EDITORIAL: Ankara Summit — Rutte, Turn Promises Into Steel or Go Home

Ankara, July 7: a summit that cannot afford to fail

On July 7, 2026, the leaders of the 32 NATO member nations will gather in Ankara, Turkey, for what Secretary General Mark Rutte himself has called a summit "more important than The Hague" of the previous year. Past summits have produced gleaming communiqués, resounding commitments, and ambitious objectives. The Hague summit, in 2025, even extracted the historic pledge to raise defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2035 — a target no one had dared to name a few years earlier. Bravo. But promises don't fire. Communiqués don't fly. Declarations of intent don't push back Russian tanks.

Ankara cannot be another summit of fine words. Rutte knows it. He said so himself on June 25, 2026, before the Atlantic Council in Washington: "In Ankara, allies will advance concrete plans for increased investments." He also announced that the summit will see the announcement of "tens of billions of dollars" in new defense contracts. That is a commitment that demands scrutiny. Because the difference between "tens of billions in signed contracts" and "tens of billions in letters of intent" could mean all the difference between an alliance that truly strengthens itself and one that pretends to.

The crucial distinction: contracts or communiqués

Here is the distinction Rutte must impose on his allies for Ankara: a signed contract is legally binding, it commits budgets, it triggers supply chains, it produces real weapons on real timelines. A memorandum of understanding (MoU) or a letter of intent is a political commitment, revisable, subject to shifting governments and budget priorities. These are not the same thing. And in the current context — an active war in Europe, a Russia that is rearming, a China testing its limits, a North Korea commissioning nuclear destroyers — this is not the time for contractual ambiguities.

Rutte said the right thing before the Atlantic Council: "Putin is not afraid of our commitments — he is afraid of us implementing them." That sentence sums everything up. NATO's problem for decades has not been a lack of declarations — it has been a lack of execution. Ankara must be the anti-summit: less rhetoric, more steel.

5% of GDP — a historic target, an uncertain trajectory

The commitment to 5% of GDP for defense by 2035, adopted at The Hague in 2025, is historic in its ambition. Rutte confirmed on June 25 that allies are on a "trajectory" to meet this target. He noted that European and Canadian allies had increased their defense spending by more than $90 billion in 2025 — an increase of roughly 20% compared to the previous year. That is real. That is significant. That is not enough.

The concrete reality is this: in 2024, out of 32 NATO members, only a handful reached or exceeded the then-current target of 2% of GDP. Moving from 2% to 5% means multiplying defense budgets by 2.5 — a phenomenal budgetary effort that most European economies cannot sustain without painful political trade-offs: cuts to pensions, healthcare, education, or social benefits. Politics is always the adjustment variable for military promises.

The defense industrial revolution: promise and reality

Rutte also framed Ankara as an opportunity to "showcase how we are seizing opportunities and making this revolution a reality." He was referring to the defense industrial revolution — a transformation of NATO's industrial base to produce more weapons, faster, at lower cost, integrating cutting-edge technologies, notably artificial intelligence. It is the right vision. But between the vision and the serial production of intercontinental missiles or advanced interceptors, there are years of development and billions in investment.

The "defense industrial revolution" — I have been hearing this term since at least 2022, every time NATO meets. It is a seductive idea. But an industrial revolution takes time: Europe did not reopen its artillery shell production lines at the snap of a finger. Some allies are only just beginning to sign multi-year contracts with their defense industries. Ankara must accelerate this process — not celebrate it as if it were already complete.

The "defense industry day": spectacle or substance?

Rutte described the first day of the Ankara summit as a "big defense industry day" where "you will see a massive amount of new contracts, MoUs, letters of intent, but also big contracts being signed." The phrasing is revealing: it conflates levels of commitment. "Big contracts being signed" is the part that truly counts. The rest — MoUs, letters of intent — is diplomatic theater, useful for appearances but insufficient for defense.

The French position on European arms procurement, the consistency of German budgets after years of stagnation, the United Kingdom's capacity to honor its post-Brexit commitments within NATO: these are the concrete tests to which Ankara will be subjected. Rutte can announce hundreds of billions — but if contracts lack detail, figures, precise delivery schedules, and penalty clauses for delays, they will not be worth the paper they are printed on.

The message to Putin: the credibility of deterrence

Rutte delivered direct messages to Vladimir Putin in his June 25 speech: "Putin is not afraid of our commitments — he is afraid of us implementing them — and that is exactly what we are doing, Vladimir. We will defend ourselves." These are courageous words. But the credibility of deterrence is not built with words — it is built with real capabilities, deployed, trained, and ready for use. If Ankara produces real contracts that translate into concrete weapons deliveries within 12 to 18 months, the message to Putin will be credible. Otherwise, it will be noise.

Putin is a man who reads intelligence reports, not press communiqués. He knows exactly how many F-35s have actually been delivered, how many battalions are genuinely deployable, what the real artillery shell stockpiles of European armies amount to. Rutte's declarations will impress him only if they are followed by measurable effects. And right now, the gap between announcements and actual capabilities remains troubling.

$1.2 trillion in new European investment since 2017

Mark Rutte provided impressive figures during his exchange with Donald Trump: since 2017, European and Canadian allies have increased their defense spending by a cumulative total of more than $1.2 trillion — generating, according to Rutte, a $300 billion order book for the American defense industrial base. These figures serve a precise political purpose: to show Trump that American pressure for a more equitable burden-sharing is working, and to maintain US engagement in NATO.

Trump confirmed his intention to attend the Ankara summit and praised his relationship with Turkish President Erdogan. This personal relationship is crucial: Turkey is a problematic NATO member — it maintains commercial ties with Russia despite the war, it purchased Russian S-400 systems, and it occasionally blocks allied decisions. But Erdogan remains a partner NATO needs, and Trump's personal rapport with him can paradoxically help move some stalled files forward.

The Trump paradox for the Atlantic alliance

Trump has always been an ambivalent figure for NATO: he threatens to withdraw the United States, accuses allies of not paying enough, yet in the end he maintains American presence and effectively pushes Europeans to raise their defense budgets. Rutte, diplomatically, has transformed this pressure into an opportunity: massive European investments in defense create American jobs, feed missile and aircraft factories in the United States, and maintain American interest in the alliance. That is how to speak to Trump — in terms of jobs and business, not values or moral obligations.

Trump as the unwitting engine of European rearmament — that is the fundamental irony of our era. His "America First" rhetoric has done more for European defense than ten years of speeches about shared values. Europeans rearmed not out of ideological conviction but because they feared being left alone to face Putin. That is pragmatic, not glorious, but it works.

The Ukrainian president expected in the Turkish capital

Volodymyr Zelensky will be in Ankara — Rutte confirmed it. That is symbolically crucial: Ukraine remains at the heart of NATO's raison d'être in 2026. But Zelensky is not coming for symbols. He is coming for commitments: delivery timelines on promised weapons systems, long-term security guarantees, and — a recurring question still without a definitive answer — a credible path toward NATO membership.

Discussions on long-term security guarantees for Ukraine are particularly urgent. In the absence of formal NATO integration — which several members continue to block out of fear of Russian reaction — a bilateral and multilateral security architecture must be built that offers Kyiv concrete guarantees. Bilateral defense agreements with the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany have been signed — but their operational contents often remain vague.

The weapons Ukraine needs — now

Ukraine's military needs for Ankara are clear: more air defense systems — in particular interceptors to replace depleted stockpiles; more long-range artillery ammunition; tanks to offset losses; and clarification on F-16 deliveries. On each of these points, there is a gap between promises made at previous summits and actual deliveries. Ankara must close this gap with timelines and quantities, not expressions of solidarity.

Zelensky is right to demand timelines. His army is fighting today, not five years from now. Every weapons system delivered six months late represents soldiers killed, cities destroyed, civilians displaced. Ukrainian urgency is not a diplomatic posture — it is the reality of an existential war. Allies who continue to trickle deliveries for domestic political reasons should be ashamed.

NATO 3.0: a stronger Europe within a stronger NATO

Rutte put forward the vision of "NATO 3.0" — a Europe taking on more responsibility for its own conventional defense, while the United States would maintain a long-term conventional presence and provide the "nuclear umbrella as the ultimate guarantor." That is the right vision. But its implementation requires Europe to develop conventional capabilities that are currently insufficient: rapidly deployable ground forces, ammunition stockpiles for prolonged conflicts, logistical capabilities to sustain large-scale operations.

France, the United Kingdom, and Germany have all raised their defense budgets. But delivery timelines for new equipment — Leclerc 2 tanks, SCAF submarines, Caesar artillery systems in sufficient quantities — stretch over years. And all the while, Russia was rebuilding its ammunition reserves, massively recruiting for its army, and adapting its doctrine to drone warfare. Western rearmament is necessary, but it will not close the capability gap for several years.

The European Union's role in collective defense

Rutte explicitly mentioned the European Union's role in strengthening defense production, noting that the 23 NATO members who are also EU members use the EU as a "power tool" to accelerate industrial production. The European Defense Fund, joint defense projects, and discussions on an autonomous European defense capability are advancing — more slowly than the geopolitical situation demands, but they are advancing.

The European Union as a defense actor — that is the most promising and most frustrating construction project of the decade. Promising because European budgetary, industrial, and technological resources are considerable. Frustrating because governance across 27 members is a model designed to slow decisions, not accelerate them in times of crisis. The Ankara summit must clarify how to coordinate NATO and the EU without duplicating structures or paralyzing decision-making.

The success indicators for Ankara

To judge the real success of the Ankara summit, I propose five concrete indicators. First indicator: the number of arms contracts signed (not MoUs, not letters of intent — contracts with delivery dates and penalty clauses). Second indicator: the announcement of a collective financing mechanism for ammunition destined for Ukraine, with specific commitments and timelines. Third indicator: detailed national defense spending commitments for 2027–2030, not just for 2035. Fourth indicator: a clear decision on Ukraine's status vis-à-vis NATO — either a clearly marked accession path, or a security guarantee alternative. Fifth indicator: a final communiqué that explicitly names China as a strategic concern for NATO in the Asia-Pacific, not just Russia.

If Ankara delivers measurable results on these five points, it will have been a historic summit. If Ankara produces a brilliant but vague communiqué, it will have been a squandered opportunity.

The indicators of a failed summit

The failure indicators are symmetrical. A final communiqué that reaffirms existing commitments without adding new ones. Announcements of "tens of billions" that, upon examination, are composed 80% of MoUs and letters of intent with no contractual value. An absence of any concrete mechanism to accelerate deliveries to Ukraine. Silence on China. And — the worst — visible divisions among allies on the Ukrainian question or on the allocation of defense burdens.

I am deliberately demanding because I believe NATO deserves better than the comfortable mediocrity of its usual summits. Rutte is right: this summit must be different. But "different" is not enough as an ambition — "different" must mean "concrete," "binding," and "verifiable." The world is watching. Putin is watching. Xi is watching. Kim is watching. What they see in Ankara will partly determine their strategic calculations for the next five years.

Erdogan between NATO and Moscow

The fact that the summit is being held in Turkey is not a geographical coincidence — it is a deliberate political choice. Turkey is a NATO member that refused to follow Western sanctions against Russia, purchased Russian S-400 systems, and maintains substantial commercial and energy ties with Moscow. At the same time, Turkey has been a NATO member since 1952, hosts allied military bases, provided crucial Bayraktar TB2 drones to Ukraine, and plays a mediating role between Kyiv and Moscow.

Holding the summit in Ankara is a gesture of inclusion toward Erdogan — an acknowledgment of Turkey's strategic importance. Trump explicitly praised Erdogan for having "kept Turkey out of the recent conflict with Iran." This Turkish ambivalence is precisely why Ankara is a delicate choice: everything said at the summit will unfold in the capital of a country that maintains ties with NATO's designated adversary. It is uncomfortable. But politics is always uncomfortable.

The defense industrial summit: a showcase, not a miracle

The "defense industry day" promised by Rutte for the first day will hopefully be more than a showcase. NATO member countries' defense industries are in a full expansion phase — Rheinmetall, BAE Systems, Leonardo, Thales and others have increased their production capacity. But coordination among these industries to meet the alliance's collective needs remains fragmented. Too many duplications, too many incompatible national standards, too few large-scale joint projects.

The European defense industry is its own worst enemy: it is divided into dozens of national segments competing rather than cooperating. The result is an industrial base that costs more and produces less than its potential. Ankara should impose accelerated equipment and ammunition standardization — not out of federalist ideology, but out of operational necessity. A Polish soldier and a German soldier should be able to use the same ammunition. That is still not the case for many systems.

AI at the core of the military revolution

Rutte explicitly mentioned artificial intelligence among NATO's technological priorities. That is a justified priority: AI is transforming military capabilities at a stunning speed. It improves strike precision, accelerates decision cycles, optimizes logistics, and enables forms of autonomous warfare whose ethical and strategic implications are still poorly understood. Russia and China are investing massively in these technologies. NATO must ensure that democracies do not fall behind in this technological race.

Ankara's discussions on AI and defense should ideally produce common commitments on research and development, shared standards for integrating AI into weapons systems, and rules of engagement for autonomous weapons systems. These questions are not yet mature enough for definitive decisions — but Ankara can at least create the structures to get there within the next 12 months.

Drones and the shadow war in the electronic spectrum

The war in Ukraine has been an extraordinary laboratory for drone warfare doctrines. Each side has adapted, counter-adapted, and re-adapted its tactics at the accelerated pace of technological innovation. NATO must systematically draw lessons from this conflict to modernize its own doctrines. Ankara can be the occasion to formalize this learning process — to transform Ukrainian battlefield experience into common allied doctrine, equipment standards, and concrete deployable capabilities.

The lessons of the war in Ukraine on drone employment, electronic warfare, defense of civilian infrastructure, and the importance of industrial production in wartime are strategic treasures that NATO is not yet systematically enough exploiting. Ankara should formalize a mechanism for transferring these lessons into allied doctrine and equipment — not as an academic project, but as an operational urgency.

Three non-negotiable demands

If I were Rutte, I would have three non-negotiable demands for Ankara. First demand: that every country promising to reach 5% of GDP by 2035 publishes a detailed year-by-year spending plan, independently verifiable by the NATO Secretariat, with sanction mechanisms for those who fail to follow through. Second demand: that contracts announced on that day represent a minimum of 50% of announcements as signed and enforceable contracts, with the remainder allowed as MoUs provided that deadlines for conversion into contracts are set. Third demand: a collective commitment on a Ukrainian arms package with clear specifications, timelines, and financing — not a vague promise of "unwavering support."

Are these demands realistic? Partially. National interests, domestic budgetary constraints, and political differences among allies will make some of these objectives difficult to fully achieve at Ankara. But demanding the most is the only way to obtain something sufficient. If Rutte only asks for what is easily granted, he will end up with even less.

History will judge Ankara by its actions, not its words

In five years, historians will not read Ankara's communiqués to judge this summit — they will look at what was actually delivered. Did the ammunition arrive in Ukraine on the promised timelines? Did member countries actually reach their defense spending targets? Were the new military capabilities announced developed and deployed? If the answer is yes, Ankara will have been a genuine turning point. If the answer is no, it will be one more summit on the long list of NATO's missed opportunities.

I believe in NATO. It is the most successful defensive alliance in human history — and it has maintained peace in Europe for more than 75 years. But I also believe that complacency is the mortal enemy of alliances. NATO needs Ankara to remind its members that promises without execution protect no one. Rutte has the vision. He now needs the authority to enforce it.

China and NATO: a debate that demands attention

One of the most important debates at Ankara — and probably the least spectacular in media terms — is that of the relationship between NATO and the Indo-Pacific region. China is formally designated as a "concern" in NATO's strategic documents — not yet as a direct threat, but as an actor whose support for Russia directly affects Euro-Atlantic security. Allies such as Japan, Australia, and South Korea participate in NATO discussions without being members — a sign of the alliance's expanding agenda beyond the traditional North Atlantic area.

The challenge for Ankara is to strike a balance between focusing on the immediate Russian threat and preparing for the medium-term Chinese threat. These two priorities are not incompatible, but they mobilize different resources and require different doctrines. The war in Ukraine is a conventional ground war and drone war. The Chinese threat is a combination of hybrid warfare, technological competition, maritime pressure, and the potential risk of conflict over Taiwan. NATO must simultaneously win the war of today and prepare for the war of tomorrow.

Outer space and cyber as new domains

Ankara must also advance NATO's doctrines in the new domains: outer space, cyber, and the electromagnetic spectrum. These domains are already active theaters of operations — Russia is conducting cyber-sabotage operations against allied infrastructure, GPS disruptions are affecting air navigation, and the race for military space capabilities is accelerating. A NATO without a solid doctrine in these domains is a NATO with dangerous strategic blind spots.

Space, cyber, AI — these new domains are not conceptual add-ons to the Ankara summit. They are the battlegrounds on which the wars of the coming decades will be fought. And on these battlegrounds, NATO is behind not for lack of capabilities, but for lack of a collective doctrine to integrate them. Ankara can correct that — if allies choose to look forward rather than reassure each other about the past.

The structural forces framing this file

This file cannot be understood in isolation. It sits within a broader geopolitical context where the balance of power among great powers, regional alliances, and cross-cutting economic interests creates constraints that individual actors can barely ignore. Putin's Russia, Xi Jinping's China, the Revolutionary Guards' Iran, Trump's United States — all these actors calculate their positions on the basis of variables that far exceed the immediate file analyzed in this article. Understanding these structural forces is indispensable for assessing the likelihood of the scenarios described.

What the international dynamic reveals about coming trends

Analysts who focus on long-term trends see in the events described here revealing signals of deeper dynamics. The West remains at the center of the international system, but its room for maneuver is shrinking as rival powers — China, Russia, Iran — coordinate their actions in ever more systematic fashion. That is not a reason to despair — it is a reason to strengthen democratic alliances with the urgency the moment demands. Ukraine and its fighters understood this before many others. It is time for Western capitals to join them in that clarity.

I want to explicitly name what this file reveals about the state of the world in 2026: a systemic competition between democracies and autocracies that will not end with a communiqué signed at Versailles, nor with a summit in Ankara, nor with a trade deal in Beijing. It will end, if it ends, with the demonstration that democracies are capable of uniting, holding firm, and winning — or it will continue until one side collapses. I prefer the first option.

The structural forces framing this file

This file cannot be understood in isolation. It sits within a broader geopolitical context where the balance of power among great powers, regional alliances, and cross-cutting economic interests creates constraints that individual actors can barely ignore. Putin's Russia, Xi Jinping's China, the Revolutionary Guards' Iran, Trump's United States — all these actors calculate their positions on the basis of variables that far exceed the immediate file analyzed in this article. Understanding these structural forces is indispensable for assessing the likelihood of the scenarios described.

What the international dynamic reveals about coming trends

Analysts who focus on long-term trends see in the events described here revealing signals of deeper dynamics. The West remains at the center of the international system, but its room for maneuver is shrinking as rival powers — China, Russia, Iran — coordinate their actions in ever more systematic fashion. That is not a reason to despair — it is a reason to strengthen democratic alliances with the urgency the moment demands. Ukraine and its fighters understood this before many others. It is time for Western capitals to join them in that clarity.

I want to explicitly name what this file reveals about the state of the world in 2026: a systemic competition between democracies and autocracies that will not end with a communiqué signed at Versailles, nor with a summit in Ankara, nor with a trade deal in Beijing. It will end, if it ends, with the demonstration that democracies are capable of uniting, holding firm, and winning — or it will continue until one side collapses. I prefer the first option.

The structural forces framing this file

This file cannot be understood in isolation. It sits within a broader geopolitical context where the balance of power among great powers, regional alliances, and cross-cutting economic interests creates constraints that individual actors can barely ignore. Putin's Russia, Xi Jinping's China, the Revolutionary Guards' Iran, Trump's United States — all these actors calculate their positions on the basis of variables that far exceed the immediate file analyzed in this article. Understanding these structural forces is indispensable for assessing the likelihood of the scenarios described.

What the international dynamic reveals about coming trends

Analysts who focus on long-term trends see in the events described here revealing signals of deeper dynamics. The West remains at the center of the international system, but its room for maneuver is shrinking as rival powers — China, Russia, Iran — coordinate their actions in ever more systematic fashion. That is not a reason to despair — it is a reason to strengthen democratic alliances with the urgency the moment demands. Ukraine and its fighters understood this before many others. It is time for Western capitals to join them in that clarity.

I want to explicitly name what this file reveals about the state of the world in 2026: a systemic competition between democracies and autocracies that will not end with a communiqué signed at Versailles, nor with a summit in Ankara, nor with a trade deal in Beijing. It will end, if it ends, with the demonstration that democracies are capable of uniting, holding firm, and winning — or it will continue until one side collapses. I prefer the first option.

The moment to take stock of four years of rearmament

The Ankara summit takes place at a particular moment in NATO's history: after four years of urgency tied to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, after the promises of The Hague, after the beginning of a European rearmament that needs to be accelerated and institutionalized. This is the moment to take stock — not to congratulate ourselves, but to measure the gap between commitments and reality, and to close that gap with concrete decisions.

The verdict will be rendered by history and by Putin

Rutte said the right thing: Putin fears implementation, not commitments. What Ankara must produce is proof that this time, implementation is serious. Signed contracts, precise timelines, independent monitoring mechanisms. If Ankara delivers that, it will send a real signal to Moscow. If Ankara delivers a gleaming communiqué with no concrete substance behind it, Putin will smile — and he will be right to do so. The ball is in Rutte's and his allies' court.

This conclusion cannot erase the complexity of the subject addressed. I sign this article with the conviction that the reader deserves not only the facts, but also the analyst's candor about what he does not know — and about what remains at stake beyond the scope of this article.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between verified facts and interpretive analysis. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under Sources, never here.

Primary source families used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

Secondary source families: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under Sources.

Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a critical, contextual synthesis based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.