ANALYSIS: Ukrainian drones in the Netherlands — when the defense industry crosses borders

The announcement that transforms the weapons production map

In June 2026, Ukrainian Technology Minister Mykhailo Fedorov announced that the Netherlands would soon launch production of Ukrainian long-range and medium-range drones under a bilateral cooperation program called Build with Ukraine. Funding for this drone production program will be provided by the Dutch Ministry of Defense. Drones produced in the first phase will be delivered exclusively to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

This announcement, reported by Militarnyi on June 30, 2026, represents far more than a bilateral industrial agreement. It marks a step in the transformation of the logic of military support to Ukraine: moving from delivering existing Western equipment to co-producing and manufacturing Ukrainian weapons systems on partner territory. Ukraine is now exporting its war technology and its blood-earned expertise, and its allies are investing in that technology to equip Ukrainian soldiers — and potentially, in time, their own forces.

The context of the Build with Ukraine program

The Build with Ukraine initiative was designed to "multiply the production of Ukrainian defense technologies abroad" through partnerships with allied countries and foreign industry. It is part of a fundamental paradigm shift: rather than waiting for aid to arrive, Ukraine integrates its allies into its industrial production chain. In April 2026, Ukraine and the Netherlands formally launched negotiations on the Drone Deal, a joint program for manufacturing unmanned systems that also includes a missile development component and electronic warfare capabilities.

The decision to produce in the Netherlands — out of reach of Russian strikes on Ukrainian territory — carries obvious strategic importance. It guarantees production continuity independently of how the front evolves and of Russian strike capabilities. This is the geographic diversification of the Ukrainian defense industrial base, a lesson drawn from the vulnerability of factories on national soil.

Exporting a drone technology developed in an ongoing war — and industrializing it at a European partner — is something that defense history has almost never seen at this speed. Ukraine does not wait for peace to build its industrial base. It builds it during the war. That is either madness or genius. I lean toward the latter.

A diversified arsenal of long-range strike drones

The drone types covered by the Netherlands production program include long-range and medium-range systems. The models associated with the Build with Ukraine program include the Lyuty, the UJ-22 Airborne, the Bober, and a jet-propelled drone used in deep strikes on Russia. These systems span different segments of the operational spectrum: reconnaissance, precision strike, and long-range infrastructure strike.

The Lyuty drone — the name means "fierce" or "savage" in Ukrainian — is a strike drone developed for deep-penetration missions. The UJ-22 Airborne is a versatile aerial drone system capable of both reconnaissance and strike missions. The Bober (the beaver) is a heavy strike drone capable of carrying significant military payloads. These systems, developed and refined on the Ukrainian battlefield, have proven their value in real combat conditions — a competitive advantage that no laboratory can simulate.

Diversification relative to production in Britain

This Netherlands initiative complements a similar program already launched in Britain. This geographic diversification is deliberate: producing in multiple European countries reduces the risk of supply chain bottlenecks, increases total production volume, and creates a distributed industrial network that is harder for the adversary to disrupt. It also signals that the Build with Ukraine model is replicable — other countries could join this network in the months ahead.

Fedorov stated: "Ukrainian technology and battlefield experience help our partners adapt more quickly to the challenges of modern warfare. At the same time, allied support allows us to scale up solutions that have already proven their effectiveness on the battlefield." That formulation matters: this is not a donor-recipient relationship. It is a mutual value exchange.

The Bober, the Lyuty, the UJ-22. These Ukrainian animal names and adjectives carry something artisanal and determined. These drones did not emerge from Lockheed Martin laboratories with billion-dollar budgets. They emerged from an absolute necessity, designed by engineers whose cities were being bombed while they worked. That context of creation gives them a legitimacy that no military specification can replace.

A framework agreement for defense innovation cooperation

Alongside the drone production program, Ukraine signed a defense cooperation agreement with the Netherlands, focused on "advancing defense innovation and strengthening collaboration between Ukrainian and Dutch weapons manufacturers." This agreement also provides for the joint development of missiles and electronic warfare capabilities to strengthen both nations' preparedness.

This extension into missiles and electronic warfare signals the strategic ambition of the partnership: not limiting it to drones, but building an integrated bilateral defense architecture. Electronic warfare has become a critically important domain in the Ukrainian conflict — Russian electronic countermeasures seek to jam communications and navigation systems of Ukrainian drones, and Ukraine has developed remarkably sophisticated counter-countermeasures that its partners now wish to co-develop.

The Netherlands as a lead strategic partner

Fedorov described the Netherlands as a country providing not only "one of the largest volumes of military assistance" but also "some of the highest-quality support among all of Ukraine's international partners." That recognition is not gratuitous — the Netherlands notably contributed to the Patriot and F-16 coalitions, provided artillery and air defense systems, and is now entering a deep industrial relationship. The 500 million euro support package mentioned by Fedorov includes 250 million for drone procurement for Ukrainian defense forces and 250 million for purchasing American weapons under the PURL mechanism.

This dual approach — investment in Ukrainian production AND purchase of American weapons for Ukraine — illustrates the sophistication of the Dutch strategy. Amsterdam does not choose between suppliers; it multiplies aid vectors to maximize impact on the Ukrainian front. That is allied defense policy in its most effective form.

The Netherlands and Ukraine co-developing missiles and electronic warfare systems. Ten years ago, that sentence would have belonged in science fiction. Today it is a signed agreement. What the war in Ukraine has produced unexpectedly is an acceleration of European defense industrial integration that twenty years of common policies had failed to achieve.

From the Danish model to a European architecture

The Build with Ukraine program is part of what Euromaidan Press calls the "Danish model": rather than delivering Danish equipment to Ukraine, Denmark pioneered the practice of directly funding Ukrainian defense production. In November 2025, Denmark committed 188 million euros through this model. Canada raised its contribution via this model to approximately 190 million Canadian dollars by February 2026. Sweden and Norway followed.

But it is the EU that truly changed the scale. On June 30, 2026, the European Union disbursed 3.9 billion euros to Ukraine — the first defense tranche of its 90 billion euro support loan. This sum is "restricted to Ukrainian drone production, defense industrial capabilities, and urgent front-line procurement." Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated: "Ukraine's ingenuity is at the heart of its success in resisting Russia's full-scale invasion. An ingenuity we want to support."

Domestic Ukrainian production: from 70% to 90%

These investments are producing measurable results. The Ukrainian defense industry now produces 90% of its newly authorized weapons, up from 70% a year earlier. More than 400 Ukrainian combat units have ordered more than 500,000 drones and pieces of equipment through the Brave1 Market platform. The EU had also disbursed 3.2 billion euros in general macro-financial support the previous week. These massive, direct financing flows toward defense production represent a paradigm shift in how the West supports Ukraine.

The total disbursed under the EU support loan exceeded 7 billion euros after these disbursements, out of a 2026 envelope of 45 billion euros, of which 28.3 billion are dedicated to Ukrainian defense industrial capabilities. These figures are unprecedented in the history of European defense.

28.3 billion euros for Ukrainian defense industrial capabilities in 2026. If you had said that to a European Council official in 2020, they would have stared at you blankly. What was unthinkable has become official EU policy. Russia accomplished something Brussels had not managed in twenty years of common defense policy: making collective European defense genuinely urgent and real.

Producing outside Ukraine to produce more

The decision to produce in the Netherlands — and in Britain — responds to an obvious defensive logic. Drone production factories on Ukrainian territory are permanent targets of Russian strikes. The average 3,000 strikes per day documented by the Ukrainian General Staff for July 1, 2026 include attacks on industrial infrastructure. Relocating part of the production preserves supply chain continuity against Russian attempts to dismantle it.

It is the same logic that led allied democracies to relocate parts of their industrial production during the Second World War — out of range of enemy bombers. Ukraine, constrained by the realities of war, is discovering and applying these principles in real time, with remarkable agility for a country at war.

The long-term objective: a Ukrainian defense industrial base integrated into Europe

The vision behind Build with Ukraine extends beyond the current war. It aims to integrate the Ukrainian defense industry into the European industrial ecosystem durably. Whether the conflict ends in six months or two years, the factories in the Netherlands and Britain will keep producing. The missile and electronic warfare co-development agreements will keep advancing. The industrial partnerships established during the war will become the basis for deeper integration into the EU defense market.

This perspective is crucial for Ukraine's future. A country whose defense industry is integrated into Europe has an additional security guarantee that goes beyond formal treaties. Industrial interdependence creates mutual incentives for collective defense that treaty articles alone cannot guarantee.

Industrial integration as a security guarantee — that is a lesson Europe itself learned after 1945. The European project began with the ECSC, the European Coal and Steel Community: creating economic interdependencies to make war unthinkable. Integrating Ukraine industrially into Europe applies that lesson to the current situation. It is historical wisdom dressed in industrial policy.

Front-line figures that explain the urgency

To understand the urgency of the Netherlands production program, you need to look at the front-line numbers. On June 29, 2026, Russia deployed 9,618 kamikaze drones in a single day. The following day, 9,801. This drone deluge — more than 400 per hour on average — is why Ukraine needs production capacity that matches this pace of consumption. Drones have become the main vector of the Russian terror campaign, but also the main tool of the Ukrainian counter-offensive.

Ukrainian drones do not only serve to defend against Russian Shaheds. They strike Russian logistics depots, command posts, and air defense systems. Since the start of 2026, Ukraine has destroyed nearly 200 Russian air defense systems — including 31 in June alone — primarily through drone strikes. On June 30, Ukrainian counter-strikes included the destruction of six Russian drone ground control stations. This pace of targeted destruction requires a massive volume of operational drones.

The production race: interceptors, strike drones, long-range drones

Ukraine doubled its interceptor drone fleet in 2026 compared to 2025. At least 29 Ukrainian companies are now licensed for serial production of interceptors. Orders for systems such as the Octopus reach 8,000 units. The company General Cherry conducted 11,473 strikes in March 2026 alone, destroying 43% of Russian Molniya drones. These figures illustrate the scale of operational drone demand.

To sustain this pace and amplify it, production in the Netherlands and Britain is essential. It allows total available volume to increase without depending solely on production capacity on Ukrainian soil. It is a supply chain diversification with an immediate direct benefit on the front.

Nine thousand eight hundred Russian drones in a single day. To answer that, Ukraine must produce thousands of drones every week. That industrial equation obsesses me. It should obsess every Western leader. Drone production in the Netherlands is not a pleasant diplomatic announcement — it is an industrial response to an industrial assault. The front is also fought in factories.

Ukrainian long-range drones against Russian infrastructure

Ukrainian long-range drones — some of which will soon be produced in the Netherlands — play a crucial role in the campaign of strikes on Russian economic infrastructure. Strikes on Russian refineries have put 50% of Russian refining capacity out of service according to analyses compiled by Euromaidan Press. These strikes create domestic fuel shortages in Russia, reduce Moscow's oil revenues, and complicate the Russian armed forces' fuel supply.

On June 3, 2026, a Neptune missile put two primary distillation units out of service at the Novoshakhtinsk refinery in Rostov oblast. Ukrainian long-range drones struck other refineries, oil terminals, and fuel depots. This systematic campaign against Russian energy infrastructure constitutes one of the most effective fronts of the war — the one that directly penetrates the Russian civilian economy and affects Moscow's ability to finance and fuel its war machine.

The Russian economy under growing pressure

The refining industry represents only one of the sectors being hit. Ukrainian strikes have targeted weapons factories, logistics centers, and rail infrastructure. In the night of June 30 to July 1, 2026, a Ukrainian drone struck the Penza Scientific Research Institute, a manufacturer of sensors for Iskander, Kalibr, and Kh-101 missiles, as well as components for Russian military aircraft. By depriving the Russian army of its precision sensor production capabilities, Ukraine is attacking the supply chain of the weapons that strike its own cities.

Russia responded to these Ukrainian successes with statistical manipulation — its officials have, according to Swedish military intelligence chief Thomas Nilsson, "manipulated statistics to conceal the impact of four years of war on economic growth and inflation." Behind those doctored figures, the economic pressure is real and growing.

Ukraine strikes Russian refineries with drones produced in Kharkiv, Dnipro, or Kyiv. Soon, some of those drones will be produced in Rotterdam or Birmingham. There is something in that geography that goes beyond simple military logistics — it is the industrial solidarity of free Europe against the organized barbarism of the East. That solidarity is producing real effects on the queues at Russian gas stations.

The unresolved questions of co-production

The Build with Ukraine program raises complex practical questions that official communiqués do not fully detail. The intellectual property question for Ukrainian drone technologies — developed with Ukrainian public funds but improved through Western financing and partnerships — is not yet fully resolved in the European legal framework. The terms of technology transfer, the export rules applicable to drones produced in the Netherlands for third parties, and the mechanisms for reviewing the terms of an agreement initially designed for wartime needs — all of this will need to be formalized.

Personnel training is another concrete challenge. Dutch technicians will need to be trained on Ukrainian systems — a reversal of the usual direction of technology transfer in defense partnerships. This training requires time, Ukrainian presence in the Netherlands, and potentially translations of technical documentation currently available only in Ukrainian. These logistical challenges are surmountable but require rigorous planning.

Quality assurance and standardization

Another challenge concerns standardization and quality control. Ukrainian drones were developed in a wartime emergency industrial environment — sometimes with less formalized standards than those required by European defense acquisition processes. Adapting these production processes to Dutch industry requirements without losing the flexibility and speed that make Ukrainian production successful will be a delicate balance to maintain.

These challenges do not call into question the validity or importance of the program. They simply signal that the June 30, 2026 announcement is the beginning of a process, not its conclusion. The success of the Build with Ukraine program in the Netherlands will be measured in actual drone deliveries to Ukrainian forces in the coming months — and in any third-country orders that prove the commercial and strategic value of this model.

The challenges must be named without allowing them to smother legitimate enthusiasm for this program. Intellectual property, training, standardization — these are real problems. But they are the problems of people working together, not of adversaries. Good faith on both sides is evident. And in defense partnerships, good faith matters as much as contractual clauses.

Ukraine as an exporter of military expertise

Production in the Netherlands is one facet of a broader diplomatic strategy Ukraine has deployed since mid-2026: turning its drone expertise into a diplomatic asset. Estonia's foreign minister stated in June 2026 that "Ukrainian drones deployed within NATO are worth the price of Russia's defeat" — a formulation that explicitly acknowledges the strategic value of Ukrainian drone technology transfers. Japan launched collaboration with Ukrainian startups to develop interceptor drones like the Terra A1, tested in Ukraine since April 2026.

On June 29, 2026, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha began a tour of East Asia — Japan, South Korea, Taiwan — to transform Ukraine from an aid recipient into a strategic partner. Drone technology and war experience are at the center of this new diplomacy. Ukraine is building a network of technological alliances that extends well beyond the current conflict.

The Netherlands program as an exportable model

The Build with Ukraine program in the Netherlands could become a model for other allied countries. Australia, developing its own drone capabilities, Germany seeking to rebuild its defense industry, Poland investing massively in its defense — all of these countries could benefit from similar agreements with Ukraine. Ukrainian combat drone expertise — the most advanced in the world in real-combat conditions — is a resource that the entire West has an interest in integrating into its own doctrines and industrial capabilities.

The Gdańsk declaration of June 25, 2026 explicitly called for "tightening governmental and industrial defense cooperation with Ukraine, particularly in drone and counter-drone technologies." The Netherlands program is the most advanced concrete embodiment of that call to date — and likely the precursor of a distributed production network that will cover several European countries in the next two years.

Ukraine is doing something that few countries have managed in history: transforming a defensive war into a global diplomatic lever. Ukrainian drone technology has become a currency of exchange with Tokyo, Amsterdam, London, and Ottawa. That is war geopolitics — conducted with a sophistication that would honor countries with decades of diplomatic tradition.

Beyond assembly: the full sub-component chain

Drone production in the Netherlands will not be limited to assembly. The bilateral cooperation agreement includes close integration of Ukrainian and Dutch industrial technology bases. This raises a crucial question: what share of components will be produced locally in the Netherlands and what share will come from Ukraine or other sources? The dependence of the Ukrainian drone industry on Chinese electronic components — a recognized reality in analyses of drone diplomacy in Asia — is a point of vigilance.

The agreement also includes an electronic warfare component whose software elements are at the heart of modern drone effectiveness. Ukrainians have developed particularly sophisticated drone detection and jamming systems. Integrating these software capabilities into a European production framework raises data security and industrial secret protection issues that will need to be managed rigorously.

Artificial intelligence in drone systems

The next generation of drones — some of which will likely be developed under the Ukrainian-Dutch partnership — will integrate artificial intelligence capabilities for autonomous navigation, target detection, and electronic countermeasures. Ukraine is at the cutting edge of developing these systems, tested in real combat conditions that no laboratory can simulate. The partnership with the Netherlands — a country with a strong tradition of precision engineering excellence — could significantly accelerate these developments.

This AI dimension is particularly sensitive because it touches on questions of human responsibility in firing decisions — a subject that will be the object of growing international regulation. The bilateral agreement will need to integrate ethical and legal safeguards that meet European standards while preserving the operational effectiveness of systems on the battlefield.

Artificial intelligence in combat drones — that is a subject on which I must admit genuine uncertainty. I do not know precisely where the ethical limits lie that this partnership will need to respect. What I know: Ukraine is the only real-war laboratory for these technologies. And that laboratory must be supported while ensuring that international humanitarian law applies. That is not a contradiction — it is an obligation.

The strategic significance of producing outside Ukraine

The decision to produce Ukrainian drones in the Netherlands sends a clear strategic signal to Moscow: Ukrainian production capabilities can no longer be fully neutralized by strikes on Ukrainian territory. Factories in Rotterdam or other Dutch cities are beyond the reach of Russian missiles and kamikaze drones. This production continuity guarantee changes Russian calculations on the effectiveness of strikes against the Ukrainian defense industry.

It is the same logic as North Korea's involvement in the conflict — Moscow sought ammunition supply sources beyond the reach of Ukrainian counter-strikes. Ukraine responds with the same logic, but in reverse: its allies become distributed production nodes that the adversary cannot strike. That is twenty-first-century industrial warfare.

Pressure on the Russian decision to continue

This delocalized production program adds to the other factors complicating Russia's calculation on the war's duration. The Russian advance rate has fallen by 77% in less than a year. The 200 Russian air defense systems destroyed since January weaken protection for Russian forces. Burning refineries reduce Russian state revenues. And now, the industrial base producing Ukrainian weapons is expanding geographically out of reach. The combination of these factors must weigh in discussions within the Russian military command on the long-term sustainability of this war.

But I must stay honest: this pressure is not yet sufficient to force a short-term change in Russian direction. Putin has shown a capacity to absorb costs that defies conventional forecasts. The duration of this war remains an unknown. What the Build with Ukraine program guarantees is that the more time passes, the more Ukrainian capabilities grow — and the more the Russian calculation deteriorates.

Time works against Putin — if the West holds. It is that conditional that concerns me. Netherlands drone production is good news. The persistence of Western support over eighteen months, twenty-four months, thirty-six months — that is where the outcome will be decided. Democracies have short memories and merciless electoral cycles. This program must survive the political transitions in allied capitals.

Co-developing missiles: a major milestone

The Ukraine-Netherlands bilateral agreement also provides for joint missile development — a dimension that goes well beyond drones and positions this partnership as one of the most ambitious in recent European defense history. If this component materializes, the Netherlands would become a co-developer of offensive armaments with Ukraine — a remarkable precedent for a country that, before 2022, had no tradition of co-developing weapons with partners outside NATO.

This missile component of the partnership fits into the same movement as the memorandum between MBDA and the Luch Bureau for the Neptune 2, or Storm Shadow deliveries to Ukraine. The European defense industry recognizes that Ukrainian technologies — developed and tested under the harshest conditions imaginable — have a value that would be absurd not to capitalize on. Co-development creates industrial synergies that will benefit both Ukraine at war and Europe at peace.

Electronic warfare: a domain in revolution

The electronic warfare component of the Dutch partnership deserves particular attention. The conflict in Ukraine has produced a revolution in this domain — Russian electronic countermeasures (GPS jamming, communications disruption, drone data-link neutralization) forced Ukrainians to develop remarkably sophisticated counter-countermeasure systems. These Ukrainian advances in electronic warfare are documented and recognized as among the most advanced in the world under real combat conditions.

Integrating these Ukrainian electronic warfare capabilities into a Dutch co-development framework would allow Europe to strengthen its own defenses against Russian hybrid strategies — jamming civilian systems, communications disruption, cyberattacks. What is being tested on the Ukrainian battlefield today will become the electronic defense doctrine of the entire NATO tomorrow.

Electronic warfare is the domain talked about least in mainstream media and considered one of the most decisive by military professionals. Ukraine has learned to fight in an environment of intense jamming, electronic decoys, and permanent cyberattacks. That expertise, which the Netherlands wants to co-develop, is worth billions. And it should interest every NATO member preparing for the same threat.

What this program says about Western strategic solidarity

The Build with Ukraine program in the Netherlands represents the maturity of an alliance relationship that has grown since the first deliveries of helmets and bulletproof vests in 2021. In four years, Western support for Ukraine moved from humanitarian to military, then from military to industrial. This progression signals a growing understanding that supporting Ukraine is not charity — it is an investment in the collective security of the West.

Fedorov said it clearly: "This is an investment in Europe's defense industrial capacity and in our common security." That formulation is accurate and important. Drones produced in the Netherlands under Ukrainian license are not only weapons for the current war. They are the prototypes of an integrated European defense industry that will be better, more agile, and more capable than before this war.

Ukraine as a partner, not as a recipient

The fundamental paradigm shift that Build with Ukraine represents is the transition from recipient to partner status. Ukraine is no longer merely a country receiving weapons — it is a country contributing technologies, patents, and expertise that its allies want to co-develop. This transformation has profound implications for the future of Ukraine-EU relations: a country whose military technologies are integrated into European industry is a far more credible accession candidate than a simple aid recipient.

On June 30, 2026, Ukraine was simultaneously under Russian bombs, receiving 3.9 billion euros from the EU for its drones, and launching production of its own systems in the Netherlands. This triple reality — the war, the financing, the delocalized production — says everything about what Ukraine has become: a country that fights, innovates, and builds its future at the same time. That is a form of courage that few nations could have sustained.

Under the bombs and simultaneously launching an industrial production line in Europe. I do not have the words to fully do justice to what Ukraine is accomplishing. I only know that every time someone says "Ukraine cannot hold," that kind of announcement — precise, industrial, strategic — answers them more effectively than any speech.

The largest single disbursement ever made for a third country's defense

The disbursement of 3.9 billion euros on June 30, 2026 — the first defense tranche of the 90 billion euro Ukraine Support Loan — represents the largest single payment ever made by the EU for the defense of a third country. This sum, strictly dedicated to "Ukrainian drone production, defense industrial capabilities, and urgent front-line procurement," is managed by Ukraine under Brussels' supervision. It falls within a 2026 envelope of 45 billion euros, of which 28.3 billion are dedicated to Ukrainian defense industrial capabilities.

Financing at this scale makes the Build with Ukraine program in the Netherlands not only possible but sustainable. Ukraine does not depend solely on the variable bilateral aid of member states — it has a stable institutional financing stream, drawn from a mechanism voted on by the European Parliament and the Council. This financial architecture is one of the most important institutional innovations of the European response to the war in Ukraine.

Use of funds: what this tranche will finance

The 3.9 billion euros will finance drone orders through the Brave1 Market platform, investments in Ukrainian industrial capabilities, and urgent front-line procurement. Part of these funds will likely finance the setup of the production line in the Netherlands, the associated technology transfer, and initial production contracts. The traceability of these funds — ensured by Brussels' verification mechanisms — is essential to maintaining the confidence of countries that agreed to co-borrow to finance this loan (with the exception of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia, which chose not to participate in the joint borrowing).

Minister Fedorov was clear on the use: "These resources will be invested directly in expanding Ukrainian defense production — multiplying drones and other critical capabilities for our Defense Forces." The Netherlands program is the concrete expression of that vision: multiply drones by diversifying production sites.

28.3 billion for Ukrainian defense industrial capabilities. That is almost three times Belgium's annual defense budget. If Europe invests these sums effectively, in the right technologies, with the right processes, this war will mark the beginning of a European defense industry finally worthy of the name. Otherwise, it will be money well spent to save Ukraine — and poorly spent for the future of European defense. The devil is in the details of execution.

The legacy of the Build with Ukraine program for the post-war period

When this war ends — in whatever form — the Build with Ukraine program will have left a lasting imprint on the European defense industry. Drone factories in the Netherlands and Britain. Ukrainian patents and expertise integrated into European industrial processes. Missile and electronic warfare co-development agreements. Human networks between Ukrainian, Dutch, and British engineers. These legacies will outlast the conflict and form the foundation of a transformed European defense industry.

This legacy is valuable regardless of the war's final outcome — even though I remain convinced that Ukraine will win, meaning it will preserve its existence as a sovereign nation within its internationally recognized borders. Industrial cooperations established during wars have often produced the most enduring innovations in the history of technology. The Build with Ukraine program is writing one of those chapters.

The final message: innovating under the bombs is the ultimate dignity

Ukraine's capacity to innovate, to build industrial partnerships, to steer its own defense production strategy — all while absorbing thousands of strikes per day — is the most eloquent proof that this country deserves full and complete Western support. This is not a country begging for aid. It is a country proposing a partnership of mutual added value. The Netherlands understood this. Let the rest of Europe do the same.

Ukraine innovates under the bombs. Its engineers design drones while their cities are struck. Its negotiators sign industrial agreements while their country burns. There is in that capacity for simultaneous building and destruction something that belongs to human dignity in its highest form. I have no other word for it. And that is why I continue writing about this war.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between verified facts and interpretive analysis. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under Sources, never here.

Primary source families used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

Secondary source families: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under Sources.

Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a critical, contextual synthesis based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.