ANALYSIS: The Iran-USA Deal and the Strait of Hormuz — Victory or a Sixty-Day Gamble?

ANALYSIS: The Iran-USA Deal and the Strait of Hormuz — Victory or a Sixty-Day Gamble?

Introduction: The June 17, 2026 MOU — An Agreement That Must Be Read Between the Lines

The signed text and its fourteen points — what it says and especially what it omits

On June 17, 2026, Donald Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian remotely signed a fourteen-point memorandum of understanding (MOU), officially concluding the nearly four months of war that had pitted the United States, Israel, and their allies against Iran since Operation Epic Fury on February 28, 2026. The Strait of Hormuz, closed by Tehran at the start of the conflict, will be reopened toll-free for at least sixty days. American oil sanctions will be suspended for the same duration. The IAEA is invited to supervise Iran's nuclear commitments. A reconstruction fund of $300 billion is mentioned.

But experienced negotiators read agreements for what they exclude as much as for what they contain. And what this MOU excludes is revealing. Not a word about Iran's ballistic missiles — the weapons that constitute the delivery system of a potential nuclear bomb and that demonstrated their deadly range during the conflict. Not a word about support for militias — Hezbollah, the Houthis, Iraqi militias — that Iran has financed and trained for decades. These two omissions are the time bomb embedded in the June 17 MOU.

The war that preceded it: a campaign that fell short of its objectives

To understand the MOU's significance, one must recall what the United States and Israel had declared they wanted to achieve in launching Operation Epic Fury in February 2026. The officially proclaimed objectives were clear: complete destruction of Iran's nuclear and ballistic program, an end to Tehran's support for regional militias, and some analysts close to the Netanyahu government were raising the prospect of regime change. Four months later, the MOU text reveals a very different reality: the Iranian government is intact, its highly enriched uranium has not been surrendered, its missiles have not been destroyed.

The human toll of the conflict exceeds 7,000 deaths. Iran's economic infrastructure suffered significant damage. Iran's military capacity was weakened — but not eliminated. It is in this context of military results disappointing relative to initial ambitions that the MOU was negotiated. It faithfully reflects this balance of forces: the United States obtained the reopening of Hormuz and a nuclear commitment — their immediate economic and strategic priority — but abandoned the other declared objectives.

The Strait of Hormuz: The Central Economic Issue of the Agreement

Why Hormuz commands everything

The Strait of Hormuz, that maritime corridor only 54 kilometers wide at its narrowest point, is the most strategically important chokepoint in the global energy economy. Approximately 20 % of global oil and 25 % of liquefied natural gas transits through this passage. When Iran closed the strait in February 2026, the Brent crude price jumped by more than 40 % within days, sending shockwaves through global economies already under strain.

The reopening of Hormuz is therefore Iran's most immediately valuable concession for the United States and its allies — far more so than the nuclear commitments, whose direct economic consequences are less immediate. That is why Trump triumphantly declared the strait was "totally open." For him, this is the visible, tangible victory he can communicate to his electorate. For markets, it is the main reason the agreement was received positively.

The nuance no one wants to hear: a conditional opening

But the reopening is not as simple as it appears. Iran created the Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA) in the spring of 2026 — a traffic regulation body in the strait managed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) that requires ships wishing to pass to provide information about their owner, insurance, crew, and cargo, accompanied by formal authorization. The MOU provides for a toll-free reopening — but does not dissolve the PGSA.

In other words, Tehran retains an authorization mechanism that allows it, in theory, to keep the Hormuz tap open during the sixty days of the agreement while maintaining the legal and organizational infrastructure necessary to close it again at will once the agreement expires. Marco Rubio, the American Secretary of State, has rejected any idea of Iranian tolls or fees on Hormuz — but the MOU itself does not resolve the question of the PGSA. This is one of the ambiguities fueling analysts' concerns about the durability of the opening.

The Nuclear Question: Between Promises and Unverifiable Commitments

Enriched uranium: "diluted on-site" — but verified how?

On the nuclear front, the MOU is both promising and frustrating. Iran reaffirms that it will not develop nuclear weapons — a promise it has made in the past and systematically circumvented. The MOU provides that Iran's highly enriched uranium will be "diluted" on Iranian soil to bring its enrichment level below the critical threshold — but under the supervision of the IAEA, whose Director General Rafael Grossi assured that inspections "will take place."

But the day after the signing in Geneva, a head-on disagreement erupted. The Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister declared there was "no plan" to grant IAEA inspectors access to nuclear sites damaged by the American-Israeli strikes before a final agreement was signed and all sanctions lifted. Grossi responded that inspections were provided for in the text — and that "to supervise, one must inspect, there is no other way." This public contradiction on day two of the agreement is revealing of the MOU's fundamental ambiguities.

What the IAEA can verify and what it cannot

The IAEA's verification capacity depends entirely on access granted by the host state. In Iran, some of the main uranium enrichment sites — notably Fordow and Natanz — sustained damage during the 2025 strikes. The actual state of highly enriched uranium stockpiles has been unknown for months. The American demand that inspectors have access to these specific sites is refused by Tehran, which conditions all access on prior sanctions relief.

This sequence — verification before sanctions relief vs. sanctions relief before verification — is the fundamental impasse of all nuclear negotiations with Iran for the past twenty years. The novelty of 2026 is that the United States granted a pre-emptive lifting of oil sanctions before nuclear verification was complete, via General License X issued by the U.S. Treasury on June 22. Tehran cashed the economic opening without yet having delivered the promised nuclear transparency. This asymmetry is the central vulnerability of the agreement.

Ballistic Missiles: The Elephant in the Negotiating Room

Why Iran would never abandon its missiles

President Pezeshkian's statement in Pakistan on June 23, 2026 left no room for ambiguity: "If our missiles didn't exist, Israel and the US would have plowed Iran like Gaza." He added that Iran "will never, under any circumstances, with anyone, negotiate our defensive capabilities." This statement — confirmed publicly by Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, who had played a mediating role — is unequivocal: ballistic missiles are beyond the reach of any future negotiation.

Iran's logic is actually coherent from the standpoint of its national security doctrine. Iran is surrounded by adversaries — Israel to the northwest, Saudi Arabia to the south, American bases throughout the Gulf. Without a robust conventional deterrence capacity, it would be at the mercy of its adversaries. Ballistic missiles are its regime survival guarantee. Asking Iran to give them up is asking it to adopt the strategic vulnerability of Libya after its 2003 denuclearization — whose result was the collapse of the Gaddafi regime in 2011. Tehran has drawn that lesson.

Trump's rhetorical capitulation on missiles

What is more surprising than the Iranian position is Trump's rhetorical surrender on this subject. The man who, since his first term, insisted that any deal with Iran had to include the ballistic missile program, declared in June 2026 that it would be "a little bit unfair" to deny Iran missiles if other countries in the region had them. "Missiles are not the problem," he said. This semantic pirouette — which ignores that missiles are precisely the delivery system for a nuclear bomb — illustrates the distance between the declared objectives at the start of the conflict and the results obtained at its end.

For analysts at FDD Action, JINSA, and other think tanks close to American security, this concession is particularly troubling. An unlimited ballistic missile arsenal combined with a nuclear program whose verification remains problematic constitutes precisely the combination of threats that Operation Epic Fury was supposed to eliminate. The June 17 agreement definitively resolved neither of those problems.

Militias and Iranian Proxies: The Other Major Absence

Hezbollah, the Houthis, Iraqi militias: the network intact

Iran projects its regional power primarily through its allied militia network — Lebanese Hezbollah, Yemeni Houthis, and various Iraqi militias such as the Badr Organization and Kataib Hezbollah. These organizations received during the 2025-2026 conflict Iranian missiles, drones, and operational support that allowed them to strike Israel and American targets hundreds of miles away. The MOU contains no provision requiring Iran to reduce this support.

This omission is doubly problematic. First, it preserves intact Iran's capacity to wage proxy wars without risking direct confrontation with the United States. Second, the MOU includes a clause on Lebanon — cessation of hostilities "on all fronts, including in Lebanon" — that Iran has interpreted as giving Hezbollah implicit protection. The Iranian Foreign Minister explicitly declared that any continued Israeli military action in Lebanon would be considered a violation of the MOU — which is not exactly what the text says, but what Tehran chooses to read into it.

The Lebanese question: an uncut Gordian knot

Lebanon is the MOU's most explosive complication. Israel — which did not participate in the negotiations and did not sign the agreement — indicated it did not consider itself bound by its terms. Prime Minister Netanyahu rejected the MOU's conditions, particularly the Lebanon clause, arguing that it would prevent Israel from continuing its operations against Hezbollah, which it considers an existential threat. Hezbollah for its part did not sign either and indicated it was not bound by an agreement to which it is not a party.

The MOU provides a deconfliction mechanism involving Washington, Tehran, and Beirut to attempt to impose a ceasefire in Lebanon. Vice President Vance explained the logic: "Sometimes a low-level guy fires a drone without command approval." The idea is that direct communication between parties can prevent accidental escalation incidents. This is theoretically reasonable. In practice, with an Israel that rejects the agreement and a Hezbollah that continues to consider itself at war with Israel, this deconfliction mechanism has little chance of imposing durable peace in Lebanon.

Lifted Sanctions and Unfrozen Assets: An Irreversible Flow?

General License X: 60 days of oil opening

On June 22, 2026, the U.S. Treasury issued General License X, granting Iran the ability to produce, ship, and sell its crude oil for sixty days, with direct U.S. dollar transactions authorized. This measure has considerable immediate economic effects for Tehran: Iran can sell its oil directly to global markets, bypass the shadow tankers it used to evade sanctions, and rebuild its foreign currency reserves.

Iran's frozen assets potentially represent $24 to $25 billion according to several sources. A reconstruction fund of $300 billion is mentioned — but conditioned on signing a final agreement. The U.S. Treasury indicates that representatives will be in Qatar to monitor the use of released funds. Vice President Vance specified that "not a cent of American money would go to Iran" and that funds had to be invested in American products. But as many analysts noted: money is fungible. Nothing in the MOU prevents Iran from using freed oil revenues to fund its proxies and rebuild its military capabilities.

Money and militias: the central paradox

This is the sharpest paradox of the agreement: the economic resources the United States releases to Iran could fund precisely the networks they failed to dismantle militarily. JINSA analysts warned that "the release of frozen funds and the lifting of sanctions could strengthen Tehran's regional networks, reinforcing the very threats the MOU was supposed to contain."

The American counter-argument is that the sixty days of the agreement are specifically intended to negotiate the necessary safeguards. Rubio indicated that missiles and support for armed groups could still be raised in the final negotiations. But if Iran has declared these subjects "never on the agenda under any circumstances," the negotiating window is extraordinarily narrow. Sixty days will probably not be sufficient to resolve what four months of war could not resolve.

Israel: The Excluded Ally That Compromises Everything

Netanyahu rejects the MOU — and the consequences are predictable

Israel was excluded from the MOU negotiations — a deliberate American decision, according to several sources, to prevent maximalist Israeli conditions from blocking any agreement. The result is that Israel does not consider itself bound by an agreement to which it is not a party. Netanyahu explicitly rejected the terms, particularly the Lebanon clause that would prevent Israel from maintaining its operations against Hezbollah in the south of the country.

Iran for its part declared that any continuation of Israeli military operations in Lebanon would constitute a violation of the MOU justifying an Iranian response. If Israel resumes strikes against Hezbollah — which seems probable given its refusal to recognize the Lebanese clause — Iran will have formal justification to denounce the agreement and potentially close Hormuz again. This is the nightmare scenario that the agreement's sixty days are supposed to prevent. But the architecture of the agreement makes precisely this scenario probable.

The Trump-Netanyahu relationship: the other critical variable

The durability of the agreement partly depends on Trump's ability to constrain Netanyahu to respect the Lebanese clause. But the relationship between the two men is complex: Trump needs the political support of the pro-Israel lobby, and the evangelical Republicans who form part of his electoral base would not look favorably on excessive pressure on Israel. At the same time, a collapse of the agreement with Iran because of Israeli actions would be politically embarrassing for Trump, who has made it one of his major diplomatic achievements.

This tension between Trump's domestic political imperatives and the geopolitical requirements of a durable Iranian agreement is structurally inherent to his foreign policy. His first term already saw him abandon the 2015 nuclear agreement (JCPOA) — a precedent his Iranian interlocutors have not forgotten. The credibility of sixty-day American commitments is therefore also mortgaged by the track record of volatility in American policy on the Iranian file.

Geopolitical Analysis: What the MOU Says About American Power

A demonstration of the limits of American military power

The June 17, 2026 MOU is an involuntary but eloquent demonstration of the limits of American military power against a state determined to survive. Four months of intensive strikes — which caused real damage to Iranian military and nuclear infrastructure — did not achieve the declared objectives. Iran held on, negotiated from a position of relative weakness but absolute strategic will, and obtained an agreement allowing it to rebuild while having abandoned as little as possible.

This Iranian resilience in the face of a military superpower is no surprise to strategists who study the history of American military interventions. The lesson of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya remains the same: military power can destroy physical capabilities, but it cannot rebuild the political will of a regime that prefers to suffer rather than capitulate. Iran, governed by an ideological regime that derives its legitimacy from resistance to "imperialism," was particularly unlikely to collapse under military pressure.

Regional allies and their reading of the MOU

The Gulf states — Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain — welcomed the Hormuz opening with relief but observe the MOU with concern. For them, an Iran whose missiles and proxy militias remain intact, and which now has renewed economic resources, is potentially more dangerous than before the war. The Iranian resilience demonstrated during the conflict has reinforced the regional perception that Tehran cannot be militarily neutralized — a conclusion that makes regional security arrangements even more precarious.

Russia and China, for their part, observe the American limits with obvious strategic interest. For Moscow, the demonstration that the United States cannot achieve its war objectives against even a weakened Iran feeds reflection on the durability of American commitment to Ukraine. For Beijing, which has for years been contemplating its options regarding Taiwan, the Iranian capacity for resistance against American power offers instructive lessons.

The Sixty-Day Negotiating Window: What Can Still Collapse

The five potential breaking points within the negotiating window

The sixty-day window to negotiate a final agreement is extraordinarily short for resolving such complex questions. Analysts identify at least five potential breaking points. First, nuclear verification: if the IAEA cannot access damaged sites before a final agreement is signed, Washington finds itself granting economic concessions without verification. Second, the Lebanese clause: if Israel resumes operations in Lebanon, Iran could declare the agreement void.

Third, missiles: even though Tehran has declared this subject off-limits, congressional pressure from the United States and Israel to include some reference to the ballistic program risks blocking finalization of an agreement. Fourth, the sanctions/verification sequence: if Iran refuses to allow inspections before full sanctions relief, and if Washington refuses to lift sanctions without verification, dialogue becomes sterile. Fifth, money and militias: if evidence emerges that released funds are financing Hezbollah or the Houthis, American political support for the agreement could collapse.

The extension scenario: the most probable outcome but not the most ambitious

The MOU provides for the possibility of extension by mutual consent beyond sixty days. This is probably the most likely and least ambitious scenario: the agreement will be extended, negotiations will continue, but without major progress on the most difficult questions — missiles and militias. This crisis management solution — not a resolution, just a deferral of the problem — is the natural logic of diplomatic systems confronted with irreducible contradictions.

For oil markets, extension would be good news: it would keep Hormuz open beyond the initial window. For regional security, it would perpetuate strategic ambiguity. For Israel, it would create growing international pressure to contain its military operations. For Iran, it would consolidate economic gains without requiring the most painful strategic concessions. It is, at bottom, a half-victory for everyone in a conflict nobody truly won.

Critics and Supporters of the Agreement: The American Debate

The Trump administration's defense of the agreement

The Trump administration defends the MOU as a major diplomatic success. Trump himself sees it as confirmation of his negotiating talent: he obtained the opening of Hormuz and nuclear commitments that Obama had failed to extract. His supporters point out that ending a costly war, reopening maritime routes, and initiating a dialogue with Tehran is a substantial outcome. They argue that comparing with the initial war objectives is misleading — that tactical flexibility is a diplomatic virtue, not a weakness.

Vance presented the talks as having laid "very good foundations for a successful final agreement." Bessent assured that the Treasury would monitor the use of released funds. Rubio suggested that missiles and proxies could still be raised in the final negotiations. These statements reflect the administration's communication strategy: presenting the agreement as a partial success opening the way to a more complete agreement, without admitting that current omissions compromise the promise of a durable settlement.

The critics: too little for too high a price

Critics of the agreement are numerous and varied. Neoconservative hawks and pro-Israel think tanks like FDD and JINSA believe the United States capitulated on its essential objectives after paying the highest price. Congressional lawmakers — Republican and Democrat — have sought explanations for the absence of restrictions on missiles and proxies. Independent national security analysts point out that Iran obtained economic relief without having demonstrated it will not seek to quickly rebuild its capabilities.

The comparison with the 2015 JCPOA is inevitable — and troubling. The Obama agreement was more comprehensive: it included more detailed verification mechanisms, restrictions on centrifuges, and more stringent inspection provisions. The 2026 MOU is in several respects less ambitious than the agreement Trump himself abandoned in 2018, claiming it was insufficient. This irony has not been lost on analysts.

Implications for the Middle Eastern Regional Order

The post-war period: a reconfigured Middle East or just a more unstable one?

The 2025-2026 war and the MOU that ended it have deeply altered perceptions of power in the Middle East — not necessarily in the direction hoped for by Washington and Tel Aviv. Iran, though militarily weakened, emerged from the conflict with its regime intact, its missiles preserved, and a promise of economic reconstruction. The Gulf states, which had hoped to see Iran sufficiently diminished to no longer threaten the region, must now envisage an economically revitalized Iran without the strategic safeguards they had hoped for.

For regional powers — Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the UAE — the post-MOU period opens a period of uncertainty. The recalibration of regional alliances based on the new balance of power will be complex. Iran's reconstruction will be an opportunity for China and Russia to deepen their economic partnerships with Tehran. The West, which waged the war, could find itself excluded from reconstruction contracts if the final MOU does not incorporate clauses favorable to Western companies.

Ukraine, Korea, Taiwan: what the MOU tells other actors

The resolution of the Iranian conflict through an agreement that does not satisfy the initial objectives sends a signal to other theaters of geopolitical tension. For Russia in Ukraine, the demonstration that American military pressure has limits and that Washington eventually negotiates is an encouragement to resist. For North Korea, whose missiles and nuclear program are in a situation similar to Iran's — neither truly militarily eliminable nor truly politically negotiable — the MOU confirms that a de facto nuclear power can resist and survive. For China on Taiwan, the strategic lessons are equally instructive.

None of these actors draws the lesson that American power is negligible — it remains formidable. But they draw the lesson that sufficient strategic determination can resist that power beyond the threshold of American political tolerance. That is a dangerous lesson for international stability, and the June 17, 2026 MOU is one more illustration of it.

Russia and China: The Silent Beneficiaries of the Agreement

Moscow watches, calculates, and prepares

Among the actors who did not participate in the negotiations but observe their results with the greatest interest is Russia. Since the start of the Israeli-Iranian conflict, Moscow maintained a position of discreet support for Tehran — drone supplier, diplomatic backing at the Security Council, energy market coordination — while carefully avoiding any direct involvement that might have attracted additional Western reprisals. The June 17, 2026 MOU is for Russia a broadly favorable outcome: Iran did not collapse, the Moscow-Tehran axis remains functional, and America's Middle East distraction offered Russia a strategic window in Ukraine that it attempted to exploit.

The prospect of Iranian reconstruction is also enticing for Russian companies in the energy and infrastructure sectors. If Western sanctions on Iran are lifted, competition for Iranian markets will be fierce. But Russia, having maintained its relations with Tehran throughout the conflict, finds itself in an advantageous position for contracts in the military, civilian nuclear, and energy sectors — provided the sixty-day negotiations lead to sufficient sanctions relief.

Beijing plays its economic card patiently

China played an even better game than Russia. By maintaining its economic relations with Iran — continuing to buy Iranian oil despite sanctions, supplying dual-use goods and technology components — it positioned itself as Tehran's indispensable economic partner since 2021. The 2021 twenty-five-year China-Iran cooperation agreement constitutes the framework of this relationship. Iran's reconstruction, if the MOU is finalized, will be largely financed and executed by Chinese companies.

For Xi Jinping, the resolution of the Iranian conflict through the MOU is a strategic victory on several fronts. It reduces instability in a region from which China massively imports its oil. It weakens the credibility of the American coercion strategy, demonstrating that sanctions and military strikes are not sufficient to bend a determined power. And it opens the way for deepening Chinese economic penetration in Iran, whose gas reserves and infrastructure represent considerable opportunities for Chinese state-owned enterprises.

The Role of the Gulf Countries: Between Relief and Deep Concern

Riyadh and Abu Dhabi: relieved allies but not reassured

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates welcomed the MOU with visible relief but substantial reservations. The relief: the closure of Hormuz directly threatened their own economies — even if their bypass pipelines allow them to export part of their oil without passing through the strait, globally stressed financial markets penalize their oil revenues. The reopening of Hormuz is therefore a direct benefit to their economies.

But deep concerns remain. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi wanted a durably diminished Iran — without long-range missiles, without Hezbollah in Lebanon, without the Houthis in Yemen, without nuclear access. The MOU offers them none of that. On the contrary, an Iran economically revitalized by sanctions relief risks being, over time, more capable of funding its militias and investing in its ballistic program. The Saudi and Emirati vision was a total victory over Iran. What they get looks more like a slightly modified status quo — with an Iran that retains the essential instruments of its regional power.

Gulf monarchies and their own arms race

The partial resolution of the Iranian conflict has not ended the arms race in the region. Saudi Arabia, pursuing its own discussions on a civilian nuclear program with Washington, has made clear that it could not accept a nuclear Iran without developing its own capabilities. Purchases of sophisticated weaponry — missile defense systems, advanced fighter jets, cruise missiles — continue at a sustained pace throughout the region. The Persian Gulf is, in 2026, one of the world's regions with the highest per capita military spending.

This growing militarization is partly a direct consequence of the uncertainty that the MOU perpetuates about Iranian capabilities. If Saudi Arabia and the UAE had been certain that Iran was definitively abandoning its nuclear ambitions and reducing its missiles, a de-escalation of regional military spending would have been possible. Without that certainty, every regional actor continues preparing for the worst scenario, fueling an arms dynamic that makes the region more dangerous for everyone — including the countries financing it.

The Lebanese File: The Agreement's Time Bomb

Hezbollah: a force the MOU does not disarm

The MOU clause concerning Lebanon is perhaps the most ambiguous and most explosive in the entire agreement. The text provides for an Iranian withdrawal of military support to Hezbollah — but the timelines, verification mechanisms, and consequences in case of non-compliance are insufficiently specified, according to analysts who have been able to examine the available elements. Hezbollah, a political and military organization deeply integrated into Lebanese institutional life, cannot simply be disarmed by Iranian decision — it has its own organizational logic, its own interests, and a social base in Lebanon that extends beyond the sole framework of Iranian funding.

For Israel, an armed and operational Hezbollah on its northern border is an existential threat — or at least is presented as such by the Netanyahu government. Israeli strikes in Lebanon that accompanied the main conflict weakened Hezbollah but did not destroy it. If the final agreement does not provide a credible mechanism for the disarmament or removal of Hezbollah's ballistic capabilities from the Israeli border, Israel will probably refuse to consider itself bound by the constraints arising from the MOU.

Lebanese reconstruction and the Iranian equation

Lebanon emerges from this period of conflict in catastrophic condition. Israeli strikes, the chronic economic crisis that had been ongoing since 2019, and permanent political instability have reduced the Lebanese state to a shell. Reconstruction requires tens of billions of dollars and a political stability the country has not known for decades. In this context, the Iranian clause on Hezbollah in Lebanon is all the more crucial: if Iran maintains its support for Hezbollah, Lebanon remains a state partly governed by an armed militia that prevents any durable reconstruction. If Iran genuinely withdraws its support, Hezbollah must transform or reduce its grip — which is a major political transformation that nobody can guarantee will be achieved in sixty days.

The international community — France, the United Nations, the World Bank — is ready to engage in Lebanese reconstruction, but on condition of a minimum of stability and a Hezbollah at least partially integrated into the structures of the regular state. This conditionality is reasonable. It is also potentially another factor in the failure of the agreement if the timelines of political transformation in Lebanon prove incompatible with the country's economic urgency.

Conclusion: A Useful But Structurally Insufficient Agreement

What the MOU achieves — and what it defers

The June 17, 2026 MOU achieves two essential things: it ends a costly war and reopens the Strait of Hormuz, immediately reducing pressure on global energy markets. These are real accomplishments that deserve to be recognized as such. A world where Hormuz is open is economically better than a world where it is closed. A ceasefire, even an imperfect one, is preferable to continued military escalation.

But the MOU defers without resolving the questions that provoked the conflict: the Iranian nuclear program, the ballistic program, the support for proxy militias. These questions, insufficiently addressed in the MOU text, will be the subjects of the sixty days of coming negotiations — with minimal mutual trust between the parties, fundamentally antagonistic interests, and an Israel that is not party to the agreement but whose actions can blow up the entire edifice.

The sixty-day gamble: rational but fragile

At bottom, the MOU is a rational gamble: freeze the conflict to create the conditions for a final negotiation, hoping that sixty days are sufficient to build a durable security architecture. This gamble can prove successful if both parties, under economic and diplomatic pressure, make sufficient concessions on nuclear verification and if Lebanon does not derail everything. It will prove a losing one if the omissions on missiles and proxies, combined with Israeli intransigence on Lebanon, cause the negotiating window to collapse before a final agreement is signed. The history of Iranian agreements recommends cautious optimism — but it is caution that must dominate, not optimism.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

My biases on the Iranian file

I consider Iran an authoritarian regime, a state sponsor of terrorism through its proxy militias, whose nuclear ambition constitutes a serious threat to regional stability. This position makes me skeptical of agreements that do not treat these questions in a binding manner. At the same time, I am convinced that "regime change" preventive wars generally do not work as planned, and that an imperfect agreement is often better than endless war. These two convictions create the tension that, I hope, comes through honestly in this analysis.

I do not have access to the full text of the MOU — my sources are the publicly available analyses and reports that describe its fourteen points. I obviously have no access to the internal deliberations of either the American or Iranian side.

What I do not know

The outcome of the sixty-day negotiations is entirely uncertain. The internal dynamics within the Iranian administration, between moderate and hardline factions, are complex and difficult to read from the outside. Trump's actual willingness to maintain pressure on Israel to respect the Lebanese clause is unknown. The actual amount and condition of Iranian highly enriched uranium stockpiles are information to which only the IAEA will have access.

Sources

Primary sources

CNBC — UN nuclear watchdog says it has access to Iran's nuclear sites — June 26, 2026

NPR — IAEA chief says inspectors will visit Iran's nuclear sites — June 24, 2026

Euronews — Iran sharply contradicts the US on framework deal — June 23, 2026

The National — Four key disputes clouding the US-Iran talks — June 24, 2026

Al-Monitor — Rubio rejects Iran tolls on Hormuz — June 23, 2026

Secondary sources

BBC — Iran says no new commitments on nuclear sites — June 22, 2026

Foreign Affairs Forum — The Iran MOU and the Architecture of Deferred Conflict — June 23, 2026

JINSA — The Unmaking of America's Persian Gulf Order — June 26, 2026

FDD Action — Urgent Questions for Congress on the Iran MOU — June 22, 2026

Irish Times — US and Iran enter second day of negotiations — June 22, 2026