DECODING: Kostyantynivka — How Moscow Manufactures Victories With AI and Lies

Introduction: The Ghost City Putin "Captures" Every Week

The declarations and the reality

On June 23, 2026, Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed during a public statement that Russian forces are advancing on all fronts and "practically reaching" Kostyantynivka. Hours earlier, the Russian Ministry of Defense (Russian MoD) had published its now-standard series of "hyper-tactical details" about alleged Russian gains inside the city. And that same evening, Russian-language Telegram channels were circulating videos showing Russian soldiers hoisting flags in various areas of Kostyantynivka — videos that the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) assessed as "probably AI-generated or AI-altered."

The reality documented by the ISW over the same period is radically different. The deputy commander of the Ukrainian 19th Army Corps, Yuriy Madyar, stated on June 23 that Ukrainian forces had cleared zones south of Kostyantynivka with a "minimum" number of Russian fighters remaining in the area. He specified that Ukrainian forces are conducting operations to push Russian troops out of the city's center and west. According to Madyar, Russian forces in the sector sustain approximately 53 casualties per day versus only 3 per day for Ukraine. And crucially: Russian forces have not encircled Kostyantynivka — an allegation Madyar explicitly denied, clarifying that there are far more Ukrainian soldiers inside the city than Russian ones.

The ISW and its counter-narrative role

The ISW, a Washington-based think tank that publishes daily assessments of the Russian offensive campaign based on geolocated open-source data, has become one of the most reliable analytical voices for countering Russian propaganda. Its June 23 assessment is explicit: "The Ukrainian tactical situation at Kostyantynivka is deteriorating, but the Russian MoD and Putin are falsely presenting the capture of Kostyantynivka as imminent." Russian infiltrations into the city are documented — but they "do not constitute terrain control in the doctrinal military sense" and will not allow Russian forces to achieve "a rapid operational breakthrough."

The Mechanics of Russian Propaganda Around Kostyantynivka

The repeated pattern: infiltration, video, proclamation

Analysis of several weeks of Russian communication around Kostyantynivka reveals a very consistent pattern. Step one: Russian infiltrators — groups of 1 to 2 soldiers according to the description of the ISW's lead Russia analyst Kateryna Stepanenko — penetrate into areas of the city. Step two: videos are published showing these soldiers at positions inside the city, often with flags. Step three: the Russian MoD issues press releases declaring "advances" in specific neighborhoods, accompanied by interviews with fighters "in the field." Step four: Kremlin-aligned media and milbloggers amplify these declarations on Telegram and X. Step five: the information circulates in international media, with some outlets reproducing Russian figures without sufficient scrutiny.

What the ISW, Ukrainian Censor.Net, and other analysts have systematically demonstrated is that these infiltrations do not constitute territorial control in the military sense. Soldiers entering an abandoned building in a city do not control the city. But in media representation, the nuance between "Russian soldiers are in Kostyantynivka" and "Russia controls Kostyantynivka" is easy to lose — and Moscow deliberately exploits this confusion.

AI as a weapon in service of the lie

The most alarming element of the Russian campaign around Kostyantynivka is the confirmed use of videos probably generated or altered by artificial intelligence. The Russian MoD published footage showing Russian soldiers hoisting flags in the city of Lyman — videos that the ISW says it could not geolocate and has "reason to believe [are] possibly AI-altered." Similar footage circulated for Kostyantynivka. AI video generators can produce convincing images in minutes — and even if they are debunked quickly, their impact on prediction markets (Polymarket saw the probability of Kostyantynivka's capture spike by 20 points upon such a publication) and on international media coverage is real and immediate.

What the Numbers Actually Say About Kostyantynivka

The available ground data

The available assessments of the actual situation at Kostyantynivka as of June 26, 2026 present a nuanced but distinct picture from the tableau painted by Moscow. Russian forces have genuinely infiltrated the city — the ISW, which had repeatedly resisted confirming Russian gains for lack of geolocated data, has progressively expanded its assessment area in favor of Russian positions over the weeks. Fighting in the southern and eastern parts of the city is documented. Ukrainian soldiers interviewed by BBC confirmed that the situation is "serious" — but not nearly as catastrophic as Russian sources claim.

Ukrainian Brigadier General Oleksandr Bakulin, commander of the 19th Army Corps, declared on June 15 that approximately 123 to 130 Russian soldiers are present inside Kostyantynivka — a figure that "varies by 20 to 30" according to him. "To say the enemy controls a part of Kostyantynivka would be premature and an exaggeration," he stated. According to Madyar, Russian forces in the Kostyantynivka sector must travel 20 to 30 kilometers to approach the city, while Ukrainian forces strike the surrounding areas heavily. Russian milbloggers themselves note that Russian forces struggle to resupply their positions north of Kostyantynivka and depend on drone deliveries.

Failure to meet self-proclaimed timelines

A telling detail that Russian propaganda media have carefully buried: according to Polymarket data, Russia had set itself a target of capturing Kostyantynivka by May 2026. It missed that deadline spectacularly, causing the probability of capture by end of June to plummet to very low levels. The rate of advance documented by analysts is less than 100 meters per day — described by Ukrainian soldiers as "extremely slow progression due to Ukrainian drone strikes." This pace falls far short of the imminent breakthrough Putin describes in his speeches.

The Strategic Objective of Russian Disinformation

Creating pressure on Ukraine's Western partners

The Russian cognitive campaign around Kostyantynivka is not built to convince Ukrainians — it is primarily an influence operation targeting Kyiv's Western partners. By presenting the Ukrainian front as being on the verge of collapse, Moscow seeks to fuel Western political currents that advocate forcing Ukraine to negotiate on terms that Russia dictates: specifically, the "battlefield realities" — an expression Putin explicitly used on June 23. This language means: accept Russian conquests as accomplished facts and obtain a peace in defeat.

The ISW and the Critical Threats Project documented on June 25 that the Russian cognitive campaign has so far failed to convince Ukraine's key partners. US President Trump and Under Secretary of State Jeremy Levin both declared on June 24 and 25 that Ukraine "currently has the advantage on the battlefield" — a statement that directly contradicts the Russian narrative of imminent collapse. Levin also emphasized that Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian oil infrastructure "increase the cost of the war for Russia and force it to divert resources from the front."

Manipulating prediction markets

An unexpected collateral effect of Russian propaganda is its impact on prediction markets. According to Polymarket data, the publication of Russian flag videos at Kostyantynivka — even unverified — caused the probability of the city's capture on the "captured by September" market to spike by 20 points. This manipulation of market sentiment has value for Moscow: it creates pressure on Ukrainian partners attentive to perceptions of "war trajectory." Prediction market investors are not military analysts — they react to flag videos, not geolocation analyses.

Ukraine's Tools for Countering Disinformation

Ukraine's offensive response in the information space

Ukraine is not passively absorbing the Russian information war. Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian infrastructure — refineries, military depots, railway infrastructure in occupied Crimea and occupied oblasts — are deliberately documented and published, creating a counter-narrative of Ukrainian offensive resilience. The ISW counted at least 28 Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian oil infrastructure in June 2026, following 33 in May and 18 in April. This sustained campaign demonstrates that Ukraine is not merely defending Kostyantynivka — it is striking deep behind Russian lines.

The public statements from commanders like Madyar and Bakulin — with precise figures on Russian losses, troop numbers present in the city, and ongoing clearing operations — also constitute a counter-disinformation tool. By making public data that directly contradicts Russian MoD claims, the Ukrainian command asserts factual primacy in a contested information space. This transparency is a deliberate strategic choice — and broadly effective at maintaining Western partners' confidence.

The limits of counter-disinformation

Despite these efforts, Russian propaganda continues to find audiences in less rigorous media spaces. Pro-Russian Telegram channels with millions of subscribers broadcast AI videos within seconds. ISW fact-checks typically arrive several hours after videos first circulate — and in the social media era, the first hours are crucial to opinion formation. Some international outlets reproduce Russian MoD figures as official statements without sufficiently contextualizing their propagandistic nature.

The information war remains a domain where Western investments in verification media and digital literacy are insufficient. Russia dedicates industrial resources to disinformation — teams of translators, AI content generators, professional trolls — while the Western response rests largely on underfunded non-governmental organizations. This resource gap translates into a reach gap that truth alone cannot bridge.

The Strategic Objective of Russian Disinformation

Creating pressure on Ukraine's Western partners

The Russian cognitive campaign around Kostyantynivka is not built to convince Ukrainians — it is primarily an influence operation targeting Kyiv's Western partners. By presenting the Ukrainian front as being on the verge of collapse, Moscow seeks to fuel political currents in the West that advocate forcing Ukraine to negotiate on Russia's terms: the "battlefield realities" — an expression Putin explicitly used on June 23. This language means: accept Russian conquests as accomplished facts and obtain a peace in defeat.

The ISW and the Critical Threats Project documented on June 25 that the Russian cognitive campaign has so far failed to convince Ukraine's key partners. President Trump and Under Secretary of State Jeremy Levin both declared on June 24 and 25 that Ukraine "currently has the advantage on the battlefield" — a direct contradiction of the Russian narrative of imminent collapse. Levin also highlighted that Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian oil infrastructure "increase the cost of the war for Russia."

Manipulating prediction markets

An unexpected collateral effect of Russian propaganda is its impact on prediction markets. According to Polymarket data, the publication of Russian flag videos at Kostyantynivka — even unverified — caused the capture probability on the "captured by September" market to spike by 20 points. This manipulation of market sentiment has value for Moscow: it creates pressure on Ukrainian partners attentive to perceptions of "war trajectory."

Prediction market investors are not military analysts — they react to flag videos, not geolocation analyses. The response of serious analysts is to systematically tie their probabilities to verified geolocated data. The ISW maintains an interactive map updated daily that documents the front line with kilometer-level precision. This map is reality. Prediction markets that do not integrate it produce noisy signals — and Moscow knows perfectly well how to exploit this noise.

Ukraine's Tools for Countering Disinformation

Ukraine's offensive response in the information space

Ukraine is not passively absorbing the Russian information war. Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian infrastructure — refineries, military depots, railway infrastructure in occupied Crimea and occupied oblasts — are deliberately documented and published, creating a counter-narrative of Ukrainian offensive resilience. The ISW counted at least 28 Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian oil infrastructure in June 2026, following 33 in May and 18 in April. This sustained campaign demonstrates that Ukraine is not merely defending Kostyantynivka.

The public statements from commanders like Madyar and Bakulin — with precise figures on Russian losses, troop numbers present in the city, and ongoing clearing operations — also constitute a counter-disinformation tool. By making public data that directly contradicts Russian MoD claims, the Ukrainian command asserts factual primacy in a contested information space. This transparency is a deliberate strategic choice — and broadly effective at maintaining Western partners' confidence.

The limits of counter-disinformation

Despite these efforts, Russian propaganda continues to find audiences in less rigorous media spaces. Pro-Russian Telegram channels with millions of subscribers broadcast AI videos within seconds. ISW fact-checks typically arrive several hours after videos first circulate — and in the social media era, the first hours are crucial to opinion formation.

The information war remains a domain where Western investments in verification media and digital literacy are insufficient. Russia dedicates industrial resources to disinformation — teams of translators, AI content generators, professional trolls — while the Western response rests largely on underfunded non-governmental organizations. This resource gap translates into a reach gap that truth alone cannot bridge.

The Wider Context: Kostyantynivka in Russia's Global Strategy

The city as symbol in the narrative war

Kostyantynivka is not in itself a strategically decisive city — it is not Avdiivka, it is not Bakhmut. What makes it a priority information warfare battleground for Moscow is its symbolic value in the narrative of Russian advance. If Russia can show that its forces are progressing in the Donbas despite Western support for Ukraine — even using AI-generated images — it fuels the narrative that Western support is useless and costly.

Whether Kostyantynivka holds or falls in the coming months will partly determine the credibility of this narrative. If the city holds — with Western support in weapons, intelligence, and training — it will be a demonstration that disinformation does not replace reality on the ground. If the city falls, Moscow will have won symbolically, even though the operational reality remains that Russia advances at 100 meters per day while paying 53 daily casualties in that sector alone.

The long-range strike campaign as counter-narrative

While Moscow manufactures visual victories at Kostyantynivka, Kyiv manufactures real ones deep inside Russia. The 28 long-range strikes against Russian oil infrastructure in June 2026 are not only tactical — they are narrative. Every refinery hit, every fuel depot ablaze, demonstrates that Ukraine has the capacity and will to strike deep into Russian territory. This counter-narrative is difficult to contradict with AI-generated videos.

This is a lesson Ukraine has brilliantly integrated into its communication strategy: images of destruction on Russian territory — documented, geolocated, irrefutable — are the most powerful antidote to Moscow's propaganda. Under Secretary of State Levin explicitly recognized this: these strikes "increase the cost of the war for Russia." For this reality to remain visible, Western allies must continue lifting restrictions on long-range strikes.

Conclusion: Propaganda as a Systemic Weapon of War

What Kostyantynivka reveals about Russian doctrine

The Kostyantynivka affair reveals the sophistication of Russian informational doctrine in 2026: synchronization between the Kremlin, the MoD, milbloggers, and AI tools to saturate the information space with false victory narratives. This doctrine does not aim to convince people that Russia has won — it aims to create enough confusion and doubt to paralyze the political will of Ukraine's Western partners. It is a strategy that has partially worked in the past. The appropriate response is the same that the ISW practices: analytical rigor, systematic geolocation, and a refusal to take official Russian statements at face value.

What the West must do

The international community must invest massively in counter-disinformation, verification media, and digital literacy. Social media platforms must develop AI-generated video detection tools and limit their viral spread before verification. And Western governments must resist the temptation to calibrate their support for Ukraine on battlefield perceptions manufactured by Moscow rather than on factual assessments. Kostyantynivka has not fallen. Ukraine is fighting. And Russian disinformation must not inflict more damage on Ukrainian resistance than Russian missiles themselves.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

My position in this conflict

I am pro-Ukraine, I am convinced that Putin is waging an illegal and criminal war of aggression, and I consider Western support for Ukraine a moral and strategic necessity. I trust the ISW's analysis as the most rigorous open-source analytical source available on this conflict, while knowing that even the best analyses are imperfect and may be revised as new data emerges. My stated bias does not prevent factual rigor — but it does shape my interpretive framework.

What I cannot verify

I have no correspondent on the ground in Kostyantynivka. All data used in this article comes from cross-referenced open sources — ISW, CNN, BBC, Euromaidan Press, Censor.Net — which themselves work from documentary sources, geolocated data, and soldier testimonies. The situation on the ground evolves daily and may have changed significantly between writing and publication. The precise casualty figures (53 Russian versus 3 Ukrainian per day) come from statements by Ukrainian commanders and are not independently verifiable.

Sources

Primary sources

ISW — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 23, 2026 — June 23, 2026

Critical Threats — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 25, 2026 — June 25, 2026

Euromaidan Press — What Ukrainian generals say about Kostiantynivka — June 22, 2026

Secondary sources

KRDO/CNN — Russia inching forward in eastern Ukraine, but claims exaggerated — June 24, 2026

BBC — Russian forces have penetrated Kostyantynivka — June 21, 2026

Euromaidan Press — Russia pushes forward: Kostyantynivka on the verge — June 25, 2026