DECODING: Ukraine-France and the SCALP licence — what the "first advances" actually change

June 29 and Fedorov's declaration

On June 29, 2026, Ukrainian Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov dropped a statement that deserves careful unpacking: "first advances" had been recorded in negotiations with France for a licence to manufacture SCALP cruise missiles. This phrase, delivered in an interview reported by NewsUkraine RBC, contains more information between the lines than in the words themselves. Let us decode it.

Before June 29, the delivery of Storm Shadow missiles by the United Kingdom and SCALP missiles by France had already transformed Ukraine's long-range strike capability. The next step — a production licence — would be of an entirely different order of magnitude. It would no longer represent the delivery of weapons, but the transfer of the know-how to manufacture them. That would be a fundamental qualitative shift in the defence relationship between Paris and Kyiv.

"First advances" — a diplomatic formulation in all its subtlety. It can mean a great deal or almost nothing, depending on who is speaking and in what context. Fedorov is a minister who chooses his words carefully. His use of "first advances" rather than "significant progress" or "imminent agreement" says a great deal about the actual state of the discussions. We are at the foundations, not the roof.

The SCALP-EG's technical characteristics

The SCALP-EG (Système de Croisière Autonome à Longue Portée - Emploi Général) is a Franco-British air-to-ground cruise missile, jointly developed by MBDA. The French version is the SCALP-EG; the British version is called the Storm Shadow. Declared range: more than 250km, according to official sources, with estimates going well beyond that. Warhead: approximately 450kg of tandem penetrating charge (BROACH for the Storm Shadow). Guidance: GPS/INS with DSMAC terminal guidance (Digital Scene Matching Area Correlator) for metric precision.

These characteristics make the SCALP one of the most precise and powerful cruise munitions available. For Ukraine, the ability to strike at 250km+ with metric precision means the ability to reach targets deep in occupied territories or Russia itself — ammunition depots, logistical infrastructure, command posts — from relatively secure positions. That is the definition of a strategic advantage.

SCALP missiles already delivered: a real operational capability

France began delivering SCALP missiles to Ukraine starting in 2023. These deliveries, initially confirmed after months of negotiations, were followed by further deliveries in 2024 and 2025. Ukraine used these missiles for documented strikes on high-value targets — Russian military infrastructure, logistical depots, command installations. The operational effectiveness of Ukrainian SCALP missiles is confirmed by open sources and satellite damage analyses.

But the delivery of existing missiles has its limits: French SCALP stocks are finite. France cannot give away weapons it no longer has. This is precisely why the idea of a production licence is logically the next step: if Ukraine can manufacture its own SCALP missiles, it is no longer dependent on partners' declining stocks. It can produce as many as it can build.

France delivered SCALP missiles to Ukraine in 2023. That was courageous. But delivering missiles that progressively empty your own stockpiles is aid with a natural limit. A production licence is a step above: it means transferring the capability, not just the weapon. If Paris takes that step, it will change things far beyond the current Ukrainian conflict.

What happened at the Élysée

According to Fedorov's statements reported by NewsUkraine RBC, it was during President Volodymyr Zelensky's visit to France that the discussion on the SCALP licence was initiated at the highest level. Fedorov had a "very productive" discussion with President Emmanuel Macron on the possibility of granting Ukraine a manufacturing licence for SCALP missiles. This is a head-of-state-to-head-of-state discussion, transposed to the technical level by ministers.

The fact that Macron himself was involved in initiating these discussions is significant. It means the matter has political buy-in at the highest level, not merely at the bureaucratic level. A decision this sensitive — transferring the intellectual property of a precision cruise missile — requires exactly this kind of top-level political support to clear the institutional, legal, and commercial barriers that stand in its way.

Fedorov's carefully worded formulation

Fedorov was explicitly cautious in his statements: "These are the first steps. Carefully, we continue to maintain these communications to obtain results." He added that it is "still too early to announce concrete results." This caution is not rhetorical — it is a realistic assessment of the state of discussions.

The negotiations cover three main areas, according to Fedorov: intellectual property rights, the launch of production, and legal and technical aspects. These three areas are precisely the most complex in any defence technology transfer. The intellectual property of a joint Franco-British missile is shared between two countries, two companies (MBDA France and MBDA UK), and potentially third-party component suppliers. Resolving this complexity does not happen in a few weeks.

I will be honest: "first advances" in a cruise missile licence process can take years to materialise. The history of military technology transfers is full of announced agreements that took five years to translate into actual production. Fedorov knows that. Macron knows that. What matters is that discussions have begun at the right level. What follows belongs to patience and political will.

Intellectual property shared between France and the United Kingdom

The SCALP-EG / Storm Shadow is a joint Franco-British development programme, managed by the jointly owned company MBDA. Intellectual property rights are therefore shared between Paris and London. Any decision to licence production to a third party — in this case Ukraine — requires agreement from both parties. The United Kingdom closely followed French decisions on Storm Shadow / SCALP; its position on a production licence granted to Ukraine is, as of this writing, not publicly declared.

According to the Fakti.bg source reporting on the same negotiations, the discussions involve "the French government and the company concerned" — which almost certainly refers to MBDA. The company will need to give its commercial consent to any licence transfer, independently of the political decisions of both governments. MBDA is a private company with shareholders — Airbus, BAE Systems, Leonardo — whose commercial interests must be taken into account in any licence agreement.

ITAR constraints and American components

The SCALP almost certainly contains electronic components subject to ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) regulations. Any US-origin component in a weapons system transferred to a third party requires a re-transfer approval from the US government. This constraint is a reality in virtually all Western military technology transfers.

This explains why Fedorov also mentioned parallel negotiations with the United States on arms licences. These discussions, conducted at the level of Ukraine's National Security and Defence Council (NSDC), are inseparable from the French negotiations. If the United States does not approve ITAR component re-transfers to Ukraine, the French licence alone would not be sufficient to start full production.

ITAR is the silent bureaucratic weapon of US defence policy. Thousands of weapons systems worldwide contain American components that create an invisible dependency on Washington. For Ukraine, obtaining ITAR waivers on SCALP components would be just as important as obtaining the French licence. These two negotiations are in reality a single conversation.

Discussions at NSDC level — unprecedented and significant

Negotiations with the United States on arms manufacturing licences are being conducted at the level of Ukraine's National Security and Defence Council. Fedorov was categorical about the exceptional nature of these discussions: "It is unprecedented that it has even been announced, and that such conversations have begun." He declined to provide further details on the weapons systems concerned.

The fact that conversations on US arms production licences have begun — even without public details on the systems involved — is itself significant information. Before 2022, the idea that the United States would grant Ukraine production licences for advanced weapons systems was unthinkable. The fact that these discussions are being held at NSDC level in 2026 illustrates how dramatically Ukraine's strategic status has shifted in Washington's eyes.

Trump and Ukraine defence policy: a complicated context

The Trump administration context complicates these discussions. Donald Trump, whose posture toward Ukraine has oscillated between pragmatic support and unfavourable rhetoric, has allowed his representatives — Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, mentioned by Putin himself — to conduct parallel discussions with Moscow. In this context, Washington's approval of production licences for Ukraine is politically sensitive.

Nevertheless, Trump is a pragmatic man — that is precisely his defining characteristic, described by those who observe him as a "necessary evil for the West." If he calculates that allowing Ukraine to produce its own weapons reduces the political pressure on the United States for costly direct deliveries, his interest could align with Ukrainian needs. This is not sentimentality — it is political calculation.

Trump is not a friend of Ukraine in the sense Zelensky might hope. But he is not necessarily an enemy either. He is a negotiator looking for a deal. And for Trump, a deal where Ukraine defends itself with locally manufactured weapons — reducing the American political cost of this conflict — could be exactly the kind of deal he would want to strike. Pragmatic realpolitik sometimes produces pleasant surprises.

Existing capabilities and gaps

The question of Ukraine's capacity to produce cruise missiles of the SCALP's sophistication is complex. Ukraine already produces long-range domestic cruise missiles — the Molniya-1 drone-missiles and other variants that have struck targets in Russia hundreds of kilometres away. These systems demonstrate a guided missile development and production capability.

However, SCALP missiles are of considerably greater sophistication: turbojet propulsion, metric precision DSMAC guidance, high-air-defence survivability, tandem penetrating charge. Producing such systems requires precision manufacturing chains, special materials, and sophisticated testing processes that Ukraine has not yet fully developed. The road from licence to operational production is therefore long, but not impossible.

The MBDA-Armor precedent: a signal of hope

A parallel development deserves mention in this context: German defence company MBDA signed a strategic agreement with Ukrainian firm Armor for the development of long-range strike systems. This is not the same as the SCALP licence, but it illustrates the same underlying movement: Western defence manufacturers are engaging in co-development partnerships with Ukrainian firms, not merely in sales.

European Defence Commissioner Andrius Kubilius described Ukraine's defence industry as "one of the most innovative in Europe." This high-level institutional recognition creates a favourable environment for licence agreements like the one being discussed with France. When European institutions legitimise Ukrainian industrial capability, private companies and governments follow more readily.

I do not know the technical details of cruise missile production well enough to say with certainty whether Ukraine can produce SCALP missiles in five years. What I know is that Ukraine has proven since 2022 that it is capable of accomplishing things everyone judged impossible. I choose to trust it on this point as well.

A qualitative shift in long-range strike capability

If the SCALP production licence materialises, the impact on Ukraine's strike capability would be transformative. Currently, Ukrainian SCALP stocks are finite — they are deliveries of quantities limited by available French inventories. Domestic production would mean the ability to strike at 250km+ with metric precision in industrial quantities, at a pace chosen by Ukraine.

In this scenario, every Russian military infrastructure in occupied territories, every logistical depot, every command post in Russian strategic depth would be within range. The logistical pressure described by the June 29 bridge strikes would be amplified exponentially. And Russia, which is investing massively in its air defence to intercept current Ukrainian missiles, would face a cruise missile threat reconstituted at will.

The strategic signal to Moscow

The announcement of these discussions, even at an early stage, sends a message to Moscow. If Russia fails to reach a negotiated peace agreement, Ukraine will progressively develop a domestic long-range strike capability that will render all Russian strategic depth obsolete. This message is intentional — Fedorov chose not to keep these negotiations secret. He announced them.

The transparency of this announcement is itself a diplomatic pressure tool. It tells Putin: the West is not limiting its support to Ukraine to existing arms deliveries. It is considering transferring production capabilities themselves. And this trajectory, once set in motion, is difficult to reverse. The cost of continuing the war for Russia rises with each step of this kind.

Fedorov is a brilliant minister. Announcing "first advances" on the SCALP licence publicly is not imprudence — it is a calculated decision. It keeps pressure on Paris not to back down. It signals to Moscow that the trajectory of Western aid moves in only one direction. And it reassures the Ukrainian population that its allies are working on durable solutions. One phrase, three audiences, three messages. That is pure Fedorov.

Kyiv's long-term vision

Fedorov situated the SCALP licence negotiations within a broader context: Ukraine's strategy of developing its own defence industrial complex. This is not only for the current war. It is for the post-war period, for the decades ahead, for a Ukraine that wants to be a sovereign actor in its own defence — not a dependent client relying on external deliveries.

This vision is consistent with the ambition of NATO membership. A NATO member that can produce its own precision cruise missiles is a member that contributes to the Alliance's defence industrial base, not merely a beneficiary. Ukraine wants to transform its position from "defence customer" to "defence partner." The SCALP licence, if it materialises, would be a major step toward that goal.

Other licences under discussion

The SCALP licence is not the only one under discussion. Fedorov mentioned negotiations with the United States on other arms licences without specifying their nature. Defence sector analyses suggest other systems — potentially guidance systems, missile components, propulsion technologies — are involved. The overall direction is clear: Ukraine wants to produce, not just receive.

Other co-production agreements are already under way with European partners. Poland, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, and other countries have discussions under way with Ukrainian companies. The Danish model finances this domestic production. The Kongsberg-DevDroid agreement for UGVs is one illustration. The SCALP licence, if it comes to fruition, would be the most powerful symbol of this direction — a Franco-Ukrainian cruise missile produced in Kyiv or Lviv.

A Ukraine capable of producing its own SCALP missiles would be a Ukraine that no longer needs to ask Paris's permission to strike a given target. Full military sovereignty means exactly that: not only deciding what to strike, but having the capacity to strike it without depending on anyone. That is what Zelensky and Fedorov are working toward. I think it is the right direction, even if it is a long road.

MBDA's commercial interests

MBDA, the company that produces SCALP missiles, is a commercial entity with obligations to its shareholders. A production licence transfer to Ukraine potentially creates a competitor in the precision cruise missile market. A Ukraine capable of producing SCALP missiles could sell them on export markets, in competition with MBDA itself. This commercial tension is real and must be resolved in negotiations.

Solutions to this tension exist: a production licence limited to the Ukrainian market and Ukraine's national defence, with restrictions on re-export. Licence royalties paid to MBDA for each unit produced. Supply obligations for certain key components from MBDA or its suppliers. These mechanisms are standard in defence licence agreements, and they make it possible to reconcile the technology holder's commercial interests with the recipient's sovereign needs.

MBDA's precedent with other customers

MBDA has already granted production licences to third countries for some of its systems. The precedent therefore exists. The question is whether Ukraine meets the standard conditions for obtaining such licences: institutional reliability, non-proliferation guarantees, sufficient industrial capacity to produce to the required quality standards. On these three criteria, Ukraine is making measurable progress.

The European recognition of Ukrainian defence industry quality by Commissioner Kubilius helps establish this credibility. Certification of Ukrainian systems by Western partners, signed co-production agreements, the demonstrated quality of Ukrainian drones and missiles in real combat — all of this constitutes a de facto application file for Western production licences.

MBDA must weigh the short term — potentially losing market share if Ukraine can produce SCALP missiles — against the long term: being the preferred partner of a country that will be a massive defence importer after the war. I think the commercial calculation will tilt toward the long term. And I hope to remember having written this when the contract is signed.

Announcing a licence during peace negotiations

The announcement of these discussions on the SCALP licence comes during a moment of dual negotiations — on one side, peace talks evoked between Russia, Ukraine, and the United States; on the other, Ukraine developing its long-term capabilities. These two movements do not contradict each other — they are complementary. A militarily stronger Ukraine in the long term is also a better-positioned Ukraine to negotiate from a position of strength.

Putin, for his part, reaffirmed on June 29 itself that Russia would not change its negotiating positions. He still demands Ukrainian withdrawal from Donetsk and Luhansk. Faced with this intransigence, Ukraine is developing its long-range capabilities. This is not contradictory — it is rational: if negotiations fail, Ukraine must be capable of holding out and making Russia pay a heavy price for its persistence.

France between diplomacy and armament

France is playing a difficult role in this matter: it is both an active diplomatic player in the search for a negotiated solution — the G7 in June at Évian, maintained contacts with Moscow — and a military supplier considering the transfer of cutting-edge technologies to Ukraine. These two postures are not incompatible for Paris: supporting Ukraine militarily strengthens its negotiating position and therefore the chances of a viable peace agreement.

Macron, who initiated the SCALP licence discussion with Zelensky, understands this dual logic. He knows that France cannot be both the country seeking peace and the one leaving Ukraine without sufficient capabilities to defend that peace. The SCALP licence, if it comes to fruition, would be the embodiment of this dual policy: diplomatic support accompanied by long-term military support.

Macron embodies a vision of French foreign policy that I respect, even when I do not always agree with his decisions. On Ukraine, he evolved from the initial caution of 2022 to significant military engagement by 2024–2026. The discussion on the SCALP licence shows this engagement continues to progress. That is more than many European capitals have done. I note it.

The intellectual property negotiation

The intellectual property rights of a cruise missile like the SCALP include patents on propulsion, guidance systems, warhead design, navigation software, electronic countermeasure systems, and thousands of subsystems. Mapping this intellectual property to define transfer conditions is months of legal and commercial work.

The specific question of the DSMAC (Digital Scene Matching Area Correlator) — the SCALP's very high-precision terminal guidance system — is particularly sensitive. This technology is among the most precise available in Western cruise missiles. Its transfer to a third party, even a friendly third party like Ukraine, raises security questions about the potential diffusion of this technology to potential adversaries. This is a real debate that the negotiators must address.

Legal aspects: international law and Ukrainian law

An arms production licence agreement involves complex international law provisions: non-proliferation treaties, bilateral defence agreements, revocation clauses in case of regime change, end-use verification mechanisms. Ukraine is not yet a member of NATO or the EU, which creates legal uncertainties around some of these clauses.

Progress on the Ukrainian side in harmonising its legislation with Western arms management standards is a favourable factor. Ukraine has demonstrated since 2022 that it is capable of managing advanced weapons systems with the levels of security and accountability that allies require. This operational credibility is an implicit prerequisite for any licence transfer, and it is being built.

International arms transfer law is one of the most obscure and most important areas of defence policy. Few people outside of specialists truly understand it. What I know is that Ukraine has an interest in investing in this legal expertise just as much as in its technical capabilities. The world's best weapons are useless if licences cannot be formalised for lack of legal expertise.

The American negotiations: the documented mystery

The discussions with the United States on arms licences are the most intriguing — and the least documented. Fedorov clearly declined to provide details: "We cannot yet disclose details." He did, however, confirm that these discussions are being held at NSDC level and are "unprecedented."

Speculation is tempting, but the fact-checker must resist. What can be said without speculating: the most relevant US systems for Ukraine whose production under licence would be transformative include missiles like the ATACMS (if the maximum range could be produced locally), precision guidance systems, or air defence technologies. But without confirmation, these avenues remain conjecture.

The F-16 precedent and what it teaches

The F-16 delivered to Ukraine file offers an instructive precedent. Initially, the very idea of delivering fourth-generation fighters to Ukraine seemed impossible. Then it became possible with conditions. Then conditions were lifted. Then deliveries took place. The timeline took roughly two years between the first serious discussion and the first deliveries.

If a similar pattern applies to production licences, the discussions of June 29, 2026 on the SCALP licence could lead to actual Ukrainian production by 2028 or 2029. This does not mean the war will last that long — it may end sooner. But even in peacetime, having the capacity to produce precision cruise missiles is strategically essential for Ukraine.

The F-16 precedent gives me hope for the SCALP licence. Two years of "impossible" before the F-16s flew to Ukraine. The trajectory for cruise missiles could be similar. I hold onto the date of June 29, 2026 as the beginning of a process whose results, if all goes well, will be measured in years — and in kilometres of range.

What we know for certain

The "first advances" in negotiations on the SCALP licence, announced on June 29, 2026 by Mykhailo Fedorov, represent a genuine step in a complex process. The discussions took place at the level of presidents — Zelensky and Macron — and are continuing with the French government and MBDA. The key issues to resolve are documented: intellectual property, production launch, legal aspects.

Parallel negotiations with the United States are confirmed and described as "unprecedented." They are being conducted at the level of Ukraine's National Security and Defence Council, confirming their strategic importance. The overall direction is clear: Ukraine wants to move from the status of recipient to that of producer of advanced Western armaments.

What these negotiations say about the future

The discussions on the SCALP licence are part of a broader transformation of the defence relationship between Ukraine and the West. This transformation does not happen in a few months — it unfolds over years. But the trajectory is established, and each announcement like the one of June 29 is a verifiable step along it.

For Putin, who thought in 2022 that Ukraine would be on its knees in a matter of days, watching Kyiv negotiate production licences for French cruise missiles is probably one of the most bitter images of this war. The Ukraine he tried to destroy is building its military sovereignty, brick by brick, licence by licence. This image, more than any spectacular strike, may best summarise the fundamental strategic failure of the Russian invasion.

Putin wanted a disarmed, submissive Ukraine, incapable of resistance. Instead, he produced a Ukraine negotiating the production of precision cruise missiles with France and the United States. The irony would be funny if it did not cost so many human lives. But the direction is right. And it is irreversible.

Acknowledged zones of uncertainty

This decoding has its limits. I do not know the exact text of documents exchanged between Paris, MBDA, and Kyiv in these negotiations. I do not know which specific US weapons systems are covered by the parallel discussions. I cannot predict whether these negotiations will succeed or be blocked by unforeseen technical, commercial, or political obstacles.

What I can affirm: the sources are reliable, the statements are those of a Defence Minister on the public record, and the general context is consistent with other available data. Fedorov's own caution in his statements — "first steps,""too early for concrete results" — indicates that I am not over-interpreting an announcement he himself presents as preliminary.

The necessary follow-up

This file deserves rigorous monitoring in the months ahead. The next milestones to watch: a formal announcement of a framework agreement on the licence, the publication of details on production conditions, and any communication on progress in the parallel American negotiations. These markers will allow an assessment of whether the "first advances" of June 29, 2026 translate into concrete results — or whether they remain for now in the category of well-founded hopes.

I commit to following this file with the same rigour as this decoding. Because if the SCALP licence comes to fruition, it will be one of the most important developments in the war — and it deserves the serious journalistic coverage it may not yet have received in full measure.

Journalists covering wars tend to chase big headlines — strikes, casualties, front-line movements. Missile production licence negotiations are less spectacular. And yet that may be precisely where Ukraine's future is being decided. I prefer to cover what matters in the long run over what makes good images in the short term.

An irreversible process if political will holds

The negotiations on the SCALP production licence illustrate a broader reality: the war in Ukraine has triggered a process of building Ukrainian military sovereignty that, if the allies' political will holds, will become irreversible. This process no longer depends on a few one-off political decisions — it is anchored in commercial agreements, industrial partnerships, and incremental technology transfers that create lasting facts.

Fedorov has understood it, Macron has understood it, and even Trump — in his pragmatic logic — is beginning to understand it. A militarily autonomous Ukraine is a Ukraine that costs allies less in the long run. This calculation, as pragmatic as it may be, pushes in the right direction: toward technology transfers, toward production licences, toward a Ukraine that defends its own borders with its own weapons.

Fedorov's phrase of June 29, 2026 will endure

In one year, two years, perhaps five, if a SCALP production line is running somewhere in Ukraine, people may well look back on this declaration of June 29, 2026. This sober phrase from Fedorov — "first advances have been recorded" — will be the first public trace of a process that will have transformed Ukraine's long-range strike capability. Great stories always begin with first advances. What matters is what comes next.

And Ukraine, more than anyone, knows that what comes after first advances is work. Relentless, patient, systematic. Exactly as it has been doing since February 24, 2022.

I end this decoding with the feeling that history's great transformations happen in the details: a memorandum signed here, a first advance announced there, a licence granted after months of negotiation. The Ukraine of 2030 will be defined by decisions taken in 2026 in meetings no one was covering live. That is why we must keep decoding, even when the headlines are sober.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between verified facts and interpretive analysis. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under Sources, never here.

Primary source families used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

Secondary source families: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under Sources.

Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a critical, contextual synthesis based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.