COMMENTARY: The STCA in its "skeleton phase" — real justice or institutional illusion?

COMMENTARY: The STCA in its "skeleton phase" — real justice or institutional illusion?

Introduction: 36 states, the EU, and a tribunal without walls or judges

What exactly is the STCA?

The Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine — the STCA — is entering what JusticeInfo.net calls its "skeleton phase." This international tribunal, created on May 15, 2026 by 36 states and the European Union at a meeting of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in Chișinău, is the first such mechanism since the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after the Second World War. Its mandate: to try the Russian political and military leaders responsible for the decision to launch and conduct a war of aggression against Ukraine.

But as of June 2026, the STCA is still a tribunal without a building, without judges, without administrative staff. It has an acronym, a founding agreement, and a political intent. It does not yet have the institutional tools to function. This is what the "skeleton phase" means — a legal framework laid, but institutional flesh yet to be built. To understand what this truly means, it is worth tracing the history of this project and its stakes.

First since Nuremberg: the symbolic weight

The historical context is essential. Nuremberg (1945–1946) and Tokyo (1946–1948) established the precedent that a state's leaders could be held personally accountable for the crime of aggression — then called "crimes against peace." These precedents were incorporated into the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 1998. But the ICC has a major structural limitation: it cannot try nationals of states that have not ratified the Rome Statute for crimes committed on the territory of those states — which excludes Russia for the crime of aggression.

The STCA works around this limitation through a different structure: it is established by agreement between Ukraine and the Council of Europe, and will exercise jurisdiction on Ukraine's behalf. This innovative legal architecture will allow it to try senior Russian officials — potentially Putin himself — even in their absence, through trials in absentia.

The genesis: from idea to founding agreement

A project reaching back to 2022

The idea of a special tribunal for the Russian crime of aggression against Ukraine was launched by Zelensky and his legal advisors as early as 2022. The project advanced step by step. In 2023, a Core Group of 36 countries formed to work on the tribunal's creation. In January 2026, Council of Europe Secretary General Alain Berset announced the signing of an agreement establishing a preparatory team. On May 14–15, 2026 in Chișinău, the foreign ministers of the 46 members of the Council of Europe formally adopted the expanded agreement — with 37 countries supporting the document, according to Ukrinform.

This four-year journey, punctuated by legal challenges, political resistance, and complex technical discussions, is remarkable. It reflects a persistent political will rooted in the conviction that the individual accountability of leaders for state crimes must be an effective principle of international law — not merely an aspiration.

The key roles of Ukraine and the Netherlands

Two actors were central to the creation of the STCA. First, Ukraine, which initiated the project, negotiated the founding agreement (signed by Zelensky on June 25, 2025, ratified by the Ukrainian Parliament on July 15, 2025), and pushed relentlessly for its advancement. Second, the Netherlands, which offered to host it — the tribunal will likely be based in The Hague, the world capital of international justice institutions. This geographic placement is not incidental: it anchors the STCA in the institutional ecosystem of international criminal justice, alongside the ICC, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.

The EU played an essential catalyzing role: the European Parliament voted on April 30, 2026, by 446 votes in favor, 63 against, and 52 abstentions, in favor of establishing the tribunal. This broad, bipartisan vote across Europe gave the project a democratic legitimacy that goes beyond a simple intergovernmental agreement.

What the STCA can do — and what it cannot

Trials in absentia: judging without the accused

The STCA provides for the possibility of trials in absentia — trying the accused even in their absence. This is a practical necessity: it is unlikely that Putin or other senior Russian officials will voluntarily appear before the tribunal. This provision is also a powerful symbolic declaration: even if the accused refuse to appear, the evidence will be presented, the crimes documented, and a judgment rendered. Impunity will not be complete.

Historically, trials in absentia have value at multiple levels. They establish a legal record of crimes. They can strip the accused of certain rights in signatory countries. They create lasting international stigmatization. And above all, they keep alive the principle that state crimes — even those committed by "untouchable" leaders — will one day be accounted for.

The real limits: without the United States or China

The STCA's limitations are as real as its strengths. First, the United States — not being a member of the Council of Europe — has not joined the tribunal. This does not invalidate it, but reduces its perceived authority. China, Russia, India, and other major powers are not part of it. The tribunal remains essentially a European project and its close allies.

Second, without an effective arrest mechanism, any eventual convictions remain symbolic as long as the accused are not on the territory of a signatory state. Putin is already under an ICC arrest warrant for child deportation — this warrant has not prevented him from continuing to govern. A STCA judgment will have no immediate practical effect on his freedom of movement.

The crimes covered: the crime of aggression

What exactly is the crime of aggression?

The crime of aggression is one of four crimes falling under international criminal law — alongside war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes against protected groups. It designates "the planning, preparation, initiation, or execution of an act of aggression" by a state. Unlike other crimes, which can be committed by individuals at any level of the military hierarchy, the crime of aggression can only be committed by those who exercise effective control or direction over a state's political or military action — meaning leaders at the very top.

For Ukraine, this means the STCA targets specifically Putin and his immediate circle — members of the Russian Security Council, senior military commanders, ministers who approved or implemented the decision to invade. The tribunal focuses on the decision to invade Ukraine — a decision that constitutes the crime of aggression in itself, independently of the methods employed.

The difference from the ICC: why a separate tribunal was necessary

The ICC is already prosecuting individual Russians for war crimes — including the warrant against Putin and Lvova-Belova for child deportation. But the ICC cannot handle the crime of aggression against Ukraine because Russia has not ratified the Rome Statute. This legal gap was an obstacle that only the creation of a specific tribunal could resolve.

The STCA therefore complements the ICC — it does not compete with it. Both institutions can operate in parallel: the ICC on war crimes and crimes against humanity, the STCA on the crime of aggression. Together, they cover the full spectrum of international criminal accountability for the Russian war against Ukraine.

The "skeleton phase": what it means concretely

A legal framework without infrastructure

The "skeleton phase" described by JusticeInfo.net is the STCA's current period: the legal framework is in place — the founding agreement, the statutes, the governance structure — but the tribunal does not yet have a physical building, appointed judges, or administrative staff. This is a necessary transition period between the political decision to create the tribunal and its full operationality.

Concretely, this means: ongoing negotiations with the Netherlands on hosting; a judge selection procedure to launch (they will serve nine-year terms, under rules voted by the European Parliament); recruitment of registry staff, prosecutors, and investigators; and the establishment of evidence collection and management protocols. Each of these steps takes time — but each is under way.

The investigations that can begin now

What is important to understand is that even during the skeleton phase, preliminary investigations can begin. Evidence of the crime of aggression — official Russian decisions, speech transcripts, documented communications through the chain of command — is abundant and in the public domain. The International Centre for the Prosecution of Aggression (ICPA), established in The Hague, is already accumulating evidence that will be transferred to the STCA once it is fully operational.

Furthermore, member states have national jurisdictions exercising universal jurisdiction for the crime of aggression. Judicial proceedings in Germany, Spain, and Sweden constitute parallel procedures that feed the overall evidentiary base. The STCA is therefore born into an already-active legal ecosystem — it does not have to start from scratch.

Why international justice matters, even when imperfect

The value of future deterrence

Skeptics of international justice often argue that tribunals like the STCA have no practical effect on leaders currently in power. This is partially true — Putin will not surrender himself to The Hague. But the value of the STCA is not only in condemning the current aggressor. It lies in deterring potential future aggressors.

If the decisions of an international court demonstrate that a head of state can be personally convicted for launching a war of aggression — even if that conviction does not materialize in an arrest until after his death or fall — this alters the risk calculus for any future leader considering a similar venture. It is not a guarantee. But it is an additional risk — and a signal to the international community that this type of crime does not go unpunished.

Collective memory as a function of justice

Beyond deterrence, international justice fulfills a function of collective memory. The Nuremberg trials established a definitive factual record of Nazi crimes — a record that made the denial or minimization of those crimes impossible. The STCA will fulfill the same function for the Russian war against Ukraine: a legally established record, with evidence presented and examined according to criminal law standards, findings that will form part of the official history of this conflict.

For Ukraine and its victims, this legal memory is of incalculable importance. It says: what happened to you happened. It was a crime. The responsible parties are named. And one day, the world will hold the record of their accountability.

The absent states: when neutrality becomes complicity

The countries that said no to the STCA

Out of 193 United Nations members, only 37 states have joined the STCA. The majority of the world — China, India, Brazil, South Africa, much of Africa and Asia — has abstained or actively refused to participate. Some invoke sovereignty and non-interference. Others have economic and diplomatic interests with Moscow they are unwilling to jeopardize. The result is a tribunal representing less than a fifth of humanity.

This geopolitical reality limits the STCA's reach, but does not invalidate it. The Nuremberg Tribunal was not universal either — it represented the victorious allied powers. Its legitimacy nonetheless survived decades, because the principles it established were just. The STCA can follow the same path: beginning with 37, and seeing its legitimacy grow over time.

Russia before justice: scenarios and probabilities

Will Putin ever face trial?

Vladimir Putin, 73 years old in 2026, has governed Russia for more than a quarter century. It is quite likely that he will die of old age or another cause before ever physically appearing in a courtroom. The STCA can conduct proceedings in absentia — a judgment rendered in the defendant's absence — as certain international tribunals allow. This is not ideal symbolically, but it would produce a legally valid verdict and a permanent record of the crimes.

Alternative scenarios exist. A regime change in Russia could bring a successor government to cooperate with the tribunal — as West Germany cooperated with denazification processes after 1945. Continued economic and diplomatic pressure could isolate Russia sufficiently that cooperation becomes a political necessity. And even without extradition, the mere existence of an international arrest warrant transforms Putin into a pariah — as Omar al-Bashir or Ratko Mladić were before their arrests.

Conclusion: Ukraine chose the path of law — and that is the right choice

A three-level strategy: military, diplomatic, legal

The creation of the STCA fits within Ukraine's three-level strategy. Militarily: resist, counter-attack, reclaim territory. Diplomatically: maintain Western support, isolate Russia, build coalitions. Legally: document crimes, establish accountability, build an international justice architecture that makes Russia answerable for its aggression in a lasting way.

These three strategies reinforce each other. Military resistance creates the conditions in which diplomacy and law can function. Diplomatic pressure sustains support for judicial investigations. And international justice legitimizes military resistance by confirming its legal grounding in the face of illegal aggression.

The long arc of international justice

The "skeleton phase" of the STCA should not be read as weakness or delay. It reflects the profoundly institutional nature of international justice — a justice that, to be durable and credible, must be built with rigor. The Nuremberg trials began one year after the end of the war. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia delivered its first judgments years after the crimes. International justice is slow — but it is also tenacious.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Sources and positioning

This commentary draws on sources published by JusticeInfo.net, Ukrinform, Euromaidan Press, and The Kyiv Independent. The columnist explicitly supports the STCA project as a necessary international justice mechanism. This position influences his presentation of the topic, though he has sought to present fairly the tribunal's limitations and critics.

Limits of coverage

The exact status and internal procedures of the STCA continue to evolve. Some technical legal aspects go beyond the columnist's expertise, as he is not an international lawyer. The cited information is accurate as of June 28, 2026 but may have evolved since.

Sources

Primary sources

JusticeInfo.net — Special Tribunal for Crime of Aggression Ukraine enters skeleton phase — June 2026

Ukrinform — Council of Europe approves agreement to establish Special Tribunal — May 15, 2026

Euromaidan Press — European Parliament backs establishment of special tribunal for Russia — April 30, 2026

Secondary sources

The Kyiv Independent — 36 countries in Core Group on Special Tribunal — May 2023 (historical context)

Euromaidan Press — Russia could face special tribunal by 2026 — May 14, 2025

Euromaidan Press — Austria joins tribunal coalition — April 16, 2026