DECODING: Kostyantynivka — How Moscow Manufactures Victories With AI and Lies

The declarations and the reality

On June 23, 2026, Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed during a public statement that Russian forces are advancing on all fronts and "practically reaching" Kostyantynivka. Hours earlier, the Russian Ministry of Defense (Russian MoD) had published its now-standard series of "hyper-tactical details" about alleged Russian gains inside the city. And that same evening, Russian-language Telegram channels were circulating videos showing Russian soldiers hoisting flags in various areas of Kostyantynivka — videos that the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) assessed as "probably AI-generated or AI-altered."

The reality documented by the ISW over the same period is radically different. The deputy commander of the Ukrainian 19th Army Corps, Yuriy Madyar, stated on June 23 that Ukrainian forces had cleared zones south of Kostyantynivka with a "minimum" number of Russian fighters remaining in the area. He specified that Ukrainian forces are conducting operations to push Russian troops out of the city's center and west. According to Madyar, Russian forces in the sector sustain approximately 53 casualties per day versus only 3 per day for Ukraine. And crucially: Russian forces have not encircled Kostyantynivka — an allegation Madyar explicitly denied, clarifying that there are far more Ukrainian soldiers inside the city than Russian ones.

The ISW and its counter-narrative role

The ISW, a Washington-based think tank that publishes daily assessments of the Russian offensive campaign based on geolocated open-source data, has become one of the most reliable analytical voices for countering Russian propaganda. Its June 23 assessment is explicit: "The Ukrainian tactical situation at Kostyantynivka is deteriorating, but the Russian MoD and Putin are falsely presenting the capture of Kostyantynivka as imminent." Russian infiltrations into the city are documented — but they "do not constitute terrain control in the doctrinal military sense" and will not allow Russian forces to achieve "a rapid operational breakthrough."

This is the heart of the information war that Moscow wages just as intensely as the physical one: creating an alternative reality in the media space, saturating the information landscape with false narratives so that even serious observers begin to doubt. When AI-generated videos circulate for hours before being debunked, the cognitive damage is already done. This is the Gerasimov doctrine applied at industrial scale.

The repeated pattern: infiltration, video, proclamation

Analysis of several weeks of Russian communication around Kostyantynivka reveals a very consistent pattern. Step one: Russian infiltrators — groups of 1 to 2 soldiers according to the description of the ISW's lead Russia analyst Kateryna Stepanenko — penetrate into areas of the city. Step two: videos are published showing these soldiers at positions inside the city, often with flags. Step three: the Russian MoD issues press releases declaring "advances" in specific neighborhoods, accompanied by interviews with fighters "in the field." Step four: Kremlin-aligned media and milbloggers amplify these declarations on Telegram and X. Step five: the information circulates in international media, with some outlets reproducing Russian figures without sufficient scrutiny.

What the ISW, Ukrainian Censor.Net, and other analysts have systematically demonstrated is that these infiltrations do not constitute territorial control in the military sense. Soldiers entering an abandoned building in a city do not control the city. But in media representation, the nuance between "Russian soldiers are in Kostyantynivka" and "Russia controls Kostyantynivka" is easy to lose — and Moscow deliberately exploits this confusion.

AI as a weapon in service of the lie

The most alarming element of the Russian campaign around Kostyantynivka is the confirmed use of videos probably generated or altered by artificial intelligence. The Russian MoD published footage showing Russian soldiers hoisting flags in the city of Lyman — videos that the ISW says it could not geolocate and has "reason to believe [are] possibly AI-altered." Similar footage circulated for Kostyantynivka. AI video generators can produce convincing images in minutes — and even if they are debunked quickly, their impact on prediction markets (Polymarket saw the probability of Kostyantynivka's capture spike by 20 points upon such a publication) and on international media coverage is real and immediate.

We are in territory we have never truly traversed before: a war where the adversary uses not only classical disinformation but AI tools to fabricate visual evidence of nonexistent victories. The challenge is no longer just to verify sources — it is to distinguish the real from the synthetic in real combat time. Ukraine fights with drones. Russia fights with deepfakes too. Both are modern weapons of war.

The available ground data

The available assessments of the actual situation at Kostyantynivka as of June 26, 2026 present a nuanced but distinct picture from the tableau painted by Moscow. Russian forces have genuinely infiltrated the city — the ISW, which had repeatedly resisted confirming Russian gains for lack of geolocated data, has progressively expanded its assessment area in favor of Russian positions over the weeks. Fighting in the southern and eastern parts of the city is documented. Ukrainian soldiers interviewed by BBC confirmed that the situation is "serious" — but not nearly as catastrophic as Russian sources claim.

Ukrainian Brigadier General Oleksandr Bakulin, commander of the 19th Army Corps, declared on June 15 that approximately 123 to 130 Russian soldiers are present inside Kostyantynivka — a figure that "varies by 20 to 30" according to him. "To say the enemy controls a part of Kostyantynivka would be premature and an exaggeration," he stated. According to Madyar, Russian forces in the Kostyantynivka sector must travel 20 to 30 kilometers to approach the city, while Ukrainian forces strike the surrounding areas heavily. Russian milbloggers themselves note that Russian forces struggle to resupply their positions north of Kostyantynivka and depend on drone deliveries.

Failure to meet self-proclaimed timelines

A telling detail that Russian propaganda media have carefully buried: according to Polymarket data, Russia had set itself a target of capturing Kostyantynivka by May 2026. It missed that deadline spectacularly, causing the probability of capture by end of June to plummet to very low levels. The rate of advance documented by analysts is less than 100 meters per day — described by Ukrainian soldiers as "extremely slow progression due to Ukrainian drone strikes." This pace falls far short of the imminent breakthrough Putin describes in his speeches.

If Russia were actually advancing at the speed and with the power that Moscow's propaganda describes, Kostyantynivka would have fallen long ago. The reality of Russian losses — 53 per day in this sector alone according to Madyar — reveals what a media arsenal cannot hide: an army grinding through bodies of its own soldiers to advance a few meters a day. That is not victory — it is a meat grinder.

Creating pressure on Ukraine's Western partners

The Russian cognitive campaign around Kostyantynivka is not built to convince Ukrainians — it is primarily an influence operation targeting Kyiv's Western partners. By presenting the Ukrainian front as being on the verge of collapse, Moscow seeks to fuel Western political currents that advocate forcing Ukraine to negotiate on terms that Russia dictates: specifically, the "battlefield realities" — an expression Putin explicitly used on June 23. This language means: accept Russian conquests as accomplished facts and obtain a peace in defeat.

The ISW and the Critical Threats Project documented on June 25 that the Russian cognitive campaign has so far failed to convince Ukraine's key partners. US President Trump and Under Secretary of State Jeremy Levin both declared on June 24 and 25 that Ukraine "currently has the advantage on the battlefield" — a statement that directly contradicts the Russian narrative of imminent collapse. Levin also emphasized that Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian oil infrastructure "increase the cost of the war for Russia and force it to divert resources from the front."

Manipulating prediction markets

An unexpected collateral effect of Russian propaganda is its impact on prediction markets. According to Polymarket data, the publication of Russian flag videos at Kostyantynivka — even unverified — caused the probability of the city's capture on the "captured by September" market to spike by 20 points. This manipulation of market sentiment has value for Moscow: it creates pressure on Ukrainian partners attentive to perceptions of "war trajectory." Prediction market investors are not military analysts — they react to flag videos, not geolocation analyses.

The fact that Russian disinformation can move prediction markets used by analysts, journalists, and decision-makers as indicators of the military situation — that is deeply troubling. These markets lack the analytical resistance of the ISW. They aggregate perceptions, not truths. And in a war where perception of trajectory influences political and financial support for Ukraine, this manipulation has very concrete consequences.

Ukraine's offensive response in the information space

Ukraine is not passively absorbing the Russian information war. Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian infrastructure — refineries, military depots, railway infrastructure in occupied Crimea and occupied oblasts — are deliberately documented and published, creating a counter-narrative of Ukrainian offensive resilience. The ISW counted at least 28 Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian oil infrastructure in June 2026, following 33 in May and 18 in April. This sustained campaign demonstrates that Ukraine is not merely defending Kostyantynivka — it is striking deep behind Russian lines.

The public statements from commanders like Madyar and Bakulin — with precise figures on Russian losses, troop numbers present in the city, and ongoing clearing operations — also constitute a counter-disinformation tool. By making public data that directly contradicts Russian MoD claims, the Ukrainian command asserts factual primacy in a contested information space. This transparency is a deliberate strategic choice — and broadly effective at maintaining Western partners' confidence.

The limits of counter-disinformation

Despite these efforts, Russian propaganda continues to find audiences in less rigorous media spaces. Pro-Russian Telegram channels with millions of subscribers broadcast AI videos within seconds. ISW fact-checks typically arrive several hours after videos first circulate — and in the social media era, the first hours are crucial to opinion formation. Some international outlets reproduce Russian MoD figures as official statements without sufficiently contextualizing their propagandistic nature.

The information war remains a domain where Western investments in verification media and digital literacy are insufficient. Russia dedicates industrial resources to disinformation — teams of translators, AI content generators, professional trolls — while the Western response rests largely on underfunded non-governmental organizations. This resource gap translates into a reach gap that truth alone cannot bridge.

I pay tribute to the work of the ISW, Kateryna Stepanenko, and their colleagues who methodically dismantle, day after day, the Kremlin's lies with geolocated evidence. This work is as vital for Ukraine as weapons deliveries. And yet it remains underfunded, little known to the general public, and constantly trailing the industrial output of Russian disinformation. It is one of the most important battles of this war — and the West is not yet dedicating the resources it deserves.

Creating pressure on Ukraine's Western partners

The Russian cognitive campaign around Kostyantynivka is not built to convince Ukrainians — it is primarily an influence operation targeting Kyiv's Western partners. By presenting the Ukrainian front as being on the verge of collapse, Moscow seeks to fuel political currents in the West that advocate forcing Ukraine to negotiate on Russia's terms: the "battlefield realities" — an expression Putin explicitly used on June 23. This language means: accept Russian conquests as accomplished facts and obtain a peace in defeat.

The ISW and the Critical Threats Project documented on June 25 that the Russian cognitive campaign has so far failed to convince Ukraine's key partners. President Trump and Under Secretary of State Jeremy Levin both declared on June 24 and 25 that Ukraine "currently has the advantage on the battlefield" — a direct contradiction of the Russian narrative of imminent collapse. Levin also highlighted that Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian oil infrastructure "increase the cost of the war for Russia."

The fact that Russian disinformation can move prediction markets used by analysts, journalists, and decision-makers as indicators of the military situation — that is deeply troubling. These markets lack the analytical resistance of the ISW. They aggregate perceptions, not truths. And in a war where perception of trajectory influences political and financial support for Ukraine, this manipulation has very concrete consequences.

Manipulating prediction markets

An unexpected collateral effect of Russian propaganda is its impact on prediction markets. According to Polymarket data, the publication of Russian flag videos at Kostyantynivka — even unverified — caused the capture probability on the "captured by September" market to spike by 20 points. This manipulation of market sentiment has value for Moscow: it creates pressure on Ukrainian partners attentive to perceptions of "war trajectory."

Prediction market investors are not military analysts — they react to flag videos, not geolocation analyses. The response of serious analysts is to systematically tie their probabilities to verified geolocated data. The ISW maintains an interactive map updated daily that documents the front line with kilometer-level precision. This map is reality. Prediction markets that do not integrate it produce noisy signals — and Moscow knows perfectly well how to exploit this noise.

Ukraine's offensive response in the information space

Ukraine is not passively absorbing the Russian information war. Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian infrastructure — refineries, military depots, railway infrastructure in occupied Crimea and occupied oblasts — are deliberately documented and published, creating a counter-narrative of Ukrainian offensive resilience. The ISW counted at least 28 Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian oil infrastructure in June 2026, following 33 in May and 18 in April. This sustained campaign demonstrates that Ukraine is not merely defending Kostyantynivka.

The public statements from commanders like Madyar and Bakulin — with precise figures on Russian losses, troop numbers present in the city, and ongoing clearing operations — also constitute a counter-disinformation tool. By making public data that directly contradicts Russian MoD claims, the Ukrainian command asserts factual primacy in a contested information space. This transparency is a deliberate strategic choice — and broadly effective at maintaining Western partners' confidence.

I pay tribute to the work of the ISW, Kateryna Stepanenko, and their colleagues who methodically dismantle, day after day, the Kremlin's lies with geolocated evidence. This work is as vital for Ukraine as weapons deliveries. And yet it remains underfunded, little known to the general public, and constantly trailing the industrial output of Russian disinformation. It is one of the most important battles of this war — and the West is not yet dedicating the resources it deserves.

The limits of counter-disinformation

Despite these efforts, Russian propaganda continues to find audiences in less rigorous media spaces. Pro-Russian Telegram channels with millions of subscribers broadcast AI videos within seconds. ISW fact-checks typically arrive several hours after videos first circulate — and in the social media era, the first hours are crucial to opinion formation.

The information war remains a domain where Western investments in verification media and digital literacy are insufficient. Russia dedicates industrial resources to disinformation — teams of translators, AI content generators, professional trolls — while the Western response rests largely on underfunded non-governmental organizations. This resource gap translates into a reach gap that truth alone cannot bridge.

The city as symbol in the narrative war

Kostyantynivka is not in itself a strategically decisive city — it is not Avdiivka, it is not Bakhmut. What makes it a priority information warfare battleground for Moscow is its symbolic value in the narrative of Russian advance. If Russia can show that its forces are progressing in the Donbas despite Western support for Ukraine — even using AI-generated images — it fuels the narrative that Western support is useless and costly.

Whether Kostyantynivka holds or falls in the coming months will partly determine the credibility of this narrative. If the city holds — with Western support in weapons, intelligence, and training — it will be a demonstration that disinformation does not replace reality on the ground. If the city falls, Moscow will have won symbolically, even though the operational reality remains that Russia advances at 100 meters per day while paying 53 daily casualties in that sector alone.

We are in territory we have never truly traversed before: a war where the adversary uses not only classical disinformation but AI tools to fabricate visual evidence of nonexistent victories. The challenge is no longer just to verify sources — it is to distinguish the real from the synthetic in real combat time. Ukraine fights with drones. Russia fights with deepfakes too. Both are modern weapons of war.

The long-range strike campaign as counter-narrative

While Moscow manufactures visual victories at Kostyantynivka, Kyiv manufactures real ones deep inside Russia. The 28 long-range strikes against Russian oil infrastructure in June 2026 are not only tactical — they are narrative. Every refinery hit, every fuel depot ablaze, demonstrates that Ukraine has the capacity and will to strike deep into Russian territory. This counter-narrative is difficult to contradict with AI-generated videos.

This is a lesson Ukraine has brilliantly integrated into its communication strategy: images of destruction on Russian territory — documented, geolocated, irrefutable — are the most powerful antidote to Moscow's propaganda. Under Secretary of State Levin explicitly recognized this: these strikes "increase the cost of the war for Russia." For this reality to remain visible, Western allies must continue lifting restrictions on long-range strikes.

What Kostyantynivka reveals about Russian doctrine

The Kostyantynivka affair reveals the sophistication of Russian informational doctrine in 2026: synchronization between the Kremlin, the MoD, milbloggers, and AI tools to saturate the information space with false victory narratives. This doctrine does not aim to convince people that Russia has won — it aims to create enough confusion and doubt to paralyze the political will of Ukraine's Western partners. It is a strategy that has partially worked in the past. The appropriate response is the same that the ISW practices: analytical rigor, systematic geolocation, and a refusal to take official Russian statements at face value.

What the West must do

The international community must invest massively in counter-disinformation, verification media, and digital literacy. Social media platforms must develop AI-generated video detection tools and limit their viral spread before verification. And Western governments must resist the temptation to calibrate their support for Ukraine on battlefield perceptions manufactured by Moscow rather than on factual assessments. Kostyantynivka has not fallen. Ukraine is fighting. And Russian disinformation must not inflict more damage on Ukrainian resistance than Russian missiles themselves.

The Kostyantynivka affair reveals the sophistication of Russian informational doctrine in 2026: synchronization between the Kremlin, the MoD, milbloggers, and AI tools to saturate the information space with false victory narratives. The appropriate response is the same that the ISW practices: analytical rigor, systematic geolocation, and a refusal to take official Russian statements at face value. Kostyantynivka has not fallen. Ukraine is fighting. And Russian disinformation must not inflict more damage on Ukrainian resistance than Russian missiles themselves.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between verified facts and interpretive analysis. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under Sources, never here.

Primary source families used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

Secondary source families: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under Sources.

Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a critical, contextual synthesis based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.