REPORT: The E5 Berlin Summit — Europe's Five Military Powers Unite for Ukraine

Five leaders, one message, one united front

On June 24, 2026, the leaders of the five largest military powers in Europe gathered in Berlin under the informal format known as the E5. Friedrich Merz (Germany), Emmanuel Macron (France), Keir Starmer (United Kingdom), Giorgia Meloni (Italy), and Donald Tusk (Poland) pledged to strengthen the European pillar of NATO, accelerate cooperation on air defense, autonomous systems, artificial intelligence, and long-range strike, and maintain full support for Ukraine.

This summit came two weeks before the NATO summit in Ankara on July 7–8, 2026 — a meeting shaping up to be historic, with defense contracts worth "dozens of billions of dollars" expected to be signed. The E5 in Berlin served as a European dress rehearsal: the five military powers of the EU and the United Kingdom aligned their common positions before heading to Ankara to defend a coherent European vision of security.

Germany announces 3.5% of GDP in defense spending by 2029

The summit's most resonant announcement came from Chancellor Friedrich Merz: Germany is targeting 3.5% of GDP in defense spending by 2029. This is a declaration of considerable ambition for a country that long resisted increasing its military spending beyond NATO's 2% threshold. This announcement, combined with a commitment to provide approximately €8.5 billion in military aid to Ukraine in 2026, confirms Germany's transformation into a major player in European security — a paradigm shift that would have seemed impossible before the Russian invasion of 2022.

This figure of 3.5% exceeds even the 3% target now being discussed among some NATO members. It puts Germany, which has Europe's largest economy, on a rearmament trajectory unprecedented since the end of the Cold War. The political decision to invest heavily in defense was made possible by the exceptional public support that aid to Ukraine has garnered in Germany since 2022.

Five countries. Two-thirds of European GDP. And a shared decision: to finally take responsibility for their own defense. The E5 summit in Berlin is not a discussion club. It is the beginning of a European security architecture that did not exist before 2022. The fact that the meeting is happening now, ten days before the Ankara summit, says everything about the urgency these leaders feel.

Germany announcing 3.5% of GDP for defense is a historic reversal. This country, traumatized by two world wars and its own militarist past, spent decades refusing to play a military role in Europe. Putin managed in two years what years of NATO pressure had failed to accomplish: convincing Germany that military weakness is more dangerous than military strength.

A Europe taking greater charge of its own defense

The concept of a "European pillar of NATO" is not new — it dates back to debates in the 1990s about the European Security and Defence Identity. But it takes on new and urgent meaning in 2026, in a context where the Trump administration has blown hot and cold on the American commitment to Europe, creating a strategic uncertainty that Europeans cannot afford to leave unanswered.

Strengthening the European pillar of NATO means, concretely: increasing national defense spending to meet and exceed the 2% targets, developing European command-and-control capabilities, building defense industries capable of producing sufficient munitions, weapons systems, and equipment to sustain a prolonged war effort without full dependence on the United States. The E5 in Berlin commits its members to all these dimensions.

Air defense, autonomous systems, and AI

The three areas of accelerated cooperation announced in Berlin — air defense, autonomous systems, and artificial intelligence — are precisely those that the war in Ukraine has identified as the most decisive for the next generation of conflicts. The saturation of Ukrainian air defense systems by massive Russian drone and missile strikes, and the rise of autonomous drones as a strategic breakthrough weapon, have shown that the forces that master these technologies will hold a decisive advantage.

The E5 coordination on these areas seeks to avoid the duplication of national efforts — a chronic problem in the European defense industry — and to create economies of scale that allow the most needed capabilities to be developed faster and more cheaply. Ukraine itself becomes a partner in this industrial cooperation, as demonstrated by the EU's €343 million program for Ukrainian defense technologies announced in Gdańsk.

Long-range strike is perhaps the capability that most clearly reveals the current stakes. Ukraine has demonstrated that a relatively small country can strike deep into enemy territory with strategic effects — refineries, factories, logistics hubs. The five major European powers have learned the lesson. The race for long-range strike systems is on in Europe.

A country that understood before the others

The presence of Donald Tusk at the E5 in Berlin symbolizes Poland's strategic transformation. Sharing borders with both Ukraine and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, Poland has understood the reality of the Russian threat for decades. It now dedicates more than 4% of its GDP to defense — the highest level of any NATO member. It is becoming one of the most modern and best-equipped armies in Europe.

Poland is also one of the main logistical hubs for Western support to Ukraine. Its airports, roads, and railways serve as corridors for the delivery of weapons and equipment. Its shared border with Ukraine makes it a natural and vital partner for everything concerning Ukrainian security. The diplomatic crisis over the memorial question of the UPA — which led to Zelensky's White Eagle Order being revoked — must not obscure the depth of this structural cooperation.

The E5 format: flexibility and efficiency against institutional gridlock

The E5 format has no official status in the institutional architecture of the EU or NATO. This is deliberate. It allows five countries to coordinate rapidly, make decisions, and announce them without waiting for the EU's 27-member or NATO's 32-member decision-making processes. Those processes are necessary to legitimize formal decisions — but they are too slow for the pace at which the security environment in Europe is evolving.

The E5 functions as an engine of European defense integration: it creates facts on the ground that formal institutions are then called upon to ratify. It is the same model that governed the birth of the Franco-German partnership — two countries that coordinate upstream to then bring the others along. With five countries representing the major European defense budgets, the leverage effect is considerably greater.

The E5 format is a perfect illustration of what political scientists call "coalition leadership" in international politics. When formal institutions are too cumbersome, the most powerful actors organize outside them to decide faster. It is democratically imperfect — but it is often more effective. And right now, effectiveness matters more than procedural perfection.

A €70 billion aid package expected in Ankara

Beyond the E5 commitments in Berlin, a €70 billion military aid package for Ukraine is expected at the NATO summit in Ankara — with Zelensky's personal attendance. This package would represent one of the largest military support commitments ever collectively expressed by Alliance members.

For Ukraine, the political significance of this commitment exceeds its material content. It means that NATO — despite internal tensions, despite American uncertainties, despite the hesitations of some members — is maintaining its support for Ukraine at a high level. It is a signal to Moscow that the attrition strategy is not working, that the West will not abandon Ukraine halfway.

Advanced weapons deliveries: a qualitative shift

Allied support for Ukraine has evolved considerably in quality since 2022. The trajectory has moved from helmets and body armor in the opening weeks to Patriot missile systems, F-16s, Swedish Gripens (with 20 E/F to be acquired and 16 C/D as gifts), Storm Shadow and SCALP cruise missiles, and now pledges of French Rafales. Each escalation was preceded by long hesitations — and each escalation was ultimately crossed.

This upward trajectory in weapons deliveries is one of the reasons Ukraine has been able to hold out and develop its own offensive capabilities. The Bars RS missiles with a 1,000 km range, long-range strike drones, Ukrainian glide bombs — all capabilities developed by the Ukrainian defense industry based on lessons learned from using Western systems.

Every time the West crossed a "red line" in weapons deliveries to Ukraine — tanks, long-range missiles, aircraft — it turned out that Russia did not respond with nuclear escalation or direct conflict with NATO. Perhaps because Putin understands the limits of his coercive power. Or perhaps because the red lines we imposed on ourselves were fantasies. Either way, the lesson is clear: we should have gone further, sooner.

Ukraine as a pioneer of strategic strike doctrine

The 40-day campaign approved by Zelensky on June 25, 2026, targeting Russian energy, logistics, and industrial infrastructure with medium- and long-range strikes, marks a new phase in the war. Ukraine is no longer simply defending itself — it is conducting a strategic economic attrition campaign against Russia's war-making capacity.

Strikes on the Slaviansk-on-Kuban refinery (Krasnodar), on refineries in the Yaroslavl region, on the Azot chemical plant in Novomoskovsk (Tula), on the VZPP-S semiconductor factory in Voronezh — all these strikes hit targets between 500 and 1,200 km from the front. They demonstrate a deep strategic strike capability that Ukraine is developing at remarkable speed.

The E5 and long-range strike: toward a common doctrine

The E5's commitment to cooperate on long-range strike is directly grounded in this Ukrainian reality. The European countries that have supplied Storm Shadow, SCALP, and similar systems have observed their effectiveness in Ukrainian hands. They now understand the strategic value of these capabilities — and are seeking to develop more advanced versions, in sufficient quantities, for their own arsenals and for continued support to Ukraine.

Cooperation in this area is also tied to the question of long-range munitions for common systems. European arsenals have shrunk considerably since the war in Ukraine began — and rebuilding them takes time. The E5 in Berlin commits its members to accelerating this rebuild, by coordinating orders to achieve better economies of scale from national and allied industries.

Long-range strike is a capability that Europe had been under-developing for decades, comfortably assuming the United States would handle it. The war in Ukraine has revealed the price of that dependency. Building an autonomous European strategic strike capability will take years — but the process is now irreversibly underway.

Lessons of an insufficient industrial mobilization

One of the most difficult challenges revealed by the war in Ukraine is the inadequacy of European defense industrial capacity. Stockpiles of artillery shells, missiles, air defense systems, and armored vehicles proved far insufficient to sustain a prolonged high-intensity war. Europe had dimensioned its defense industry for peace — not for war.

Since 2022, considerable effort has been made to accelerate production. The EU has launched defense industry support programs (EDIP, ASAP), joint financing for shell procurement, and incentives for production investment. The result is real progress — but still insufficient against Ukraine's needs and the allied stockpile rebuilding targets.

E5 industrial partnerships: building common supply chains

The E5 in Berlin commits to developing industrial partnerships in the most critical areas — air defense, autonomous systems, long-range strike. These partnerships aim to create transnational industrial supply chains capable of producing in sufficient quantities the capabilities Europe needs. They also allow the sharing of research and development costs, often prohibitive for the most technologically advanced programs.

Ukraine is invited into these partnerships — not as a passive beneficiary, but as a co-developer. Its defense industry, which has demonstrated remarkable innovative capacity under the pressure of war, possesses expertise in drones, anti-drone systems, and guided munitions that European industries recognize as valuable. The EU's program of €343 million in guarantees and subsidies for Ukrainian defense technologies, signed in Gdańsk, follows this co-development logic.

The idea of a Ukrainian defense industry co-developing capabilities with German, French, Polish, and British companies would have seemed absurd in 2021. In 2026, it is a concrete reality. The war has created an economic and industrial integration that years of diplomacy had not produced. It is one of the unintended effects that Putin certainly did not anticipate.

Taking over capabilities long provided by Washington

The central message of the E5 Berlin summit is clear: Europe must gradually take over the capabilities long provided by the United States. This diplomatic formulation covers a concrete reality — strategic intelligence, long-distance air transport, anti-missile defense, long-range precision strike. All areas where Europe has relied on Americans for decades and which today represent a structural dependency that is potentially problematic in the face of a Trump administration signaling progressive disengagement.

The five nations agreed to coordinate their investments in these specific areas — not to duplicate American capabilities, but to reduce their criticality. If Washington reduces its presence in Europe, European allies must be able to fill the most urgent gaps without catastrophic delay. This coordination work, begun at the defense minister level since 2024, is now elevated to the level of heads of state. This shift in hierarchy means faster decisions and larger budgets.

Spain's exclusion: a political warning

The decision to exclude Spain from the E5 group in Berlin is a strong political signal. According to the Spanish daily El Español, Madrid was sidelined in part because Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez refuses to commit to spending 5% of GDP on defense — the target that the four other E5 nations have accepted. This exclusion is not permanent, but it sends a message: in post-2022 Europe, nations that do not make serious commitments to their own defense do not sit at the strategic decision-making table.

The lesson is hard but necessary. European solidarity cannot function if some members free-ride on collective effort without contributing proportionally. The Baltic states, Poland, Finland — which devote 5 to 6% of their GDP to defense — are entirely right to demand reciprocity from their larger and wealthier partners. The E5 in Berlin took this into account. Ankara will need to do the same.

Starmer attended the E5 summit as sitting Prime Minister even after resigning under pressure from his own party. His potential successor will need to confirm these commitments. This is the inherent fragility of democracies in prolonged crises: leaders change, wars continue. Sweden, Poland, and France have shown that you can navigate changes of government without changing strategy vis-à-vis Russia. That can be learned.

Sánchez excluded — a signal for the holdouts

Spain's exclusion from the E5 summit in Berlin did not go unnoticed. According to the Spanish daily El Español, Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez was sidelined in part because he refuses to commit to the 5% of GDP in defense spending target — the same target that the four other E5 members have accepted. This symbolic exclusion sends a powerful message to every European capital: strategic solidarity has a price, and those who refuse to pay it do not sit at the decision-making table.

Spain is not the only European country dragging its feet on military spending. But it is one of the continent's largest economies, and its refusal to meet NATO's historic targets contrasts sharply with the efforts of smaller nations on the eastern flank. Lithuania, with three million inhabitants, devotes 5.4% of its GDP to defense. Spain, with 47 million, remains well below the Alliance's historic 2% baseline. This contrast illustrates the divide between nations that live with the reality of the Russian threat and those that still perceive it as distant.

The stakes of the Ankara summit for allied unity

The E5 summit in Berlin is a dress rehearsal for the Ankara summit. The five major European powers that met on June 24 wanted to arrive in Ankara with a coordinated message. They succeeded in aligning their positions on the main issues: support for Ukraine, strengthening the European pillar, industrial coordination. This united front strengthens the position of European allies in their dealings with the Trump administration, which seeks to engage each ally individually rather than facing a coordinated bloc.

The participation of Mark Rutte by video conference from Washington speaks to the summit's importance. He needed to meet with Trump to defuse tensions ahead of Ankara — tensions arising from American criticism over insufficient allied support for action against Iran and from Hegseth's announcement of a review of US forces in Europe. The E5 united front is the best argument Europeans can bring to that discussion: Europe is spending, Europe is organizing, Europe deserves the American partnership.

A strategic turning point for European security

The E5 summit in Berlin on June 24, 2026 is not an ordinary event. It marks the crystallization of a strategic transformation of Europe that began on February 24, 2022 and is not yet complete. The five largest military powers on the continent displayed their unity, their ambitions, and their commitment to Ukraine with a clarity that history will note.

Germany targeting 3.5% of GDP for defense, France sending its cyber troops to learn in Kyiv, the United Kingdom maintaining its unwavering support despite Brexit, Italy integrating itself into European defense cooperation, Poland spending 4% of its GDP on defense — these five countries form a hard core around which European defense can finally take a coherent and credible shape.

What remains to be done

But the road ahead is long. Announcements must be transformed into real capabilities, budget commitments into delivered equipment, announced cooperations into effective industrial supply chains. This level of ambition must be sustained over time, in the face of economic pressures, domestic political changes, and Russian attempts to divide the Alliance. And support for Ukraine must continue — not only until a ceasefire, but until a just and lasting peace that guarantees its sovereignty and security.

The E5 in Berlin laid the foundations. Ankara must consolidate them. And the years that follow must transform them into the permanent reality of a Europe capable of defending itself and defending its values.

Berlin, June 24, 2026 — a date that will remain in the annals of European defense integration. Five leaders decided together that Europe could no longer rely solely on Washington. This is not anti-Americanism. It is strategic maturity. And it arrived, as it often does, under the pressure of events.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

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I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

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