DECODING: KOSTIANTYNIVKA — PUTIN LIES, MADYAR RESPONDS WITH NUMBERS

Introduction: the theater of the false siege

On June 23, 2026, Putin claims an "imminent capture"

On June 23, 2026, before the cameras, Vladimir Putin declared that Russian forces are advancing on all front lines and are "practically reaching" Kostiantynivka. He rejected statements from Ukrainian officials characterizing the city as a "contested gray zone," while admitting in the same breath that Ukrainian forces hold positions in buildings and counter-attack. This internal contradiction — "we are on the verge of taking it" and "they are still counter-attacking in buildings" — encapsulates on its own the absurdity of Russian propaganda about Kostiantynivka. The Russian president cannot claim an imminent victory while simultaneously describing active resistance without contradicting himself.

The most precise response to these claims did not come from a press release, nor from an official spokesperson, nor from a Washington think tank. It came from the field, the same day. Yuriy Madyar, deputy commander of the Ukrainian 19th Army Corps, provided on June 23, 2026 precise operational data that refutes the Russian narrative point by point. His testimony is the direct response of someone fighting in that city — not someone commenting from a palace in Moscow.

What the ISW documented about the real situation

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) confirmed in its June 23, 2026 assessment that the Ukrainian tactical situation at Kostiantynivka is deteriorating — but that the Russian Ministry of Defense and Putin are falsely presenting the capture of Kostiantynivka as imminent. This is not nuance — it is a sharp contradiction between data and narrative. The ISW also documented that Russian forces at Kostiantynivka are using infiltration tactics that do not constitute actual control of terrain in the doctrinal sense, and that will not enable a rapid operational breakthrough against Ukraine's eastern fortress belt as a whole.

Russian forces are infiltrating positions inside the city — but infiltrating does not mean controlling. A Russian milblogger himself acknowledged that Russian forces are struggling to resupply their positions near northern Kostiantynivka and are relying on drone drops. That is not the logistics of an army on the verge of taking a city — it is the logistics of an army struggling to feed its soldiers already in place.

Madyar's numbers: a casualty ratio that says everything

53 against 3 — the price Moscow pays per day

Yuriy Madyar, deputy commander of the Ukrainian 19th Army Corps, reported on June 23, 2026 a striking operational figure: Russian forces are suffering approximately 53 casualties per day in the Kostiantynivka direction, against approximately three on the Ukrainian side. This ratio of 17.6 Russian casualties for every Ukrainian casualty on that axis is not the profile of a successful offensive. It is the profile of an army paying an exorbitant price for marginal gains. It should be noted that casualties include killed, wounded, and captured — the operational term covers all those categories.

Madyar also specified that Russian forces must march 20 to 30 kilometers to approach Kostiantynivka, because Ukraine is striking the surrounding areas heavily. This logistical detail is crucial: if reinforcements and supplies must cover that distance under the constant threat of Ukrainian strikes, every kilogram of ammunition, food, and equipment becomes a precious and vulnerable resource. Logistics, in modern warfare, is survival. And Russian logistics around Kostiantynivka are under constant pressure.

Ukrainian forces advance to the south

Madyar also reported on June 23, 2026 that Ukrainian forces had cleared areas to the south of Kostiantynivka with a "minimum" number of Russian soldiers remaining in the area — and that operations are underway to push Russian forces back from the center and west of the city. That is not the description of a defensive army on the verge of collapse. It is the description of a coordinated local counter-offensive. The ISW independently confirmed that Ukrainian forces had regained some positions at Kostiantynivka — information that the Russian "imminent capture" narrative ignores entirely.

Madyar also directly refuted the Russian claim that Ukrainian forces are encircled in the city: "There are far more Ukrainian soldiers in Kostiantynivka than Russian ones." This is not a rhetorical statement — it is an operational assessment from the ground commander. Russian forces have not encircled the city. They have infiltrated certain sectors. These are two fundamentally different military realities.

The Russian cognitive war around Kostiantynivka

AI-generated videos to fabricate victory

The ISW documented in its June 23, 2026 assessment something particularly revealing: Russian cognitive warfare efforts around Kostiantynivka include the promotion of artificial intelligence-generated videos claiming to show Russian successes on the ground. This is a revelation about the state of the Russian information campaign: when there are no real victories to show, they are fabricated. The stated purpose of this informational saturation is to push the West and Ukraine to capitulate to Russian demands out of fear of a Ukrainian collapse that is not occurring.

This strategy has a name in Russian military doctrine: demoralization information warfare. It aims to create a perception of defeat before the defeat is real. If Western partners believe Kostiantynivka is on the verge of falling, they might pressure Kyiv to accept a ceasefire on Russian terms. If Ukrainian public opinion believes the front is collapsing, political resistance to a capitulation agreement weakens. The doctored video is not a detail — it is a tool of foreign policy.

The Russian Ministry of Defense as a propaganda machine

The ISW also noted that the Russian Ministry of Defense continues to publish hyper-tactical details about alleged gains at Kostiantynivka to "amplify Russian progress." Publishing micro-tactical details without real operational context is a classic military propaganda technique: it creates the impression of steady progression by drowning the observer in details that prevent a comprehensive strategic assessment. Taken in isolation, each statement seems valid. Placed in the overall picture — a loss ratio of 17.6 to 1, Ukrainian counter-offensives to the south, reliance on drone resupply — it reveals its deceptive character.

RBC-Ukraine had already documented in June 2026 that Russia was potentially using videos created with artificial intelligence to spread false claims about its successes near Kostiantynivka. Independent experts estimated at the time that Russian forces infiltrated into the city numbered between 93 and 153 saboteurs — well below the 250 to 300 soldiers put forward by Russian estimates. The tendency to exaggerate is not isolated — it is systemic.

Kostiantynivka's history — a city resisting since October 2025

Russian forces in the city for eight months — without controlling it

Russian forces first entered Kostiantynivka in October 2025. Since then, according to ISW, they have maintained a presence in at least 12.69% of the city. Eight months after their first infiltration, they control less than 13% of a city they claim to be on the verge of taking. In March 2026, the Russian military command had set a deadline: seize Kostiantynivka before May 2026. May 2026 passed. The city holds.

Since then, the Russians have reinforced to 80% the units attacking Kostiantynivka. They have intensified their offensive operations. And yet, according to data available on June 23, 2026, progress remains marginal against a Ukrainian resistance that is actively counter-attacking. The ISW maintained its analytical position: Russian forces will likely make tactical gains at Kostiantynivka over summer 2026, but a rapid operational breakthrough against the fortress belt as a whole remains unlikely.

What the fortress belt represents strategically

The fortress belt — that arc of fortified cities in eastern Ukraine, including Kostiantynivka, Sloviansk, and Kramatorsk — represents a Ukrainian defensive depth built over years. Even if Russia were to take Kostiantynivka tomorrow — which is not imminent — it would face the next city, with its own stretched logistics, accumulated casualties, and a Ukrainian resistance that has had time to reposition. The belt is not taken at a single point — it is bypassed or methodically broken, at a human and logistical cost that the Russian army of 2026 is struggling to sustain.

In May 2026, according to ISW, Russia had processed only 7% of Kostiantynivka in terms of infiltrated presence. Even including June advances, we are far from a city under control. What Putin calls "practically reaching" Kostiantynivka is in reality an army struggling to cross the final third of a city it has never truly dominated in eight months.

The Russian infiltration strategy and its doctrinal limits

Infiltration is not control

The ISW insisted in several June 2026 assessments on a crucial distinction: the infiltration of Russian forces into Kostiantynivka does not constitute control of terrain in the doctrinal sense. Infiltrating small groups into buildings, occupying certain blocks, holding positions in apartments — this creates footholds but not a consolidated front line. And without consolidation, these infiltrations do not enable a broad operational breakthrough. They cost soldiers, consume resources, and create friction zones without producing the critical mass necessary for a genuine city capture.

Reports indicate that Russian forces are struggling to resupply positions near northern Kostiantynivka and are relying on drone deliveries. A soldier resupplied by drone inside a building in central Kostiantynivka is not a soldier controlling the city — he is a soldier surviving in a hostile zone. This situation is precarious, costly, and cannot be sustained indefinitely at scale.

Reports of Ukrainian counter-offensives to the south

According to ISW, reports indicating that Ukrainian forces are clearing Russian positions on the southern flank of Kostiantynivka suggest that Russian forces are unable to consolidate their positions after infiltration and will require more personnel to convert these infiltrations into usable front lines. This need for additional personnel is itself limited by the logistical constraints already documented — the 20 to 30 kilometers that reinforcements must cross under Ukrainian strikes.

A Russian milblogger cited by ISW confirmed the resupply difficulties in the north of the city. The fact that an informal pro-Moscow analyst echoes the logistical difficulties documented by ISW is a strong signal: even observers favorable to Moscow cannot ignore operational realities. This is not a victory taking shape at Kostiantynivka — it is a painful war of attrition that Russia is losing on the human ratio.

Why Moscow is making Kostiantynivka its priority

A political symbol more than a military one

Kostiantynivka has become the main priority of Russia's spring-summer 2026 offensive after attempts at Sloviansk — to which Moscow had committed mechanized tank brigades at the start of the offensive — failed. Russian forces did not have the combat capacity required for a concentrated push northward. They therefore redirected their resources toward Kostiantynivka, a city they had been claiming to be "almost taking" for months.

The symbolic value is clear: Kostiantynivka is presented by Russian propaganda as a key to the fortress belt and ultimately to the entire Donetsk oblast. If Moscow can show a victory at Kostiantynivka before any eventual return to the negotiating table, it strengthens its position in talks. This is the direct link between battlefield war and diplomatic war: every Russian gain, real or fabricated, is used as leverage to extract concessions.

The spring-summer 2026 offensive — a disappointing tally for Moscow

Russia's spring-summer 2026 offensive did not unfold as planned. In April and May 2026, Ukrainian forces liberated more territory than the Russians seized. Russia's 2026 advances represent approximately 7.87% of what they were during the same period in 2025. This spectacular deceleration is visible in ISW data and incompatible with the Russian narrative of a victorious offensive advancing irresistibly.

The Russian chief of staff, according to an ISW report from February 2026, had claimed that Russian forces had captured approximately 900 square kilometers and 42 localities since the beginning of 2026. The ISW calculated that the real confirmed figures were 572 square kilometers and 19 localities — significantly less than what the Russian command was advancing to its own hierarchy. This distortion between official figures and verifiable figures is not accidental — it is the sign of a military system where reports reach Putin filtered by officers afraid to deliver bad news.

The role of the Ukrainian strike campaign in the Kostiantynivka context

Ukrainian strikes degrade Russian logistics

What is happening at Kostiantynivka cannot be understood without the context of Ukraine's intermediate-range strike campaign. According to ISW, this campaign is increasingly inhibiting Russian logistics across occupied territories, and the effects are beginning to manifest on the front line. In the Lyman direction, Russian forces face fuel supply problems directly caused by Ukrainian drone strikes. These logistical constraints are not isolated — they are part of a broader picture of degradation of Russian operational capability.

In the Pokrovsk direction, Ukrainian strikes prevented Russian forces from accumulating personnel and weapons in May 2026, according to a statement by the Ukrainian 7th Rapid Response Corps. That same Corps declared having destroyed more than 105 Russian artillery systems in May 2026 — twice as many as in April. These figures illustrate how much the Ukrainian strike campaign acts as a defensive force multiplier, reducing Russian offensive capacity before soldiers even make direct contact.

Russian ground lines of communication under pressure

Ukraine's campaign against Russian ground lines of communication in occupied Crimea and southern Ukraine also illustrates Moscow's logistical difficulties. On June 21, 2026, elements of Ukrainian Special Forces, the GUR, and the Unmanned Systems Forces launched coordinated strikes against Russian maritime logistics, oil infrastructure, and air defense systems in Crimea and Krasnodar Krai. Russia temporarily suspended ferry service through the Kerch Strait and advised cargo traffic to reroute through Mariupol, Melitopol, and Simferopol.

These logistical diversions lengthen Russian supply routes and increase their cost in fuel, time, and exposure to Ukrainian strikes. Every Russian unit at the front — including those at Kostiantynivka — ultimately depends on these logistical lines. Disrupting them means weakening the offensive at depth, without direct fire on front-line positions.

What Russian milbloggers reveal despite themselves

Distress signals in the Russian informational space

One of the most reliable indicators of the real state of Russian forces is found, paradoxically, in the space of Russian milbloggers — those semi-official commentators who operate on the margins of the Kremlin's information control system. A Russian milblogger cited by ISW in the June 23, 2026 assessment acknowledged that Russian forces are struggling to resupply their positions near northern Kostiantynivka and are relying on drone drops. This admission comes from someone whose usual interest is to present Russian forces in their best light.

These involuntary signals in the Russian informational space — complaints about ammunition, laments about losses, criticism of command — constitute a complementary source of information to Western assessments. They indicate a level of dissatisfaction and operational difficulties that official Russian communications cannot entirely mask. The Russian army at Kostiantynivka is under pressure — not on the verge of victory.

The failure to encircle the city

One of the most grandiose claims in Russian narratives around Kostiantynivka was that Ukrainian forces there would be encircled. Madyar directly denied this on June 23, 2026: there is no encirclement. There are far more Ukrainian soldiers in the city than Russian soldiers. Russian forces do not control the access roads. They have not cut Ukrainian supply lines. Ukrainian counter-attacks to the south of the city confirm that Ukrainian forces maintain their operational mobility inside and around the combat zone.

Encirclement is the classic technique of Soviet-era warfare — the kessels, the pockets, the destruction of encircled forces. It is in that military DNA. At Kostiantynivka, that technique is not being applied, not because the Russians did not attempt it, but because they did not have the necessary military mass. This is not a tactical choice — it is a capacity constraint.

The hybrid war dimension — information and terrain

The link between disinformation and negotiation

Understanding why Russia fabricates victories at Kostiantynivka requires looking beyond the battlefield. The objective declared by ISW is to push the West and Ukraine to capitulate to Russian demands out of fear of an imminent collapse. This direct link between tactical disinformation and diplomatic outcome is at the heart of the Kremlin's strategy. If Western capitals believe Kostiantynivka is on the verge of falling, pressure on Kyiv to accept a ceasefire on Russian terms increases. The AI victory fiction video is not entertainment — it is an instrument of foreign policy.

This strategy is not new. Russia used similar techniques during the 2008 conflict in Georgia, during the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and throughout the war since 2022. What is new in 2026 is the use of generative artificial intelligence to produce visual evidence that cameras on the ground do not provide. It is a technological escalation in the information war that the West must learn to identify and counter.

The importance of ISW as a factual counter-narrative

In this context of organized disinformation, the role of institutions like the ISW is critical. By systematically documenting advances and retreats with geolocated imagery, by distinguishing what is confirmed from what is alleged, by explicitly naming the contradictions between official Russian statements and verifiable realities, the ISW maintains a space of truth in an environment saturated with propaganda noise. Its conclusion of June 23, 2026 on Kostiantynivka is direct: the situation is deteriorating tactically for Ukraine, but claims of imminent capture are false. That word — false — is stated without hesitation.

This is the clarity that is too often missing in diplomatic communiqués and media commentary that, in the name of balance, present both positions as equivalent. They are not. One is supported by geolocated data, verifiable casualty figures, and testimony from ground commanders. The other is a fabrication in the literal sense — including fabrications generated by artificial intelligence.

What the Kostiantynivka case teaches about the Russian army of 2026

An army that advances but bleeds

The Russian army in 2026 is an institution transformed by four years of war, and not always in the right direction for Moscow. It has accumulated real combat experience. It has adapted its tactics — the small-group infiltration at Kostiantynivka is one example. But it has also consumed human resources at a rate that even a population of 144 million is beginning to feel. Forced recruitment campaigns, high enlistment bonuses, shortened rotations — all of this signals an army struggling to maintain its force volume.

The ratio of 53 Russian casualties against 3 Ukrainian at Kostiantynivka is not an anomaly. It is consistent with broader estimates available on the conflict. In 2025, according to ISW, Russian forces were advancing while losing on average 83 soldiers per square kilometer gained. That horrifying figure says everything: Russia pays for terrain with blood in industrial quantities. It can sustain this pace if recruitment holds and if popular support for the war remains sufficient. Both conditions are increasingly fragile.

The question of Russian strategic reserves

In February 2026, the ISW documented that the Russian military command was planning to deploy its strategic reserves — presumably limited — for the spring-summer 2026 offensive. ISW's assessment at the time was that Russia likely did not have sufficient reserves to both prepare the offensive and achieve its objectives. The offensive results confirm this analysis: marginal gains at Kostiantynivka, failures on the Sloviansk axis, an advance rate of 7.87% compared to 2025. The reserves were consumed. The next offensive will be planned with even less.

And that is precisely this context — a Russian army whose advance pace is declining, whose reserves are dwindling, whose casualties at Kostiantynivka reach 53 per day — that Putin ignores in his public statements. His communiqués about "battlefield realities" are constructed for external audiences, not to reflect internal realities. And those internal realities will tell, in the coming months, what the Russian army can actually accomplish.

The Ukrainian response — active operations, not passive defense

Kostiantynivka is not just a defensive position

A common misunderstanding in coverage of Kostiantynivka is presenting Ukraine solely in a defensive position — holding the line against a Russian offensive. Madyar corrected this framing on June 23, 2026: Ukrainian forces are launching operations to push back Russian soldiers from the center and west of Kostiantynivka. This is not passive defense — it is offensive counter-action in a city where combat is fought over every building, every street, every elevated position.

This active operational posture is consistent with Ukraine's overall strategy: not simply absorbing blows, but inflicting costs high enough to render the Russian offensive unsustainable. At 53 Russian casualties against 3 Ukrainian, the war of attrition inside Kostiantynivka weighs on the Kremlin, not on Kyiv. That is not what the Russian public hears from state media — but it is what the operational data indicate.

Morale as a strategic factor

There is a factor that numbers do not fully capture: morale. An army fighting on its own territory, for its national survival, with the active support of its population and international allies, holds a resource that casualty tables do not measure. Ukraine in 2026 is a mobilized nation — not by compulsion alone, but by a deep understanding of what is at stake. What Putin triggered in 2022 was the consolidation of a distinct and irreducible Ukrainian identity. He sought to destroy a nation. He forged one instead.

This psychological and political reality partly explains why Russian demoralization tactics — propaganda, strikes on cities far from the front, false narratives of imminent capitulation — have not produced their intended effect. After four years of total war, Ukrainian society has integrated resistance into its daily functioning. It is no longer an extreme emergency — it is a permanent condition that Ukrainians have learned to manage while continuing to live, work, and rebuild.

The fortress belt — the systemic challenge for Russia

After Kostiantynivka, still more cities

Even assuming Russia eventually manages to take Kostiantynivka — which current data makes unlikely in the short term — it would immediately face the next cities of the fortress belt: Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk, Sloviansk. Each of these cities is fortified. Each requires a separate offensive, with its own logistical and human costs. The fortress belt is not a line — it is a depth. And an army whose advance rate is 7.87% in 2026 compared to 2025 does not have the momentum to cross that depth.

This is one of the reasons the ISW consistently maintains its distinction between likely tactical gains and unlikely rapid operational breakthrough. The two can coexist: Russia can make local gains at Kostiantynivka while being incapable of a strategic advance toward Kramatorsk or beyond. Putin fuses these two levels in his public statements — presenting micro-tactical gains as the announcement of a strategic victory. ISW carefully separates them. This distinction is crucial to understanding the reality of the conflict.

Ukraine's deep strike campaign changes the calculus

Ukraine's deep strike campaign against Russian refineries and infrastructure — which in June 2026 succeeded in striking Moscow's Kapotnya refinery twice, the Tyumen refinery 2,000 kilometers from the Ukrainian border, and gas processing facilities in Siberia — fundamentally changes Russia's strategic calculus. Every damaged refinery reduces Moscow's capacity to fuel its war economy. Every fuel depot struck complicates supply to front-line forces. Ukraine's deep strike campaign is the strategic correlate of the tactical battles at Kostiantynivka.

Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak publicly acknowledged during the St. Petersburg Economic Forum that Russian oil production had declined since the beginning of the year, attributing the drop to "unplanned maintenance work" — the official euphemism for damage caused by Ukrainian strikes. Russian oil production in spring 2026 was 15% lower than the previous year despite high prices. This economic pressure is an additional dimension that Putin's statements about "battlefield realities" carefully omit.

The transparency Russia refuses

No independent verifiable data

One of the most telling signs of the real situation on the ground is what Russia refuses to show. No independent international organization has access to Russian combat zones. No independent foreign journalist can cover Russian front lines freely. Russian casualty figures are never officially published — families receiving coffins sign confidentiality agreements. This systemic opacity is not military discretion — it is proof there is something to hide.

Ukraine, conversely, has its own military communication problems — but Madyar's figures, published publicly on June 23, 2026, can be cross-referenced with other sources, geolocated imagery, and testimonies. The ratio of 53 against 3 is operational data attributed to a named commander whose role and position are identifiable. This is not absolute truth — it is a verifiable source. The difference from Russian communication is fundamental.

When Russian state media contradicts its own narrative

Researchers like those at the ISW have documented that the Russian Ministry of Defense publishes hyper-tactical details about Kostiantynivka — building names, intersections taken, meters advanced — precisely because at the operational level, there is nothing substantial to announce. This inflation of micro-detail is a signature of military propaganda: when you have no great victory, you invent one from an accumulation of small noise. The public following the Russian Ministry of Defense's Telegram account for months observes this repeated pattern: every day, an announced progression. And yet the city still holds.

The absence of a major victory at Kostiantynivka eight months after the first infiltrations is, in itself, a demonstration of Ukrainian resistance. And Putin, by saying on June 23, 2026 that the capture is "imminent," implicitly acknowledges that it has not yet occurred — after eight months and tens of thousands of Russian casualties on that axis.

Conclusion: Madyar's numbers against Putin's words

A decoding that leaves no room for doubt

The contrast is sharp and documented: Putin claims an imminent capture of Kostiantynivka. Madyar reports 53 Russian casualties per day against 3 Ukrainian, a Ukrainian counter-offensive to the south of the city, and Russian reinforcements that must march 20 to 30 kilometers under strikes to approach their own positions. ISW confirms that claims of imminent capture are false. A Russian milblogger himself admits resupply difficulties. Russian forces have occupied less than 13% of the city after eight months of combat.

This is not a Russian victory in progress. It is a costly war of attrition in which Russia bleeds at an unsustainable rate on this axis, uses propaganda and AI-generated content to mask its failures, and hopes that international diplomatic pressure produces the capitulation that its soldiers cannot obtain on the ground. Kostiantynivka holds. Decoding what is really happening in this city is an informational act of resistance as much as a strategic analysis.

Conclusion: truth as a weapon

Naming the false for what it is

The information war around Kostiantynivka is not a secondary theater — it is a central dimension of the conflict. If Russian disinformation succeeds in convincing the West that the Ukrainian front is collapsing, it produces real political effects: pressure on Kyiv, reduced Western support, reinforcement of the Russian position in negotiations. The response to this information war is the analytical clarity that ISW, Madyar, and others provided on June 23, 2026.

Madyar's figures — 53 against 3, 20 to 30 kilometers of marching under strikes, active Ukrainian counter-offensives to the south — are the most effective refutation of Putin's claims of an imminent capture. They do not come from a Western think tank. They come from a field commander. And they say, with the dry precision that war imposes, that Kostiantynivka is not falling — it is being defended, actively, at the cost of real sacrifices, against an army bleeding at a rate that its own military bloggers are beginning to document.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

Editorial positioning

This decoding is written from an assumed pro-Ukraine posture, which considers Ukrainian resistance at Kostiantynivka and across the front as legitimate and strategically justified. This posture does not compromise factual rigor — every figure, every attributed claim, every cited assessment comes from verifiable sources. The editorial posture influences the framing and value judgments, not the raw data.

Methodology and sources

This decoding relies primarily on the ISW assessment of June 23, 2026, which constitutes the primary source for casualty figures (Madyar), Russian infiltration data, assessments of the tactical situation at Kostiantynivka, and analyses of the Russian cognitive war. Historical data on Russian territorial gains in 2025-2026 comes from previously cited ISW assessments. The percentage of the city controlled by Russia (12.69%) comes from the June 2026 ISW assessment cited by UA.NEWS. Comparative Russian casualty figures per square kilometer gained (83 soldiers/km²) come from ISW 2025. No figure has been invented or extrapolated without an identifiable source.

Nature of the analysis

This text is a columnist's decoding that interprets available operational data to refute a specific propaganda narrative — Russian claims of an imminent capture of Kostiantynivka. The exercise assumes a critical posture toward official Russian communications, justified by the documented contradictions between those communications and available independent data. The posture is neither neutral nor pretendedly neutral — it is transparent.

Sources

Primary sources

ISW — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 23, 2026 (Madyar data, Russian infiltrations, cognitive warfare)

RBC-Ukraine — Russia fabricates Kostiantynivka capture with AI content — June 16, 2026

UA.NEWS — Russia failed to take Kostiantynivka before May — ISW — June 11, 2026

Secondary sources

RBC-Ukraine — Russia's "big wins" at the front are fake, ISW reveals real figures — February 21, 2026

ISW — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 21, 2026

ISW / Critical Threats — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 1, 2026