INVESTIGATION: Oman, Strategic Intermediary — How Tehran Uses Muscat to Reshape the Gulf

Muscat, June 23, 2026: a meeting with far-reaching consequences

On June 23, 2026, in Muscat, a closed-door meeting took place between Iranian and Omani officials. On the surface, it concerned the management of the Strait of Hormuz — pursuant to Article 5 of the memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed by Donald Trump and Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei on June 17, 2026. But according to a detailed analysis by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), published on June 24, this meeting was far more than that. Tehran was using the Hormuz discussions as an entry point to attempt to reshape the entire security architecture of the Persian Gulf in its favor.

The Iranian delegation was led by Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, speaker of the Iranian parliament and chief negotiator. Added to this meeting, as early as June 24, was a discussion between Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and his Saudi counterpart Faisal bin Farhan — aimed at "strengthening regional cooperation." At the same time, Iranian officials were meeting senior security officials of the United Arab Emirates. And in Muscat, the Oman-Iran discussion was taking on a broader dimension: according to a diplomat cited by AFP, Saudi Arabia was preparing to organize a "reconciliation summit" between Iran and Arab Gulf states. The web was being woven — thread by thread.

Article 5 of the MoU: a gateway into the Gulf's architecture

Article 5 of the US-Iranian MoU is, on paper, a technical clause: it charges Iran with discussing the future management of the Strait of Hormuz with Oman and other Gulf riparian states. This provision flows directly from the preceding crisis — during which Iran had partially blocked or threatened to block the strait, through which 20% of global oil trade passes. The full and lasting reopening of Hormuz was a non-negotiable condition of the MoU. But for Tehran, this obligation to consult neighbors on Hormuz was also an opportunity: to open conversations about strait governance that would unlock the door to far broader ambitions.

Article 5 of the MoU may be the most dangerous element of the agreement for the Gulf security architecture. By charging Iran with "discussing the management" of the strait with its neighbors, it grants Tehran new legitimacy to insert itself into regional discussions from which it has long been kept at arm's length. It is a door left ajar that Iran is now trying to throw open — and the West does not appear to fully grasp this risk.

Oman's singularity in the Gulf architecture

Oman is the unique case in the geopolitics of the Persian Gulf: a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member state that has maintained, for decades, functional diplomatic relations with Iran. While Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain view Iran as an existential threat, Muscat chose the path of pragmatism: keeping communication channels open with Tehran even during periods of maximum tension.

This unique position has made Oman the natural mediator in several Iranian-American crises. This is not the first time Muscat has played this role: in 2013, it was Oman that facilitated the first secret contacts between Obama and Rouhani that led to the JCPOA in 2015. Oman also served as an intermediary in several US-Iranian prisoner exchanges. The trust Tehran places in Muscat is not purely diplomatic — it is built on years of discretion and reliability.

Oman's vulnerability: caught between Iran and the GCC

But Oman is not a neutral actor without its own interests. Its unique geographic position — 2,092 kilometers of coastline, a direct maritime border with Iran, and guardianship over half the Strait of Hormuz — places it in a position of particular vulnerability. If Iran were to impose a toll or a control regime on the strait, Oman would be directly impacted. And if Arab Gulf states hardened their position against Iran, Oman would find itself caught between its GCC allies and its Iranian interlocutor. Muscat therefore plays a permanent balancing act — and the intensity of the post-MoU period is putting that balance under severe strain.

Oman is one of the most underestimated actors in Middle Eastern geopolitics. Its quiet pragmatism and systematic discretion have made it a mediator all parties accept — precisely because it does not seek diplomatic celebrity. But that same discretion means that what takes place in Muscat in Iran-Oman discussions remains largely out of Western public view.

From Hormuz discussions to conversations on regional architecture

The ISW's analysis of June 24 is particularly valuable for understanding what Tehran is actually seeking in these discussions with Oman and the Gulf states. According to the ISW, Iran "likely seeks to use these discussions to shift conversations from the immediate management of the Strait of Hormuz and the resumption of traffic toward broader discussions on a new regional architecture in the Gulf zone."

This formulation deserves to be unpacked. Iran does not simply want to manage maritime traffic at the Strait of Hormuz — it wants to rewrite the security rules of the entire Persian Gulf. This implies reducing or eliminating American and Israeli presence in the region, transforming Gulf states from American security partners into states at least partially accommodating toward Iran, and replacing the US-centric alliance system with a "regional architecture favorable to Iran."

The Iranian narrative on regional security

The ISW reported that Iranian officials had articulated, "in Iranian and regional media," the belief that "US partnerships with Gulf states fuel instability for those states." This narrative — calculated to exploit "Gulf states' fears of Iranian drone and missile attacks" and uncertainty over the US-Iranian negotiations — is an invitation to consider that accommodation with Iran, rather than reliance on American and Israeli partnerships, offers greater stability. It is diplomatic divide and conquer: suggesting that American protection is unreliable while presenting itself as an available security alternative.

This Iranian narrative is sophisticated and potentially effective, because it capitalizes on real Gulf state anxieties: the reliability of the United States under Trump, the risk of renewed Iranian strikes if negotiations fail, and the necessity of coexisting geographically with Iran regardless of American policy. Tehran is skillfully exploiting this anxiety — and the West should counter-argue with concrete guarantees, not declarations.

The June 23 meeting and its immediate implications

Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf's visit to Muscat on June 23 is particularly significant. Ghalibaf is not a career diplomat — he is a pragmatic conservative politician with a security-service background. His presence in Muscat, just one day after the Bürgenstock discussions, signals that Iranian regional diplomacy is being deployed on multiple fronts simultaneously and with very precise coordination. During this meeting, Ghalibaf explicitly declared that "Iran is ready for security agreements with Gulf states that are made durable through economic cooperation."

This formula — security agreements made durable through economic cooperation — is the keystone of Iran's post-MoU strategy in the Gulf. Iran is essentially offering Gulf states a pact: replace your security dependence on the United States with a non-belligerence relationship with Tehran, and we offer you in return access to our markets, our gas, and our regional influence. It is an offer designed to appeal to Gulf states weary of an American presence perceived as costly and sometimes unreliable.

The economic dimension: gas, trade, and cooperation

Brigadier General Esmail Ahmadi Moghaddam, president of Iran's National Defense University and an influential figure in Iranian security discourse, had emphasized on June 24 the "objectives of Iran to strengthen its strategic relations with its neighbors in this post-war period." The economic dimension of this vision is crucial: Iran holds some of the world's largest natural gas reserves. An Iran that had normalized relations with Gulf states could become a major regional energy supplier — paradoxically reducing some Gulf states' dependence on more distant energy imports.

Iran as a gas supplier to Arab Gulf states — that is a vision few would have imagined even five years ago. But Middle Eastern geopolitics in the post-war era is changing at a disconcerting pace. If the US-Iranian negotiations lead to a significant lifting of sanctions, Tehran could indeed become a major regional energy actor — which would completely reconfigure alliances and balances of power across the zone.

Doha's nuanced position on the strait

Qatar — both a mediator in the US-Iranian negotiations and a Gulf state directly affected by Hormuz management — adopted a position characteristic of its diplomacy: openness to discussions, firmness on red lines. Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al Thani stated, according to the Financial Times cited by the ISW, that Qatar was "open to discussing Iranian plans to administer the strait alongside Oman" with other Gulf countries. But he categorically ruled out any system of "control" over the Persian Gulf — which he called Qatar's "gateway to the world."

This Qatari position is an important signal: Gulf states are not closing the door to cooperation with Iran on Hormuz management, but they are drawing clear boundaries. No toll system, no unilateral Iranian control, no challenge to the strait's status as an international waterway. These conditions are fully consistent with international maritime law and with their vital economic interests — Qatar exports its liquefied natural gas (LNG) through that same strait.

Saudi Arabia and the "reconciliation summit"

According to a diplomat cited by AFP on June 24, Saudi Arabia was preparing to organize a "reconciliation summit" separate from the US-Iranian negotiations, involving Iran and Arab Gulf states. This Saudi initiative — if it materializes — would reveal Riyadh's desire to manage its relationship with Tehran directly, without necessarily depending on American mediation. Following the China-brokered Saudi-Iranian normalization agreement of 2023, Riyadh clearly has an interest in maintaining direct dialogue with Tehran even in a context of American pressure on the Islamic Republic.

Saudi Arabia organizing a reconciliation summit with Iran — independently of the United States — signals that Riyadh no longer wishes to be entirely dependent on Washington to manage its relations with its main regional rival. This is a significant evolution in Saudi foreign policy, likely influenced by Mohammed bin Salman and his vision of a more autonomous Saudi Arabia on the international stage.

Meetings with Emirati security services

The ISW reported that senior Iranian officials had recently met senior security officials of the United Arab Emirates — a series of meetings triggered by "multiple Iranian requests for meetings aimed at rapprochement." This information is significant: the UAE is one of the Gulf states that moved closest to Israel through the Abraham Accords, and Iran has traditionally regarded them with deep suspicion. The fact that security meetings are taking place between Tehran and Abu Dhabi suggests both parties are seeking to avoid unwanted escalation.

For the UAE, the stakes are clear: they have massive economic interests in Dubai — a regional commercial hub through which a significant portion of trade flows to or via Iran despite sanctions. They also have direct security interests: Iranian missiles could reach their cities within minutes. The UAE's diplomatic caution in its approach to Iran in the post-MoU environment is therefore entirely rational.

Bahrain: the most exposed American ally

Bahrain is the Gulf state in the most delicate situation: it is home to the US Fifth Fleet, the cornerstone of American military presence in the Gulf. Iran, which historically claims that Bahrain belongs to its territory, would be delighted to see the Fifth Fleet leave the region. Any weakening of the security alliance between Manama and Washington would represent a massive strategic gain for Tehran.

The Fifth Fleet in Bahrain is the concrete symbol of what Iran wants to eliminate from the region: the American military presence that prevents Tehran from imposing itself as the regional hegemon. Any negotiation that includes a discussion on "regional architecture" is potentially a negotiation over maintaining or withdrawing that presence. The West must be extremely vigilant on this point — and American security guarantees in the Gulf must not become a bargaining chip.

UNCLOS and the international character of Hormuz

The ISW underscored a fundamental legal point in its June 24 analysis: the Strait of Hormuz is an international waterway governed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Any attempt to place the strait under the control of one or several states "would erode long-standing international norms and maritime law." This is not an academic nuance — it is the legal foundation guaranteeing that merchant vessels of all countries can transit through Hormuz without requiring Iranian consent.

Iran's position, through its demands for environmental, navigation, or security fees on vessels transiting the strait, is an attempt to create a precedent that progressively erodes this international character. Gulf states, led by Qatar, have clearly signaled their opposition to any toll or control system. But Iranian pressure on this point will likely not cease — it is too important to Tehran's strategic vision of dominant regional influence.

The stakes for global trade

To understand why these Hormuz discussions are of crucial international importance, consider the figures: according to data from the International Energy Agency (IEA), approximately 20% of global oil trade transits through the Strait of Hormuz. That represents roughly 20 to 21 million barrels per day. A toll of just a few dollars per barrel would represent billions of dollars in annual revenues for the state controlling it. It is not hard to understand why Iran, facing a severe foreign currency shortage, is seeking to create this maritime revenue mechanism.

An Iranian toll on the Strait of Hormuz would be the maritime equivalent of a transit fee on the world's most important commercial route. This is not a far-fetched idea — it is a proposal that Iranian officials have explicitly put forward. And if it were accepted even partially, it would set an extraordinarily dangerous precedent for international freedom of navigation. This is a red line the West must hold.

The "new regional architecture" as euphemism

The ISW was direct in its analysis: "Iran likely seeks to use discussions with Gulf states on Hormuz to shift them toward broader conversations on limiting American or Israeli influence and partnerships in the Gulf." The ISW's "likely" is carefully measured — the statements of Iranian officials such as Ahmadi Moghaddam and Ghalibaf on a "regional architecture" and "durable security agreements" leave little doubt about the objective.

Iran knows that direct security partnerships with Gulf states — even minimal, even informal — would significantly complicate maintaining a robust American military presence in the region. Every step toward regional "reconciliation" dilutes the argument for which Gulf states need American protection. It is a strategy of indirect expulsion of the United States — subtle, patient, and potentially highly effective over the long term.

Israel's fears in the face of regional realignment

For Israel, the prospect of an Iranian-Arab reconciliation that weakens the Abraham Accords and reduces American presence in the Gulf is a direct existential threat. The Abraham Accords of 2020 were built on the foundation of a common perceived Iranian threat — a threat that had pushed the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and others to normalize relations with Israel. If Iranian pressure diminishes in the perception of Arab Gulf states thanks to MoU negotiations, the strategic impetus for the Abraham Accords could weaken.

Post-MoU Iranian diplomacy is a sophisticated attempt to dismantle the pro-American, pro-Israeli alliance system that had been strengthened in the Gulf in recent years. If it were to succeed, even partially, it would be a considerable Iranian strategic victory — achieved without a single shot fired, through the sheer force of diplomacy and economic pragmatism. This is a threat the West is underestimating.

Washington: engaged and watchful

The United States is in a delicate position: they have signed an MoU requiring Iran to discuss Hormuz management with its neighbors, and this discussion is now spilling beyond its intended limits. Washington must both allow these discussions to proceed — to maintain the MoU's peace dynamic — and closely monitor that they do not lead to a weakening of America's security architecture in the Gulf.

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei declared on June 24 that "as long as American military forces interfere in the region, the Middle East will never achieve lasting peace." That is the diplomatic translation of Iran's ultimate objective: the expulsion of the United States from the Gulf. American negotiators must keep this statement in mind at every negotiating table.

US security guarantees for Gulf states: a crucial signal

In this context, the way the United States reasserts and reinforces its security guarantees for Gulf states during the Iran negotiations is crucial. If Washington leaves doubt about its long-term commitment to the region — which the Trump "America First" rhetoric can sometimes suggest — Gulf states might be tempted to develop alternative security arrangements with Iran. The American guarantee must be credible, continuous, and clearly communicated.

Trump is simultaneously the man who signed the MoU with Iran and the leader of the security alliance that Iran is seeking to dissolve in the Gulf. This contradiction at the apex of American policy is being exploited by Tehran — which can point to every Trumpian ambiguity about American presence to stoke Gulf state anxiety. This is a real American diplomatic vulnerability that future administrations will need to correct.

The Iranian corridor project via Oman

Beyond the security aspects, there is an economic dimension to the Iran-Oman relationship that observers discuss less often: the project of a land transport corridor and a commercial exchange network linking Iran to the Sultanate of Oman through free-trade zones and customs agreements. This project, raised sporadically for years, would take on a new dimension if sanctions on Iran were significantly lifted under the MoU framework.

A functional Iranian-Omani economic corridor would allow Iran to access Gulf markets and beyond more easily, partially bypassing the logistical bottlenecks created by sanctions. For Oman, such a corridor would represent a significant economic gain — but also increased dependence on Iran, with all the political risks that entails. Muscat will need to navigate carefully between economic opportunity and strategic vulnerability.

Chinese investments and Sino-American competition in the Gulf

China is, here too, an important variable. Beijing has invested heavily in Gulf infrastructure — notably in Omani ports and Saudi development projects under Vision 2030. An accelerated Iranian normalization driven by an American MoU would also benefit Chinese economic interests in the region. Chinese companies, less constrained by sanctions that would be in the process of being lifted, could accelerate their investments in Iran and the broader Middle East. The economic geopolitics of the Gulf is therefore a terrain of Sino-American competition as much as of US-Iranian negotiation.

I find myself observing a situation where the United States is trying to contain Iran through a peace agreement, while China patiently waits to harvest the economic benefits of that peace. That is a considerable strategic irony — and perhaps an American miscalculation. If Washington does not ensure that its own companies and allies benefit proportionally from any Iranian normalization, China will emerge the big winner.

The possibility of a less belligerent Gulf

Despite all legitimate concerns about Iranian ambitions, it must be acknowledged that a partial normalization of relations between Iran and Arab Gulf states could produce real positive effects. Less risk of renewed drone and missile strikes on Gulf infrastructure, more stable management of the Strait of Hormuz, and a regional context more conducive to economic investment — which Ukraine and Western economies would need after years of oil-price shocks. Dialogue between Tehran and its neighbors is not intrinsically bad — it is the quality and the conditions of that dialogue that matter.

The ISW itself — while pointing to the risks of Iranian ambitions — did not rule out the possibility that substantive discussions between Iran and Gulf states could lead to more stable regional management mechanisms. Analytical caution is warranted: one must neither ignore the risks of Iranian maneuvers, nor categorically exclude the possibility that these maneuvers lead to something genuinely stabilizing for the region.

The limits of the Iranian strategy

The Iranian strategy in the Gulf runs up against significant structural limits. Gulf states, even if willing to engage with Tehran, will not easily abandon their security alliances with the United States — too many of their regimes depend on American protection for their political survival. Saudi Arabia is simultaneously negotiating a bilateral security agreement with Washington that would include direct military protection guarantees. The UAE maintains the American base at Al Dhafra. Qatar hosts Al Udeid. These physical American presences in the Gulf will not disappear overnight following an Iranian-Arab reconciliation summit.

Iran probably believes time is on its side in the Gulf — that the inevitable gradual American withdrawal from the region will create a vacuum it can fill. But this calculation overlooks the adaptive capacity of Gulf states, which have demonstrated since 2020 that they can diversify their security partnerships well beyond the traditional US-Iran binary. Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Doha will never be mere Iranian satellites.

An agreement whose text remains secret

A fundamental problem affects all post-MoU negotiations in the Gulf: the full text of the memorandum of understanding signed on June 17 at Versailles between Trump and Khamenei has never been made public. Neither the American nor Iranian governments, nor the Gulf states concerned, nor journalists, nor researchers have access to this document. This means that discussions about what Article 5 "charges" Iran to do with its neighbors rest on partial interpretations and deductions based on official declarations.

This opacity is deliberate — both parties clearly wanted to preserve the ability to interpret the MoU differently for their respective domestic audiences. But it creates deep legal and political uncertainty on which all parties — Gulf states, European countries, international organizations — are attempting to navigate blindly. An agreement this important for regional stability deserves far greater transparency than has been offered so far.

The risks of divergent interpretations

As with the simultaneous dispute over IAEA nuclear inspections between Vance and Gharibabadi, the risk of divergent interpretations of the MoU on Hormuz management is real. If Tehran interprets Article 5 as granting it a mandate for co-management of the strait, and if Washington interprets the same article as limiting discussions to purely technical maritime circulation modalities, an interpretive conflict is inevitable. And this conflict could call the entire agreement into question at a geopolitically critical moment.

The MoU's opacity may be its most serious flaw. By keeping the text secret, both parties preserved their latitude for domestic interpretation — but they also created the conditions for an interpretive crisis that could blow the agreement apart within the 60-day window. Transparency is not only a liberal value — it is also a practical condition for diplomatic agreements to hold over time.

The structural forces framing this file

This file cannot be understood in isolation. It sits within a broader geopolitical context where the balance of power among great powers, regional alliances, and cross-cutting economic interests creates constraints that individual actors can barely ignore. Putin's Russia, Xi Jinping's China, the Revolutionary Guards' Iran, Trump's United States — all these actors calculate their positions on the basis of variables that far exceed the immediate file analyzed in this article. Understanding these structural forces is indispensable for assessing the likelihood of the scenarios described.

What the international dynamic reveals about coming trends

Analysts who focus on long-term trends see in the events described here revealing signals of deeper dynamics. The West remains at the center of the international system, but its room for maneuver is shrinking as rival powers — China, Russia, Iran — coordinate their actions in ever more systematic fashion. That is not a reason to despair — it is a reason to strengthen democratic alliances with the urgency the moment demands. Ukraine and its fighters understood this before many others. It is time for Western capitals to join them in that clarity.

I want to explicitly name what this file reveals about the state of the world in 2026: a systemic competition between democracies and autocracies that will not end with a communiqué signed at Versailles, nor with a summit in Ankara, nor with a trade deal in Beijing. It will end, if it ends, with the demonstration that democracies are capable of uniting, holding firm, and winning — or it will continue until one side collapses. I prefer the first option.

The structural forces framing this file

This file cannot be understood in isolation. It sits within a broader geopolitical context where the balance of power among great powers, regional alliances, and cross-cutting economic interests creates constraints that individual actors can barely ignore. Putin's Russia, Xi Jinping's China, the Revolutionary Guards' Iran, Trump's United States — all these actors calculate their positions on the basis of variables that far exceed the immediate file analyzed in this article. Understanding these structural forces is indispensable for assessing the likelihood of the scenarios described.

What the international dynamic reveals about coming trends

Analysts who focus on long-term trends see in the events described here revealing signals of deeper dynamics. The West remains at the center of the international system, but its room for maneuver is shrinking as rival powers — China, Russia, Iran — coordinate their actions in ever more systematic fashion. That is not a reason to despair — it is a reason to strengthen democratic alliances with the urgency the moment demands. Ukraine and its fighters understood this before many others. It is time for Western capitals to join them in that clarity.

I want to explicitly name what this file reveals about the state of the world in 2026: a systemic competition between democracies and autocracies that will not end with a communiqué signed at Versailles, nor with a summit in Ankara, nor with a trade deal in Beijing. It will end, if it ends, with the demonstration that democracies are capable of uniting, holding firm, and winning — or it will continue until one side collapses. I prefer the first option.

Oman as a crowbar

This investigation into Iran's use of Oman as a strategic intermediary in the Gulf reveals a coherent and patient strategy. Tehran is using the MoU-mandated discussions on Hormuz management as leverage to engage in conversations on the broader regional architecture. It is using Muscat as an access point to other Gulf states. It is exploiting regional anxieties about American reliability to position itself as a security alternative. And it is offering concrete economic incentives — durable security agreements through economic cooperation — to make accommodation with Tehran attractive.

What the West must monitor

The West must monitor several indicators in the weeks ahead: the precise agenda of the Saudi "reconciliation summit" with Iran; the exact nature of Iran-UAE discussions at the security level; and the positions of Gulf states on any Iranian proposal for Hormuz transit fees. If these three signals point in the direction of growing accommodation with Iranian ambitions, the United States will need to actively and visibly reinforce its security guarantees in the region — not through rhetoric, but through presence and concrete commitments.

This conclusion cannot erase the complexity of the subject addressed. I sign this article with the conviction that the reader deserves not only the facts, but also the analyst's candor about what he does not know — and about what remains at stake beyond the scope of this article.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between verified facts and interpretive analysis. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under Sources, never here.

Primary source families used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

Secondary source families: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under Sources.

Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a critical, contextual synthesis based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.