ANALYSIS: The London Summit — Macron, Starmer, Merz and Zelensky lay the foundations for peace

A trilateral meeting that became quadrilateral

On June 7, 2026 in London, French President Emmanuel Macron, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to reaffirm their unwavering support for Ukraine and to define together the conditions they consider non-negotiable for any lasting peace. This meeting — convened in the context of the approaching G7 in Évian and the upcoming NATO summit in Ankara — is no ordinary gathering. It is a moment of doctrine, a moment when Ukraine's closest allies clearly state what they expect from any resolution to the crisis.

The four conditions set out are precise and demanding: a full ceasefire, a withdrawal of Russian troops, binding security guarantees including the deployment of a Multinational Ukraine Force, and the maintenance of the freeze on Russian assets until full compensation is paid. These conditions close the door to a rushed peace deal at Ukraine's expense. For Moscow, they are also a red line that says: there is no easy way out.

The context: a particularly charged diplomatic week

The June 7 meeting fits within an especially intense diplomatic sequence: the G7 in Évian on June 15–17, Ramstein on June 18, the European Council on June 18–19, and the upcoming NATO summit in Ankara. The London meeting served to coordinate positions before all these gatherings — to ensure that Paris, London, and Berlin spoke with one voice on the fundamental questions related to Ukraine.

This prior coordination is crucial in great-power diplomacy. Multilateral summits only produce concrete results when key actors have agreed behind closed doors before the plenary sessions. The London meeting is one of those essential preparations that make major political decisions possible.

I recognize what it means that Macron, Starmer, and Merz — the leaders of France, the United Kingdom, and Germany — meet in London with Zelensky to coordinate their positions. Four years ago, such a meeting would have been unimaginable. Today, it is diplomatic normalcy. The war has forged solidarities that peacetime had failed to create.

The ceasefire and withdrawal: the first two demands

The first two conditions set by the four leaders — a full ceasefire and a withdrawal of Russian troops — appear simple but carry enormous political weight. They implicitly reject any "conflict freeze" arrangement in which Russia would retain the occupied Ukrainian territories in exchange for a halt to hostilities. That type of deal, occasionally floated in certain diplomatic circles as a pragmatic compromise, is categorically refused.

The withdrawal demand is the condition most difficult for Moscow to satisfy — and that is precisely why it is on the list. It clearly states: a peace that rewards aggression by leaving Russia on conquered territories is unacceptable. It is a principled position grounded in international law, one that makes Ukraine's territorial integrity an uncrossable line.

The Multinational Ukraine Force: the concrete security guarantee

The third condition — binding security guarantees including the deployment of a Multinational Ukraine Force — is the most innovative and concrete element of the peace doctrine outlined in London. This Multinational Force, whose precise contours remain to be defined, would be deployed on Ukrainian territory to guarantee compliance with any eventual peace agreement and deter any further Russian aggression.

This concept recognizes a fundamental reality: a peace without concrete security guarantees is a truce, not a peace. Ukraine needs to know that if Russia violates an agreement, there will be an automatic and binding international response — not just more condemnations. The Multinational Ukraine Force would be that institutional response.

The Multinational Ukraine Force is a concept that both fascinates and questions me. It resembles a partial guardianship arrangement — and I understand that some Ukrainians see it that way. But in the current context, where Russia has shown it does not honor unguaranteed agreements, an international military presence may be the only credible guarantee. It is not perfect. It is realistic.

The London meeting as G7 preparation

The June 7, 2026 meeting also had an immediate practical objective: to coordinate European positions ahead of the G7 in Évian. The four leaders wanted to ensure that G7 decisions on Ukraine — particularly on frozen Russian assets, financial support, and sanctions — would reflect the positions agreed upon in London.

This prior coordination bore fruit. The G7 in Évian produced concrete commitments on support for Ukraine, on strengthening sanctions against Russia, and on the ERA mechanism for mobilizing frozen Russian assets. These results would not have been as coherent without the preparation done at the London meeting.

Ramstein and the European Council in the same dynamic

The coordination dynamic initiated on June 7 in London continued at Ramstein on June 18, the European Council on June 18–19, and the E5 meeting in Berlin on June 22. Within the span of a few weeks, Europe's allies consolidated a common doctrine, formalized major military and financial commitments, and aligned their positions ahead of the NATO summit in Ankara.

This cadence of summits and coordination meetings can appear excessive to an outside observer. But for those involved, it is the normal mechanics of intensive crisis diplomacy. The Ukraine war has forced democracies to operate at a coordination speed they had not practiced in decades.

I am sometimes irritated by the procedural dimension of this diplomacy — summit after summit, declaration after declaration. But when I look at the coherence of the decisions produced over June 2026 as a whole, I have to admit the machine works. Slowly, imperfectly, but it works.

A commitment of duration against Russia

The fourth condition — the maintenance of frozen Russian assets until full compensation — is a durational commitment the four leaders wanted to inscribe as a non-negotiable principle. It responds to a legitimate fear: that a peace agreement would lead to the premature lifting of sanctions and asset freezes before Ukraine has been compensated for the damage caused by Russian aggression.

This condition carries considerable weight. It means that even after a ceasefire and a withdrawal of Russian troops, the frozen assets — roughly $300 billion — would remain locked until Russia has paid the compensation owed to Ukraine. It is a form of permanent economic pressure on Moscow, designed to ensure that peace is also a just peace.

The International Claims Commission: the compensation mechanism

The International Claims Commission for Ukraine, whose establishment is advancing in parallel with the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression, is the mechanism designed to assess and process Ukrainian compensation claims. Its operationalization, welcomed by the European Council on June 18–19, 2026, is a key piece of the justice and accountability architecture being built around the war in Ukraine.

The fact that this condition — frozen assets until full compensation — appears among the four peace conditions set in London shows that European allies have incorporated the legal and economic dimension into their vision of peace. It is not just a ceasefire they want — it is a comprehensive resolution that addresses the consequences of the aggression in all their dimensions.

The frozen assets until full compensation condition is, in my view, the most important of the four. It guarantees that peace will not be a disguised amnesty. It tells Moscow: you will pay in full for the damage you caused. I find this vision of international justice not only right, but necessary for the credibility of international law itself.

The transformation of Zelensky's standing on the world stage

Volodymyr Zelensky arrived in London on June 7, 2026 not as a leader pleading with allies, but as an equal partner co-defining the conditions of a just peace. This transformation of his diplomatic standing is one of the most remarkable achievements of his presidency: he transformed Ukraine from a victim-country seeking pity into a strategic actor co-defining European security policy.

This position of relative strength is the product of four years of successful resistance, mastered communication, and intensive diplomacy. It also rests on a military reality: Ukraine holds, strikes deep, and innovates. These results give Zelensky a credibility and weight that few leaders of comparably sized countries possess on the world stage.

The London conditions as Zelensky's minimum program

The four conditions set in London represent Zelensky's minimum program — the floor below which he cannot accept a deal without losing the legitimacy earned through four years of resistance. This is not stubbornness: it is recognition that his population has consented to immense sacrifices to avoid accepting a peace that would resemble a disguised defeat.

This domestic political constraint is real. Zelensky cannot sign an agreement that would abandon occupied territories, provide no binding security guarantees, and release Russian assets without compensation. Any agreement that failed to meet these minimum criteria would be politically unacceptable in Ukraine — and he would be right to reject it.

I see Zelensky in London and think of the head of state who, in February 2022, answered American evacuation offers with "I need ammunition, not a ride." There is absolute consistency between that man in 2022 and the one in 2026 co-defining peace conditions with the leaders of France, the UK, and Germany. Resistance has a diplomatic reward.

Ankara as the next key moment

The London discussions had the NATO summit in Ankara firmly in view. The four leaders discussed coordination for that event, knowing it would be the venue where long-term security guarantees for Ukraine — including the question of NATO membership and/or alternative guarantees — would be negotiated with all 32 Alliance members.

The question of Ukrainian NATO membership remains thorny. Secretary General Mark Rutte has repeatedly stated there is no unanimity on near-term membership. But alternative security guarantees — including the Multinational Ukraine Force — could provide a credible security path without requiring formal near-term accession.

The diplomacy of peace as a minefield

The road to a just peace is strewn with pitfalls. Russian demands — including Ukraine's withdrawal from the Donbas — are incompatible with the conditions set in London. Trump, who wants a swift peace without necessarily ensuring it is just, could seek to bypass European demands. And divisions within NATO — particularly around countries more accommodating toward Moscow — could be exploited by Russian diplomacy.

These obstacles are real. They do not mean peace is impossible — they mean it requires constant vigilance and a European cohesion that cannot be fragmented by Russian and American pressures. The London meeting of June 7, 2026 is one answer to this challenge: creating a hard European core that holds together on the essential conditions.

The road to peace is long and dangerous. Every summit, every coordination meeting, every joint declaration is an attempt to maintain this cohesion against centrifugal pressures. I am not certain it will be enough. But I am certain that without these efforts, the probability of a just peace would be far lower.

Washington between disengagement and pressure for a quick deal

Donald Trump is the most unpredictable variable in the peace equation defined at London. Having directed his attention toward Iran since the spring of 2026, he relaunched his interest in Ukraine at the G7 in Évian in June. His meeting with Zelensky on the sidelines of the summit on June 16 led him to declare that "Russia must make a deal" — an encouraging phrase on substance, but whose concrete meaning has yet to be confirmed by action.

The problem with Trump is not a lack of willingness to end the war — he has been clear about that since his campaign. It is his definition of what constitutes a good deal. For him, a quick agreement that stops the fighting may seem acceptable even if it does not satisfy all the London conditions. European allies must therefore ensure their conditions are sufficiently embedded in any negotiation process involving Washington to avoid being bypassed.

Structural dependence on American engagement

Despite the growing strength of European support, Ukraine remains dependent on the United States in several critical dimensions: satellite intelligence, certain electronic capabilities, and the political weight of Washington in any negotiation with Moscow. This dependence means that the peace conditions set in London cannot be maintained against Trump's will — they must be defended within the framework of a difficult but necessary transatlantic dialogue.

European coordination meetings — including the one in London — also serve to reinforce the collective European position in this dialogue with Washington. A united Europe around clear conditions is harder to work around than a fragmented Europe where each capital can be approached separately. That is the strategic value of the cohesion displayed on June 7.

Trump is the wild card in this diplomatic chess match. He can accelerate peace — that would be positive. He can also impose a rushed peace that satisfies none of the London conditions — that would be a slow-motion catastrophe. I have no certainty about what he will do. But I know that Europe must hold its demands, even under Washington's pressure.

The US-Russia-Ukraine negotiations in 2026

According to diplomatic sources, three rounds of US-Russia-Ukraine negotiations have taken place since the start of 2026 without reaching a ceasefire agreement. The main reason for the failure: Russian demands for Ukraine's withdrawal from the Donbas — incompatible with Kyiv's position and with the conditions set in London. These negotiations illustrate both that dialogue exists and that fundamental positions remain far apart.

The fact that these negotiations have taken place, even without result, is significant. It indicates that Russia is willing to sit at the table under certain conditions — implying that military and economic pressure is beginning to have effect. But "sitting at the table" is very different from "accepting reasonable conditions." Russia is still seeking an exit on its own terms — and that is precisely what the London conditions aim to prevent.

Maximum pressure strategy as a prerequisite for negotiation

The logic behind the 40-day operation launched by Zelensky in late June 2026 — striking Russian energy infrastructure to force Moscow to negotiate — is consistent with the peace doctrine defined in London. One does not obtain fair peace terms by negotiating from a position of weakness. Maximum pressure on Russia is the prerequisite for negotiations that could produce an agreement respecting the four allies' conditions.

The London allies understand this logic. Their weapons deliveries and statements are not aimed solely at supporting Ukraine militarily — they are also aimed at creating the conditions for negotiations in which Ukraine will be in a position to defend its interests. A militarily strong Ukraine is a diplomatically strong Ukraine.

The logic of maximum pressure to negotiate from strength is as old as diplomacy itself. It is cold and cynical. But in a world where Russia only respects force, it may be the only language it understands. I say "may be" — because I am not certain, and humility is required before a situation this complex.

What the June 7 meeting says about the state of the Alliance

The London meeting of June 7, 2026 is a strong signal of the cohesion of the European core around Ukraine. Paris, London, and Berlin — often divided by diverging national interests — speak here with a common voice on the essential conditions of a just peace. With Zelensky at their side, not as a spectator but as co-author of this doctrine, the meeting illustrates the maturity of a partnership forged over time.

This cohesion is not guaranteed forever. It can be tested by elections, economic pressures, and demands from Washington. But the fact that it exists today, expressed in clear and non-negotiable peace conditions, is a significant political reality that will weigh in the negotiations ahead.

Just peace: a requirement, not an aspiration

I end this analysis with the conviction that the conditions set in London on June 7, 2026 are the right ones. They are not perfect — no peace conditions ever are. But they are honest toward Ukrainian sacrifices, consistent with international law, and firm enough to prevent a peace that would be a disguised defeat. That is what could be hoped of this meeting.

The lesson of the London meeting is simple: a just peace is not a utopian ideal — it is a political and legal demand grounded in international law principles and the sacrifices made by the Ukrainian people. Macron, Starmer, and Merz said so clearly on June 7, 2026. Zelensky has been saying it from the start. This file will not be closed by a rushed deal. A just peace or no peace — that is the line these four leaders drew together in London, and it is the line that must hold.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

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