OPEN LETTER: These North Korean soldiers who want to choose their own fate

OPEN LETTER: These North Korean soldiers who want to choose their own fate

Introduction: Men caught between two worlds

Captured soldiers and a historic decision

On June 23, 2026, South Korea announced that it would accept all North Korean prisoners of war captured by Ukraine on Ukrainian territory, if those prisoners express a wish to go to Seoul. Not forced repatriation. Not automatic return to Russia. A choice. The decision was announced by the South Korean Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lee Jae-won, and it rests on a straightforward legal foundation: the South Korean constitution considers the entire Korean Peninsula to be its territory — which means every North Korean citizen is, legally, also a South Korean citizen.

Kim Jong-un sent between 14,000 and 15,000 North Korean soldiers to Russia at the end of 2024. By spring 2026, approximately 7,000 of them had been killed or wounded — 2,251 killed, 4,807 wounded. Two were captured alive in January 2025 in the Kursk region. In December 2025, these two men expressed a wish to go to South Korea. Russia asked twice that Ukraine hand them over. Ukraine declined both times. Ukraine-South Korea foreign ministerial talks were scheduled for June 30, 2026 in Seoul, specifically to define a legal transfer mechanism.

The context: 14,000 North Koreans in Putin's war

A massive deployment and its human consequences

The deployment of North Korean troops to Russia in support of Putin's war against Ukraine is one of the most extraordinary facts of this conflict. Kim Jong-un sent soldiers to die in European trenches in exchange for Russian military technology — ballistic missiles, satellites, submarine capabilities. The exchange is documented. The casualties are documented. The two survivors captured in Kursk are documented. These are not intelligence rumors — they are confirmed realities, corroborated by multiple independent sources including Ukrainian military intelligence and Western security services.

What is less documented is what these soldiers were told. What they were promised. What they knew about where they were going and why. The two captured soldiers, interviewed after their capture in January 2025, provided testimony that Ukrainian authorities described as significant. Russia pushed twice to have them returned — an insistence that is unique among all foreign fighters captured in this conflict. That insistence alone says something: these men know things that someone does not want them to say publicly.

Seoul's decision: an unprecedented policy

The non-refoulement principle and its implications

The non-refoulement principle — one of the foundational pillars of international refugee law — prohibits returning a person to a country where they risk persecution, torture, or death. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk stated on May 13, 2026 that this principle applies to North Korean prisoners of war captured in Ukraine. Sending them back to North Korea — where having been captured rather than dying would be treated as treason — would expose them to execution or forced labor. The principle is clear. The legal framework exists.

Seoul's June 23 announcement goes one step further: not only will South Korea refuse to accept forced repatriation, it actively declares itself ready to welcome these men. Ukraine ambassador to Seoul Dmytro Ponomarenko had stated in February 2025 that Ukraine was open to dialogue on a possible third-country transfer if the soldiers expressed that wish. The framework exists. The will exists. What is missing is the precise mechanism — which the June 30 talks were intended to define.

What Ukraine must navigate

The complexity of international humanitarian law

The situation places Ukraine before a genuine legal challenge. Under the Geneva Conventions, prisoners of war must be treated with dignity and repatriated at the end of hostilities. But the North Korean soldiers' case is unique: their government ordered them to die rather than surrender. Their country does not acknowledge the conflict. They have no consular protection. Repatriation to North Korea or even to Russia — at Kim's request — is not repatriation within the spirit of the Conventions. It is delivery to certain punishment.

Ukraine respects humanitarian law precisely because Russia does not. This distinction is not rhetorical — it is strategic. Every Ukrainian decision that demonstrates respect for international norms strengthens Ukraine's diplomatic position, its access to Western support, and the moral argument it makes to the world. Taking time to protect the rights of soldiers sent to destroy it is not weakness. It is a definition of civilization in action, documented for the historical record.

What Pyongyang fears

Living witnesses who could speak

Pyongyang's order to commit suicide rather than be captured was not born of military doctrine. It was born of fear. Fear of living witnesses who could testify — about the conditions of deployment, about what these soldiers were told, about the reality of the Kim-Putin alliance seen from the perspective of those who paid for it with their bodies. A soldier who speaks is a weapon that Pyongyang cannot control.

Russia has been largely silent on other foreign fighters captured in this conflict. It has not insisted on their return. The singular insistence on the two North Korean soldiers — twice demanding their return — was made at Kim's request, according to sources cited by Ukrainian Pravda. The goal is clear: prevent testimony that could damage the strategic partnership that both regimes need. A prisoner who stays silent — by death, by repatriation, by isolation — is a prisoner who cannot testify against the system.

The historical precedent: North Korean defectors

A reception system that already exists

South Korea already receives thousands of North Korean defectors each year — most through China and neighboring countries. The Hanawon program provides linguistic integration, psychological support, vocational training, and social reintegration for new arrivals. The framework is not theoretical — it has been tested, refined, and expanded over decades. What the June 23 decision does is extend this framework to a new category: prisoners of war captured in a third country.

This extension fundamentally changes the calculation for North Korean soldiers still on the front. Until now, the choice was: fight and die, or be captured and face either repatriation to a regime that will execute you or indefinite legal limbo. Now there is a third option: capture as a path to a new life. This option cannot be broadcast to soldiers currently in Russian trenches. But the mere fact that it exists — that Seoul has stated it publicly — means it will reach some of those soldiers through the channels that information always finds, however restricted.

The geopolitical dimension: Kim-Putin versus the international community

A strategic partnership laid bare

The deployment of North Korean troops to Russia violates UN Security Council resolutions prohibiting military cooperation with North Korea. It constitutes direct third-party interference in the conflict. Russia, as a permanent member of the Security Council, blocks any resolution that could sanction Pyongyang for this cooperation. The result is institutional paralysis — but the paralysis does not erase the documented reality.

South Korea has provided defense equipment to Ukraine since 2024, recognizing that a Russian victory would increase the military technology that Moscow can offer Kim. It is a NATO partner by industrial capacity. By stating it will accept these prisoners, South Korea sends a message that goes beyond humanitarian law: this conflict is global, not only European. The Kim-Putin alliance has a direct cost for the security of the Korean Peninsula, and Seoul intends to document it publicly, one prisoner at a time.

Conclusion: An open letter to decision-makers

The urgency of a clear legal mechanism

To President Zelensky and the ministers meeting in Seoul on June 30: find the mechanism. International humanitarian law is complex, but it was not written to prevent men from choosing their own lives. The legal framework for third-country transfer of prisoners of war exists — it requires political will and a bilateral agreement that respects both Ukrainian law and South Korean constitutional provisions. The talks on June 30 are the right moment to formalize what has already been stated publicly by both sides.

What this decision says to history

History will remember nations that chose dignity over convenience. South Korea's decision to open its doors, without conditions, without pressure, without political calculation against human lives — this is a decision that deserves to be recorded. And to the international community watching this situation: support the mechanism. Do not allow diplomatic complexity to become an obstacle to a humanitarian outcome that international law already authorizes and human dignity demands.

When law becomes a weapon for peace

International law in service of individuals

Kim and Putin vs. Ukraine and South Korea: the contrast could not be starker. On one side, a system that sends its own citizens to die in foreign trenches and orders them to kill themselves rather than speak. On the other, two democracies working to find a legal framework so that those same citizens can exercise a right that their regime denies them: the right to choose. The question that this contrast poses to the international community is simple. What can you offer these men that we cannot give them?

A signal for all soldiers still at the front

To all North Korean soldiers still in Ukrainian trenches or on the plains of Kursk: an alternative exists. It is difficult to reach. It requires courage and a series of circumstances out of your control. But the mere fact that an alternative exists — that a country has stated publicly and legally that it will welcome you — is in itself a revolutionary fact. In one of the most hermetically sealed regimes on earth, every crack in the wall of inevitability matters.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Editorial positioning

This open letter is written from the perspective of a columnist who supports Ukraine's right to defend itself and who considers South Korea's decision to accept North Korean prisoners of war to be both legally grounded and morally necessary. The columnist does not have access to classified information or direct contact with the individuals involved. All facts cited are based on publicly available sources.

Limits of available information

The precise identity and current status of the two North Korean soldiers captured in January 2025 in Kursk are not publicly disclosed for their protection. The legal mechanism for a potential transfer to South Korea was not finalized at the time of writing — the June 30 talks were the next step. This letter reflects the state of publicly known information as of June 23-24, 2026.

Sources

Primary sources

Reuters via US News — South Korea to Accept All North Korean POWs in Ukraine if They Desire, Ministry Says — June 23, 2026

Kyiv Independent — South Korea Says It Will Accept North Korean POWs Captured in Ukraine — June 23, 2026

Ukrainska Pravda — Ukraine and South Korea to Hold Talks on North Korean POW Transfer — June 23, 2026

Secondary sources

United24 Media — South Korea Says It Will Accept All North Korean POWs Captured by Ukraine — June 23, 2026

Ukrainska Pravda — Russia Has Twice Asked Kyiv to Hand Over North Korean POWs — May 4, 2026

Ukrainska Pravda — Over 7,000 North Korean Troops Killed or Wounded in Russia's War — April 29, 2026