DECODING: 123 or 300 Russian Soldiers in Kostiantynivka? — The Intelligence Numbers War

Introduction: The Fog of War Begins with a Number

A Ukrainian General Steps Out of the Shadows and Says “Probably”

On June 15, 2026, Brigadier General Oleksandr Bakulin, commander of the 19th Army Corps, spoke before cameras during the 24/7 joint news telethon. He said something rare in war: “We estimate that there are currently, probably, about 123 enemy personnel in the city.” This “probably” isn't a sign of weakness. It’s a lesson in military epistemology offered live to a nation that needs to understand why war figures are never read like an accounting balance sheet.

Other sources — notably the Hromadske investigation, published on June 12 — provide estimates ranging from over a hundred up to 250 Russian soldiers infiltrated into Kostiantynivka. And some reports in circulation even mention the figure of 300. How can the same battlefield produce such wide ranges? This is precisely the question this decoding intends to explore — without pretending to settle the matter where the experts themselves do not dare to do so.

Kostiantynivka: The City Whose Name No One Wants to Say Out Loud

Kostiantynivka is a city in the Donetsk Oblast, a strategic crossroads connecting Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk, and Sloviansk, the last large Ukrainian urban centers still standing in the region. Since August 2025, Russian forces have begun to tighten the vice. Since October 2025, according to the ISW (Institute for the Study of War), the first infiltrations have been documented within the city itself. In June 2026, the urban battle is well and truly underway — and the question of the number of enemy soldiers present within the walls is no longer just academic. It determines lives.

The city, with its large disemboweled arteries and its neighborhoods reduced to dust by guided bombs (KAB), now resembles what Pokrovsk was six months ago. And that is exactly where the heart of this analysis lies: why the numbers diverge, who produces them, and what this divergence tells us about the epistemology of war intelligence.

Bakulin's Figure: An Inexact Science Turned into a Method

How Does the 19th Corps Estimate Infiltrators?

Bakulin explained it clearly during his television appearance: “I rely on reports from brigade intelligence and my own intelligence units.” The estimate is based on multiple intelligence channels — ground observations, drone surveillance, radio intercepts, and reports from units in contact. It’s not a head count; it’s a probabilistic synthesis. It is fundamentally different from a census.

Moreover, the general introduced an explicit margin of error himself: “In my personal opinion, this figure could vary by 20 to 30 soldiers, as duplicates may exist between different intelligence sources.” He also acknowledged that some individuals might have been missed. This level of methodological transparency is exceptional in the context of official military communication. Bakulin isn't trying to reassure with a precise number — he’s trying to be useful with an honest one.

The Operational Range: Between 93 and 153

What the media outlet United24 reported on June 16 adds further nuance: Bakulin reportedly specified that the operational range lies between 93 and 153 Russian soldiers infiltrated into parts of the city. The median value of this range — roughly 123 — is precisely the figure used by Ukra06ska Pravda in its June 15 article. Therefore, it is not an arbitrary number, but the center of a distribution of uncertainty carefully bounded by the commander himself.

Why does this precision matter? Because it demonstrates that the 19th Army Corps applies a rigorous methodology, however imperfect. In an environment where Russian propaganda spreads fanatical figures to exaggerate its gains, and where some Ukrainian estimates might overestimate the threat to justify reinforcements, Bakulin chooses the narrow path of analytical honesty. It is a rare posture. It is a courageous posture.

The 250-300: Where Do These Numbers Come From and Why Bakulin Disputes Them

The Hromadske Investigation and the Voice of Field Commanders

The investigation published by Hromadske on June 12, 2026, is the primary source for the high-end estimates. The Ukrainian media outlet interviewed three commanders who estimate that over a hundred Russian soldiers have already entered Kostiantynivka. One of them — cited anonymously — believes the real figure could be closer to 250, arguing that it is difficult to accurately count the number of enemy groups. Another source mentions Russian presence in the central part of the city, as well as in the Santurynivka neighborhood in the northeast.

These estimates are not invented. They come from soldiers who see the Russians, who face them, who lose comrades to them. But they suffer from an inevitable structural bias: each commander only sees a fragment of the battlefield. Without a centralized system for deconflicting data, the same enemy groups can be reported independently by several units, artificially inflating the perceived total. This is exactly what Bakulin identifies when he talks about “duplicates between intelligence sources.”

Why Bakulin Contests Without Invalidating

Bakulin didn't say the estimates of 250 or 300 were false. He said they were “somewhat exaggerated,” while immediately adding: “That said, I cannot state with absolute certainty that these figures are incorrect, as this is intelligence information, which is always presented with the word 'probably'.” This nuance is of paramount importance. The corps commander isn't trying to win a media debate. He is trying to establish a usable operational truth — an estimate precise enough to guide decisions, yet humble enough not to mislead those who use it.

This is the fundamental difference between operational intelligence and political communication. The former lives with uncertainty. The latter hates it. And in the context of a war where Moscow is circulating AI-generated videos to claim they have captured the city — as documented by the ISW on June 15 and reported by United24 on June 16 — Bakulin’s epistemic modesty constitutes a form of informational resistance in itself.

The Small-Group Infiltration Tactic: A Doctrine, Not an Improvisation

How the Russians Penetrate Kostiantynivka

Russian forces did not attack Kostiantynivka in a classic armored formation. According to converging analyses from DeepState, Bakulin, and the ISW, the method employed is infiltration by small infantry groups, moving through tree lines, abandoned buildings, and covered routes. These groups progress point-to-point, accumulate, and then attempt to establish fixed positions in the urban fabric. The mapping group DeepState specified that Russian soldiers had been spotted entering via Novodmytrivka in the eastern part of the city, with additional pressure from Berestok and Illinivka.

The media outlet Militarnyi documented a particularly striking case on May 13, 2026: the 100th Mechanized Brigade used explosive ground drones to neutralize a group of eight Russian infiltrators — former prisoners turned saboteurs — who had taken refuge in an abandoned building. Their movements had been tracked by reconnaissance drones. The operation illustrates both the sophistication of Russian infiltration tactics and Ukrainian adaptability. But it also illustrates the difficulty of counting: would this group of eight have been included in Bakulin's estimate or in Hromadske's?

A Doctrine Perfected on the Pokrovsk Front

Bakulin said it explicitly: this tactic had previously been perfected on the Pokrovsk front. And Ukrainian forces have, according to him, learned lessons from the mistakes made during operations around Pokrovsk. The Hromadske investigation details the mechanism: in Pokrovsk, the Russians infiltrated the city and tried to split it into separate sectors, compromising organized defense and placing Ukrainian infantry under the threat of encirclement. The scenario in Kostiantynivka is developing according to the same pattern.

According to the two Russian tactical groups identified by the ISW — the ‐Bakhmut‑ (built around the 3rd Army Corps) and ‐Dzerzhinsk‑ (8th Combined Arms Army) groups — the Russians progressed from Stupochky via Novodmytrivka toward the northeast of the city, and from Illinivka toward the northwest and southwest areas. The two infiltration prongs were about two kilometers from each other in mid-June, according to United24. The geometry of the infiltration resembles a pincer that is slowly closing.

The Pokrovsk Comparison: Mirror and Warning

How Pokrovsk Fell and What It Tells Us About Kostiantynivka

The fall of Pokrovsk in early 2026 constitutes the most recent and relevant precedent for analyzing the situation in Kostiantynivka. According to the detailed report from EuroMaidan Press / DeepState dated June 18, 2026, Pokrovsk succumbed through a combination of sustained infantry pressure, repeated attempts at infiltrating urban areas, and systematic targeting of Ukrainian logistical routes. These tactics gradually exhausted the defense, leaving Ukrainian units to operate under increasingly difficult logistical conditions.

DeepState describes the method as a gradual “absorption” — a term that perfectly captures the insidious nature of these operations. The Russians did not seek to take Pokrovsk by frontal assault: they gradually made it indefensible. The city was surrounded on three sides, its logistical corridors placed under drone control, its inhabitants forced to flee. In Kostiantynivka, according to Hromadske, the distance between the two infiltration flanks has become a continuous “kill zone”, with the two main roads under enemy drone surveillance.

What is Different — and Why Ukraine Has Reason for Hope

“The situations in Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka are not identical.” Bakulin insists. Ukrainian forces have learned from their mistakes. The units in place have better knowledge of the terrain, have developed more sophisticated infiltration countermeasures, and use surveillance drones coupled with explosive ground drones — as the May 13 operation testifies. The spokesperson for the 28th Mechanized Brigade, Yevhen Alkhimov, confirmed to The Kyiv Independent that Ukrainian forces had quickly adapted to the threat of fiber-optic FPV drones, which now constitute the main danger.

The ISW adds an extra dimension: Russian forces missed their own target deadline — they were supposed to have taken Kostiantynivka before May 2026. They failed. According to United24 (June 11), Russian troops have penetrated about 12.69% of the city since October 2025. It is significant. It is not irreversible — provided that Ukrainian reinforcements arrive and the logistics hold. Two massive “ifs” that summarize the entire war.

November 2025: The Forgotten Precedent That Explains Everything

The First Massive Infiltration and What It Taught Both Sides

To understand the June 2026 estimates, we must return to what Bakulin himself mentioned: in November 2025, approximately 50 Russian soldiers had managed to infiltrate Kostiantynivka. At the time, according to him, some reports spoke of 200 infiltrators. The reality was 50. Ukrainian forces settled the issue — “We successfully managed this situation in November,” Bakulin says. But this episode reveals how much the gap between the initial estimate and reality can be considerable, in either direction.

Hromadske specifies that the first enemy presence in the city was documented as early as october 2025, and that the massive infiltration began in the spring of 2026. This chronology is consistent with ISW data (United24, June 11), which confirms that the Russians began infiltrating in October 2025 and have since penetrated about 12.69% of the city. Six months of gradual infiltration — that is the real timeline behind the June 15 figures.

The Problem Persists in June 2026 — and Bakulin Admits It

Bakulin chose total transparency: “We have not yet managed to fully remedy the situation and clean the area to the point where public concerns about the presence of enemy forces in Kostiantynivka subside.” This sentence is remarkable. A corps commander in the field says publicly that his job isn't finished, that the situation isn't resolved, and that the Russians are still there. It is a form of crisis communication that contrasts radically with Russian propaganda, whose generals were announcing — according to Bakulin himself — the complete capture of the city to their hierarchy while they were still attempting to infiltrate it.

Bakulin's final phrase — “But we are taking the necessary measures” — isn't an empty slogan. It signals that countermeasures are underway, that the situation is operationally under control even if it isn't tactically resolved. This is a distinction that military analysts understand, but which the general public, accustomed to clear victories or defeats in war media, has trouble grasping.

Russian Disinformation: When AI-Videos Replace Official Communiqus

Computer-Generated Flags on Real Ruins

On June 15, 2026, Russian sources circulated videos allegedly showing troops raising Russian flags on the western outskirts of Kostiantynivka and in the neighboring village of Dovha Balka, which the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed to have captured that same day. The ISW assessed that these videos could have been generated by artificial intelligence, noting their consistency with previous Russian information operations using similar technologies to support territorial gain claims. United24 reported this on June 16.

On the same day, Ukrainian troops were cleaning Dovha Balka of Russian infiltrators, according to the same source. In other words: Russia was broadcasting videos of flags over a village that Ukraine was currently retaking. This gap between the reality on the ground and the broadcast narrative is not new — but the use of AI to produce it marks a qualitative escalation in information warfare. Synthetic images are now mobilized not just for external propaganda, but to convince the Russian military hierarchy itself of false successes.

Bakulin Reveals the Absurd: Russian Generals Announced the City's Capture

Bakulin’s most staggering statement on June 15 wasn't about the numbers — it was this: Russian commanders had already reported the capture of Kostiantynivka to their military hierarchy and were now trying to turn those claims into reality on the ground. In other words, the Russian military bureaucracy works in reverse of war logic: you declare victory first, then you try to make it happen. It’s Potemkin logic applied to modern warfare.

This revelation sheds new light on the numbers war. Russian estimates of 250 to 300 soldiers in the city may not just be a misjudgment — they could be a narrative construction designed to justify reports of success already sent up the chain of command. In this perspective, Bakulin's “probably 123” is not only more accurate — it is fundamentally more honest about the very nature of military information.

DeepState: The Mapping Group That Says What Generals Cannot

“As Matter of Time” — The Phrasing That Terrifies

The combat monitoring group DeepState published an assessment that deliberately contrasts with Bakulin's cautious pragmatism. According to EuroMaidan Press on June 18, DeepState described the situation as developing according to its “worst-case scenario” and warned that the fall of Kostiantynivka was “a matter of time” if current trends continued. The group indicated that Russian forces had reached the positions necessary to begin a gradual “absorption” of the city.

DeepState operates from open source — video geolocation, satellite analysis, public data processing. Its estimate is structurally different from Bakulin’s: where Bakulin synthesizes secret operational reports, DeepState aggregates publicly verifiable information. The two methods produce different figures not because one is wrong, but because they measure partially different realities. DeepState sees the mapped advances; Bakulin counts the confirmed presences within the urban fabric. They are two angles on the same problem.

The Strategic Dynamics Beyond Kostiantynivka

DeepState also traced the domino scenario that no one dares to formulate officially: if Kostiantynivka falls, Druzhkivka would become the next Russian objective due to its key logistical role, then the pressure would shift toward Kramatorsk. The analysis suggests that Russia could simultaneously attempt to open an additional axis toward Sloviansk and Kramatorsk south of Lyman. Gaining control of Kostiantynivka would also complicate movements across the entire area and increase the operational reach of Russian drone operators deep behind the lines.

ISW, in its assessment cited by United24 on June 11, expressed a more nuanced judgment: Russian forces will likely make tactical gains in Kostiantynivka this summer, but it remains highly unlikely that they will achieve an operational breakthrough capable of capturing the broader network of fortified Ukrainian positions in the region. The Ukrainian “fortress belt” — the deep defense system — remains an obstacle that small-group infiltrations cannot overcome alone.

Prudence as Doctrine: Why “Probably” Is Not a Weakness

The Epistemology of Military Intelligence in Urban Zones

In military intelligence, “probably” is a beacon of confidence, not an excuse. It indicates that the analyst has sufficient evidence to form an estimate but not direct confirmation. In urban zones, estimating enemy presence is particularly complex: buildings block lines of sight, movements can be nocturnal, and infiltration units deliberately avoid identifiable positions. Counting 123 soldiers scattered throughout a partially destroyed city, without a saturation of drones or human agents, is objectively difficult.

An Ukrinform spokesperson reported in March 2026 that Ukrainian forces had repelled a four-direction simultaneous attack in Kostiantynivka — demonstrating that the Russians were continuing to experiment with tactics. Each new incursion, each dispersed group, each night movement adds a layer of complexity to the mapping of presences. The 28th Mechanized Brigade, defending the city, noted in March that the Russians were daily increasing their attempts to push as many troops as possible into the city. This continuous flow makes any stable count fundamentally impossible.

The Paradox of Exact Intelligence in an Inexact War

There is a fundamental paradox in the demand for accuracy that the media and public opinion project onto military intelligence. We want a precise figure because precise figures reassure us — they give the illusion that the war is mastered, accounted for, and understandable. But a commander who gave a precise figure without quantified uncertainty would be either lying or hallucinating. Apparent precision would mask unjustified confidence in inherently unstable data.

Bakulin said: “These pieces of information are always presented with the word 'probably'.” This is the professional standard for intelligence — not an institutional weakness. Western agencies, from the CIA to GCHQ, use standardized probabilistic confidence scales precisely for this reason. That this standard is explained publicly by a Ukrainian corps commander live on television is — and I weigh the word carefully — remarkable. It is a form of culture of democratic transparency in wartime.

The Humanitarian Situation: Behind the Numbers, Civilians

A City Under Bombs and Under Drones

Beyond the debate over the number of infiltrated Russian soldiers, there are civilians — those who remain in an increasingly destroyed city. The Governor of Donetsk Oblast, Vadym Filashkin, had described a city on the brink of “humanitarian catastrophe” in June 2025: nearly half the city without electricity, 1,900 homes in the Santurynivka neighborhood without gas, and water supplied for only one hour a day to 20-25% of the demand. Twelve months later, the situation has only worsened.

Alkhimov, from the 28th Brigade, explained to The Kyiv Independent that the Russians are deliberately targeting civilian vehicles — including buses — to place all movement in the city under drone control. The goal is not just military: it is to make the city unlivable, to force civilians to leave to deprive Ukrainian defenders of a moral justification for their presence. Ukrposhta, the Ukrainian national post, closed its offices in Kostiantynivka in August 2025 — a signal that often says more than military communiqus.

Evacuation as a Strategic Indicator

The number of civilians remaining in Kostiantynivka is itself a piece of intelligence data. Russian forces adapt their infiltration tactics to the residual population density — present civilians complicate Ukrainian cleaning operations, as every building occupied by Russian infiltrators is also potentially a shelter for non-combatants. Filashkin's decision to urgently call for evacuation is not just humanitarian: it is a tactically grounded decision that would simplify counter-infiltrations.

This humanitarian dimension serves as a reminder that the troop numbers we debate — 123 or 300 — are not abstract. Each infiltrated Russian group represents a direct threat to people living in basements, collecting water drop by drop, hearing the impacts of KABs a few streets away. Numbers have a moral weight that analytical debates tend to erase. Kostiantynivka is suffering. And behind every probabilistic estimate, there are real lives.

The ISW and the Big Picture: A Concentrated Offensive After Failure Elsewhere

Why Kostiantynivka Became Moscow's Main Bet in Summer 2026

United24 reported on June 11, 2026, that after the failure of initial mechanized assaults around Lyman and the stalling of the push toward Sloviansk, Russia redirected the bulk of its spring-summer 2026 offensive toward Kostiantynivka. It is an admission of geographic failure turned into a concentration of forces. According to the ISW, the Western Group of Russian Forces likely lacks the combat capacity required to push simultaneously on Sloviansk and continue fighting in the Kupyansk and Borova directions.

This strategic refocusing explains why the numbers of infiltrators in Kostiantynivka increased so rapidly between October 2025 and June 2026. Russia is concentrating considerable human resources — 80% of assault units were reportedly replenished as of June 6, according to the ISW — on a single objective. And yet, it missed its own capture deadline set for May 2026. This missed deadline is the most significant data point: it indicates that Ukraine managed to slow down, at least temporarily, a massively concentrated offensive.

The “Fortress Belt” as an Operational Red Line

The ISW maintains a vital distinction: tactical gains in Kostiantynivka are likely; an operational breakthrough against the Ukrainian fortress belt in the region remains unlikely. The fortress belt — the Ukrainian deep defense system — represents months of construction under fire, tiered defense lines, and prepared positions. Taking Kostiantynivka would be a blow to Ukraine, but it would not be the end of the Donetsk front.

The distinction between tactical and operational is fundamental and often misunderstood in media coverage. A city can fall without the front collapsing — as evidenced by the fall of Pokrovsk, which did not lead to the breakthrough toward Dnipropetrovsk that Moscow expected. Russia's war in Ukraine has become a war of attrition with marginal territorial gains — costly in human lives on both sides, particularly on the Russian side which accepts, according to DeepState, heavy infantry losses in exchange for gradual territorial gains.

Ukrainian Intelligence vs. the Media: A Structurally Asymmetric Relationship

Why the Media Wants Round Numbers and the Military Can't Provide Them

The tension between probabilistic military estimates and media expectations of precision is a constant in all modern wars. Newsrooms want precise numbers because they are easy to headline, compare, and memorize. “123 Russian soldiers” is a possible headline. “Probably between 93 and 153 Russian soldiers, with a margin of error of 20-30 due to potential duplicates between intelligence sources” is not. This structural asymmetry between military and media communication formats produces systematic distortions in public understanding of the war.

Bakulin attempted to bridge this gap live. He gave a figure — 123 — while immediately framing that figure within a range, a margin of error, a methodological justification, and an explicit acknowledgment of the limits of his own data. It was an exceptionally well-calibrated exercise in communication for a military context. But he also took the risk that the media would remember the 123 and forget the “probably.” Which some indeed did.

Ukraine as a Laboratory for Democratic Information in Wartime

Bakulin's transparency is part of a broader trend in Ukrainian military communication: since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Kyiv has gambled on transparency — by sharing loss data, admitting tactical setbacks, and publicly explaining its logistical decisions. This model contrasts sharply with Russian opacity, but it also carries risks. Information that is too precise can help the enemy adjust their tactics. The balance between democratic transparency and operational security is one of the great challenges of wartime communication.

Bakulin's decision to publicly disclose the figure of 123 while contextualizing its uncertainty seems to have been deliberately calibrated: precise enough to show that the situation is manageable, humble enough not to fuel false confidence. This is high-quality strategic communication — rare in any military context. Rare, and necessary. For in the information war, credibility is a resource that Russia long ago abandoned, and that Ukraine must preserve at all costs.

What Kostiantynivka Reveals About the Future of the Donetsk Front

The Battle as a Systemic Test

Kostiantynivka is not just a city. It is a systemic resistance test for the Ukrainian defense. If Ukrainian forces manage to contain the infiltration, keep logistical corridors open, and preserve their command capability within the urban fabric, they demonstrate that they have integrated the lessons of Pokrovsk. If they fail, they validate the Russian absorption model and offer Moscow a path to Druzhkivka, then to the heart of the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk urban cluster.

The ISW (United24, June 11) documented Ukrainian advances in the east and west of the city between June 4 and 8 — geolocated gains that prove the Ukrainians are not passively suffering the infiltration but are conducting active counter-operations. The cleaning of Dovha Balka on June 15 is another illustration. The battle is two-way. And for now — just for now — Ukraine is holding.

Lessons for the West and Military Support

For Ukraine's Western allies, the battle of Kostiantynivka carries a precise message: ammunition and troop deficits are paid for in urban terrain surrendered to Russian infiltrations. The 28th Brigade spokesperson mentioned a lack of sufficient manpower for a direct assault during the May 13 operation — which is why ground drones were used. Tactical creativity partially compensates for structural shortages. But it cannot compensate for everything indefinitely. The pressure on NATO allies to accelerate deliveries of weapons, ammunition, and anti-drone defense systems is not a symbolic call — it is a measurable operational necessity in lives.

DeepState also reported that some Ukrainian brigades are facing manpower shortages along certain sections of the front. These deficits partly explain why Russian infiltrations progress despite a competent and determined Ukrainian defense. It is not a question of military talent — Ukraine has proven its worth in combat time and again. It is a question of mass, one of the fundamental principles of war, which Western democracies sometimes struggle to understand in its arithmetic brutality.

Conclusion: “Probably” as an Act of Resistance

Assumed Uncertainty as Operational Intelligence

The numbers war in Kostiantynivka has no analytical winner. Bakulin says 123 probably. Hromadske says more than a hundred, maybe 250. Reports in circulation mention 300. None of these estimates are false — they measure partial realities with different methods, from different angles, at slightly different times of a dynamic situation. The truth probably lies somewhere in that space of uncertainty. And anyone who claims to know it exactly, without reservation, without a margin, is lying — or lying to themselves.

What this analysis sought to demonstrate is that honestly quantified uncertainty is informationally superior to manufactured certainty. In a context where Russia produces AI videos of flags on non-captured cities, where Russian generals report fictional victories to their hierarchy, Bakulin's “probably” is as much a political act as an epistemological one. It is a refusal to lie to reassure. It is a respect for the truth in a war that cruelly lacks it.

Kostiantynivka: The City That Still Resists

As of the time of writing, Kostiantynivka is holding. Ukrainian forces are conducting counter-operations within the urban fabric. Explosive ground drones are eliminating infiltration groups. The 28th Mechanized Brigade is adapting its tactics in real time. Logistical corridors are under pressure but not yet cut. The city has absorbed about 12.69% enemy infiltration over several months and has not fallen. That is not nothing. It is not a victory. It is war as it really is — slow, costly, full of uncertainties, and won or lost in the margins of a probabilistic estimate.

The numbers war will continue. Other diverging estimates will circulate. Other generals will say “probably” live. And every time that happens, let us remember that this word is not a hesitation. It is a method. And in a total information war, it is also — in its own way — a weapon.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Sources

Primary Sources

Ukra06ska Pravda — Bakulin: Russia does not control Kostiantynivka, about 123 enemy soldiers in city — June 15, 2026

EuroMaidan Press — DeepState: Kostiantynivka faces Pokrovsk-style siege, “matter of time” — June 18, 2026

Hromadske — “Will Kostiantynivka hold out until the end of summer?”: Investigation into Russian infiltration — June 12, 2026

Secondary Sources

United24 Media — Russia uses AI-generated videos to fake military success near Kostiantynivka, ISW says — June 16, 2026

United24 Media — Russia shifts Donbas offensive to Kostiantynivka after Sloviansk push stalls, ISW says — June 11, 2026

The Kyiv Independent — Kostiantynivka on brink of humanitarian crisis, says Donetsk Governor — June 25, 2025

Militarnyi — Ground drones help eliminate Russian infiltrators in Kostiantynivka — May 13, 2026

Ukrinform — Ukrainian forces repel four-direction Russian assault in Kostiantynivka — March 26, 2026