OPEN LETTER: First Open Tender for Strike Drones — Ukraine Reinvents Its Procurement

Fedorov announces a break with the past

To those who govern democracies in wartime, to those who manage defence budgets under the pressure of urgency, to those tempted to believe that transparency must wait for peace — here is an example that deserves your attention. Ukrainian Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov announced on June 25, 2026 the launch of the first open and competitive tender for Ukraine's purchase of intermediate strike drones (middlestrike) and strike-reconnaissance systems. First. Open. Competitive. Those three words together, in the context of a total war, constitute a revolution in Ukrainian military procurement management.

Until now, the majority of strike drone purchases were made through direct contracts with companies identified by the services, with no formal competitive bidding and no transparency on selection criteria or pricing. That system had its advantages — speed of supply, flexibility — but also well-documented flaws: inflated prices, favoritism, inefficient allocation of limited budget resources. The open tender of June 25 is a direct response to those flaws. And the figures from the previous comparable experience — a similar tender for 155 mm ammunition had saved 16% of the budget — provide concrete grounds for optimism.

16% savings on 155 mm ammunition by switching to a competitive tender. This is not theory — it is real money, used to buy more drones, more missiles, more defence capacity. Transparency in wartime purchasing is not a moral luxury. It is an operational necessity.

What is an intermediate strike drone?

Intermediate strike drones (middlestrike) occupy a specific capability niche in the Ukrainian autonomous systems spectrum. They sit between FPV (First Person View) drones used massively for short-range tactical strikes a few kilometers from the front, and long-range drones capable of striking targets several hundred or thousands of kilometers deep inside Russia. Middlestrike drones combine an intermediate range (approximately 50 to 200 kilometers), a larger payload than FPVs, and the capacity to strike high-value targets in operational depth areas.

These systems play a crucial role in the battle against Russian logistics: they can strike ammunition depots, forward command posts, fuel supply points, and supply columns at distances that FPVs cannot reach. Ukraine has developed several domestic middlestrike drone models since 2022, but production remains insufficient relative to operational needs — and the absence of standardization and supplier competition has kept prices artificially high.

Why this specific segment for the first tender

The choice to start with intermediate strike drones for the first open tender is deliberate. This segment carries both high operational stakes and is representative of the previous procurement system's flaws: non-standardized pricing, specifications that varied by supplier, and a Ukrainian industrial base capable of responding to an open tender but that had not previously been given the opportunity to do so. By choosing this segment as a proving ground, the Ukrainian Defence Procurement Agency was also testing local manufacturers' responsiveness to open competition.

The announcement by Fedorov that the objective is to extend this model to FPV drones and long-range drones by summer 2026 indicates that the first middlestrike tender is designed as a prototype for systemic change. Its results in terms of savings, proposal quality, and manufacturer responsiveness will inform decisions on future formats.

Start with middlestrike, then extend to FPV and long-range — that is an intelligent organizational change strategy. Test, learn, adapt, generalize. Exactly what a government at war should do with its procurement processes.

How the tender changed the shell market

The 155 mm ammunition precedent is the primary argument for extending the open tender model. Before competitive bidding was introduced in this segment, procurement contracts for 155 mm shells for Ukrainian artillery systems — notably the PzH 2000, Caesar, and Krab howitzers — were priced in a way that reflected both the urgency of demand and the absence of formal competition among suppliers.

When Ukraine introduced a competitive tender process based on technical specifications (caliber, accuracy, barrel life) rather than specific brand names, suppliers were forced to compete on price and quality. The result: 16% savings on unit ammunition costs. Across purchase volumes of several hundred thousand shells, that translates to hundreds of millions of hryvnias saved — money reallocated to other military needs. It is concrete proof that competition works, even in wartime.

Internal resistance and how to overcome it

Introducing an open tender in a sector accustomed to direct contracts never comes without resistance. Some suppliers who benefited from the old arrangements expressed their reluctance. Military officers accustomed to working with trusted suppliers sometimes preferred the predictability of established relationships over the uncertainty of an open tender. And legitimate concerns were raised about the timelines of a formal process in a situation of military urgency.

The Ukrainian Procurement Agency's response to this resistance was pragmatic: design tenders with compressed timelines, maintain strategic reserves for absolute emergency situations, and create supplier qualification mechanisms that allow for speed once a supplier is qualified. These adaptations maintained operational pace while gaining in economic efficiency.

Overcoming internal resistance in a system accustomed to direct contracts — that may be the hardest battle Fedorov fought. Harder than convincing allies. Because internal resistance does not appear in press releases.

An institutional reform driven by war

The Ukrainian Defence Procurement Agency (DPA), whose tenders are now the standard mechanism for strategic military purchases, is a relatively recent institution — structured in its current form in the early years of the full-scale war, under the combined pressure of transparency requirements from international partners and the need to optimize constrained defence budgets.

Its creation is part of a broader wave of institutional reform that has transformed several Ukrainian state sectors since 2014 — notably the Prozorro reform (transparent public procurement system), which made Ukrainian public tenders more transparent than those of many EU member states. That reform had itself produced documented savings of several billion hryvnias in civilian public procurement. Extending the same logic to military procurement was logical — but took time given the security sensitivity of defence contracts.

The Prozorro model and its military applications

The Prozorro system — whose name means "transparent" in Ukrainian — is cited in international good governance circles as a model use of technology to reduce corruption in public procurement. Its partial extension to defence procurement, with the adaptations needed to protect sensitive military capability information, represents a significant advance in Ukrainian wartime governance.

The fact that this extension begins with middlestrike drones — an offensive system whose technical specifications can be partially made public without compromising operational security — shows that Ukraine has thought through the limits of wartime transparency. Tenders for the most sensitive systems — long-range missiles, cryptography, intelligence capabilities — will likely never be fully public. But in segments where competition is possible without major security risk, the Prozorro model applies.

Prozorro showed that transparency reduces corruption and saves public money. The same principle applied to military procurement — it is the same logic, adapted to wartime constraints. This is not idealism. It is documented effectiveness.

An industrial base professionalizing itself

Ukraine's drone industry has exploded since 2022, growing from a handful of companies to hundreds of manufacturers of all sizes — from garage startups to enterprises with several hundred employees. That proliferation produced a diversity of products and technologies — but also a market fragmentation that made it difficult to identify the best operators and standardize specifications.

An open tender based on technical specifications produces several beneficial effects on this industrial base: it forces companies to articulate their technical capabilities clearly, compare their performance against competitors, and invest in quality rather than client relationships. For the best companies — those whose products genuinely perform — the tender is an opportunity to stand out on technical merit. For weaker performers, it is an incentive to improve or pivot.

Export as a post-war horizon

Beyond the immediate efficiency of military procurement, the development of a drone industry capable of responding to competitive tenders positions Ukraine as a post-war exporter in this sector. Several countries — particularly in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Africa — are seeking to develop their tactical drone capabilities, and Ukraine, which is accumulating real-time operational usage data unmatched anywhere in the world, is developing a unique competitive advantage for military drone suppliers.

Introducing a standardized tender framework is also a prerequisite for the homologation and certification of Ukrainian systems for export. Foreign buyers want to purchase systems whose specifications are documented, whose performance is verified, and whose procurement process is transparent. It is no coincidence that the world's largest defence companies — Raytheon, BAE Systems, MBDA — have operated on the basis of structured tenders for decades.

Ukraine manufactures the world's best tactical drones because it tests them in real time against one of the most formidable adversaries on earth. That know-how has considerable market value. The open tender is the first step toward an export industry.

How the industry received the tender announcement

The announcement of the open tender for middlestrike drones was broadly welcomed by Ukrainian companies in the sector. Players who had invested in the quality of their systems and in technical documentation of their performance saw in the tender an opportunity to distinguish themselves from the competition. Players who depended on informal relationships with buyers expressed reservations — but those reservations were less audible than the enthusiasm of innovators.

Companies that had previously focused on specific market niches — long-range reconnaissance, precision strike, night reconnaissance — began structuring their offers to meet the middlestrike tender specifications. This adaptation illustrates how a clear public policy signal — an open tender with defined criteria — can direct industrial investment in the desired direction.

Foreign partners and governance credibility

For Ukraine's foreign partners — governments, foundations, international organizations financing the development of Ukrainian drone capabilities — the introduction of open tenders is a governance signal that strengthens the credibility of their investments. Donors transferring funds through multilateral mechanisms — the International Fund for Ukraine, EU programs, bilateral defence funds — want assurance that their contributions are used efficiently and transparently.

The open tender for middlestrike drones gives them those assurances concretely. It shows that Ukraine is prepared to subject its military procurement to the same transparency standards it demands for civilian public contracts. That is an additional argument for maintaining and increasing those contributions — at precisely the moment when some donors were beginning to ask questions about fund traceability.

When Ukraine's allies ask for good governance guarantees before signing the checks, the open tender is the best possible response. This is not communications — it is substance.

The generalization timeline

Fedorov's announcement included a timeline: the objective is to extend the open tender model to FPV drones and long-range drones by summer 2026. That timeline is ambitious — the middlestrike tender was still receiving bids at the time of the announcement — but it is consistent with organizational learning logic: use the results and lessons of the first tender to calibrate the next ones.

The extension to FPVs presents specific challenges: the FPV market is highly fragmented, with hundreds of small suppliers whose products vary considerably in quality. Designing a tender that both selects the best products and maintains sufficient supply volume requires a carefully constructed framework. The Procurement Agency team is working on that framework informed by the results of the first tender.

Conditions for success: speed, specification clarity, and follow-through

The success of this generalization depends on three conditions: process speed (a six-month tender is incompatible with military needs), clarity of technical specifications (objective criteria enabling fair comparative evaluation), and rigorous contract execution monitoring (verifying that what is delivered matches what was promised in the bid). These three conditions are the pillars of any effective public procurement process — and they apply all the more to military purchases where performance stakes are existential.

The Ukrainian Procurement Agency has already demonstrated its capacity to meet these conditions in civilian tenders. The challenge of summer 2026 is to prove it can do so for sensitive military procurement, within timelines compatible with operational needs. If it succeeds, that will be a lasting transformation of Ukrainian defence governance — a reform that Ukraine will carry into its EU accession negotiations as evidence of institutional maturity.

Reforming military procurement during a war — that is making the hardest reform, in the most hostile possible context. If Ukraine succeeds, it will be its finest institutional victory. And no one will award a medal for it.

The open tender: a break from opaque past practices

Ukraine's first open tender for strike drones is far more than a military acquisition decision. It is a statement of principle on how Ukraine wants to manage its public resources — with transparency, competition, and accountability. In a country that long suffered from systemic corruption in public procurement, this decision is a strong signal of the institutional reform commitment that the Zelensky government has pursued, with uneven success, since 2019.

Transparency in defence procurement is particularly sensitive for two contradictory reasons. On one side, operational security demands a degree of confidentiality on weapons system specifications and suppliers. On the other, anti-corruption demands that public funds be traceable and auditable. The open tender attempts to strike a balance between these two imperatives — making the tender process public while keeping critical technical specifications confidential.

The conditions for a credible Ukrainian defence industry

For Western partners who condition part of their aid on governance progress, this tender is a concrete example to highlight. The European Commission, the IMF, and several governments have insisted on the need for anti-corruption reforms in Ukrainian military acquisition processes. This first open tender responds to that demand and creates a precedent that partners can cite to encourage its generalization.

In the long term, a credible Ukrainian defence industry rests on transparent acquisition processes that encourage innovation, reward quality, and deter corruption. The small drone companies that have emerged in Ukraine since 2022 — often more innovative than large state enterprises — will benefit from a more level playing field through this type of open procedure. That is an investment in the industrial ecosystem as much as in a specific weapons system.

An open tender for war drones in Ukraine — this is not a bureaucratic footnote. It is democracy functioning even under fire. It is the signal that Ukraine is building institutions that will last beyond the war. Every transparent public contract is a brick in that building.

What this first tender says to those who support Ukraine

This open letter has an ultimate addressee beyond ministers and industrialists: the citizens of allied democracies whose governments are financing the Ukrainian military. Those citizens have the right to know their money is being used effectively. This open tender for middlestrike drones is a direct response to that demand — it shows that Ukraine is actively reforming its processes to maximize the effectiveness of every dollar, euro, or pound received.

In a context of political fatigue in some allied countries — where legislators question the guarantees of proper fund use — this reform is also a foreign policy argument. A Ukraine that is transparent in its military procurement is a Ukraine that deserves the trust of its supporters. And a Ukraine that deserves the trust of its supporters has a better chance of receiving what it needs to win.

What Fedorov set in motion

By announcing this first open tender for middlestrike drones on June 25, 2026, Mykhailo Fedorov set something in motion that extended well beyond his ministry. He signaled to the entire Ukrainian drone industry, to all foreign partners, to all hesitant legislators, that Ukraine is choosing the difficult path of open competition over the easy path of direct contracts. And in this war where every decision counts, that choice too is part of the victory.

I sign this open letter on behalf of all those who believe that how you fight a war says something about how you build the peace. An open tender for Ukrainian war drones is also that: Ukraine choosing to be the kind of country it wants to become, even in the middle of a conflict. That choice deserves our unconditional support.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

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