on investment from supporting Ukraine that few decision-makers highlight, but which is real.

Russian air defense in decline: strategic context

Why this tactic is possible now

The Ukrainian pair tactic would not have been as practicable in 2022 or 2023. It is possible now in part because Russian air defense has been seriously degraded. S-300 and S-400 systems have been struck and destroyed by Ukrainian long-range missiles. Ground control radars have been neutralized. Russian air coverage over forward positions is thinner than it once was.

Euromaidan Press headlined on June 24, 2026: "As Russian air defense dwindles, Ukrainian glide bombs join the fray — but juicy targets are receding." The paradox is there: airspace opens for Ukrainian strikes as Russian defenses weaken, but the most valuable military targets are being repositioned further back, out of range of limited-range bombs.

The range race: the central stakes

This is where range becomes the central issue. Russian KABs have an effective range of 40 to 80 km depending on type — which allows Russian aircraft to remain outside the range of Ukrainian surface-to-air missile systems while striking targets inside Ukrainian territory. Current Ukrainian glide bombs have comparable or slightly shorter ranges — meaning Ukrainian aircraft must push closer to Russian positions to hit equivalent targets.

This is precisely why the escort is so critical to Ukrainian doctrine. Without it, the bomber cannot advance far enough without being shot down. With it, it can. And with Gripen/Meteor, it will be able to advance even farther — turning the escort's reach into the bomber's effective strike range. This is the tactical logic behind the urgency of Gripen deliveries.

The psychological and tactical impact on the Russian army

Russia in the shoes of its own victim

There is a psychological dimension to this tactical reversal worth noting. For three years, Ukrainian pilots lived under the threat of Russian glide bombs — watching cities pulverized by KAB-500s and KAB-1500s, buildings collapse, military positions disappear under salvos of precision munitions. Now it is Russian forward bases, ammunition depots, and troop concentrations facing that same threat.

The Russian Telegram channel "The Commander Speaks" admits it involuntarily: the Ukrainians are "hard to catch." The moment a Russian fighter fires a missile, the Ukrainian pair abandons its mission and flees — tracking the incoming missile. This is not cowardice. It is tactical intelligence. Coming back to strike tomorrow is worth more than being shot down today.

Russian ground personnel and equipment losses

Ukrainian glide bomb strikes have already produced concrete results. Ukrainian MiG-29s used French AASM HAMMER rounds to destroy a building full of Russian soldiers. In April 2026, Ukrainian aircraft struck a drone storage site at Donetsk Airport with GBU-39s. These strikes will not decide the war on their own. But they create constant pressure on the logistics and morale of Russian forces — exactly the same pressure that Russian bombs have been exerting on Ukraine.

Over time, the Ukrainian capacity to strike logistics targets in depth — fuel depots, ammunition dumps, maintenance hubs — could significantly slow Russian operational tempo. That is the strategic objective behind the pair tactic: not merely to survive, but to gradually degrade the adversary's war machine.

The Gripen: the escort that changes everything

Specifications and delivery timeline

The Swedish JAS 39 Gripen is one of the most capable combat aircraft of its generation for long-range escort missions. Light, agile, equipped with an active-array (AESA) radar, it combines exceptional aerodynamic performance with modern avionics. Its primary armament for the escort role will be the Meteor missile — a ramjet-sustainer air-to-air missile with an effective range exceeding 200 km in certain configurations, whose "no-escape zone" — the zone in which the target aircraft cannot maneuver fast enough to evade it — has no equivalent in the current Russian arsenal.

First Gripen deliveries to Ukraine have been announced for 2026. The exact number of aircraft remains classified for operational security reasons. Ukrainian pilots have been in training for several months. The transition to this aircraft represents a considerable investment of time and resources — but the prospect of escorts capable of holding airspace at 200 km distance fully justifies that investment.

Range as a strike-power multiplier

The equation is simple but powerful. Currently, the Ukrainian escort (F-16 with AIM-120) can protect the bomber at a distance of several dozen kilometers from Russian lines — sufficient to strike forward positions. With a Gripen/Meteor, that protection extends to 150–200 km from Russian lines. The bomber, protected farther back, can now advance much deeper into contested airspace — carrying its glide bombs deep into Russian logistics and command zones.

This means targets that were previously "safe" for Russia — ammunition depots 100 km from the front, regional command centers, resupply rail hubs — would suddenly become vulnerable. This extension of the effective strike radius of Ukrainian aviation is one reason why the arrival of the Gripens is so anticipated — and so dreaded on the Russian side.

The implications for the overall conflict dynamic

How Ukrainian glide bombs shift the balance

The deployment of the Ukrainian pair tactic for glide bombs is not only a tactical innovation — it is a shift in the psychological balance of the conflict. For three years, the aerial asymmetry massively favored Russia: it could strike deep into Ukraine from its own territory, while Ukraine was limited to defense and sporadic long-range strikes. The pair doctrine partially breaks that asymmetry.

For Ukrainian negotiators, demonstrating functional offensive air capabilities strengthens their position. A Ukraine that can precisely strike military targets inside Russia is not in the same negotiating position as one that can only defend. This is a concrete diplomatic lever, not merely a military one — and developing these capabilities is therefore also a strategic priority.

The technological race does not stop

Russia will respond. It is developing countermeasures to Ukrainian glide bombs — more electronic warfare systems at the tactical level, more fighters on patrol, improvements to still-operational S-300/S-400 systems. The Russian Telegram channel that documented the Ukrainian pair tactic is already working to expose its potential weaknesses — perhaps to inform Russian pilots of new counter-tactics.

This is the permanent nature of this technological war: every innovation creates a response, every response creates a counter-response. The question is not whether Russia will adapt — it will. The question is who adapts faster. And in that race, Ukraine has proven since 2022 that it can be, and often is, ahead.

Conclusion: A new chapter in the air war in Ukraine

From survival to tactical initiative

Adopting the pair tactic for Ukrainian glide bombs marks a turning point: the Ukrainian Air Force moves from defensive posture to one of initiative. It is no longer merely absorbing blows — it is striking. Not yet at the same scale as Russia, not yet with the same strategic depth. But with a doctrine that works, weapons that are improving, and soon an escort — the Gripen — whose range will push the boundaries of what is possible.

For Ukraine, this development also represents a narrative shift: after three years of grinding defense, the Ukrainian military is reclaiming initiative in at least one domain. That matters for morale, for international perception, and for negotiation. A country that counter-attacks effectively is in a stronger position to negotiate than one that only holds the line.

What Ukrainian pilots are bearing witness to

Ukrainian pilots flying these escorted strike missions do not speak publicly about their operations — operational security is paramount. But the results speak for them. Precise strikes on Russian military targets, crews returning to base, a doctrine proving its effectiveness despite limited resources. What these pilots testify to, indirectly, through their actions: resistance is not passive. It learns. It adapts. And now it strikes back.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Sources and methodology

This testimony draws on articles by David Axe for Euromaidan Press published on June 23 and 24, 2026, analyzing Ukrainian glide bomb tactics based notably on open Russian military sources. The columnist cross-referenced this information with other sources on Ukrainian air capabilities. No classified sources were used.

Limits and caution

Effective range figures for glide bombs are analyst estimates, not official specifications. Gripen delivery timelines are subject to change. The columnist acknowledges that detailed operational information on combat missions necessarily remains incomplete for security reasons.

Sources

Primary sources

Euromaidan Press — For three years, Russia glide-bombed Ukraine in escorted pairs. Now Ukraine is glide-bombing Russia the same way — June 23, 2026

Euromaidan Press — As Russian air defense dwindles, Ukrainian glide bombs join the fray — June 24, 2026

Euromaidan Press — Russian pilots chase Ukraine's glide-bomb jets. They will soon meet Gripens' 200-km Meteors — June 24, 2026

Secondary sources

The Kyiv Independent — Ukraine air force operations — June 2026

Defence-UA — Ukraine glide bomb capabilities — June 2026

Militarnyi — Ukraine air warfare analysis — June 2026