COLUMN: Seoul, 30 million citizens under the direct threat of Kim Jong Un's new weapons

Introduction: The world's most exposed capital doesn't complain — it adapts

A permanent threat that has become background scenery

Very few metropolises in the world have 30 million people living 50 kilometres or less from a border armed to the teeth by a regime that has never signed a peace treaty. Seoul and the greater capital metropolitan area of South Korea are among them. Since June 25, 2026 — the 76th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War — this threat has taken on a new dimension. That day, Kim Jong Un oversaw weapons tests that, if the figures announced by the KCNA agency are accurate, now place the entire Seoul metropolitan area within the direct range of a multiple-launch rocket system positioned near the border, without its launchers needing to relocate.

The improved 240mm rocket system, with a range extended to 90 kilometres and an "autonomous precision guidance system," can strike virtually every major city on the South Korean peninsula from fixed positions north of the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ). Analysts at Kyungnam University confirmed to the Yonhap agency that these systems are "specifically designed to directly threaten Seoul." In parallel, the 155mm self-propelled howitzer tested with extended-range shells of 65 kilometres can reach, according to experts, the southern suburbs of the metropolis.

A deliberately chosen anniversary

The date of June 25 is no coincidence. By choosing the anniversary of the start of the 1950–1953 Korean War to demonstrate his new strike capabilities against the South, Kim Jong Un is sending a political message as much as a military one. He reminds the world that North Korea still considers itself in a state of unresolved war with the South — the 1950 conflict ended with an armistice, not a peace treaty. And he asserts that his army is now capable of resuming where 1953 left off, with weapons his predecessors never had.

What the June 25, 2026 tests really mean

Precision, range, autonomy: an unprecedented combination

What sets the June 25 tests apart from previous ones is the combination of three elements: extended range (90 km), autonomous precision, and rate of fire. The 240mm multiple-launch rocket system with 24 tubes can fire a massive salvo in minutes. If this system can now strike Seoul with precision from its current positions, this fundamentally changes the military calculus: with minimal pre-launch warning, thousands of guided rockets could hit key infrastructure of the South Korean capital — airports, ports, power plants, government districts — within minutes.

The objective announced by KCNA is explicit: "inflicting fatal damage on enemy airstrips, ports, and electrical installations." This formulation clearly designates the civilian and military infrastructure of South Korea. This is not hollow rhetoric — it is a publicly articulated targeting doctrine, and the systems tested on June 25 are designed to execute it.

The tactical nuclear dimension

The tests also included a "special mission" warhead for tactical ballistic missiles. This vague but loaded designation suggests small-format nuclear or chemical warheads designed to be fitted on short-range missiles capable of striking Seoul. If the most pessimistic interpretation is correct — and Kim Jong Un declared in June 2026 that the North Korean navy will be equipped with nuclear weapons — the threat to Seoul carries a tactical nuclear component that strategists must now integrate into all defence scenarios.

Seoul facing the threat: a city of resilience

Shelters, drills, normal life

The city of Seoul has one of the densest networks of air-raid shelters in the world. Tens of thousands of building basements, subway stations, and tunnels are designated as emergency shelters, regularly inspected and stocked. Every year, South Korea conducts civil protection drills where sirens sound and citizens are invited to move to the nearest shelter. In schools, emergency evacuation procedures are regularly practised.

And yet, in a city that attracts millions of tourists each year, where coffee shops and karaoke rooms run until dawn, where per capita GDP rivals that of Western European nations — the North Korean threat has been integrated into a form of extraordinary normality. This resilience is not naivety — it is the result of decades of psychological and infrastructural adaptation to a situation without parallel in developed democracies.

THAAD, Patriot missiles, and the American shield

Seoul's defence rests on a multilayer system. The THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) intercepts ballistic missiles at high altitude. Patriot missiles constitute a second layer at lower altitude. National South Korean air defence systems complete the setup. The US Fifth Fleet and American troops based in South Korea — approximately 28,500 soldiers — constitute Washington's strategic guarantee.

Seoul's response: 500,000 drone soldiers

A doctrine revised in the light of the war in Ukraine

Seoul's response to the June 25 tests was swift and concrete. On Friday, June 26, Defence Minister Ahn Gyu-back announced that South Korea would train 500,000 "drone soldiers" capable of using drones as "personal weapons." This decision reflects a revised military doctrine: having watched how Ukraine uses drone swarms to neutralise Russian artillery and strike deep infrastructure, Seoul is drawing the operational lessons of that war for its own strategic context.

The idea of training 500,000 drone soldiers — approximately 15% of the total reserve force — represents a doctrinal transformation without precedent. If every soldier can operate a combat or surveillance drone as an individual weapon, battlefield coverage density increases exponentially. Against North Korean artillery that can saturate a geographic area, drones offer a mobile, discreet, and decentralised counter-battery capability.

Drone production and international cooperation

South Korea is already a significant actor in military drone production. Its defence industry, represented by conglomerates such as Hanwha Aerospace and Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI), is actively developing drone systems capable of matching North Korean threats. Cooperation agreements with the United States and Europe allow the integration of advanced technologies into domestic platforms. The war in Ukraine has also opened the door to direct knowledge-sharing with the Ukrainian industry — which has more operational experience of drone warfare than any other nation.

The psychological weight of permanent threat

Life under the threat: an underexplored reality

What geostrategic analyses often overlook is the psychological and social cost of an entire population living under permanent threat. Academic studies conducted on Seoul populations show levels of North Korea-related threat stress significantly higher than in other comparable cities. But there is also a form of threat fatigue — after decades of North Korean provocations, Seoulites have developed a capacity to function normally despite background anxiety.

This habituation has its virtues — it avoids collective paralysis. But it also carries a risk: the risk of underestimating a real escalation. If Kim Jong Un were one day to cross the threshold of an actual strike, the normalisation of the threat could create a civilian population reaction delay that represents a real danger. This is one of the most delicate challenges of South Korea's civil defence planning.

The memory of the 1950–1953 war

For older generations of Seoulites, the North Korean threat is not abstract. The 1950–1953 war killed between 2.5 and 3.5 million people on the peninsula, a large proportion of them civilians. Entire families were separated by the demarcation line. These memories, still vivid in the over-60 generation, give the threat an existential dimension that younger generations understand intellectually but have not lived through. This memorial fracture also influences how South Korean society perceives the risk of conflict.

The memory of the Korean War: a founding trauma still alive

Seventy-six years on, the most "forgotten" conflict remains open

June 25, 2026 marks the 76th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War — a war that has never officially ended. The armistice of July 27, 1953 is not a peace treaty. Technically, the two Koreas are still in a state of war, a legal and geopolitical reality that has not changed in three quarters of a century. The Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) — a strip of terrain 4 kilometres wide and 250 kilometres long — remains one of the most heavily fortified and mined borders in the world.

This war, often described as the "Forgotten War" in the West because it fell between World War II and Vietnam in American historical memory, is omnipresent in the Korean collective consciousness. South Korea built its national identity partly around resilience in the face of the Northern threat. Seoul itself, today a megacity of 30 million inhabitants, was largely destroyed during the war and was rebuilt in the permanent shadow of a neighbour armed with ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads. This traumatic memory structures South Korean political psychology in ways that Westerners often struggle to fully grasp.

Trilateral security cooperation: Seoul, Tokyo, Washington

A security triangle strengthened by North Korean threats

Facing North Korea's military build-up, the United States, South Korea, and Japan have strengthened their trilateral security cooperation in recent years. This triangle, long complicated by historical tensions between Seoul and Tokyo (legacy of Japanese colonisation and the "comfort women" issue), has become more functional under the pressure of a shared threat. The three countries now share real-time intelligence data on North Korean launches, coordinate their missile defence exercises, and consult their command chains on response protocols.

The American THAAD system deployed in South Korea is integrated into this trilateral architecture. American warships equipped with SM-3 missiles in the Sea of Japan constitute a third layer of North Korean missile interception. And Japan, which recently lifted constitutional restrictions on its defence spending and offensive capabilities, is developing its own long-range missiles capable of striking North Korean launchers on their own territory.

China's role: passive accomplice or regulatory actor?

Beijing holds the keys but refuses to use them

China is theoretically in a position to exert decisive pressure on Pyongyang. It accounts for approximately 90% of North Korea's foreign trade and is the main source of humanitarian and economic aid for the Kim regime. Serious Chinese sanctions could plunge the North Korean economy into a crisis that would force the regime back to the negotiating table. But Beijing has systematically refused to exert this pressure decisively — fearing a regime collapse that would send waves of refugees toward China, and because a reunified, pro-American Korea on its border is a scenario it dreads more than a nuclear North Korea.

This calculated ambiguity from China is one of the most frustrating factors in the North Korean deadlock. Beijing's official indifference to Kim Jong Un's ballistic tests — even as it presides over commercial negotiations with Washington and claims to want "regional stability" — is hypocritical and dangerous. If North Korea were to achieve credible nuclear strike capability against the continental United States, this would fundamentally alter the strategic balance in the Asia-Pacific in ways that would also affect Chinese long-term interests.

Conclusion: Seoul resists, adapts — but the threat is growing

An arms race of increasing asymmetry

The tests of June 25, 2026 mark a qualitative threshold in the North Korean threat against Seoul. The combination of extended range, autonomous precision, and special-mission warheads represents a capability upgrade that demands a response. South Korea is responding with its own investments — 500,000 drone soldiers, long-range missile systems capable of striking Pyongyang, cooperation agreements with Washington and Tokyo. But the race remains uncertain, and the 30 million inhabitants of the metropolitan area remain its primary stakes.

What the world must understand

The North Korean threat to Seoul is not a bilateral problem between two Koreas — it is a global security problem. If American guarantees to South Korea were weakened, if North Korea achieved intercontinental nuclear credibility, if China were to modify its calculus on peninsula stability — these changes would have global consequences. Seoul is the canary in the coal mine of Asia-Pacific security. What it faces today, other capitals could face tomorrow.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

My sources and limits

This column draws on public sources: KCNA, Al Jazeera, Yonhap, Straits Times, SFGate, Kyungnam University analysis. Demographic data on the Seoul metropolitan area comes from public statistical sources. I have no specialised military expertise on the Korean peninsula — my analysis is that of an informed observer, not a regional security expert.

What I don't know

I do not know with certainty whether the ranges announced by KCNA (90 km for the rocket system, 65 km for the howitzer) correspond to real capabilities or to exaggerated propaganda. I also do not know the precise nature of the "special mission warheads" tested. These uncertainties are fundamental to assessing the actual scale of the threat change.

Sources

Primary sources

Yonhap — N. Korea's Kim oversees tests of key weapons seen as aimed at S. Korea — June 26, 2026

Al Jazeera — North Korea conducts major weapons tests; South training 'drone warriors' — June 26, 2026

SFGate/AP — North Korea's Kim watches weapons tests and calls for 'deadly and destructive' military posture — June 25, 2026

US News — North Korean leader Kim oversees weapons tests, KCNA reports — June 25, 2026

Secondary sources

Straits Times — North Korean leader Kim oversees weapons tests, KCNA reports — June 26, 2026

The Guardian — North Korea nuclear programme expansion — June 24, 2026