ANALYSIS: THE 2022 ISTANBUL PROTOCOLS — THE SURRENDER ACT PUTIN IS PULLING BACK OUT

Introduction: a document the Kremlin never let go of

On June 23, 2026, Putin restates the same ultimatum

On June 23, 2026, Vladimir Putin publicly declared that Russia is ready for peace talks with Ukraine — but only on the basis of the 2022 Istanbul protocols, Putin's June 2024 speech at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the so-called Anchorage understandings of August 2025. That is the framework. That is the condition. And anyone who reads that document with even minimal rigor immediately understands what it means: Ukraine's complete capitulation. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) stated it without ambiguity in its June 23 assessment: those three combined bases constitute a surrender document, not a peace agreement.

This is not a surprise. This is not new. It is the same Russian demand dressed in good-faith rhetoric that Moscow has been repeating since spring 2022, when Ukrainian and Russian negotiators met in Istanbul under radically different battlefield conditions: Russia was then advancing toward Kyiv and occupied substantial portions of northeastern, eastern, and southern Ukraine. That context no longer exists. Ukrainian counter-offensives have since liberated significant territories in the Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts. And yet, Putin returns with exactly the same demands, as if nothing had happened in four years of war.

What the Istanbul protocols would actually contain

The Istanbul protocols were never finalized or signed. What is known of their content — from versions published by the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times in 2024 — reveals the scale of Russian demands: a permanent ban on Ukraine joining NATO, constitutionally imposed neutrality, a cap of 85,000 soldiers for the Ukrainian army, 342 tanks maximum, 519 artillery systems, Ukrainian missile range limited to 40 kilometers. In return? No equivalent restrictions on Russian forces. Not a single figure limiting the Kremlin's military capabilities. Russia — the aggressor — would be designated as a neutral guarantor state of Ukrainian security, alongside China, which would hold veto power over any response to a future Russian aggression.

The ISW, in its February 24, 2025 fact sheet, summarized it without softening: accepting these conditions would amount to rendering Ukraine defensively incapable against a future Russian invasion. Ukraine would have to withdraw the sanctions it has imposed on Russia since 2014, abandon ongoing proceedings before the International Criminal Court, and amend its constitution to enshrine the Russian language on equal footing with Ukrainian. It is a forced rewrite of national identity imposed by the enemy.

The three pillars of the Russian demand in 2026

Pillar 1 — The Istanbul protocols as the maximum starting point

According to the ISW assessment of June 23, 2026, Putin explicitly framed his June 23 statements as his maximum starting position for any renewed negotiation. This is not a floor from which Moscow would be prepared to move upward — it is a ceiling that Putin considers insufficient and hopes to surpass to his advantage. The claim that Russia would be "ready for peace" is a hollow diplomatic formula masking a simple reality: none of Russia's demands have shifted one iota since March 2022. Ukraine's neutrality. Drastic military limitation. Recognition of occupied territories. Abandonment of Euro-Atlantic aspirations.

And if Ukraine refuses? Putin also referenced the "realities of the battlefield" — a longstanding Kremlin expression aimed at painting the Ukrainian front as heading toward collapse, so that Kyiv and its partners yield now out of fear of offensives to come. Except the available data contradict this narrative: according to ISW, since November 2025, the pace of Russian advances has been in steady decline. Ukraine has liberated more territory than Russia has seized in April and May 2026. The "realities of the battlefield" that Putin invokes speak against him.

Pillar 2 — The June 2024 speeches and the so-called Anchorage understandings

The second pillar is Putin's June 2024 speech at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which demanded the complete withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from all territory controlled by Ukraine in the oblasts of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson — including areas Russia has never actually controlled. The third pillar is even more opaque: the alleged "Anchorage agreements" from the August 2025 US-Russia summit in Alaska. Neither the United States nor Russia has published an official communiqué on that event. Moscow systematically exploits this informational vacuum to advance narratives about supposed American concessions, without ever documenting them.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated on June 23 that Russia will achieve all its war objectives: Ukraine's neutrality, non-nuclear status, elimination of allegedly "discriminatory" laws against the Russian language and the Russian Orthodox Church, and recognition of the illegal referendums held in occupied territories. This agenda goes far beyond a ceasefire agreement — it is a demand to transform the Ukrainian state according to Moscow's prescriptions.

What the 2026 conditions reveal about Russian strategy

A negotiation war waged in parallel with the battlefield

The Russian logic is transparent: continue the military offensive to accumulate territorial gains, however small, then use them as leverage in negotiations. Every village taken, every block of apartments infiltrated at Kostiantynivka, represents another piece in the staging of a victorious Russia that dictates its terms. The ISW observed that Russian cognitive warfare efforts around the Kostiantynivka direction — including the promotion of artificial intelligence-generated footage of invented successes — aim precisely to saturate the informational space so that the West and Ukraine capitulate out of fear of an imminent collapse that is not happening.

This strategy has a direct consequence: Moscow has no interest in any agreement that does not give it total satisfaction. The repeated statements by Lavrov and Putin in the days preceding the G7 summit in Évian (June 2026) were aimed at testing whether Donald Trump had changed his position — specifically, whether Washington would be prepared to push Kyiv toward the concessions Moscow demands. The answer, for now, remains unclear. That is exactly what the Kremlin hopes for: an ambiguity it can interpret and manipulate.

The Minsk precedent and the repetition of the pattern

Recent history offers an unsettling mirror. The 2014 and 2015 Minsk agreements were also presented by Moscow as a path to peace. Angela Merkel acknowledged in 2022 that those agreements had in reality served to buy time to rearm Russian forces. The Istanbul protocols follow the same rhetorical structure: an agreement that disarms Ukraine, protects Russian interests, and leaves the door open to a future aggression under conditions even more favorable for Moscow.

This is not Ukrainian paranoia — it is a strategic reading consistent with the trajectory observed since 2014. Putin has used every peace agreement as a rearmament window. Why would an agreement based on the Istanbul protocols be different? The ISW noted that the Istanbul draft treaty would explicitly prohibit Ukraine from accepting foreign military personnel, instructors, and weapons systems — making any future Western assistance illegal under the signed treaty. It is the forced de-Westernization of Ukraine through diplomatic channels.

The battlefield reality Putin prefers to ignore

An advance rate in decline since November 2025

The "realities of the battlefield" rhetoric that Putin waves like a red flag deserves to be confronted with the data. The ISW documented that between December 2025 and May 2026, Russian forces gained control of or infiltrated 40.64 square kilometers in Ukraine. For the same period in 2025: 515.84 square kilometers. Russia's 2026 performance represents approximately 7.87% of what it was during the same period the previous year. This is not a military victory. It is a spectacular deceleration.

Even more telling: in the Kostiantynivka direction, the deputy commander of the Ukrainian 19th Army Corps, Yuriy Madyar, reported on June 23, 2026 that Russian forces were suffering approximately 53 casualties per day against three on the Ukrainian side on that axis. Russian forces must march 20 to 30 kilometers to approach Kostiantynivka because Ukraine is striking the surrounding areas heavily. This ratio of 17.6 Russian casualties for every Ukrainian casualty on that axis is not the profile of an army on the verge of a breakthrough.

Kyiv liberates more than Moscow conquers

A fact Putin never mentions in his speeches about "battlefield realities": according to ISW, in April and May 2026, Ukrainian forces liberated more territory than Russian forces seized. This is data that invalidates the narrative of imminent collapse. It says something else: a war of attrition that Ukraine is holding, at a terrible human cost, but holding. And the longer Ukraine holds, the less the 2022 conditions are relevant as a negotiating baseline.

Ukraine's deep strike campaign against Russian logistical lines in occupied Ukraine is beginning to materialize on the ground. The ISW noted that the Ukrainian intermediate-range strike campaign is increasingly inhibiting Russian logistics across occupied territories. In the Lyman direction, Russian forces face fuel supply problems caused directly by Ukrainian drone strikes. These logistical constraints are real, measurable, and growing.

Zelensky facing the pressure of capitulation dressed as peace

The Ukrainian position: not one centimeter without reciprocity

Volodymyr Zelensky has repeated without letup that Ukraine will cede no territory to Russia without resistance. This position is not stubbornness — it is a strategic reading that accepting the 2022 terms would condemn Ukraine to a perpetual dependence on Russian goodwill, in a context where Russia has proved that its diplomatic commitments carry no binding force. An agreement that disarms Ukraine without disarming Russia is not a peace agreement — it is a window of opportunity for the next invasion.

Ukraine's representative at the UN, Andrii Melnyk, warned on June 23, 2026 that if the UN Security Council adopts a wait-and-see posture, Ukraine might "recalibrate and modify" its ceasefire proposal. The signal is clear: Kyiv is prepared to push harder diplomatically if its interlocutors do not respond. But "pushing harder" does not mean accepting the 2022 terms. A ceasefire along the current front line is already, according to Melnyk, "a significant compromise."

The diplomatic trap the West must avoid

The central risk is not that Ukraine refuses peace. The risk is that some Western partners — exhausted by a conflict entering its fifth year — yield to Russian rhetorical pressure and begin presenting the Istanbul protocols as a reasonable compromise. That framing is false and dangerous. No restrictions on Russian forces. No credible security guarantees for Ukraine. A Russia designated as the security guarantor of the nation it invaded. This is not a compromise — it is a strategic absurdity that ISW has documented with precision.

The West must name things correctly: the Istanbul protocols are a Ukrainian capitulation document, not a fair negotiating baseline. Any peace discussion starting from that point departs from a flawed premise. The G7 summit in Évian, in June 2026, appears to have produced an inflection in Trump's position — which Macron described as a "genuine evolution" in the American stance, recognizing that Russia is not interested in peace. If that inflection is real and durable, it changes the dynamic. If it is ephemeral, Moscow will know how to fill the gap.

Russian rhetoric as a strategic weapon

"Battlefield realities" as psychological pressure

The phrase "battlefield realities" is a carefully engineered rhetorical weapon. It creates psychological pressure: if you do not accept our terms now, tomorrow will be worse. It positions Russia as an irresistible force advancing inexorably. And it deliberately ignores data that contradict this narrative. Putin used this formula on June 23, 2026, while implicitly acknowledging Ukrainian resistance at Kostiantynivka by admitting that Ukrainian forces hold positions in buildings and counter-attack. You do not counter-attack in a city already lost.

Russian cognitive warfare efforts around Kostiantynivka include, according to ISW, the promotion of artificial intelligence-generated videos showing fictitious successes on the ground. The objective is to saturate the informational space so that Western partners believe in an imminent collapse and pressure Kyiv into capitulating. It is large-scale reality fabrication, designed to produce concrete political effects.

Lavrov and the art of deliberate confusion

Sergei Lavrov, on June 23, 2026, enumerated Russia's war objectives with a precision that leaves no ambiguity: Ukraine's neutrality, non-nuclear status, elimination of "discriminatory" laws against Russian and the Russian Orthodox Church, recognition of illegal referendums in occupied territories. This list is not new. It is identical to the demands of spring 2022. Four years of war, hundreds of thousands of dead, and Lavrov recites the same script. This is not coherence — it is strategic rigidity masquerading as consistency.

The deliberate confusion Lavrov maintains around the so-called Anchorage understandings perfectly illustrates the technique: citing agreements whose content has never been made public to create the impression of American commitments that were never formulated. The ISW noted that Lavrov himself slipped, the Tuesday before his June 23 statement, that the Anchorage summit may have been an "American tactic to buy time to rearm the Kyiv regime." In a single day, the same summit is presented as the foundation of a foundational agreement and as an American betrayal. This contradiction is not accidental — it is a deliberate cognitive destabilization technique.

The question of NATO membership — the Gordian knot

Why Ukraine cannot accept permanent neutrality

The permanent ban on joining NATO is, in the Istanbul protocols, far more than a military clause — it is the heart of the Russian strategic objective. If Ukraine can never join NATO, it can never benefit from Article 5 and the collective security guarantee it offers. Which means a future Russia — under Putin or under an even more nationalist successor — can attack again with the certainty that no Western power is legally obligated to defend Ukraine. Accepting this clause means accepting being a permanent target.

Ukraine's permanent neutrality would not serve peace in Europe — it would serve Russian imperial ambitions in Europe. That is precisely why ISW characterizes the Istanbul protocols as a surrender document: they create the legal conditions for a disarmed, isolated Ukraine exposed to future aggression without a safety net. Drafting them in terms of "peace" is an intellectual fraud that only Western fatigue can render plausible.

Alternative guarantees and their limits

Some propose bilateral security guarantees as a substitute for NATO membership. The problem is that such guarantees — without the collective mechanics of Article 5 — have only as much durability as the political will of their signatories. And that will can change with every election, every economic crisis, every new national interest calculation. Ukraine has already lived that experience with the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which guaranteed its territorial integrity in exchange for abandoning its nuclear arsenal. That memorandum was violated by Russia with the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Ukraine is not naive.

And yet, Ukraine is, according to Kyiv's UN representative, prepared to accept a ceasefire along the current front line as a compromise. That is not nothing. It is not capitulation. It is a real concession on a painful territorial reality. But it can only work if, in parallel, credible and binding security guarantees replace the absence of NATO coverage. Without that, a ceasefire is a pause in the war, not a peace.

What "ready to negotiate" means in the Kremlin's language

The ritual formula as an inverted signal

When Putin says Russia is "ready for peace," it is worth translating into the Kremlin's operational language. "Ready to negotiate" means: we are ready to accept Ukraine signing its surrender. "Battlefield realities" means: we are asking you to yield now because tomorrow we will be even stronger, which is a lie. "Neutrality" means: Ukraine's unilateral disarmament under diplomatic cover. This lexicon has been built and tested over decades of Russian foreign policy, from Georgia to Moldova, from Belarus to Ukraine. It works when Western interlocutors choose to hear what they want to hear.

The ISW clearly established in its June 23, 2026 assessment that the combined declarations of Putin and Lavrov that day represent a reaffirmation of Russia's original 2022 war objectives — objectives that demand not only Ukraine's capitulation but also concessions from NATO and the West as a whole. This is not a peace agenda — it is an agenda for reorganizing the European security order according to Russian interests.

The G7 moment and the Western reaction

At the G7 summit in Évian, in June 2026, Donald Trump called on Russia to conclude a peace deal with Ukraine after what he described as a "very good" exchange with Zelensky. G7 leaders sensed cautious optimism from those statements. Emmanuel Macron indicated that Trump had acknowledged Russia was not interested in peace — a "genuine evolution" of the American position according to him. Lavrov, for his part, was trying on June 24 to understand whether Trump had truly changed his position or whether it was rhetoric for the G7 gallery.

This scene perfectly illustrates the problem: the West searches for positive signals, Russia looks for cracks. Moscow uses every ambiguous statement from Washington to advance its own interpretations. American representatives Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner were expected to travel to Moscow in the days following the G7. What they tell Lavrov — and what they bring back to Trump — will determine whether the United States maintains its rejection of Russian maximum demands or whether Washington begins sliding toward pressure on Kyiv. The stakes are not small.

The consequences for Ukraine if the protocols become the baseline

Disarmament, isolation, vulnerability

Imagine, for a moment, that Ukraine accepts the Istanbul protocols as a negotiating baseline. The Ukrainian army would be reduced to 85,000 soldiers. The range of its missiles would be limited to 40 kilometers. No Western instructor could set foot on Ukrainian soil. No Western weapons system could be delivered. Russia — whose forces would be subject to no reciprocal limitation — could freely reposition along the Ukrainian border. This scenario produces a Ukraine that cannot defend itself, with an international community legally prevented from helping. It is an open invitation to the next invasion in ten or fifteen years.

The Budapest lesson — too painful to ignore — says exactly that: guarantees without teeth do not protect. Ukraine surrendered the third-largest nuclear arsenal in the world in 1994 in exchange for written guarantees of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Twenty years later, Russia annexed Crimea. There was no coercive mechanism. There was no NATO. There was only a piece of paper. The Istanbul protocols replicate that structure, only worse.

The impact on broader European security

What is at stake goes beyond Ukraine. If the Istanbul protocols become the norm for resolving wars of aggression — the model in which the aggressor dictates terms and the victim signs — then every medium-sized democracy in Europe must reconsider its own security. The Baltic states, Poland, Finland, Sweden — all are watching what happens with extreme attention. If the West validates this precedent, it sends a signal: aggression pays if sustained long enough. That signal is incompatible with a rules-based international order that the West claims to want to defend.

NATO and the European Union have invested politically, financially, and militarily in Ukrainian resistance since 2022. Allowing that resistance to conclude with an agreement that places Ukraine in a worse position than before the invasion would not only be a defeat for Ukraine — it would be a defeat for the very concept of Western alliance.

The real question: was Putin bluffing on June 23?

The test of Russian sincerity

The real question is not whether Putin is "sincerely" ready to negotiate. It is whether the conditions he sets allow good-faith negotiation. They do not. Demanding as a starting point that Ukraine abandon its NATO aspirations, disarm massively, and recognize illegally occupied territories is not a diplomatic opening — it is a demand for prior capitulation. No serious negotiation can begin where Putin asks it to begin. Any conversation that accepts this baseline validates the Russian thesis.

What the ISW documented on June 23, 2026 is a staged performance: Putin announces his "willingness for peace" precisely at the moment when Ukraine and the West appear ready to restart serious negotiations, in order to capture the good-faith narrative while maintaining unacceptable demands. It is façade diplomacy — visible, theatrical, and deeply dishonest.

Why clarity is the best response

The best response to this maneuver is absolute clarity: publicly naming what the Istanbul protocols actually mean, refusing any formulation that legitimizes them as a fair baseline, and maintaining support for Ukraine without ambiguity. That is precisely what ISW did in its June 2026 assessments. That is what the G7 in Évian attempted to do. And it is the only way to prevent Western diplomatic fatigue from being exploited by Moscow as a proxy victory.

Volodymyr Zelensky is right to maintain a red line on Ukrainian sovereignty. Ukraine has already conceded too much — its territory, its cities, its civilians. What it cannot concede is its capacity to defend itself and its right to belong to the security alliance of its choice. That is not stubbornness — it is survival. And no document drafted in 2022, under military pressure that no longer exists in quite the same way today, can validly serve as the foundation for peace in 2026.

International consensus facing Russian demands

The European Union and the Ukrainian position

The European Union has maintained a consistent line since 2022: any settlement must respect the United Nations Charter, Ukraine's territorial integrity, and cannot be dictated by the aggressor. This position is incompatible with the Istanbul protocols, which implicitly recognize Russian territorial gains by requiring Ukraine to withdraw its forces from territories it legitimately controls in the Donbas and Zaporizhia oblasts. The EU cannot endorse this framework without fundamentally contradicting itself.

Canada, which on June 12, 2026 imposed a new package of sanctions against 162 individuals, entities, and vessels linked to the Russian war machine — including the shadow fleet, energy revenues, the defense industrial base, and disinformation networks — also maintained a firm position. Prime Minister Mark Carney announced these sanctions at the G7 in Évian, during a bilateral meeting with Zelensky, clearly signaling that Ottawa refuses to validate Russian territorial ambitions through passive acquiescence.

The key role of the United States in the next phase

Everything ultimately depends on Washington's position. If the Trump administration pushes Ukraine to accept the Istanbul protocols as a negotiating baseline — in whatever form — the entire Western resistance collapses. That is why the announced visit of Witkoff and Kushner to Moscow is so crucial. What they tell Lavrov — and what they bring back to Trump — will determine whether the United States maintains its rejection of Russian maximum demands or whether Washington begins sliding toward pressure on Kyiv.

The inflection described by Macron at the G7 — Trump acknowledging that Russia is not interested in peace — is encouraging if real. But a statement at a summit is not a foreign policy. What matters is American behavior in the weeks that follow. And in the corridors of international diplomacy, the days following June 23, 2026 could define this war's trajectory for months to come.

Ukraine in 2026 — a nation transformed by war

A society that will not accept capitulation

What the Istanbul protocols entirely ignore — because the Kremlin refuses to see it — is the profound transformation of Ukrainian society since February 24, 2022. The Ukraine of 2026 is no longer the Ukraine of 2022, which itself was no longer the Ukraine of 2014. Four years of total war have produced a generation of Ukrainians for whom national sovereignty is no longer an abstraction — it is a reality defended at the cost of blood. An agreement resembling capitulation would be politically untenable for any Ukrainian government, regardless of external pressures.

Zelensky knows this. Ukraine's military commanders know it. And Putin, in his rare moments of lucidity, knows it too — which is why he seeks a deal not with the Ukrainian people but with Western leaders, hoping that sufficient external pressure will force Kyiv to accept what Kyiv viscerally rejects. That strategy has limits. Ukraine has survived four years of total war — it will not bend before a piece of paper drafted in 2022.

The human cost of refusing capitulation

It is honest to acknowledge what refusing the Istanbul protocols costs. According to a report by a UN human rights mission cited by PBS, the month of May 2026 recorded 274 civilians killed and 1,763 wounded — the highest monthly figure since April 2022. The majority of these victims were in cities far from the front. These are families. Homes. Children. The cost of resistance is real, immense, and cannot be minimized in the equation.

But accepting the Istanbul protocols would not end these sufferings — it would program new ones, at an undetermined future date, under conditions even less favorable for Ukraine. The real question is not peace or war — it is what kind of peace: a peace that protects or a peace that condemns. Ukraine deserves an honest answer to that question, not urgency rhetoric demanding it accept its own liquidation in the name of Western fatigue.

The final strategic analysis — why Putin is relaunching now

The timing is no accident

Putin relaunched the Istanbul protocols on June 23, 2026, precisely as Ukraine and the West appeared ready to restart serious negotiations. This timing is calculated. It allows Moscow to capture the good-faith narrative — Russia is "ready for peace" — while maintaining demands that make peace impossible on Russian terms. If Ukraine refuses, Moscow can say Kyiv is the one refusing peace. If the West hesitates, Moscow can advance its conditions as negotiating ground. In either case, the Kremlin gains something.

The challenge for Ukraine and its allies is to dismantle this framing in real time — to clearly name what Putin calls "peace" as no such thing, without appearing to reject the very principle of negotiation. It is a delicate but indispensable rhetorical exercise. ISW did it in its June 23 assessment. G7 leaders must do the same, with equal clarity, in every public statement.

The most likely scenario by end of 2026

Based on available data as of June 24, 2026, the most likely scenario is not a peace agreement — based on the Istanbul protocols or any other foundation. It is a continuation of the war of attrition, with marginal and declining Russian territorial gains, growing diplomatic pressure on both belligerents from all sides, and a negotiating environment in which each party hopes to improve its position before truly sitting at the table. That is not a pleasing prospect. But it is reality — and intellectual honesty requires stating it clearly.

What this means concretely: Ukraine needs sustained Western support in weapons, financing, and sanctions, at least until negotiating conditions are sufficiently balanced that any agreement does not resemble capitulation. And the West must resist the temptation to sell its own populations a quick peace that would only be a Russian victory dressed up as compromise.

Conclusion: naming capitulation for what it is

A 2022 document for a 2026 world

The Istanbul protocols were negotiated in spring 2022, when Russian tanks were still within twenty kilometers of Kyiv, when Ukraine was still holding positions at Kharkiv, when no one knew whether the resistance would hold. That document bears the imprint of a moment of extreme weakness. Ukraine has since liberated entire swaths of its territory. It has pushed the Russian navy out of the western Black Sea. It has developed deep-strike capabilities that reach Moscow. Using the Istanbul protocols in 2026 means erasing four years of military history in favor of the Russian narrative.

The ISW, with the analytical rigor that defines it, stated the simple and true thing on June 23, 2026: the combined demands of Putin and Lavrov that day amount to Ukraine's complete capitulation. This is not a starting position for balanced negotiation. It is a demand disguised as compromise. And calling it by its real name is the first act of any responsible foreign policy.

What the West must do now

Maintain support for Ukraine. Refuse any diplomatic framework based on the Istanbul protocols. Name publicly and repeatedly what those protocols actually mean. Support sanctions against the Russian war machine — as Canada did on June 12, 2026 with 162 new designations targeting the shadow fleet, energy revenues, and the defense industrial base. And resist the temptation of a quick peace that would only be a deferred victory for Moscow.

Conclusion: capitulation does not call itself peace

What the truth demands

The truth is uncomfortable but necessary: the 2022 Istanbul protocols are an act of Ukrainian capitulation dressed up as a peace treaty. They disarm Ukraine. They isolate Ukraine. They place Ukraine under the diplomatic guardianship of a Russia that would remain free of any military constraint. Putin put them back on the table on June 23, 2026 not because he wants peace — but because it is his best chance to obtain through diplomacy what his army can no longer obtain on the battlefield.

Ukraine resists. Zelensky holds the line. The G7, according to reports, produced an encouraging American inflection. But History is not made in a single summit day. It is made in duration, in consistency, in the refusal to yield to the pressure of those who prefer the end of the noise to justice. What Ukraine is asking for is not extravagant: a peace that does not announce the next war. That is the minimum. And that is precisely what the Istanbul protocols cannot offer.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

Editorial positioning

This analysis is written from an explicitly pro-Ukraine and pro-Western posture, firmly opposed to Vladimir Putin's imperial ambitions. Maxime Marquette's editorial position is that Ukrainian resistance is legitimate, that Western support for that resistance is strategically justified, and that any peace agreement that does not guarantee Ukraine's genuine sovereignty constitutes a disguised defeat for the rules-based international order. This posture is assumed and transparent — it is not propaganda but a strategic reading consistent with the available data.

Methodology and sources

This article relies exclusively on verifiable, dated sources: the ISW assessment of June 23, 2026 for data on the Istanbul protocols, Russian positions, and casualty figures on the Kostiantynivka axis; the ISW fact sheet on the Istanbul protocols (February 24, 2025) for details of Russia's 2022 demands; Lavrov's statements (June 23, 2026) as reported by ISW; ISW data from June 1, 2026 for comparative territorial gains; and information on Canadian sanctions from June 12, 2026. No figure is cited without a uniquely identifiable source. Inferences and estimates are flagged as such.

Nature of the analysis

This article is a columnist's analysis, not a neutral factual report. It interprets verifiable facts through a clearly assumed strategic and editorial prism. Quotes attributed to public figures (Putin, Lavrov, Zelensky, Melnyk, Madyar) come from verified primary sources. No quote has been invented or attributed without a source. Value judgments are clearly formulated as such and separated from documented facts.

Sources

Primary sources

ISW — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 23, 2026

ISW — Fact Sheet: Istanbul Protocol, draft document of April 15, 2022 — February 24, 2025

US News & World Report — Lavrov on Trump and the G7, Ukraine — June 24, 2026

Secondary sources

Newsweek — Russia's negotiation plan is a "capitulation document," ISW says — February 24, 2025

The Guardian — Ukraine war briefing: "Our patience is not endless" — June 23, 2026

Ukrainska Pravda — Canada imposes new sanctions on Russia — June 16, 2026