TESTIMONY: €3.2 Billion from the EU for Ukraine in Gdańsk — a promise that must not be broken

A historic first disbursement on June 25, 2026

On June 25, 2026, at the Ukraine Recovery Conference 2026 in Gdańsk, the European Commission disbursed the first installment of €3.2 billion under the Ukraine Support Loan (USL) — a financial instrument worth €90 billion adopted by the EU to support Ukraine over the years 2026–2027. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen personally announced the transfer. Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko, who led the Ukrainian delegation in Zelensky's absence, confirmed its receipt.

This disbursement is not a grant — it is a loan conditioned on 32 budgetary reforms that Ukraine commits to implementing. Among them: measures for transparency in public financial management, tax reforms, improvements in anti-corruption efforts, and adjustments in state enterprise management. Of the €90 billion total program, €30 billion is earmarked for direct macro-financial assistance, and €60 billion for strengthening defense capabilities.

The schedule of upcoming disbursements

This first disbursement of €3.2 billion is followed by a provisional calendar: a second indicative disbursement of €3.7 billion is expected in September 2026, and a third of €1.45 billion before year's end. In total, Ukraine is expected to receive approximately €8.35 billion in 2026 under the USL alone — a significant share of the total Western financial support, which also includes American and British funds and bilateral aid from numerous EU member states.

The Gdańsk conference also saw the announcement of approximately €10 billion in additional pledges from various sources — governments, international financial institutions, and the private sector. These commitments cover civil infrastructure reconstruction, support for the Ukrainian private sector, and investments in defense capabilities. This is a considerable sum for a country whose territory is still under bombardment.

Gdańsk, June 2026. Billions of euros are committed to Ukraine amid speeches and handshakes. These figures, in a wartime context, are not abstract. They represent missiles, drones, air defense systems — tools that protect cities and save lives. The story of these financial commitments deserves to be documented with precision.

There is something almost surreal about holding a "recovery" conference for a country still at war — whose refineries are burning at the very hour delegates are signing agreements in Gdańsk conference rooms. But this surreal quality is precisely Ukrainian: this country has been rebuilding what Russia destroys, simultaneously, for four years. It is institutionalized resilience.

A financial instrument adapted to an unprecedented situation

The Ukraine Support Loan is a financial instrument without precedent in the history of the European Union. Worth a total of €90 billion, it is backed by frozen Russian sovereign assets held in European financial institutions — primarily funds of the Russian Central Bank immobilized since the 2022 sanctions. The interest generated by these frozen assets (approximately €3 billion per year) services the debt on this loan, reducing the cost for EU member states.

This legal and financial construction is innovative — and controversial. It uses the assets of a third state as collateral for a loan to another third country, in the context of armed conflict. Legal experts are still debating its implications for international law. But politically, it represents a strong decision: Europe is using Russian money to finance Ukraine's reconstruction. Russia is paying for the damage it caused — at least partially.

The 32 reforms: conditionality as a governance tool

The conditionality of 32 reforms is a deliberate feature of this program. The EU seeks to use the financial instrument not only to support the Ukrainian economy in the short term, but also to anchor governance reforms that will prepare Ukraine for its future accession to the Union. Anti-corruption efforts, budgetary transparency, judicial independence — these are precisely the areas where Ukraine must make progress to comply with the requirements of the accession process.

This approach is consistent with the EU's strategy since 2022: to support Ukraine financially and militarily while using that support as leverage to accelerate the reforms that bring it closer to accession. This is a form of transformational diplomacy that has worked with other candidate countries — and should work with Ukraine, provided the conditionality is maintained with rigor.

The 32 reforms imposed by the EU in exchange for the loan represent a politically complex reality. On one hand, they are a legitimate good governance condition. On the other, they impose on a country at war administrative requirements that would take years for any state at peace. There is an inherent tension between the urgency of reconstruction and the rigor of reforms. The EU must find the right balance.

A symbol chosen with care

Gdańsk — the city of Solidarność, the city of the workers' uprising against Soviet communism, the city where history turned — is a highly symbolic choice to host the Ukraine Recovery Conference. Poland, the host of this conference, wanted to recall that its own journey from the Iron Curtain to European integration is also possible for Ukraine.

But this symbolic choice was overshadowed by the absence of Zelensky, who decided not to travel to Gdańsk because of the diplomatic crisis with Poland over the naming of a Ukrainian special forces unit after the "Heroes of the UPA." The Ukrainian president's absence — with his country being the main beneficiary of the conference — darkened the event and illustrated the fragility of the Polish-Ukrainian relationship at this crucial moment.

What the conference actually delivered

Despite Zelensky's absence, the Gdańsk conference produced tangible results. In addition to the EU disbursement of €3.2 billion, the meeting saw the signing of the €343 million program in guarantees and subsidies for Ukrainian defense technologies (European Commission, Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, French and Finnish governments), memoranda between Ukrainian drone manufacturer SkyFall and Polish state bank BGK, and industrial partnerships between Ukrainian companies and defense groups ARX Robotics (Germany), Bittium (Finland), PGZ (Poland), and Kongsberg (Norway).

These industrial partnerships may be the most structurally significant element of the conference. They create concrete economic ties between the Ukrainian defense industry and its European counterparts — ties that will outlast the conference and deepen over time.

The true success of a reconstruction conference is not measured in the grandeur of speeches or the size of announced figures — it is measured ten years later, when you can see whether the projects were carried out, whether the money reached its destination, whether the reforms were implemented. Gdańsk provided the foundations. The question is whether anything will be built on them.

Governing under the bombs while reforming institutions

Implementing 32 budgetary reforms during a high-intensity war is a challenge of extraordinary difficulty. Ukraine must simultaneously mobilize resources for the war effort, maintain basic public services for its population, manage massive flows of internally displaced persons, and reform its financial and administrative institutions to meet EU requirements. Each reform requires administrative time, expertise, and political will that must compete with the immediate demands of war.

Zelensky's government has nevertheless shown remarkable reform capacity since 2022. Anti-corruption laws, tax reforms, improvements in state enterprise management — several of the commitments under the EU accession process have advanced even in wartime. This is a sign of Ukrainian institutional maturity and the political determination of its leaders.

The governance challenge of reconstruction

One of the major risks identified by reconstruction experts is corruption in fund management. Billions of euros in international financing, channeled rapidly in a context of war and emergency reconstruction, represent opportunities for corruption networks that have long been a structural problem in Ukraine.

The EU has put in place supervision and monitoring mechanisms, notably through the role of OLAF (European Anti-Fraud Office) and disbursement conditions tied to reform implementation. These mechanisms are necessary — but they are not infallible. One of the most important tasks for the international community in the years ahead will be ensuring that reconstruction funds genuinely reach those who need them.

Corruption is the cancer that has long eaten away at Ukraine. Zelensky made real efforts to fight it — it is partly why he was elected, and it is partly what the war forced to accelerate. But sending billions of euros into a country at war without robust oversight would be naive. European conditionality is a protection for European taxpayers' money — and for Ukrainians themselves.

How financial support sustains the war effort

Western financial support to Ukraine — of which this €3.2 billion disbursement is one expression — is as essential to the war effort as weapons deliveries. Without external financing, the Ukrainian government could not pay its civil servants, maintain its public services, fund its minimal social safety net, or support businesses vital to the national economy. The economic war of attrition that Russia is waging has the explicit goal of triggering Ukraine's financial collapse.

The macro-financial support from the EU, the United States (via the IMF and direct aid), the United Kingdom, and other partners is the counterweight to this financial exhaustion strategy. It allows Ukraine to hold — economically, socially, politically — for the duration of a war that Russia seeks to prolong until Western resistance collapses.

Debt management for the post-war period

These loans — even on favorable terms — accumulate in Ukraine's public debt. Eventually, if the war ends and reconstruction begins, Ukraine will need to manage a considerable public debt while financing its reconstruction. Economists advocate anticipating these issues now — by providing for debt relief mechanisms, restructuring, or partial conversion into grants.

Precedents exist: Germany benefited from significant debt relief after the Second World War through the Marshall Plan and the London Agreement of 1953. These precedents should guide thinking on the long-term treatment of Ukrainian debt — recognizing that this country did not choose to be invaded, and that imposing a crushing post-war debt on it would be an additional injustice.

I believe Europe will eventually need to convert a substantial portion of these loans into grants. Ukraine cannot rebuild its country while simultaneously carrying the weight of a massive war debt. And the frozen Russian assets — hundreds of billions of euros — should serve, in full, to finance this reconstruction. That would be the minimum reparation for a colossal harm.

Rebuilding while the war continues

The very idea of a "recovery" conference for a country still at war is intrinsically paradoxical — but it responds to a practical necessity. In many regions of Ukraine relatively far from the front, reconstruction is already underway: homes repaired, bridges rebuilt, power stations replaced, liberated cities returning to normal life. Waiting for the end of the war to begin rebuilding would mean losing irreplaceable years.

Studies conducted by the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and other institutions estimate that the total cost of rebuilding Ukraine could exceed €500 billion. This colossal sum can only come from a combination of international public support and private investment — the latter coming only if security and governance conditions improve sufficiently to make investments viable.

The post-war period: who pays, who decides, who oversees?

The political questions of reconstruction are as important as the financial ones. Who decides on reconstruction priorities? The Ukrainian government? International donors? A combination of both? How to ensure that reconstruction responds to the real needs of the population rather than to the interests of construction firms jostling for contracts? These questions have no simple answers — but they must be asked now, before the billions begin circulating at speed.

The Gdańsk conference laid some institutional foundations for reconstruction governance. The EU, which will be the main donor, plays a coordinating role. The Ukrainian government, despite the war, has maintained the institutional capabilities needed to participate in these processes. But far more work — and rigor — will be required for Ukraine's reconstruction to succeed at the level of expectations and needs.

Ukraine's reconstruction will be one of the largest national reconstruction enterprises in modern history. It must be conducted with rigor, transparency, and international coordination without precedent. And it must succeed — because the Ukraine that emerges from this war has the right to prosper, not just to survive.

SAFE, PURL, and the instruments for financing Ukrainian defense

The €3.2 billion announced in Gdańsk is part of an increasingly sophisticated ecosystem of European financing mechanisms. The SAFE (Security Action for Europe) program provides long-term loans to member states for defense purchases — a portion of which can be allocated to Ukraine. The PURL (Pre-arranged United Replenishment Loans) mechanism allows allies to purchase American weapons specifically to deliver them to Ukraine. The European Peace Facility (APF) reimburses member states that have delivered weapons to Kyiv from their own stocks.

Lithuania, which signed the PURL agreement in Gdańsk with an announcement of a €40 million fund to procure American weapons for Ukraine, illustrates the convergence of these mechanisms. Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo also announced significant commitments. The financial support architecture for Ukraine has become more professional, and this translates into more predictable and efficient financing flows for Kyiv.

The Gdańsk conference in the context of the Ankara summit

The Gdańsk meeting serves as direct preparation for the NATO Ankara summit on July 7–8, 2026. Commitments made in Poland will be taken up and amplified in Ankara, where a €70 billion military aid package for Ukraine is expected. This advance coordination — progressive announcements building momentum before the main summit — is a deliberate diplomatic technique to create political momentum and make any last-minute backtracking difficult.

Zelensky was not in Gdańsk — a notable absence in the context of Polish-Ukrainian tensions. But the decisions made in his absence show that support for Ukraine no longer depends solely on its president's personal presence. Europe's institutional mechanisms and the solid political support of key partners guarantee a continuity of aid that transcends complex diplomatic episodes.

Zelensky's absence from Gdańsk must not obscure the essential: three billion euros were committed to Ukraine that day. Money speaks louder than presence. And when the money comes despite diplomatic tensions, it means the strategic relationship is more robust than surface frictions suggest. Warsaw and Kyiv have both understood that their futures depend on each other.

A Polish-Ukrainian diplomatic crisis in the background

Zelensky's decision not to travel to Gdańsk was not a simple scheduling issue. It reflects persistent tensions between Poland and Ukraine over sensitive historical subjects. The question of Volhynia — the actions of the UPA against Polish populations in 1943–1945 — continues to weigh on the bilateral relationship. Newly elected Polish President Karol Nawrocki has taken hostile positions toward Ukraine on this file, going so far as to demand the blocking of Ukrainian EU accession. In this context, Zelensky's presence in Gdańsk could have created a delicate diplomatic situation.

Yet Zelensky's absence did not prevent the financial decisions from being made. The €3.2 billion committed in Gdańsk — including Finnish, Lithuanian, and other contributions — went to Ukraine regardless of the Ukrainian president's presence. This reality illustrates a growing maturity in the mechanisms of support for Ukraine: financial commitments no longer depend solely on Zelensky's personal presence to materialize. The institutional support architecture functions more autonomously than it did in 2022.

Why Polish support remains essential despite the tensions

Despite the surface diplomatic tensions, Poland remains one of Ukraine's most important supporters. Its territory is the main transit corridor for Western military aid to Kyiv. It hosts millions of Ukrainian refugees. Its defense industry (PGZ and its subsidiaries) produces weapons purchased by Ukraine. And its voice in European institutions and at NATO remains precious for maintaining diplomatic pressure on Russia.

The Polish-Ukrainian crisis must therefore be managed with care — neither underestimated nor dramatized. Both nations have too much to lose from a collapse of their cooperation. The path forward runs through serious historical discussions dissociated from immediate strategic cooperation. Warsaw can work with Kyiv on the memory of Volhynia while continuing to deliver weapons and support Ukrainian European integration. This dual track is politically difficult. It is nonetheless the only pragmatic path available.

€3.2 billion — one brick in an edifice still to be built

The disbursement of €3.2 billion in Gdańsk on June 25, 2026 is concrete good news for Ukraine. It arrives at a moment when the country needs support on all fronts — military, financial, diplomatic. It confirms that the European Union is maintaining its commitments and that the €90 billion support program is not an empty promise but an instrument currently being executed.

But €3.2 billion is less than 1% of the estimated total reconstruction cost. It is one brick in an edifice that will take years and hundreds of billions to build. Ukraine and its allies must stay the course — maintaining financial commitments, maintaining reform conditionality, maintaining oversight of fund use — over the duration of an effort measured not in months but in decades.

Investing in Ukraine is investing in European security

Financing Ukraine's reconstruction is not international philanthropy — it is a strategic investment in Europe's security. A stable, prosperous, and democratic Ukraine, integrated into the EU and NATO, is the best bulwark against the future expansionist ambitions of Russia. An impoverished, fragmented, and desperate Ukraine would be a permanent source of instability on Europe's eastern border. The choice, for European policymakers, should be clear.

Three billion euros promised in Gdańsk. How many will actually be delivered, on time, to the required standard? The history of aid to Ukraine has sometimes disappointed in execution even when intentions were good. But the trend is clear: the amounts are growing, the commitments are becoming more precise, and allies are less and less inclined to hide behind vague formulations. That is progress. In the scale of this conflict, that is even remarkable progress.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

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