DECODING: Iranian sanctions — the legal labyrinth Trump cannot dismantle alone

The June 17 memorandum and its legal limits

On June 17, 2026, a memorandum of understanding signed between Trump, Iranian President Pezeshkian, and the E4 format appeared to open a door toward normalizing relations between Washington and Tehran. The General License X issued by the U.S. Treasury in its wake temporarily authorized Iranian oil sales for 60 days. On paper, it is a real advance. But in the hallways of the U.S. Congress, reality is quite different.

Texts of law accumulated over several decades — the CISADA law of 2010, provisions of the NDAA, Congressional resolutions tied to the nuclear program — form a legal wall that the president cannot dismantle by executive decree alone. Easing Iranian sanctions is not a question of political will: it is a question of legislative architecture. And that architecture, Trump does not fully control.

Why the sanctions file is unique in American diplomatic history

The structure of sanctions against Iran is particularly complex because it is the product of thirty years of legislative sedimentation. Unlike sanctions against Russia or Cuba, Iranian sanctions are embedded in primary laws that only Congress can modify — not a simple presidential executive order. This point is crucial and often misunderstood by observers who assume Trump can lift sanctions with a stroke of the pen.

The Robert Schuman Foundation documented this labyrinth in its letter no. 1161 of June 2026: the legal obstacles to lifting Iranian sanctions are multiple, interlocking, and require either a legislative majority or waiver mechanisms subject to strict conditions. Without congressional approval, any presidential deal remains partial — and therefore insufficient to convince Tehran to abandon its nuclear program.

What no one says clearly in the major media is that Trump may be selling something he cannot deliver. And if Tehran figures that out — which is likely — the negotiations have no real chance of producing anything lasting.

Understanding CISADA and its legal teeth

The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA) of 2010 is one of the cornerstone pieces of the sanctions apparatus against Iran. It codifies restrictions on financial institutions doing business with the Iranian Central Bank, on energy exports, and on technology imports that could contribute to Tehran's nuclear or ballistic program. CISADA is not a presidential decree — it is a federal law requiring a congressional vote to be modified or repealed.

Now, the current U.S. Congress, even with a Republican majority, is not unanimously in favor of a deal with Iran. Senators in the AIPAC caucus, neoconservative hawks, and members close to the Netanyahu line have already signaled their intention to oppose any relief perceived as a gift to Tehran. As of June 2026, several bills aimed at strengthening — rather than easing — Iranian sanctions are circulating in the Senate.

NDAA provisions that defy the executive

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) has for several years contained specific provisions prohibiting the use of federal funds to lift certain Iranian sanctions without prior presidential certification before Congress that Iran is meeting its international obligations. This certification is both political and legal: it exposes the president to legal challenges if his declarations prove inaccurate after the fact.

Section 122 of the 1974 Trade Act — the tariff lever Trump uses on other fronts — does not strictly apply to Iranian sanctions. Each sanctions instrument has its own lift architecture, its own conditions, its own timelines. This means a complete sanctions relief would require not one law but a coordinated series of legislation, which is politically colossal in a polarized Congress.

This is the American paradox: a president with broad foreign policy powers finds himself shackled by laws that his own camp helped enact. Trump can sign memorandums. But it is Congress that holds the keys to the sanctions — and it does not hand them over easily.

What the license concretely allows

The General License X issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the U.S. Treasury is an executive tool that can be used without a congressional vote. Under the framework of the June 17 memorandum, it temporarily authorizes transactions related to Iranian oil sales, associated financial transfers, and certain banking operations for a period of 60 days. It is a real, tangible measure that already had an impact on oil markets: the price per barrel briefly dropped by 4% after the announcement.

For the Iranian government, this license represents an economic breath of fresh air. Iran's foreign currency reserves had been severely depleted by previous years' sanctions and strikes on certain oil infrastructure. The ability to sell freely again on international markets, even for 60 days, partially stabilizes the budget situation of the Pezeshkian administration.

The FDD's criticisms and the real risks

The Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) called General License X a blank check given to the Iranian regime. Its central argument: this measure offers Tehran an immediate financial windfall with no guarantee the money will not be used to fund Hezbollah, the Houthis, or other Iran-backed armed groups in the region. The FDD notes that when the 2015 deal (JCPOA) was reached, the first funds released were partially channeled toward Iran's proxy operations in the Middle East.

This criticism deserves to be taken seriously — even if it comes from an organization that opposes any deal with Tehran on principle. The dual-use risk of funds is real. The question is whether this reality makes an agreement impossible, or whether it should simply be managed through more robust verification mechanisms. That is precisely where the Bürgenstock negotiators are stuck.

The FDD is not wrong on the substance: money given to Iran is money that can fund its proxies. But refusing any agreement because the money might be misused is also to condemn all preventive dialogue. It is a real dilemma, not a simple answer.

The parliamentary dynamic hostile to any relief

In the U.S. Senate, several leading Republican voices — including members of the Foreign Relations Committee — have publicly expressed their opposition to any substantial lifting of Iranian sanctions. Their argument: Iran did not respect its obligations under the 2015 JCPOA, accelerated its enrichment after 2018, and continues to fund armed groups that directly threaten American allies in the region.

This opposition is not monolithic: some isolationist Republicans close to Vance believe a deal would be preferable to a war. But the arithmetic majority needed to amend sanctions laws — 60 votes in the Senate to avoid a filibuster — is politically out of reach without a robust bipartisan coalition. And that coalition does not exist in June 2026.

Presidential certification mechanisms: a political trap

American law provides for presidential certification mechanisms that allow the president to temporarily suspend certain sanctions if Iran is deemed compliant with its obligations. But these certifications expose the White House to an immediate political risk: if Iran subsequently violates the agreement — or if intelligence services reveal a breach — the president is held responsible for having miscertified.

This mechanism already blocked the Obama administration on multiple occasions. It risks blocking Trump in the same way. And for someone whose political brand is never admitting a mistake, certifying Iranian compliance — and risking being wrong — is a political risk that Trump might decide to avoid by sabotaging the negotiations himself before being forced to do so.

There is a cruel irony in the fact that it is Trump — the president who did everything to exit the JCPOA in 2018 — who must now navigate the legal complexity his own withdrawal made even more intractable. He broke the machine. He now has to fix it with parts he does not control.

The Iranian oil sector under international surveillance

Iran holds the fourth-largest proven oil reserves in the world — approximately 208 billion barrels. Its oil exports, before 2018, reached 2.5 million barrels per day. After the American withdrawal from the JCPOA and the reimposition of sanctions, those exports fell to under 400,000 barrels per day. General License X aims to allow a partial return to higher levels — but potential buyers, particularly in Asia, remain cautious as long as the overall legal sanctions regime remains unclear.

Major Western oil companies — TotalEnergies, Shell, BP — will not return to the Iranian market without solid legal certainty over five to ten years. A 60-day license is not enough to justify the necessary infrastructure investments. That is why the real economic impact of General License X remains limited: the big players in the sector are waiting for a permanent agreement, not a transitional gesture.

The banking sector and the SWIFT problem

Iran has been partially excluded from the SWIFT system — the global interbank network — since 2012. This exclusion prevents ordinary international financial transactions and makes bilateral trade extremely complex, even for non-sanctioned goods such as medicines or food. Iran's return to SWIFT requires an agreement between European financial institutions, the U.S. Treasury, and Congress.

Without access to SWIFT, even oil sanctions that are lifted cannot fully benefit Iran: payments remain complex, delayed, and subject to costly intermediaries. That is why Tehran insists that any agreement explicitly include its return to SWIFT — a requirement that neither General License X nor the memorandum currently covers.

SWIFT is the nervous system of global trade. As long as Iran is excluded from it, all promises of sanctions relief remain partially empty. It is a lever the West holds — and it must decide whether it truly wants to use it to conclude something lasting.

Twenty years of memorandums without results: the historical precedent

The Foundation for Defense of Democracies and analyst David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security have both warned that Iran has used memorandums of understanding as delaying tactics for more than twenty years. In 2003, a similar agreement with the E3 suspended enrichment for two years — long enough for Iran to perfect its techniques and advance on the IR-2 centrifuge before resuming.

In 2013, during the Geneva negotiations that preceded the JCPOA, Iran used the months of discussion to consolidate its capabilities at Fordow. This recurring pattern — negotiating while advancing — is not a conspiracy theory: it is a documented strategy that American and Israeli intelligence agencies explicitly acknowledge in their internal reports.

Anti-circumvention safeguards in the current memorandum

Does the June 17, 2026 memorandum contain sufficient anti-circumvention safeguards? The honest answer is: we do not know. The full text has not been made public. The fragments known through press agencies suggest that the verification mechanisms are deliberately vague — a compromise between American demands for oversight and Iranian demands for sovereignty.

This vagueness is precisely what concerns the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), whose head, Rafael Grossi, has publicly insisted that inspections be explicitly guaranteed in any agreement. Without access to the Natanz and Fordow sites, the IAEA cannot verify whether Iran has halted its enrichment or is quietly continuing it. And without verification, any economic concession is made blind.

History has taught us that Iran is a patient and strategic negotiator. If this memorandum is yet another delaying tactic, the West will have handed revenues from oil to a regime that will use the time to strengthen itself. That is the nightmare scenario no one wants to say out loud.

The European lever on sanctions: real but limited

The European Union has its own sanctions mechanisms against Iran, distinct from the American regime. In theory, the EU could unilaterally decide to lift its sanctions — and some member states, such as Austria and Italy, have already expressed interest in commercial normalization with Tehran. In practice, however, European companies will stay away as long as U.S. secondary sanctions are in place — those sanctions that punish third parties who do business with Iran.

That is the real power of Washington in this equation: secondary sanctions transform the American sanctions regime into a global one, since anyone doing business with Iran risks being shut out of the American market. Europe can lift its own sanctions, but as long as Washington maintains its — especially the secondary ones — the impact on the Iranian economy remains marginal.

The INSTEX instrument and its successors: a partial solution

In 2019, Europeans created INSTEX — Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges — to enable commercial transactions with Iran by bypassing the SWIFT system and American secondary sanctions. The experiment was a relative failure: trade volumes were minimal, with European banks refusing to participate for fear of American retaliation. In 2026, discussions are underway to create a similar but more robust mechanism — but the same structural obstacles persist.

Without a clarification of the American sanctions regime, any European alternative remains a partial and risky workaround. The real solution runs through Washington. And Washington, right now, is a White House internally contradicting itself on the very strategy to adopt toward Tehran. Europe is therefore condemned to wait for American coherence — a wait that could prove very long indeed.

Europe does what it can in the margins Washington leaves it. It is insufficient and Europe knows it. The real question is: how long will it continue to pay the price of American incoherence without claiming a more autonomous diplomatic voice on Iran?

Scenario 1: a framework agreement before the window expires

The optimistic scenario foresees that negotiators — American, Iranian, European — reach before August 17, 2026 (the expiry of the 60 days) a framework agreement on enrichment thresholds, inspection modalities, and a partial sanctions-lifting timeline. This framework would then be submitted to Congress for legislative handling. That is what Vance seems to be pursuing, and what European diplomats are hoping for.

For this scenario to materialize, Trump would need to stop publicly sabotaging the negotiations, Iran would need to accept inspections before full sanctions removal, and Congress would need to refrain from voting contradictory new sanctions during the negotiating window. Three simultaneously fragile conditions — which makes this scenario possible but not probable.

Scenario 2: collapse and return to maximum enrichment

The pessimistic scenario — which some analysts unfortunately consider the most likely — is the collapse of negotiations before the 60-day expiry. Triggered by a Trump statement, an Israeli military action, or an inspection deadlock, this collapse would leave Iran free to resume enrichment at full capacity — with the 60 days of oil revenues already banked through General License X.

In this scenario, Iran would exit the negotiating window economically strengthened and nucleararily advanced. That is exactly what the FDD predicts — and what the Obama administration experienced in 2013. The difference with 2026 is that Iran is already far closer to the weapons-grade threshold than it was then. A post-failure resumption of enrichment could lead to weaponization within months.

If this pessimistic scenario plays out, history will record that the West gave Iran a financing window it used to advance toward the bomb. That would be a strategic blunder of a magnitude that is difficult to measure — and no one will want to take responsibility for it.

Legislative reform as a precondition for any lasting agreement

The conclusion is inescapable: a lasting Iranian nuclear deal is impossible without a serious legislative overhaul of the American sanctions framework. Memorandums and general licenses are stopgaps — useful in the short term, insufficient in the long term. For Iran to accept permanent nuclear concessions, it must be offered permanent economic relief in return. And permanent relief requires action by Congress.

This reality creates a paradox: presidential negotiators can sign anything, but only Congress can make the deal credible in Tehran's eyes. And in a deeply divided Congress on Iranian policy, achieving that legislative credibility is the hardest obstacle of all — harder even than the divergences between Vance and Trump.

The West must decide what it truly wants

At bottom, the central question is not legal — it is strategic. Does the West truly want a non-nuclear Iran, and is it willing to pay the political price of the deal needed to get there? Or does it prefer to maintain a sanctions regime that punishes Iran without stopping it, while salving its conscience? Both options currently coexist in American policy — embodied, respectively, by Vance and by the Congressional hawks and Trump's tweets.

While Washington tears itself apart over this fundamental question, the 60-day window keeps ticking. And every day that passes without clarification is a day given to Iran to advance its program, bank its oil revenues, and wait for the West to make up its mind. The legal labyrinth of sanctions is not a fatality: it is the product of political decisions. It can be undone by other political decisions. But for that to happen, Washington must first decide what it wants.

I have been decoding this file for months. And what strikes me is that the hardest obstacle to overcome is not in Tehran. It is in Washington. Its name is not Khamenei. Its name is the U.S. Congress — and sometimes, it is also Donald Trump.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

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The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a critical, contextual synthesis based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

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