INVESTIGATION: Oman, Strategic Intermediary — How Tehran Uses Muscat to Reshape the Gulf

Introduction: The quiet channel rewriting Gulf geopolitics

Muscat, June 23, 2026: a meeting with far-reaching consequences

On June 23, 2026, in Muscat, a closed-door meeting took place between Iranian and Omani officials. On the surface, it concerned the management of the Strait of Hormuz — pursuant to Article 5 of the memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed by Donald Trump and Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei on June 17, 2026. But according to a detailed analysis by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), published on June 24, this meeting was far more than that. Tehran was using the Hormuz discussions as an entry point to attempt to reshape the entire security architecture of the Persian Gulf in its favor.

The Iranian delegation was led by Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, speaker of the Iranian parliament and chief negotiator. Added to this meeting, as early as June 24, was a discussion between Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and his Saudi counterpart Faisal bin Farhan — aimed at "strengthening regional cooperation." At the same time, Iranian officials were meeting senior security officials of the United Arab Emirates. And in Muscat, the Oman-Iran discussion was taking on a broader dimension: according to a diplomat cited by AFP, Saudi Arabia was preparing to organize a "reconciliation summit" between Iran and Arab Gulf states. The web was being woven — thread by thread.

Article 5 of the MoU: a gateway into the Gulf's architecture

Article 5 of the US-Iranian MoU is, on paper, a technical clause: it charges Iran with discussing the future management of the Strait of Hormuz with Oman and other Gulf riparian states. This provision flows directly from the preceding crisis — during which Iran had partially blocked or threatened to block the strait, through which 20% of global oil trade passes. The full and lasting reopening of Hormuz was a non-negotiable condition of the MoU. But for Tehran, this obligation to consult neighbors on Hormuz was also an opportunity: to open conversations about strait governance that would unlock the door to far broader ambitions.

Oman: an atypical mediator with well-understood interests

Oman's singularity in the Gulf architecture

Oman is the unique case in the geopolitics of the Persian Gulf: a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member state that has maintained, for decades, functional diplomatic relations with Iran. While Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain view Iran as an existential threat, Muscat chose the path of pragmatism: keeping communication channels open with Tehran even during periods of maximum tension.

This unique position has made Oman the natural mediator in several Iranian-American crises. This is not the first time Muscat has played this role: in 2013, it was Oman that facilitated the first secret contacts between Obama and Rouhani that led to the JCPOA in 2015. Oman also served as an intermediary in several US-Iranian prisoner exchanges. The trust Tehran places in Muscat is not purely diplomatic — it is built on years of discretion and reliability.

Oman's vulnerability: caught between Iran and the GCC

But Oman is not a neutral actor without its own interests. Its unique geographic position — 2,092 kilometers of coastline, a direct maritime border with Iran, and guardianship over half the Strait of Hormuz — places it in a position of particular vulnerability. If Iran were to impose a toll or a control regime on the strait, Oman would be directly impacted. And if Arab Gulf states hardened their position against Iran, Oman would find itself caught between its GCC allies and its Iranian interlocutor. Muscat therefore plays a permanent balancing act — and the intensity of the post-MoU period is putting that balance under severe strain.

The Iranian strategy documented by ISW: far beyond Hormuz

From Hormuz discussions to conversations on regional architecture

The ISW's analysis of June 24 is particularly valuable for understanding what Tehran is actually seeking in these discussions with Oman and the Gulf states. According to the ISW, Iran "likely seeks to use these discussions to shift conversations from the immediate management of the Strait of Hormuz and the resumption of traffic toward broader discussions on a new regional architecture in the Gulf zone."

This formulation deserves to be unpacked. Iran does not simply want to manage maritime traffic at the Strait of Hormuz — it wants to rewrite the security rules of the entire Persian Gulf. This implies reducing or eliminating American and Israeli presence in the region, transforming Gulf states from American security partners into states at least partially accommodating toward Iran, and replacing the US-centric alliance system with a "regional architecture favorable to Iran."

The Iranian narrative on regional security

The ISW reported that Iranian officials had articulated, "in Iranian and regional media," the belief that "US partnerships with Gulf states fuel instability for those states." This narrative — calculated to exploit "Gulf states' fears of Iranian drone and missile attacks" and uncertainty over the US-Iranian negotiations — is an invitation to consider that accommodation with Iran, rather than reliance on American and Israeli partnerships, offers greater stability. It is diplomatic divide and conquer: suggesting that American protection is unreliable while presenting itself as an available security alternative.

Ghalibaf in Muscat: the signal of an offensive regional diplomacy

The June 23 meeting and its immediate implications

Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf's visit to Muscat on June 23 is particularly significant. Ghalibaf is not a career diplomat — he is a pragmatic conservative politician with a security-service background. His presence in Muscat, just one day after the Bürgenstock discussions, signals that Iranian regional diplomacy is being deployed on multiple fronts simultaneously and with very precise coordination. During this meeting, Ghalibaf explicitly declared that "Iran is ready for security agreements with Gulf states that are made durable through economic cooperation."

This formula — security agreements made durable through economic cooperation — is the keystone of Iran's post-MoU strategy in the Gulf. Iran is essentially offering Gulf states a pact: replace your security dependence on the United States with a non-belligerence relationship with Tehran, and we offer you in return access to our markets, our gas, and our regional influence. It is an offer designed to appeal to Gulf states weary of an American presence perceived as costly and sometimes unreliable.

The economic dimension: gas, trade, and cooperation

Brigadier General Esmail Ahmadi Moghaddam, president of Iran's National Defense University and an influential figure in Iranian security discourse, had emphasized on June 24 the "objectives of Iran to strengthen its strategic relations with its neighbors in this post-war period." The economic dimension of this vision is crucial: Iran holds some of the world's largest natural gas reserves. An Iran that had normalized relations with Gulf states could become a major regional energy supplier — paradoxically reducing some Gulf states' dependence on more distant energy imports.

Qatar: open to discussion, but not to everything

Doha's nuanced position on the strait

Qatar — both a mediator in the US-Iranian negotiations and a Gulf state directly affected by Hormuz management — adopted a position characteristic of its diplomacy: openness to discussions, firmness on red lines. Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al Thani stated, according to the Financial Times cited by the ISW, that Qatar was "open to discussing Iranian plans to administer the strait alongside Oman" with other Gulf countries. But he categorically ruled out any system of "control" over the Persian Gulf — which he called Qatar's "gateway to the world."

This Qatari position is an important signal: Gulf states are not closing the door to cooperation with Iran on Hormuz management, but they are drawing clear boundaries. No toll system, no unilateral Iranian control, no challenge to the strait's status as an international waterway. These conditions are fully consistent with international maritime law and with their vital economic interests — Qatar exports its liquefied natural gas (LNG) through that same strait.

Saudi Arabia and the "reconciliation summit"

According to a diplomat cited by AFP on June 24, Saudi Arabia was preparing to organize a "reconciliation summit" separate from the US-Iranian negotiations, involving Iran and Arab Gulf states. This Saudi initiative — if it materializes — would reveal Riyadh's desire to manage its relationship with Tehran directly, without necessarily depending on American mediation. Following the China-brokered Saudi-Iranian normalization agreement of 2023, Riyadh clearly has an interest in maintaining direct dialogue with Tehran even in a context of American pressure on the Islamic Republic.

The UAE and the secret rapprochement

Meetings with Emirati security services

The ISW reported that senior Iranian officials had recently met senior security officials of the United Arab Emirates — a series of meetings triggered by "multiple Iranian requests for meetings aimed at rapprochement." This information is significant: the UAE is one of the Gulf states that moved closest to Israel through the Abraham Accords, and Iran has traditionally regarded them with deep suspicion. The fact that security meetings are taking place between Tehran and Abu Dhabi suggests both parties are seeking to avoid unwanted escalation.

For the UAE, the stakes are clear: they have massive economic interests in Dubai — a regional commercial hub through which a significant portion of trade flows to or via Iran despite sanctions. They also have direct security interests: Iranian missiles could reach their cities within minutes. The UAE's diplomatic caution in its approach to Iran in the post-MoU environment is therefore entirely rational.

Bahrain: the most exposed American ally

Bahrain is the Gulf state in the most delicate situation: it is home to the US Fifth Fleet, the cornerstone of American military presence in the Gulf. Iran, which historically claims that Bahrain belongs to its territory, would be delighted to see the Fifth Fleet leave the region. Any weakening of the security alliance between Manama and Washington would represent a massive strategic gain for Tehran.

International maritime law: the lock Iran is trying to pick

UNCLOS and the international character of Hormuz

The ISW underscored a fundamental legal point in its June 24 analysis: the Strait of Hormuz is an international waterway governed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Any attempt to place the strait under the control of one or several states "would erode long-standing international norms and maritime law." This is not an academic nuance — it is the legal foundation guaranteeing that merchant vessels of all countries can transit through Hormuz without requiring Iranian consent.

Iran's position, through its demands for environmental, navigation, or security fees on vessels transiting the strait, is an attempt to create a precedent that progressively erodes this international character. Gulf states, led by Qatar, have clearly signaled their opposition to any toll or control system. But Iranian pressure on this point will likely not cease — it is too important to Tehran's strategic vision of dominant regional influence.

The stakes for global trade

To understand why these Hormuz discussions are of crucial international importance, consider the figures: according to data from the International Energy Agency (IEA), approximately 20% of global oil trade transits through the Strait of Hormuz. That represents roughly 20 to 21 million barrels per day. A toll of just a few dollars per barrel would represent billions of dollars in annual revenues for the state controlling it. It is not hard to understand why Iran, facing a severe foreign currency shortage, is seeking to create this maritime revenue mechanism.

Iran's real objective: reducing American and Israeli presence

The "new regional architecture" as euphemism

The ISW was direct in its analysis: "Iran likely seeks to use discussions with Gulf states on Hormuz to shift them toward broader conversations on limiting American or Israeli influence and partnerships in the Gulf." The ISW's "likely" is carefully measured — the statements of Iranian officials such as Ahmadi Moghaddam and Ghalibaf on a "regional architecture" and "durable security agreements" leave little doubt about the objective.

Iran knows that direct security partnerships with Gulf states — even minimal, even informal — would significantly complicate maintaining a robust American military presence in the region. Every step toward regional "reconciliation" dilutes the argument for which Gulf states need American protection. It is a strategy of indirect expulsion of the United States — subtle, patient, and potentially highly effective over the long term.

Israel's fears in the face of regional realignment

For Israel, the prospect of an Iranian-Arab reconciliation that weakens the Abraham Accords and reduces American presence in the Gulf is a direct existential threat. The Abraham Accords of 2020 were built on the foundation of a common perceived Iranian threat — a threat that had pushed the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and others to normalize relations with Israel. If Iranian pressure diminishes in the perception of Arab Gulf states thanks to MoU negotiations, the strategic impetus for the Abraham Accords could weaken.

The United States response: between the MoU and strategic vigilance

Washington: engaged and watchful

The United States is in a delicate position: they have signed an MoU requiring Iran to discuss Hormuz management with its neighbors, and this discussion is now spilling beyond its intended limits. Washington must both allow these discussions to proceed — to maintain the MoU's peace dynamic — and closely monitor that they do not lead to a weakening of America's security architecture in the Gulf.

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei declared on June 24 that "as long as American military forces interfere in the region, the Middle East will never achieve lasting peace." That is the diplomatic translation of Iran's ultimate objective: the expulsion of the United States from the Gulf. American negotiators must keep this statement in mind at every negotiating table.

US security guarantees for Gulf states: a crucial signal

In this context, the way the United States reasserts and reinforces its security guarantees for Gulf states during the Iran negotiations is crucial. If Washington leaves doubt about its long-term commitment to the region — which the Trump "America First" rhetoric can sometimes suggest — Gulf states might be tempted to develop alternative security arrangements with Iran. The American guarantee must be credible, continuous, and clearly communicated.

The economic dimension: Iran, Oman, and the land corridor

The Iranian corridor project via Oman

Beyond the security aspects, there is an economic dimension to the Iran-Oman relationship that observers discuss less often: the project of a land transport corridor and a commercial exchange network linking Iran to the Sultanate of Oman through free-trade zones and customs agreements. This project, raised sporadically for years, would take on a new dimension if sanctions on Iran were significantly lifted under the MoU framework.

A functional Iranian-Omani economic corridor would allow Iran to access Gulf markets and beyond more easily, partially bypassing the logistical bottlenecks created by sanctions. For Oman, such a corridor would represent a significant economic gain — but also increased dependence on Iran, with all the political risks that entails. Muscat will need to navigate carefully between economic opportunity and strategic vulnerability.

Chinese investments and Sino-American competition in the Gulf

China is, here too, an important variable. Beijing has invested heavily in Gulf infrastructure — notably in Omani ports and Saudi development projects under Vision 2030. An accelerated Iranian normalization driven by an American MoU would also benefit Chinese economic interests in the region. Chinese companies, less constrained by sanctions that would be in the process of being lifted, could accelerate their investments in Iran and the broader Middle East. The economic geopolitics of the Gulf is therefore a terrain of Sino-American competition as much as of US-Iranian negotiation.

Toward a new Gulf: between illusions and realities

The possibility of a less belligerent Gulf

Despite all legitimate concerns about Iranian ambitions, it must be acknowledged that a partial normalization of relations between Iran and Arab Gulf states could produce real positive effects. Less risk of renewed drone and missile strikes on Gulf infrastructure, more stable management of the Strait of Hormuz, and a regional context more conducive to economic investment — which Ukraine and Western economies would need after years of oil-price shocks. Dialogue between Tehran and its neighbors is not intrinsically bad — it is the quality and the conditions of that dialogue that matter.

The ISW itself — while pointing to the risks of Iranian ambitions — did not rule out the possibility that substantive discussions between Iran and Gulf states could lead to more stable regional management mechanisms. Analytical caution is warranted: one must neither ignore the risks of Iranian maneuvers, nor categorically exclude the possibility that these maneuvers lead to something genuinely stabilizing for the region.

The limits of the Iranian strategy

The Iranian strategy in the Gulf runs up against significant structural limits. Gulf states, even if willing to engage with Tehran, will not easily abandon their security alliances with the United States — too many of their regimes depend on American protection for their political survival. Saudi Arabia is simultaneously negotiating a bilateral security agreement with Washington that would include direct military protection guarantees. The UAE maintains the American base at Al Dhafra. Qatar hosts Al Udeid. These physical American presences in the Gulf will not disappear overnight following an Iranian-Arab reconciliation summit.

The MoU's opacity: the unknown structuring everything

An agreement whose text remains secret

A fundamental problem affects all post-MoU negotiations in the Gulf: the full text of the memorandum of understanding signed on June 17 at Versailles between Trump and Khamenei has never been made public. Neither the American nor Iranian governments, nor the Gulf states concerned, nor journalists, nor researchers have access to this document. This means that discussions about what Article 5 "charges" Iran to do with its neighbors rest on partial interpretations and deductions based on official declarations.

This opacity is deliberate — both parties clearly wanted to preserve the ability to interpret the MoU differently for their respective domestic audiences. But it creates deep legal and political uncertainty on which all parties — Gulf states, European countries, international organizations — are attempting to navigate blindly. An agreement this important for regional stability deserves far greater transparency than has been offered so far.

The risks of divergent interpretations

As with the simultaneous dispute over IAEA nuclear inspections between Vance and Gharibabadi, the risk of divergent interpretations of the MoU on Hormuz management is real. If Tehran interprets Article 5 as granting it a mandate for co-management of the strait, and if Washington interprets the same article as limiting discussions to purely technical maritime circulation modalities, an interpretive conflict is inevitable. And this conflict could call the entire agreement into question at a geopolitically critical moment.

Analysis: the broader geopolitical context

The structural forces framing this file

This file cannot be understood in isolation. It sits within a broader geopolitical context where the balance of power among great powers, regional alliances, and cross-cutting economic interests creates constraints that individual actors can barely ignore. Putin's Russia, Xi Jinping's China, the Revolutionary Guards' Iran, Trump's United States — all these actors calculate their positions on the basis of variables that far exceed the immediate file analyzed in this article. Understanding these structural forces is indispensable for assessing the likelihood of the scenarios described.

What the international dynamic reveals about coming trends

Analysts who focus on long-term trends see in the events described here revealing signals of deeper dynamics. The West remains at the center of the international system, but its room for maneuver is shrinking as rival powers — China, Russia, Iran — coordinate their actions in ever more systematic fashion. That is not a reason to despair — it is a reason to strengthen democratic alliances with the urgency the moment demands. Ukraine and its fighters understood this before many others. It is time for Western capitals to join them in that clarity.

Analysis: the broader geopolitical context

The structural forces framing this file

This file cannot be understood in isolation. It sits within a broader geopolitical context where the balance of power among great powers, regional alliances, and cross-cutting economic interests creates constraints that individual actors can barely ignore. Putin's Russia, Xi Jinping's China, the Revolutionary Guards' Iran, Trump's United States — all these actors calculate their positions on the basis of variables that far exceed the immediate file analyzed in this article. Understanding these structural forces is indispensable for assessing the likelihood of the scenarios described.

What the international dynamic reveals about coming trends

Analysts who focus on long-term trends see in the events described here revealing signals of deeper dynamics. The West remains at the center of the international system, but its room for maneuver is shrinking as rival powers — China, Russia, Iran — coordinate their actions in ever more systematic fashion. That is not a reason to despair — it is a reason to strengthen democratic alliances with the urgency the moment demands. Ukraine and its fighters understood this before many others. It is time for Western capitals to join them in that clarity.

Conclusion: Iran's Gulf strategy — patient and ambitious

Oman as a crowbar

This investigation into Iran's use of Oman as a strategic intermediary in the Gulf reveals a coherent and patient strategy. Tehran is using the MoU-mandated discussions on Hormuz management as leverage to engage in conversations on the broader regional architecture. It is using Muscat as an access point to other Gulf states. It is exploiting regional anxieties about American reliability to position itself as a security alternative. And it is offering concrete economic incentives — durable security agreements through economic cooperation — to make accommodation with Tehran attractive.

What the West must monitor

The West must monitor several indicators in the weeks ahead: the precise agenda of the Saudi "reconciliation summit" with Iran; the exact nature of Iran-UAE discussions at the security level; and the positions of Gulf states on any Iranian proposal for Hormuz transit fees. If these three signals point in the direction of growing accommodation with Iranian ambitions, the United States will need to actively and visibly reinforce its security guarantees in the region — not through rhetoric, but through presence and concrete commitments.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

Method and sources

This investigation is based on the analysis by the ISW (Iran Update Special Report, June 24, 2026) — a primary source of first importance — supplemented by information from Reuters, AFP, Financial Times, Tehran Times, and official statements by Iranian, Qatari, and Saudi officials published between June 21 and June 26, 2026. I sought to cross-check information across multiple sources to limit the risk of factual error. Where uncertainty remains — notably on the exact text of the MoU — I have explicitly noted it.

Biases and positioning

I am skeptical of Iranian foreign policy and its regional hegemonic ambitions. I believe that American presence in the Gulf contributes to regional stability and that a weakening of this presence would primarily benefit the Iranian and Russian authoritarian regimes. This bias orients my analysis toward vigilance — which the reader is free to temper according to their own assessment of the situation.

Sources

Primary sources

ISW — Iran Update Special Report, June 24, 2026 — June 24, 2026

Tehran Times — Iran seeking lasting and guaranteed US compliance — June 21, 2026

Al Jazeera — Khamenei's MoU stance stirs debate as Iran and US meet in Switzerland — June 21, 2026

The Eastern Herald — Iran Denies Any IAEA Agreement Was Made — June 26, 2026

ISW — Iran Update Special Report, June 20, 2026 — June 20, 2026

Secondary sources

Fondation Robert Schuman — Europeans caught between trust and the need for protection — June 22, 2026

Aletihad — US and Iran set for new talks in Geneva — June 21, 2026

Fox News — Iran sends whole-regime delegation to US talks — June 21, 2026

Iran International — Iran may get a lifeline, but major obstacles remain — June 20, 2026