COLUMN: Ukraine strikes at the heart of Russia — negotiate from strength, or don't negotiate

COLUMN: Ukraine strikes at the heart of Russia — negotiate from strength, or don't negotiate

Introduction: The peace Kyiv refuses to beg for

An unprecedented campaign of strikes

In June 2026, Ukraine struck an oil refinery in the heart of Moscow — 10 miles from the Kremlin — twice in one week. It targeted oil depots in the Yaroslavl and Volgograd oblasts, at 660 km and 500 km from the border. On June 18, the largest drone offensive against Moscow since the war began forced the closure of the capital's four airports. Ukraine struck refineries in Bashkiria, more than 1,500 km from its eastern border. On June 3, it targeted a petroleum terminal in St. Petersburg while Vladimir Putin was hosting his annual economic forum in the same city.

This is not a defensive war. It is a deliberate, systematic, and increasingly deep economic attrition strategy. And it is unfolding while diplomats are talking about a ceasefire. That is not a contradiction — it is the doctrine.

Zelensky makes it explicit: strike to negotiate

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated it plainly after the June 25 strike on two refineries in Ufa and a depot in Krasnodar: "Our long-range operations are a consistent and precise response to Russia prolonging the war and striking Ukrainian cities and communities." That careful phrasing is not rhetoric. It defines a doctrine: every Ukrainian strike is presented as a response to a Russian strike. No gratuitous escalation — but a measured escalation, calculated to inflict economic costs on Moscow while maintaining a posture of diplomatic good faith.

The geography of the strikes: a strategic map

Petroleum targets: the lifeblood of war

In May 2026, Zelensky declared he had struck 15 Russian refineries between January and May, claiming approximately 40 % of Russia's primary refining capacity was offline. Available data allow a precise map of the offensive to be traced. The Grushovaya Balka petroleum terminal at Novorossiysk — part of the Sheskharis complex that processes roughly one fifth of Russia's oil exports — was struck on June 7–8, with around fifty explosions reported by local residents. The US agency NASA FIRMS confirmed thermal anomalies at the site.

The Gukovo oil depot in Rostov oblast burned on June 18. The Tamanneftegaz terminal in Krasnodar sustained damage to five 30,000 m³ tanks. The Kotovo pumping station in Volgograd oblast lost three tanks and a pipeline section. According to the Ukrainian General Staff, all seven tanks at the Palkino station in Yaroslavl oblast, with a combined capacity of 95,000 cubic meters, were destroyed. This is no longer guerrilla warfare. It is a systematic campaign to dismantle Russia's oil logistics.

Beyond oil: missiles, radars, and communications

Ukrainian strikes are not limited to petroleum infrastructure. On June 21–22, Ukraine hit the "Dubna" communications space center near Moscow, a factory in Voronezh producing electronic components for Iskander and Kh-101 missiles and for Pantsir-S1 systems. The General Staff confirmed strikes on command posts in Belgorod and Donetsk, on the "Kavkaz" port infrastructure in Krasnodar, and on two ferries used to supply Russian forces in the south.

In Crimea, pressure has not eased. On the night of June 20–21, Ukrainian Special Forces hit the petroleum terminal at Kerch port, triggering multiple fires. That same night, four radar stations of S-400 systems and two Pantsir systems were neutralized. The Kerch Bridge had to be closed to vehicle traffic. A fuel shortage began to affect the peninsula — in the middle of its summer tourist season — prompting voucher distribution for private vehicles.

The effect on Russia's war economy

Documented fuel shortages

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) documented as early as June 2026 that Ukraine's strike campaign was causing gasoline shortages in several Russian regions. Russia had begun importing gasoline from unspecified Asian countries — something it had not done in 2025 — a sign that 2026 shortages would be more severe. Long lines at gas stations in parts of Russia and occupied territories were documented on Russian social media.

The governor of Leningrad, Aleksandr Drozdenko, was offering on June 23 bonuses of 250,000 rubles (approximately $3,356) to new recruits for anti-drone mobile defense units, and 100,000 rubles per intercepted Ukrainian drone. This pricing reveals the scale of the problem: Russia can no longer defend its own rear. The ISW noted that "Russia has largely failed to defend its rear against Ukrainian strikes."

Airspace restrictions: signal of a defensive rout

On June 17, Russian aviation authority Rosaviatsia imposed flight restrictions for light aircraft between 0 and 5,200 meters above Moscow and several surrounding oblasts (Ryazan, Tula, Kaluga, Tver, Yaroslavl, Vladimir). Similar restrictions had been in force since June 1 over the Moscow airspace zone. These measures illustrate the inability of Russian air defenses to effectively cover the entire territory. A country that must restrict its own airspace over its capital is a country that has lost the defensive initiative.

During the night of June 17–18, Russia's Defense Ministry claimed to have intercepted 555 Ukrainian drones, then raised the figure to 992 drones and 4 missiles in 24 hours. Even accepting these figures at face value, they reveal the scale of Russian defense saturation. Ukraine uses domestically manufactured drones, increasingly independent of Western armaments, to flood enemy defense systems.

The diplomatic context: negotiating from a position of strength

Washington's pressure and the June ultimatum

In February 2026, Zelensky revealed that Washington had set a June deadline to reach a peace deal. That deadline corresponds exactly to the period when Kyiv intensified its long-range strikes. This is not a coincidence — it is geostrategy. Ukraine wants to arrive at the negotiating table while winning, or at least not losing. Military pressure is the only way to compensate for the territorial asymmetry that five years of war have etched into the landscape.

That same week, Zelensky issued a one-week ultimatum to Belarus: dismantle Russian drone signal relay stations near the border and stop supplying fuel to Russian forces. This demand is a test: is Minsk a vassal state of Moscow or can it exercise any sovereignty? Lukashenko's response will determine whether Ukraine is prepared to extend its pressure campaign to the Belarusian axis.

Ukraine's resistance on the diplomatic front

The website EUAlive reported on June 23, 2026 that Ukrainian officials were "intensifying long-range strikes on Russian military infrastructure while delivering a firm diplomatic message: Kyiv remains open to negotiations on its terms, but patience is limited." That formulation summarizes the doctrine: we talk, but we do not capitulate. The "peace proposals" Ukraine might reconsider do not involve territorial concessions — they concern security mechanisms and guarantees.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian strikes also targeted the road bridge over the North Crimea Canal in occupied Kherson, as well as several railway bridges in Crimea and Donetsk. The objective is logistical as much as symbolic: every destroyed bridge lengthens Russian supply lines, increases costs, and creates bottlenecks that translate into additional future strikes.

The limits of Ukraine's strategy

Russia absorbs and adapts

Ukraine's strikes are impressive — but Russia is not passive. On the night of June 22–23, Russian forces launched 135 drones (Shahed, Gerbera, Italmas, and Parodiya decoy drones) against Ukraine from Oryol, Kursk, Bryansk, and the Krasnodar coast. Ukrainian forces shot down 118 drones. The 17 remaining struck targets including energy infrastructure in Odessa oblast, a gas station in Zaporizhzhia, and a DTEK facility in Dnipropetrovsk causing power outages.

Russia simultaneously conducted an Iskander-M ballistic missile strike on Kryvyi Rih, killing at least 3 people and injuring 23, hitting industrial, transport, educational, cultural, and residential infrastructure. Ukrainians absorb hits too. And Russia's capacity to keep producing missiles and drones — despite strikes on its factories — must not be underestimated. Its war economy remains resilient in the short term, sustained by Iran (Shahed) and North Korea (ammunition).

Ukrainian drones with Starlink: a troubling detail

The ISW reported on June 23 that Russian forces had attempted, unsuccessfully, to attack the Ukrainian coast with unarmed unmanned surface vehicles (USV). The intercepted Russian USVs were equipped with Starlink systems. That detail is significant: Russia is using Western commercial technologies for its military operations — the same SpaceX Starlink that transformed Ukrainian forces' communication capabilities. The dual use of technology is a reality of this conflict. The West must account for it in its export policies.

On the diplomatic front as well, limits are visible. Ukraine was informed of the June deadline set by Washington, but the Kremlin has shown zero flexibility on its core demands. Ukraine's military pressure can complicate Putin's calculations — but it cannot alone force him to reason if the political cost of capitulation remains higher than that of continuing the war.

What Moscow really wants

Putin's demands: capitulation dressed as diplomacy

On June 23, 2026, Putin declared Russia was "ready for negotiations" — but only on the basis of the 2022 Istanbul protocols, his speech at the Foreign Ministry of June 2024, and the alleged "Anchorage agreements" of August 2025. These three references form a maximalist package demanding: a permanent ban on Ukraine joining NATO, severe limitations on Ukrainian military forces, a ban on Western military aid to Ukraine, and Ukrainian withdrawal from its own territories in the four partially occupied oblasts.

The ISW characterizes these positions without ambiguity as "complete Ukrainian capitulation." Foreign Minister Lavrov reiterated the same day Russia's war aims: Ukraine's neutrality and non-nuclear status, elimination of "discriminatory" laws against the Russian language and Russian Orthodox Church, recognition of the illegal referendums in occupied territories. There is no visible flexibility. There are no "goodwill gestures."

The "Anchorage agreements": a diplomatic ghost

Lavrov claimed that during the Trump-Putin summit in Alaska in August 2025, the two presidents "had agreed on how to end the fighting." US Secretary of State Marco Rubio flatly denied it: "There was a proposal in Anchorage, but no agreement. If there had been an agreement, the war would be over." This public contradiction reveals Russia's strategy: invoke undocumented "understandings" to present Russia as the party acting in good faith and the United States as the saboteurs. It is narrative manipulation — and Ukraine cannot afford to let that story take hold.

It is precisely in this tense diplomatic context that Ukraine's strikes take on their full strategic meaning. Kyiv cannot allow Russia to dictate the terms of a ceasefire that would consolidate its territorial conquests. Military pressure is the only currency of exchange Ukraine truly possesses, in the absence of credible security guarantees from the West.

The West's role: neither strong enough nor clear enough

Long-range weapons: the lever that changes everything

Ukraine's capacity to strike at 1,500 km from its border is the result of internal technological buildup, but also of Western arms transfers. British Storm Shadow missiles, French SCALP missiles, Washington's authorization to use American weapons against certain targets on Russian territory — all of this has progressively loosened the constraints. Ukraine then developed its own long-range drones, reducing its import dependency and making its strikes harder to restrict politically.

The open question: is the West prepared to fully own this support? The rhetoric remains hesitant. France and the United Kingdom have been the boldest on arms deliveries. Germany, since Friedrich Merz came to power, has accelerated transfers. But discussions on post-conflict security guarantees — what would replace NATO membership in a peace deal — remain largely theoretical.

Trump, the "necessary evil" of Ukrainian diplomacy

Donald Trump set a June 2026 deadline for a peace deal. That deadline passed with no deal. Trump repeatedly claimed an agreement was "imminent" — only to see the dynamic evaporate. His frustration with Putin appears to be growing, but his rhetoric regarding Zelensky remains ambiguous. For Ukraine, Trump is what he has always been: unpredictable, potentially useful, and fundamentally dangerous if Kyiv trusts him unconditionally. Ukraine must build its military position precisely because it cannot rely unconditionally on Washington.

The most troubling scenario for Kyiv is not that Trump caves to Putin. It is that he imposes a ceasefire from a position of Ukrainian military weakness, freezing the current front lines without serious guarantees. That is why every long-range strike is also a diplomatic strike: it improves Kyiv's position ahead of any eventual agreement.

Ukrainian drones: a tactical revolution reshaping the war

The doctrine of reversed strategic depth

Ukraine's strikes at 1,500 kilometers from the border illustrate an emerging doctrine that military analysts call "reversed strategic depth." Where Russia believed distance protected it, Ukraine has developed the capacity to strike nerve centers — refineries, ammunition depots, logistical hubs — that feed Moscow's war machine. Every successful deep strike demonstrates that the cost of aggression is rising for the aggressor.

Ukraine's industrial buildup in the drone sector is remarkable. Hundreds of models are being tested, produced, and deployed. Defense startups are born in wartime. The expertise accumulated since 2022 positions Ukraine as one of the most advanced drone powers in the world — a considerable geostrategic asset for European security in the post-conflict era.

The informational dimension of deep strikes

Deep strikes carry a decisive informational dimension. When Ukrainian drones reach facilities on Russian soil, they shatter Putin's narrative that the war is happening "over there," far from ordinary Russians' reality. Explosions visible in Russian cities, which state censorship cannot entirely suppress, create a cognitive rupture the Kremlin struggles to manage.

This psychological pressure on the Russian population is a lever underestimated in Western analyses. Propaganda holds as long as the war remains abstract for ordinary Russians. But when air raid sirens sound in regions considered untouchable, the gap between official narrative and lived reality widens. That is no guarantee of change — but it is a crack in the regime's armor.

Conclusion: War as the continuation of diplomacy

Ukraine has rewritten the manual

Ukraine's long-range strike campaign of June 2026 represents a turning point in this conflict's military doctrine. This is no longer a trench war with minimal gains. It is a war of economic and industrial attrition, waged at unprecedented depths, targeting the infrastructure that finances Russia's war machine. Ukraine has demonstrated it can strike at 1,500 km from its borders, saturate a nuclear great power's air defenses, and create fuel shortages in the heart of Russia — all while maintaining a posture of diplomatic good faith.

This strategy has a cost: Russian reprisals on Ukrainian territory continue, and civilian casualties accumulate. But the logic is implacable. Ukraine cannot negotiate from a position of growing weakness. It must negotiate from a position where Russia has as much or more to gain from peace as from war. Strikes on refineries are the military translation of that equation.

The peace that will be built, if it is built

Peace — if it comes — will not be the result of Putin's goodwill. It will be the result of a combination of Ukrainian military pressure, Western economic pressure (sanctions), and the rational calculation of a regime that realizes the cost of war exceeds the expected benefit. That moment has not yet arrived. But every refinery burning in Bashkiria, every depot collapsing in Novorossiysk, every flight cancelled in Moscow — all of it contributes to bringing that calculation closer.

Ukraine strikes deep into Russia because it has no other choice than to win. And it will only win by making the war too costly for Moscow to continue. That is the logic of national survival elevated to the rank of military strategy.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

My biases and my method

I am explicitly pro-Ukraine in this column. I regard the Russian invasion as a war crime and support Ukraine's right to defend itself by all legal means, including deep strikes on Russian military-economic infrastructure. This bias shapes my analysis of events. I make no claim to neutrality on questions of international law or aggression — neutrality in the face of injustice is itself a political choice.

The military facts in this article are based on verified open sources: the ISW (Institute for the Study of War), the Kyiv Independent, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and international news agencies. I do not have access to classified intelligence. Some casualty and damage figures are initial estimates that ground-level reality may nuance.

What I cannot know

I do not know with certainty what Washington's true diplomatic posture toward Ukraine is at this stage. Trump's public statements are often disconnected from the operational decisions of the Pentagon and the State Department. I also do not know to what extent strikes on refineries genuinely affect Russia's ability to finance its war — the circumvention and alternative financing circuits are numerous. What I do know is that Ukraine is inflicting real costs. Their precise scale is difficult to measure from the outside.

Sources

Primary sources

ISW — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 23, 2026 — June 24, 2026

Kyiv Independent — Ukraine strikes oil depots, two refineries in Bashkiria — June 25, 2026

RBC-Ukraine — Ukraine strikes a state oil reserve more than 700 km from the border — June 14, 2026

EUAlive — Ukraine intensifies military pressure and warns of revising peace proposals — June 23, 2026

Secondary sources

RBC-Ukraine — Ukraine reveals the full list of targets struck on the night of June 18 — June 18, 2026

Council on Foreign Relations — Ukraine Conflict Tracker — updated June 2026

RBC-Ukraine — Ukraine strikes an oil depot and other military targets — June 13, 2026