DECODING: 10,000 North Koreans in Russia — the dangerous apprenticeship of war

DECODING: 10,000 North Koreans in Russia — the dangerous apprenticeship of war

Introduction: A presence that changes everything

The number that does not lie

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has repeated it multiple times since the start of 2026: approximately 10,000 North Korean soldiers are currently deployed in Russia, and their presence is "incredibly dangerous." This is not rhetorical exaggeration — it is a fact documented by American, South Korean, and Ukrainian intelligence services. This deployment represents the largest foreign military operation by North Korea since the Korean War.

What Zelensky emphasizes forcefully is less the deployment itself than its long-term implications. These soldiers are not simply fighting for Vladimir Putin — they are learning. They are acquiring combat experience that no simulated training program can replicate: drone warfare, electronic warfare, long-range precision strikes, survival under modern artillery fire. And when they return home, they will become instructors who spread these skills throughout the entire Korean People's Army.

A deployment in multiple waves

The story of this deployment began in October 2024, when the first North Korean units were ferried to training bases in the Russian Far East. By the end of that month, the Pentagon was confirming approximately 10,000 soldiers in transit. These troops were rapidly deployed to the Kursk region, the theater of a Ukrainian incursion since August 2024. Over subsequent months, rotations continued, bringing the cumulative total of North Korean soldiers who have served in Russia to estimates ranging from 15,000 to 20,000 personnel, according to private analyses cited by intelligence sources.

Kursk: the baptism by fire

Catastrophic initial casualties

The North Korean soldiers' baptism by fire in Kursk was brutal. Accustomed to an army frozen in a Soviet doctrine dating from the 1960s–70s, they found themselves facing a 21st-century combat reality they had never anticipated: FPV drones capable of targeting an isolated individual, precision-guided munitions, permanent aerial surveillance. Initial casualties were considerable.

The ISW (Institute for the Study of War) estimated, in its February 17, 2026 report, that North Korean soldiers had suffered approximately 2,000 killed and 4,000 to 5,000 wounded during the first phases of the deployment. These figures are corroborated by South Korean intelligence. The BBC reported an estimate of 2,300 North Korean soldiers killed. These losses reflect the initial disorientation of troops unprepared for drone warfare in open terrain.

Adaptation: the most troubling signal

But here is the problem: these soldiers learned. Subsequent rotations showed significant adaptation — better individual dispersion, camouflage techniques, anti-drone discipline, use of shelters. Ukraine war analytics noted that "successive rotations adapted with better individual dispersion, camouflage, and anti-drone discipline, reducing but not eliminating drone-related casualty rates." This accelerated adaptation under real-world conditions is precisely what Kim Jong-un was after.

By early 2026, according to the ISW, North Korean troops in Kursk had transitioned to a fire support role: artillery fire, MLRS (multiple launch rocket systems), aerial reconnaissance to adjust strikes. They operate under Russian command, but are acquiring a systemic understanding of combined arms operations at a level unprecedented for the North Korean army.

What they are learning: the catalogue of useful horrors

Drone warfare: an assimilated revolution

Zelensky spelled out in his interview with Kyodo News in February 2026 exactly what North Korean soldiers are learning: "They are learning how to counter missiles and various types of drones, from FPVs to long-range. They are currently training in Russia because we respond to Russian attacks." In other words, every Ukrainian strike against Russian positions — some of which are held by North Koreans — is an anti-drone tactics lesson for those soldiers.

FPV drones (First Person View), capable of targeting an individual combatant at several kilometers, have revolutionized the Ukrainian battlefield. Ukraine's long-range drones — some of which penetrate Russian territory hundreds of kilometers deep — demonstrate what low-cost precision warfare can achieve. Russian electronic warfare, with its GPS and communications jamming systems, is another invaluable lesson. All of this, North Korean soldiers are observing, experiencing, and internalizing.

Artillery and MLRS: fundamentals modernized

Ukrainian intelligence published by the Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) in February 2026 revealed that North Korean soldiers in Kursk were firing barrel artillery and MLRS against Ukrainian targets, while conducting aerial reconnaissance to adjust fire. This is a sophisticated combined arms integration that the North Korean army had never had the opportunity to practice under real conditions.

The integration of drone reconnaissance for artillery fire adjustment — a capability that the Ukrainian army has developed to an exceptional level — is now mastered by soldiers who will return to Pyongyang to teach these methods. The MLRS they are using in Russia are largely similar to those North Korea deploys along the DMZ. The learning loop is directly applicable to the Korean theater.

The return of the instructors: threat multiplier

3,000 soldiers returned, an army transformed

According to Ukrainian military intelligence cited by RBC-Ukraine in February 2026, throughout the entire North Korean deployment period, "about three thousand soldiers have returned. Most of them become military instructors in order to spread 21st-century warfare skills throughout the North Korean army." This figure is crucial: it represents the core of a program for massive doctrinal transformation of the North Korean army.

These instructors are not merely passing on techniques — they are passing on a combat culture. The difference between an army that has read manuals on drone warfare and an army whose cadres have personally survived FPV drone attacks is immense. Pyongyang is acquiring this real-combat culture at a speed that no partner could have provided otherwise.

The paradox of the sanctioned who prosper

North Korea is one of the most sanctioned countries in the world. These sanctions were designed to deprive Pyongyang of the resources needed for its nuclear and ballistic program. Yet this military deployment illustrates the partial collapse of that strategy: in exchange for its soldiers, Kim Jong-un is receiving from Russia cutting-edge military technologies, financial support circumventing sanctions, energy and food. The sanctions have impoverished the North Korean population — they have not stopped the military program.

The FDD documented that Russia has provided North Korea with electronic warfare systems, air defense systems with land and maritime applications, support for satellite launches, and substantial assistance with the missile program. These transfers represent an unprecedented acceleration of North Korean military capabilities, well beyond what Pyongyang could have developed alone in a similar timeframe.

The impact on the Korean Peninsula

Seoul responds: 500,000 drone warriors

South Korea has not remained passive in the face of this build-up. On June 26, 2026, South Korean Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back announced a massive plan: train 500,000 "drone warriors" across all branches of the armed forces, acquire more than 20,000 low-cost drones, and produce 110,000 drones by 2029 to equip the army, navy, air force, and marines. This plan, built entirely on 100% domestic components for security reasons, is a direct response to the threat that North Korean soldiers trained in Ukraine will pose to the peninsula.

This decision reflects an explicit acknowledgment by Seoul that the return of North Korean soldiers with modern combat experience fundamentally alters the security equation on the peninsula. South Korean intelligence services estimated in October 2024 that the deployment represented "a significant security threat" to South Korea and its allies.

The intelligence challenge: tracking rotations

One of the major difficulties in assessing this threat is tracking rotations. Estimates vary: 10,000 according to Zelensky (June 2026), 8,000 to 10,000 according to Ukraine's GUR (early 2026), 9,500 according to NK News (early 2026). The cumulative figure of soldiers who have served in Russia since October 2024 is much higher — private estimates speak of 15,000 to 20,000 personnel across multiple rotations.

The Russian parliament thanked Kim Jong-un for the "liberation of Kursk" — the State Duma Speaker using this provocative formulation in April 2026 to salute the role of North Korean troops in expelling Ukrainian forces from the region. That word "liberation" is an insult to reality: North Korean soldiers were used as cannon fodder to recapture territory Russia had itself lost following its own aggression.

The two prisoners: the human face of the deployment

Ri and Paek: survivors against all odds

In January 2025, Ukraine captured two North Korean soldiers in Kursk — the first living North Korean captives since the Korean War. Ri (27 years old) and Paek (22 years old), wounded in combat, both publicly expressed the wish to go to South Korea rather than return to North Korea, where, they say, they would be "executed." They have never hidden their fear: having been taken prisoner is, under North Korean doctrine, an act of treason punishable by death.

North Korea had indeed ordered its soldiers to self-detonate with a grenade rather than allow themselves to be captured. The fact that Ri and Paek are alive is due to the circumstances of their capture — severe wounds, momentary unconsciousness. These two cases reveal the totalitarian absurdity of Kim's regime: even his own soldiers prefer captivity with the enemy to a forced return home.

A major diplomatic stake

On June 23, 2026, South Korea officially declared that it would accept all North Korean prisoners of war captured in Ukraine who wish to go there, opposing any forced repatriation. Russia has systematically included the names of Ri and Paek on its lists of prisoners to exchange with Ukraine — an attempt to recover them and hand them back to Pyongyang. The Ukrainian and South Korean foreign ministers were to meet in Seoul on June 30, 2026 to discuss this matter.

International law is complex here: the Geneva Convention normally stipulates the return of prisoners after hostilities, but the principle of non-refoulement prohibits sending individuals to countries where they risk persecution, torture, or execution. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk confirmed in May 2026 that this principle applies to North Korean prisoners held by Ukraine.

The international legal architecture put to the test

The UN Charter and its practical limits

The deployment of North Korean soldiers in Russia constitutes a flagrant violation of several UN Security Council resolutions that prohibit North Korea from generating overseas revenue or military benefits. These resolutions — adopted unanimously by the Council, Russia included — were designed precisely to prevent Kim Jong-un's regime from exporting its military services for compensation. By deploying soldiers in Russia in exchange for technology and financial support, Pyongyang circumvents these restrictions with the active complicity of Moscow.

The paradox is striking: Russia itself voted for several of these resolutions before 2022. By hosting North Korean soldiers, it deliberately violates rules it helped to establish, demonstrating that its commitment to the international non-proliferation framework was always tactical, never structural. This systemic complicity erodes the credibility of the entire multilateral sanctions system — not only against North Korea, but against any actor Russia decides to protect.

The diplomatic response and its shortcomings

The United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, and South Korea have imposed additional sanctions targeting individuals and entities involved in the North Korean deployment. These measures, while symbolically important, have limited reach: they do not touch the primary beneficiaries — Kim Jong-un himself, the North Korean military leadership — who hold no assets in the sanctioning countries and do not travel abroad. Alternative financial channels — cryptocurrencies, Chinese intermediaries, informal commercial networks — allow circumvention with relative ease.

The diplomatic response has also been hampered by the absence of a credible accountability mechanism. The International Criminal Court has no jurisdiction over military matters between states. The UN General Assembly can adopt non-binding resolutions. The Security Council is paralyzed by Russian and Chinese vetoes. This legal architecture, designed in a context of great-power rivalries different from today's, is showing its structural limits.

The implications for global Asia-Pacific defense

Japan and the regional balance

Japan is watching North Korean developments with particular attention, for one simple reason: North Korean intermediate-range ballistic missiles place Japanese cities — including Tokyo and its metropolitan area of 37 million people — within their potential strike envelope. Since 2022, the Japanese government has adopted a substantially revised national defense strategy, calling for a doubling of its defense budget over five years, and acquiring for the first time since World War II a counter-strike capability — in other words, the ability to strike targets on the territory of a potential adversary.

These changes represent a historic break with Japan's postwar doctrine of "active pacifism." They are directly motivated by North Korea's military trajectory — exacerbated by Russian technology transfers — and by uncertainties surrounding the long-term reliability of the American defense shield. Japan is now investing in its own deterrence capability, complementing the US-Japan alliance.

AUKUS and the West's strategic response in the Indo-Pacific

The AUKUS agreement — between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia — for sharing nuclear-propulsion submarine technology is a strategic response to the growing threat environment in the Indo-Pacific. While primarily aimed at China, AUKUS also represents a response to North Korea's growing submarine capability, which is developing ballistic missile submarines. The connection between threats in the Indo-Pacific, East Asia, and Europe is no longer theoretical — it is documented by the deployment of North Korean soldiers in Ukraine and the Russian-North Korean technology transfers.

A coherent strategic response from the democracies requires growing coordination between European and Asian allies. The NATO-Japan-South Korea-Australia partnership, strengthened at the NATO Vilnius summit in 2023 and consolidated since, is a step in this direction. The North Korean soldiers learning drone warfare in Ukraine and returning home to teach those techniques are the living symbol of this interconnection of threats.

Conclusion: Decoding in order to prevent

A learning experience that transforms an army

This deployment of 10,000 North Korean soldiers in Russia is not merely circumstantial military assistance — it is a long-term strategic investment by Kim Jong-un in the modernization of his army. Every soldier who returns is a vector for transmitting a modernized warfare doctrine. Every instructor trained in Russia multiplies that effect. In five to ten years, the North Korean army will be qualitatively different from what it was in 2024.

The response must be regional and coordinated

The international community — and particularly the democratic allies in the Asia-Pacific — must treat the reinforced North Korean threat as a direct priority. South Korea, Japan, and the United States must coordinate their responses with their European allies, recognizing that technology transfers between Russia and North Korea create a shared threat. The deployment of 500,000 drone warriors in Seoul is a start. But the response must also include strengthening sanctions, breaking military supply chains, and increasing support for Ukraine — whose resistance is, literally, the first line of defense against the spread of this warfare doctrine.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Sources and method

This article rests on open sources: official statements by President Zelensky, ISW reports, FDD publications, publicly released South Korean intelligence analyses, and international press coverage. Figures on deployed soldiers vary across sources and dates; I have used the most recent estimates available, noting ranges where precision was uncertain.

My declared biases

I am firmly pro-Ukrainian and convinced that the Russia-North Korea-Iran authoritarian axis represents a serious threat to the international order. This bias may influence my interpretation of the facts. However, the factual elements of this article — the deployment, the casualties, the rotations, the technology transfers — are documented by multiple independent convergent sources. I do not claim impossible neutrality on these questions, but I strive to distinguish established facts from my interpretations.

Sources

Primary sources

Ukrinform — 10,000 North Korean soldiers in Russia, Zelensky says — February 20, 2026

Institute for the Study of War — Korean Peninsula Update, February 17, 2026

RBC-Ukraine — North Koreans shell Ukraine's border area — February 4, 2026

Kyiv Independent — Nearly 11,000 North Korean troops in Kursk Oblast — February 13, 2026

Secondary sources

The Guardian — Kim Jong-un strengthens military ties with Russia — April 27, 2026

Foundation for Defense of Democracies — Russian security assistance creates problems on Korean Peninsula — May 7, 2026

Kyiv Independent — South Korea to accept all North Korean POWs from Ukraine — June 23, 2026