ANALYSIS: Kim Jong Un and His Deadly New Toys — the Guided Arsenal Aimed at Seoul

Introduction: June 25, 2026, Pyongyang Commemorates by Firing

The Korean War anniversary as a military showcase

On June 25, 2026, the 76th anniversary of the beginning of the Korean War of 1950, Kim Jong Un treats the occasion not as a moment for mourning or reflection — but as a stage. Under his direct supervision, the Korean People's Army conducted a series of weapons tests sending an unambiguous strategic message to Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington: North Korea is modernizing its conventional and tactical arsenal at a pace no one can ignore.

According to the official North Korean agency KCNA, which reported the tests on Friday, the trials included an improved version of the 24-tube 240mm multiple rocket launcher, tactical ballistic missiles, and a 155mm self-propelled howitzer. Kim expressed his "satisfaction" with the results. The technical and political significance of these tests goes beyond their summary description.

What Pyongyang tests — and why it matters

The most technically significant detail of these tests is the equipping of the 240mm rocket with an autonomous precision guidance system and the extension of its range to 90 kilometers. The combination — autonomous guidance plus extended range — transforms what was a saturation area-denial system into a precision strike vector. This is exactly the combination that South Korean and American military planners fear.

The 240mm Rocket Launcher: When Area Saturation Becomes Precision

The old system: power without precision

The 240mm multiple rocket launcher is one of the oldest and most feared artillery systems in North Korea's arsenal. In its original configuration, it was designed for saturation fire — sending hundreds of rockets over a broad area to destroy it through volume. Its range was limited to about forty kilometers in its initial versions. Its lack of precision made it formidable for striking urban areas or troop concentrations, but largely ineffective against specific hardened military targets.

North Korean long-range artillery already represented an existential threat to Seoul — the South Korean capital is only 50 kilometers from the border. Thousands of artillery pieces aimed at the South's capital have for decades been part of North Korea's deterrence calculus: any preemptive attack on the North would be answered with a rain of fire on Seoul. This is the "gun pointed at the hostage's head" in Kim's strategy.

The new version: autonomous guidance at 90 km

The upgraded version presented on June 25, 2026 fundamentally changes the calculus. With an autonomous precision guidance system and a range of 90 kilometers, this system can now: strike hardened military targets with a precision the old version did not allow; reach Seoul and its large suburbs from geographically more remote positions, harder to detect and neutralize; engage critical infrastructure — airbases, ammunition storage facilities, command centers — rather than simply terrorizing civilian populations.

Kim declared that the objective of his armament program was to achieve automation, long range, and "ultra-precision." The combination of these three attributes in a single low-cost artillery system — compared to expensive ballistic missiles — represents massive conventional strike capability at relatively low cost. This is precisely what allied military strategists fear most.

Tactical Ballistic Missiles: The Centerpiece

May 2026: a prior test that establishes the context

The June 25 tests did not occur in a vacuum. In May 2026, North Korea had already announced the test of a set of weapons including tactical ballistic missiles, artillery rockets, and AI-guided cruise missiles — a first explicitly mentioned by North Korean authorities. This revelation of missiles guided by artificial intelligence had already alerted military analysts.

North Korean tactical ballistic missiles — notably the variants of the KN-23 family, with their depressed trajectory that complicates interception — were developed precisely to circumvent missile defense systems like the THAAD deployed in South Korea. Their precision has improved across successive tests, and their capacity to carry a tactical nuclear warhead is one of the most concerning hypotheses in American military staff analyses.

Nuclear-conventional integration as strategic objective

Professor Lim Eul-chul of the Institute for Far Eastern Studies at Kyungnam University provided a particularly illuminating analysis: "The intention is ultimately to fully establish tactical nuclear and precision strike capabilities in front-line units, placing all of South Korea within range." This formulation captures the essence of North Korean military doctrine in 2026: not to separate the nuclear from the conventional, but to integrate them in advanced combat units for simultaneous deterrence and employment options.

This doctrine of nuclear-conventional integration differs from Cold War logic where nuclear forces were separated from conventional ones and reserved for mutually assured destruction scenarios. By integrating tactical nuclear strike capabilities into front-line conventional formations, Pyongyang lowers the nuclear employment threshold while maintaining ambiguity about the precise moment this option would be activated.

The 155mm Self-Propelled Howitzer: Modernized Firepower

A NATO-standard caliber in North Korea's arsenal

The inclusion of a 155mm self-propelled howitzer in the June 25 tests is revealing. The 155mm caliber is the NATO standard — the same used by South Korean K9 howitzers, American M109s, French Caesars, and other allied systems. The presence of this caliber in the North Korean test raises questions about the intended employment doctrine.

A 155mm self-propelled howitzer offers direct firepower in ground combat with mobility that towed artillery pieces lack. In a scenario of breaching defensive lines or rapid counterattack, such a system would allow the Korean People's Army to engage South Korean and American mechanized units with comparable firepower in caliber, even if precision and electronics likely remain inferior to Western versions.

Conventional modernization as a complement to nuclear deterrence

Kim Jong Un's military strategy combines two complementary elements: nuclear deterrence to prevent a decisive attack on the regime, and conventional modernization to maintain a credible localized offensive capability. If nuclear forces deter total war, modernized conventional forces maintain daily pressure on allies, allow limited operations or controlled escalations, and constitute a permanent political pressure instrument.

This combination is deliberate and coherent. Pyongyang does not invest only in nuclear weapons at the expense of conventional ones — it invests in both simultaneously, seeking to cover the full conflict spectrum from border incident to nuclear exchange. This doctrine of full spectrum coverage is economically costly, but the human costs paid by the North Korean population that finances it are never mentioned in the regime's official discourse.

The Political Significance of June 25

The date as message

Choosing June 25 — the anniversary of the start of the Korean War — for these tests is not accidental. It is a politically charged choice that communicates several things simultaneously: to the domestic audience, it reinforces the official narrative that North Korea is perpetually at war with the United States and its allies, justifying the economic sacrifices imposed on the population; to the international audience, it recalls that Pyongyang considers the Korean War technically unfinished — the 1953 armistice being not a peace treaty — and reserves the right to "complete it" on its own terms.

Kim Jong Un also explicitly declared that the objective of his military modernization was to fortify the southern border — designating without ambiguity the border with South Korea as the front line of a permanent confrontation. This formulation — "southern border" — is technically precise in its aim: Seoul, its 10 million inhabitants, its infrastructure, its military bases, its economy.

The signal sent to Washington

The June 25 tests come in a particular diplomatic context. The Trump administration had previously maintained rhetoric about a possible opening toward Pyongyang, and rumors of informal contacts were circulating. The June 25 show of force responds to this diplomatic hypothesis clearly: Kim does not negotiate from a position of weakness; he negotiates — if he negotiates — from a position of military strength he continues to improve.

For Washington, the test of autonomous guidance on a major artillery system confirms that North Korea is not in diplomatic waiting mode — it is actively developing advanced military capabilities while potential discussions are on the table. This is a negotiation conducted under the explicit and demonstrative threat of the adversary, which does not simplify the equation.

Artificial Intelligence in Cruise Missiles

AI-guided missiles: a technological frontier crossed

The May 2026 test explicitly included what North Korean authorities called AI-guided cruise missiles. This designation — if it corresponds to a verifiable technical reality — represents an important technological breakthrough. An AI-guided cruise missile can in theory adapt its trajectory in real time, identify targets from images captured during flight, avoid unforeseen obstacles, and circumvent active defenses.

The Western intelligence community is cautiously skeptical about Pyongyang's technical claims — the regime tends to claim capabilities before they are fully operational, and tests sometimes present manipulated results. But the existence of an advanced autonomous guidance program is consistent with observed trends: presumed Russian assistance to certain North Korean technological programs, illicit acquisitions of advanced electronic components, and growing sophistication across successive tests.

North Korean technology: indigenous or assisted?

The question of the technological sources of North Korean armament programs remains partially opaque. Analyses from the Institute of Korean Studies and other research centers have documented growing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia — notably the supply of North Korean ammunition for Russian operations in Ukraine, in presumed exchange for military technologies, fuel, and technical assistance.

If this cooperation has included technology transfers in the domain of precision guidance or AI applied to weapons systems, it could explain the relatively rapid progression of North Korean capabilities in these areas. This hypothesis is not publicly confirmed, and I present it as such — but it is consistent with the logic of the economic and military exchanges observed between Pyongyang and Moscow.

South Korean and American Missile Defense: Sufficient?

THAAD and the gaps in coverage

The United States has deployed a THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) battery in South Korea since 2017. This system is designed to intercept short- and medium-range ballistic missiles in their terminal phase. It is effective against ballistic missiles on predictable trajectories — but potentially less effective against depressed-trajectory missiles like the KN-23 variants, nor against the mass of artillery rockets represented by the 240mm rocket launchers.

South Korea has also invested in its own air defense system — the Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) — and is developing counter-battery strike capabilities to neutralize North Korean artillery before it fires. But covering the thousands of artillery pieces that North Korea maintains in fortified tunnels near the border remains a considerable challenge. Adding autonomous precision guidance to these systems makes the task even harder.

The South Korean plan: preemptive strike capabilities

In response to rising North Korean threats, South Korea developed what military officials call the "Kill Chain" concept — a preemptive strike doctrine targeting North Korean nuclear and conventional assets if signs of an imminent attack are detected. This concept requires real-time precision intelligence and the ability to strike before North Korean missiles are launched.

The extension of the 240mm range to 90 kilometers complicates this doctrine: launch positions can now be placed further from the border, in areas more difficult to monitor and strike, while maintaining full coverage of Seoul. Every range and precision improvement that Pyongyang introduces forces Seoul and Washington to recalibrate their defense plans.

The Economic Dimension: Arming in Misery

A military program financed by the people's hunger

Kim Jong Un's armament program is financed in a context of economic catastrophe for the North Korean population. The international sanctions imposed in response to nuclear tests have severely damaged the national economy. Estimates from several NGOs and UN agencies document persistent levels of chronic malnutrition, particularly among children. Ammunition exports to Russia constitute one of the regime's rare sources of foreign currency revenue.

This economic reality is deliberately ignored in North Korean official discourse, which presents military power as an existential necessity. For the regime, the logic is clear: military capability guarantees the survival of power; the survival of power takes precedence over the population's well-being. This is a brutal, documented equation, and the June 25 military demonstrations illustrate it in their full context.

Arms exports: a parallel war economy

The supply of North Korean ammunition to Russia for its operations in Ukraine has created a revenue stream that allows Pyongyang to partially finance its own modernization program. Unofficial estimates, cited by several specialized media outlets, suggest that North Korea has supplied hundreds of thousands of artillery shells to Russia since 2023. In return, it reportedly receives fuel, food, and — potentially — advanced military technologies.

This parallel military economy allows the regime to maintain its armament program while partially circumventing the effects of sanctions. This is a concrete example of how autocrats support each other — Russia indirectly finances North Korean military modernization while North Korea provides the ammunition that allows Russia to prolong its war in Ukraine.

The Geopolitical Context: Trump, Kim, and Impossible Diplomacy

The Singapore legacy: an unkept promise

The Singapore summit of 2018 between Trump and Kim had raised considerable hopes — a vague declaration on denuclearization, a few symbolic gestures, and optimistic rhetoric. Eight years later, North Korea is more nuclearized, more precise, and more capable than in 2018. The tests of June 25, 2026 illustrate the extent of the ground covered by Pyongyang since that denuclearization promise.

The question that arises in 2026 is no longer "how to denuclearize North Korea" — an objective that virtually all experts now consider unachievable without regime change. The question becomes: how to manage a nuclearized North Korea, conventionally strengthened, and integrated into a network of autocrats hostile to the West? This is a question that democracies have not yet answered coherently.

Regional allies: Japan, South Korea, United States

South Korea and Japan have strengthened their intelligence-sharing and missile defense cooperation in recent years, partially overcoming historical tensions between the two countries. The United States maintains approximately 28,500 troops in South Korea and additional power-projection capabilities from Japan. This collective defense architecture remains the primary deterrent against North Korean aggression.

But the continued modernization by Pyongyang — autonomous guidance, extended range, tactical ballistic missiles, tactical nuclear potential in advanced units — increases the potential cost of any conflict even for a militarily superior alliance. The higher the cost of conflict, the more robust and credible deterrence must be to remain effective. And in the current American political environment — with a Trump administration whose reliability of allied commitments is questioned — American deterrence credibility is itself an uncertain variable.

The Stakes for the Korean Peninsula: A Reconfigured Balance of Terror

Seoul under direct threat

With a range of 90 kilometers and autonomous guidance, the new 240mm rocket launcher can cover not only Seoul but also a large portion of American bases in South Korea, South Korean military airports, command centers, and the country's northern industrial hubs. The combination of this system with the tactical ballistic missiles and the AI-guided cruise missiles tested in May creates a diversified strike architecture that would be difficult to counter simultaneously.

Allied military planners now calculate scenarios in which, in the first hours of a conflict, Pyongyang could saturate allied defenses through the multiplicity of vectors — depressed-trajectory ballistic missiles, long-range guided rockets, autonomous cruise missiles — before countermeasures could be fully activated. This initial vulnerability window is precisely what North Korean modernization seeks to maximize.

The allied response: the limits of the status quo

The current response of the US-South Korea-Japan alliance is based on deterrence: demonstrating that any North Korean aggression would be followed by an overwhelming response that would destroy the regime. This logic is coherent — but it rests on the assumption that Kim is rationally deterrable. If Kim calculated that a limited preemptive strike — say, a show of force against an American base — could bring him political gains while keeping the conflict below the threshold of a total response, the current deterrence doctrine would be insufficient.

This is precisely in that space — limited conflict below the threshold of total response — that North Korea's conventional and tactical nuclear modernization seeks to operate. The June 25 tests indicate that Pyongyang is actively developing capabilities for this gray zone. This is a threat that Pacific democracies must take seriously.

The International Community: Between Condemnations and Impotence

Ritual condemnations without effect

Every North Korean military test produces the same predictable international response: condemnations from Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul, a UN Security Council vote or meeting often blocked by Russian and Chinese vetoes, IAEA statements, calls for dialogue. This diplomatic routine has accompanied every test for decades — and its failure to modify Pyongyang's behavior is documented.

China, North Korea's principal economic partner, maintains an ambiguous relationship with Pyongyang: it does not approve of North Korean nuclear programs that complicate its own regional diplomacy, but it also does not want regime collapse that would provoke reunification of the peninsula under American influence. This Chinese ambivalence provides Kim with diplomatic maneuvering room that the international community cannot easily close.

Sanctions: useful but insufficient

The international sanctions imposed on North Korea have unquestionably reduced its financial resources and slowed certain aspects of its armament program. But they have not stopped nuclear progression nor prevented the conventional modernization we observe in 2026. The reason is structural: the North Korean regime has demonstrated that it can impose economic sacrifices on its population as long as necessary to maintain its military program. In a system where power is maintained through fear and repression, economic sanctions function differently than in democracies.

Arms exports to Russia — technically illegal under UN Security Council resolutions — have partially circumvented the effects of sanctions by providing foreign currency and fuel. As long as Russia needs ammunition for its war in Ukraine and China does not fully cut the economic lifelines, sanctions will remain a tool with limited effects.

Kim Jong Un and Succession: A Regime for Eternity?

The question of regime continuity

The June 25 military tests fit within a long-term strategy. Kim Jong Un consolidates his power, reinforces his military legitimacy within his army, and prepares successors to maintain a militarily strong regime. His daughter, Kim Ju Ae, regularly appears by his side during missile tests — staging that suggests preparation for succession within the Kim family clan.

This dynastic continuity is a structural factor of the North Korean threat: the problem is not only Kim Jong Un as an individual, but a political system built around regime survival through military power. As long as this system does not fundamentally change, the progression of North Korean military capabilities will continue — regardless of the personality in power.

What June 25, 2026 says about 2030 and beyond

If the modernization pace observed on June 25 continues for five years, the North Korea of 2030 will possess a formidable combination: ICBMs capable of striking anywhere in the United States, tactical nuclear capabilities integrated into conventional units, long-range precision-guided artillery, and AI-guided cruise missiles. This architecture will represent a qualitatively different threat from that of 2020.

The democracies surrounding the Korean Peninsula have five years to develop more effective responses — diplomatic, economic, military — than those that have failed so far. The June 25 tests are a warning with a deadline. It would be imprudent to ignore them.

Kim Jong Un and Summit Diplomacy: A Strategy of International Recognition

North Korea seeks to normalize its military power

The June 25, 2026 demonstration is not only a military message addressed to Seoul and Washington. It is also a diplomatic signal: Kim Jong Un seeks to be treated as the head of state of an established military power, not as the leader of a pariah regime to be contained. Every missile successfully tested, every 240mm rocket launcher presented before cameras, every 155mm self-propelled howitzer paraded through the streets of Pyongyang reinforces this message: North Korea is a real military power. Treat it accordingly.

This strategy of recognition through power demonstration has produced concrete results. Trump, during his first term, granted Kim three historic summits. These summits did not result in a denuclearization agreement, but they gave Kim the international visibility and legitimacy he sought. In 2026, Kim observes the American-Iranian dynamics and calculates: if Iran can obtain an agreement that recognizes its nuclear program, why shouldn't North Korea obtain better terms by negotiating from an even stronger military position?

The Iranian parallel and its limits

The comparison between the Iranian and North Korean situations is tempting but has important limits. Iran has not yet produced a nuclear weapon. North Korea possesses an arsenal estimated at between 40 and 100 warheads, according to American intelligence service assessments. This qualitative difference is fundamental: negotiating with a country that does not yet have the bomb is conceptually different from negotiating with a country that already has it and continues to produce more.

Moreover, North Korea does not have Iran's economic leverage — it is already so economically isolated that additional sanctions have marginal impact. Sanctions relief, which is the principal incentive the West can offer Iran, weighs much less in the North Korean balance. Kim Jong Un sits atop a state whose economy is already at the floor. What he lacks is the de facto international recognition of his nuclear power status — a recognition that the American-Iranian MoU indicates can be obtained through persistence and shows of force.

South Korea: Essential Ally Under Maximum Pressure

Seoul between Washington and the permanent threat from the North

South Korea is the most exposed ally in this equation. Its 25 million inhabitants in the Seoul region live within range of North Korean conventional howitzers — let alone ballistic missiles. This brutal geographic proximity fundamentally determines South Korean policy toward North Korea: it cannot afford a total confrontation strategy without risking exposing its capital to massive destruction before American retaliatory strikes could produce their effects.

The South Korean government constantly juggles two contradictory imperatives: maintaining a credible deterrence posture against the North, and preserving the possibility of diplomatic dialogue that could eventually reduce tensions. This tension has been structural in Korean politics since 1953. It explains the cycles of engagement and disengagement with Pyongyang depending on which government is in power. And it explains why South Korea can never simply be a spokesperson for the American position — its immediate vital interests sometimes diverge from those of its geographically distant ally.

The THAAD anti-missile shield and its controversies

The deployment of the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) anti-missile system in South Korea since 2017 remains one of the most controversial defensive decisions in the region. Designed to intercept North Korean ballistic missiles at high altitude, THAAD provoked a furious reaction from China — which sees it as a system capable of detecting its own missiles on associated radars — and a period of informal Chinese economic sanctions against South Korean companies. The tension between defensive necessity against North Korea and maintaining viable economic relations with China is a perfect illustration of the geopolitical dilemmas Seoul must manage daily.

In 2026, with the North Korean arsenal in constant documented expansion on June 25, discussions are resuming in South Korea about strengthening the THAAD shield, acquiring additional capabilities, and potentially — in conservative circles — returning to a debate about national nuclear armament. This debate, taboo just five years ago, is now openly discussed in South Korean media. This is a measure of the level of concern generated by Pyongyang's military progression.

Conclusion: An Arsenal That Has Only One Target

What the June 25 tests reveal

The tests of June 25, 2026 reveal a North Korea in the midst of a qualitative transition — no longer merely the quantity of weapons but their precision, range, and guidance autonomy. A 240mm rocket launcher with autonomous guidance at 90 km, tactical ballistic missiles, a 155mm self-propelled howitzer: this is an arsenal that, combined with existing nuclear capabilities, makes the Korean peninsula one of the most militarized and most dangerous places in the world.

What the West must understand now

The North Korean threat is not a distant geopolitical curiosity. It is a direct threat to the stability of the Asia-Pacific region, to the credibility of American deterrence, and to the international order founded on nuclear non-proliferation. Ignoring, minimizing, or managing it reactively and in isolation has not worked. A coherent approach — integrating diplomacy, sanctions, military strengthening of allies, and a clear policy toward China, which keeps Pyongyang on life support — is an urgent necessity.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

My position and my biases

I am critical of the North Korean regime, its massive human rights violations, and its nuclear proliferation strategy. I am in favor of defending Pacific democracies and credible deterrence against military threats. These positions inform my analysis. On the precise technical capabilities of North Korean weapons systems, I rely on verifiable public sources.

What I don't know

I do not have access to classified information on the actual capabilities of North Korean weapons systems beyond publicly declared tests. I cannot independently confirm whether AI-guidance claims reflect fully operational capabilities or aspirations under testing. The presumed technological cooperation with Russia is a coherent hypothesis, not a publicly documented certainty.

Sources

Primary sources

US News & World Report — North Korean Leader Kim Oversees Weapons Tests, KCNA Reports — June 25, 2026

Militarnyi — SSU Drones Strike Damages Oil Refinery in Moscow — May 17, 2026

Foreign Policy — The Philippines Are in for a Turbulent 2026 — January 19, 2026

Secondary sources

Al Jazeera — Russia reports downing 660 Ukrainian drones — June 26, 2026

The Straits Times — NATO's Rutte says billions in new defense contracts will be announced at summit — June 26, 2026

Carnegie Endowment — Are Long-Term NATO–South Korea Defense Ties Possible? — February 18, 2026

Institute for the Study of War — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 18, 2026 — June 19, 2026