NARRATIVE: In Southern Lebanon, the Void Nobody Wants to Fill — and Iran Is Watching

The June 19 Truce and Its Illusions

On June 19, 2026, Israel and Hezbollah agreed to a new ceasefire — the third in less than six months — under American pressure. According to Reuters, a US official confirmed the agreement, which was to take effect at 4:00 PM local time. The relative calm that followed was described by UNIFIL (the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) as "the longest period of calm in three months of conflict between Hezbollah and Israel." But this lull conceals an explosive reality: southern Lebanon remains a territory without a true master, traversed by antagonistic forces and coveted by actors with no interest in lasting peace.

The figures are stark. More than 11,000 residential buildings were entirely destroyed in southern Lebanon, according to a UNDP assessment conducted with Lebanon's National Council for Scientific Research. Some 90,000 people were still in collective shelters as of June 22, including many displaced southerners unable to return home. UNIFIL reported Israeli tank activity, blocked roads, and an armed drone overflying its positions twice at low altitude. "We call on all parties to fully adhere to the ceasefire and refrain from any escalation, particularly during this sensitive period of ongoing negotiations," declared the UN spokesman.

Washington as Mediator, the Belligerents Digging In

From June 23 to 26, Israeli and Lebanese delegations met in Washington under American mediation to attempt to define "pilot zones" where the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) would replace IDF positions. According to Times of Israel, after four days of talks marked by persistent disagreements over geography, the parties ultimately agreed to extend discussions an extra day on Friday, under intense American pressure. Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced on June 26 that a framework agreement had been reached, providing for an Israeli withdrawal from two pilot zones.

This half-measure outcome masks the depth of the disagreement. Lebanon wanted the pilot zones located within the Israeli "security zone" itself, inside the 10-kilometer-deep buffer along the border. Israel flatly refused, proposing only zones north of its security zone, incrementally and with no timeline. Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz was even more direct: "The Israeli army will remain in the security zones in Lebanon, in Syria and in Gaza without a time limit. We oppose the withdrawal of IDF forces from the security zone in Lebanon, despite all existing pressures."

This ceasefire looks like every other one we have seen in this region: a breathing pause between two cycles of violence, dressed up as diplomacy for the cameras. Katz says out loud what Netanyahu thinks quietly — and nobody in Washington has the real means to contradict them. What is unsettling is that Hezbollah knows exactly what this ceasefire is worth, and is playing for time.

The Pilot Zones: A Dividing Idea

The concept of "pilot zones" emerged during earlier Israeli-Lebanese discussions, before the signing of the American-Iranian memorandum of understanding. The idea: the IDF transfers control of a defined territory to the LAF, which must demonstrate its capacity to exclude any non-state actor — notably Hezbollah — from it. On June 3, both parties had accepted a general framework including these pilot zones, but Hezbollah rejected the proposal the very next day, demanding a permanent ceasefire tied to a complete Israeli withdrawal.

The only concrete transfer documented by that date was that of Dibbine, Marjaayoun district, which the IDF handed over to the LAF and UNIFIL on June 4 after its withdrawal. The Lebanese government subsequently proposed that the IDF transfer control of territory around Beaufort Castle, in the Nabatiyeh district, as a first pilot zone. But a senior Israeli official clearly told Reuters that the IDF would not withdraw from its established buffer zone — soldiers on the ground confirming they had "received no instructions to move." The Washington talks concluded with a framework agreement recognizing two initial pilot zones, according to the Lebanese embassy in the United States.

The Flaws in the Deconfliction Mechanism

One of the most concerning points is the creation of a new "deconfliction cell" overseeing the ceasefire — which includes the United States, Iran, Qatar, Lebanon, and Pakistan, but excludes Israel. According to the ISW, this mechanism replaces the monitoring system of the November 2024 Israeli-Lebanese ceasefire agreement, which allowed Israel to act against Hezbollah violations under certain circumstances. Qatar stated that a "central element" of the cell will be monitoring ceasefire violations. Meanwhile, an Israeli official told Haaretz that IDF soldiers had received no official update on the role this deconfliction mechanism might play in their situation in Lebanon.

This opacity is alarming: Israeli soldiers on the ground do not know what rules of engagement apply to them in a ceasefire framework partially supervised by Iran. Hezbollah, for its part, accuses Israel of "flagrant violations" of the ceasefire, citing a drone strike that killed three civilians. The IDF continues to strike targets it identifies as Hezbollah in localities such as Zawtar al Charqiyeh and Kfar Tebnit — five fighters killed on June 25, according to the Israeli military.

Including Iran in a ceasefire monitoring mechanism when Tehran finances, arms, and strategically directs Hezbollah — that's like appointing an arsonist as fire chief. I understand Washington's diplomatic logic: include everyone to make everyone accountable. But that logic has limits that become obvious the moment you look at it honestly.

A State Struggling to Assert Itself on Its Own Territory

The Lebanese Armed Forces are presented by Washington as the lasting solution to the security vacuum in the south. Secretary of State Rubio announced on June 24 that the United States would help strengthen the LAF's capacity to "clear and hold ground in southern Lebanon." An American plan calls for deploying "US-trained and vetted" LAF personnel to replace Israeli positions. But the reality of the LAF is far more complex than this optimistic rhetoric suggests.

The LAF operates within a structurally fragile Lebanese state that has been economically bankrupt since 2019, with an underfunded army whose equipment is outdated and whose troops are exhausted. Their capacity to "clear" vast areas of Hezbollah infrastructure — tunnels, weapons depots, command networks buried deep in the limestone bedrock of the south — is seriously limited. Even if the LAF has demonstrated goodwill in zones already handed over, converting that goodwill into real operational capability against Hezbollah is an entirely different matter.

Iranian Pressure on the LAF via Hezbollah

Hezbollah, Iran's armed instrument of foreign policy in Lebanon, has no interest in seeing the LAF solidly establish itself in the south as a credible substitute force. Its leader Naim Qassem demanded on June 23 that Israel set a complete withdrawal timeline "without retaining an inch" of Lebanese territory. This maximalist position is precisely designed to block any interim arrangement that would legitimize a prolonged Israeli presence. Hezbollah understands perfectly that if the LAF successfully establishes itself in the pilot zones, that strengthens the Israeli argument for maintaining its buffer zone until full demilitarization.

The ISW assessed that the Iranian regime is using discussions over the management of the Strait of Hormuz to delay any substantive nuclear agreement with Washington — and that the Lebanese situation fits within this broader delaying strategy. While Tehran negotiates in Switzerland, its proxies maintain pressure on Lebanese soil, preserving valuable negotiating leverage. The coordination between Iranian chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf in Muscat and Hezbollah's positions in Beirut is not coincidental.

Lebanon has been a resonance chamber for Iranian ambitions for forty years. That is nothing new. What is new is that Washington is simultaneously trying to negotiate with Tehran in Geneva while supporting Israel as it strikes Tehran's operatives in southern Lebanon. This diplomatic schizophrenia has limits that the Trump administration recognizes poorly, or not at all.

Tehran Playing on Multiple Boards at Once

The fifth clause of the American-Iranian memorandum of understanding — the framework document meant to stabilize the Middle East — tasks Iran with discussing with Oman and other Gulf states the future management of the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian parliament speaker Ghalibaf met Omani officials in Muscat on June 23. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi discussed enhanced regional cooperation with Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan on June 24. Tehran is positioning itself as an indispensable actor in new regional security architectures.

Qatar — a member of the Lebanese deconfliction cell — indicated its openness to discussing Iranian plans regarding the strait, while specifying it would not validate any "control" or tolling scheme. The stakes are enormous: the Strait of Hormuz, an international waterway under UNCLOS, sees roughly 20% of global oil transit through it. Any structured Iranian influence over its management is a first-rate geopolitical weapon that Tehran seeks to monetize within the framework of post-war negotiations.

Iran's Strategy for a Post-Conflict Presence in Lebanon

According to the ISW, Iran seeks to maintain a presence and influence in Lebanon in the post-conflict period, using it as a bargaining chip in its multilateral negotiations. The Israeli military withdrawal from southern Lebanon creates a vacuum that Tehran intends to fill — not with uniformed units, but through networks, financing, and a diffuse Hezbollah political presence rebuilt from scratch. The reconstruction of southern Lebanon, partially financed by Iran, will be a powerful vector of that influence.

Saudi Arabia was reportedly preparing a "reconciliation summit" between Iran and the Arab Gulf states, with no date set at this stage, according to a diplomatic source cited by AFP. This process, distinct from the American-Iranian negotiations, reflects the complex dynamics of a Middle East reconfiguring itself around a partially rehabilitated Iran whose regional ambitions remain fundamentally unchanged.

Iran doesn't need tank crews in the streets of Tyre to exercise its influence in Lebanon. It needs money, networks, and time. And time it has — far more than any American administration whose political cycle stops at four years. That temporal asymmetry may be the most underestimated strategic vulnerability of the West in the region.

A Return Made Impossible in a Devastated South

Beyond the diplomatic games, there is the reality of 1.2 million displaced Lebanese who cannot return to their villages. The destruction figures are staggering: more than 11,000 residential buildings entirely destroyed, 2,200 others partially damaged. The IDF maintains its buffer zone — approximately 570 to 600 square kilometers — and has explicitly barred civilians from returning to zones under its control. The Lebanese government finds itself unable to rebuild what it cannot even access.

The humanitarian situation remains "fragile and uncertain for families seeking to return home, even after the latest ceasefire," according to UN spokesman Dujarric. The toll on the Israeli side of this cycle of conflict with Hezbollah stands at at least 32 soldiers and 4 civilians killed. The Lebanese toll is significantly heavier, but complete data remains difficult to verify given access restrictions on journalists and humanitarian workers.

Reconstruction as a Geopolitical Battleground

The reconstruction of southern Lebanon will be the next battleground for regional influence. Iran, which has already financed post-war reconstructions through Hezbollah in the past, retains a considerable advantage: its ability to rapidly mobilize resources and channel them through its networks, without the constraints of international aid procedures. Gulf countries, notably Qatar and Saudi Arabia, have also expressed interest in contributing — but under political conditions that Beirut will have to negotiate carefully.

The European Union and the United States have announced contributions, but amounts and modalities remain to be specified. The international conference on Lebanon's reconstruction, discussed for several weeks, has no fixed date yet. Meanwhile, 90,000 people were still living in collective shelters as of June 22, and returns to the south remain impossible for the vast majority of displaced persons so long as the IDF maintains its buffer zone of roughly 570 square kilometers.

These Lebanese families are not statistics. They have homes, olive trees, memories. And a foreign army decides when they can return, based on security calculations from which they are entirely excluded. I am not questioning Israel's right to its security — but there is a way of exercising it that treats Lebanese civilians as human beings rather than as adjustment variables.

Who Will Finance the Reconstruction?

The reconstruction of southern Lebanon will be the next battleground for regional influences. Iran, which has already financed post-war reconstructions via Hezbollah, retains a considerable advantage: its ability to rapidly mobilize resources and channel them through its networks, without the constraints of international aid procedures. Gulf countries, notably Qatar and Saudi Arabia, have also expressed interest in contributing — but under political conditions that Beirut will have to negotiate carefully.

The European Union and the United States have announced contributions, but amounts and modalities remain to be specified. The international conference on Lebanon's reconstruction, discussed for several weeks, has no fixed date yet. Meanwhile, 90,000 people were still living in collective shelters as of June 22, and returns to the south remain impossible for the vast majority of displaced persons so long as the IDF maintains its buffer zone of approximately 570 square kilometers.

Lebanese Civilians and Humanitarian Access

Beyond the diplomatic maneuvering, there is the reality of 1.2 million displaced Lebanese who cannot return to their villages. The destruction figures are staggering: more than 11,000 residential buildings entirely destroyed, 2,200 others partially damaged. The IDF maintains its buffer zone and has explicitly barred civilians from returning to zones under its control. The Lebanese government finds itself unable to rebuild what it cannot even access.

The humanitarian situation remains "fragile and uncertain for families seeking to return home, even after the latest ceasefire," according to UN spokesman Dujarric. The toll on the Israeli side stands at at least 32 soldiers and 4 civilians killed in this cycle of conflict with Hezbollah. The Lebanese toll is significantly heavier, but complete data remains difficult to verify due to access restrictions on journalists and humanitarian workers in the south.

These Lebanese families are not statistics. They have homes, olive trees, memories. And a foreign army decides when they can return, based on security calculations from which they are entirely excluded. I am not questioning Israel's right to its security — but there is a way of exercising it that treats Lebanese civilians as human beings rather than as adjustment variables.

Including Iran in Ceasefire Monitoring

One of the most troubling points in the framework agreement of June 26 is the creation of a new "deconfliction cell" overseeing the ceasefire — which includes the United States, Iran, Qatar, Lebanon, and Pakistan, but excludes Israel. According to the ISW, this mechanism replaces the monitoring system of the Israeli-Lebanese ceasefire agreement of November 2024, which allowed Israel to act against Hezbollah violations under certain circumstances. Qatar stated that a "central element" of the cell will be monitoring ceasefire violations.

This architecture reveals a fundamental contradiction: Tehran — Hezbollah's strategic patron — is being asked to monitor a ceasefire that this same organization regularly violates. An Israeli official told Haaretz that IDF soldiers had received no official update on the role the deconfliction mechanism might play in their situation in Lebanon. This opacity is alarming in a context where rules of engagement on the ground remain unclear.

The IDF and the Pilot Zones: Ground-Level Reality

The only concrete transfer documented is that of Dibbine, Marjaayoun district, which the IDF handed over to the LAF and UNIFIL on June 4 after its withdrawal. The Lebanese government had proposed that the IDF transfer control of territory around Beaufort Castle, in the Nabatiyeh district, as a first pilot zone. But a senior Israeli official clearly told Reuters that the IDF would not withdraw from its established buffer zone — soldiers on the ground confirming they had "received no instructions to move."

The Washington talks concluded with a framework agreement recognizing two initial pilot zones, according to the Lebanese embassy in the United States. Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz had however been categorical: "The Israeli army will remain in the security zones in Lebanon, in Syria, and in Gaza without a time limit." The gap between the diplomatic declaration and the ground reality is precisely what makes this framework agreement so fragile as the days following its signing unfold.

Including Iran in a ceasefire monitoring mechanism when Tehran finances, arms, and strategically directs Hezbollah — that's like appointing an arsonist as fire chief. I understand Washington's diplomatic logic: include everyone to make everyone accountable. But that logic has limits that become obvious the moment you look at it honestly.

Tehran Positioning Itself as an Indispensable Actor

The fifth clause of the American-Iranian memorandum of understanding tasks Iran with discussing with Oman and other Gulf states the future management of the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian parliament speaker Ghalibaf met Omani officials in Muscat on June 23. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi discussed enhanced regional cooperation with Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan on June 24. Tehran is positioning itself as an indispensable actor in new regional security architectures.

Qatar — a member of the Lebanese deconfliction cell — indicated openness to discussing Iranian plans regarding the strait but specified it would not validate any "control" or tolling plan. The stakes are immense: the Strait of Hormuz, an international waterway under UNCLOS, sees roughly 20% of global oil pass through it. Any structured Iranian influence over its management is a first-rate geopolitical weapon that Tehran seeks to monetize within the framework of post-war negotiations over Lebanon.

Saudi Arabia and Regional Reconciliation

Saudi Arabia was reportedly preparing a "reconciliation summit" between Iran and the Arab Gulf states, with no date set at this stage, according to a diplomatic source cited by AFP. This process, distinct from the American-Iranian negotiations, reflects the complex dynamics of a Middle East reconfiguring itself around a partially rehabilitated Iran whose regional ambitions remain fundamentally unchanged. Riyadh, which had normalized relations with Tehran in 2023 under Chinese mediation, is now playing an unprecedented role as a regional facilitator.

This partial rehabilitation of Iran in regional diplomacy is accompanied by sustained pressure on Lebanese soil by Hezbollah, Iran's armed instrument of foreign policy. The international community finds itself in the uncomfortable position of negotiating with a regime whose proxies are simultaneously violating the very agreements those negotiations aim to consolidate. That is the fundamental structure of the Lebanese dilemma — and nothing in the Washington discussions of the week of June 23 truly resolved it.

Iran doesn't need tank crews in the streets of Tyre to exercise its influence in Lebanon. It needs money, networks, and time. And time it has — far more than any American administration whose political cycle stops at four years. That temporal asymmetry may be the most underestimated strategic vulnerability of the West in the region.

A Framework Agreement: First Building Block or Diplomatic Decoy?

The framework agreement signed on June 26 — providing for an Israeli withdrawal from two pilot zones in exchange for exclusive LAF deployment — represents a potential first building block toward normalization. But the road between a statement of intent and a real, verified, and lasting withdrawal is riddled with pitfalls. Israel describes its own movements as "symbolic" and as "gestures" toward the Lebanese government — a formulation that reveals the gap between Beirut's expectations and Jerusalem's real concessions. Hezbollah, hostile to any arrangement legitimizing a prolonged Israeli presence, remains a permanent destabilizing factor.

What the Immediate Future Holds

Southern Lebanon will remain, in the weeks and months ahead, a space of residual tensions and strategic reconfigurations. The stakes extend far beyond the Israeli-Lebanese question alone: they touch on the regional security architecture in a post-American-Iranian-agreement Middle East, the political survival of the Lebanese government, the LAF's ability to assert itself as a sovereign force, and Tehran's enduring ambitions in its near periphery. In this context, merely "holding" the ceasefire is already a daily feat — building it into lasting peace is an entirely different challenge.

The June 26 framework agreement is a first building block — fragile, insufficient, but real. The stakes extend far beyond the Israeli-Lebanese question alone: they touch on the regional security architecture in a post-American-Iranian-agreement Middle East. Holding this ceasefire is already a daily feat — building it into lasting peace is an entirely different challenge that neither Vance, nor Rubio, nor anyone else can promise in the short term.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

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