To those who still doubt Libya can ever vote

Introduction: a letter to a people tired of waiting

Why I'm writing to you today

Dear readers who have followed, often with weariness, the Libyan file for years, I address this piece to you as an open letter rather than a simple analysis. Because Libya deserves better than a diplomatic footnote drowned between two other crises. This country has been waiting for national elections since the bitter failure of the vote planned for December 2021, and every new announcement of progress is met, among the most seasoned observers, with legitimate skepticism.

And yet, something moved in late June 2026. The small 4+4 committee, meeting in Tunis under the auspices of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), reached consensus on the presidential election law during its fourth round of talks. This is a concrete, documented, verifiable step — not just one more statement of intent.

What this letter aims to accomplish

I do not claim here to convince you that Libya will vote for certain in February 2027, the date now put forward by the country's three main political institutions. I simply want to show you, piece by piece, why this file deserves renewed attention, without sliding into a naive optimism this country has too often punished.

The fourth-round consensus: what actually happened in Tunis

A technical agreement, not yet a political one

On June 24, 2026, UNSMIL announced that participants in the fourth round of consultations of the 4+4 committee — four representatives from eastern Libya, four from the west — had reached consensus on the presidential election law. This committee was created by the United Nations as an alternative mechanism to overcome the persistent political deadlock, after the House of Representatives and the High Council of State failed to agree on amending the electoral laws and appointing a new board for the High National Elections Commission (HNEC).

According to UNSMIL, this fourth session, held in an atmosphere described as "positive and constructive," resolved most of the issues linked to the electoral process in the first two phases of the UN-facilitated roadmap. A fifth round is planned for the first half of July, to continue discussions and consolidate the progress made.

A necessary clarification: the 4+4 is not the Structured Dialogue

Precision matters here, because confusion often reigns in media coverage of this file: the 4+4 committee is not a replacement for the Structured Dialogue, which concluded its own final report on June 7, 2026 with more than 525 recommendations. The United Nations insists that the 4+4 is a complementary mechanism, targeted at specific obstacles to organizing the vote.

This technical distinction matters: it shows that UN diplomacy in Libya is advancing on several parallel fronts, with precise mandates, rather than in a vague fog of structureless negotiations.

The June 18 roadmap: a calendar finally set

Three leaders, one historic agreement

A few days before the 4+4 committee's agreement, an equally significant event took place in Tripoli: on June 18, 2026, the heads of Libya's three main political institutions — Aguila Saleh, president of the House of Representatives, Mohammed Takala, president of the High Council of State, and Mohamed al-Menfi, president of the Presidential Council — jointly announced a roadmap setting simultaneous presidential and legislative elections for February 17, 2027.

This is a rare convergence between institutions that have historically distinguished themselves mainly through mutual gridlock. The agreement also calls for creating a high-level oversight body, including the governor of the Central Bank of Libya, the president of the HNEC, and representatives of the Joint Military Commission (5+5).

A calendar grounded in the 13th constitutional amendment

The roadmap calls for amendments to electoral legislation consistent with the thirteenth constitutional amendment, and requires the future elected president to launch a broad national dialogue to finalize a permanent constitution. This is a detail that matters: it shows this round of elections is not conceived as an end in itself, but as the starting point of a broader constitutional process meant to durably stabilize the country's institutions.

Respect for the Constitutional Declaration, the Libyan Political Agreement and the conclusions of previous Cairo talks was also reaffirmed by the three leaders, a welcome signal of legal continuity in a country where every actor has, in the past, sought to rewrite the rules to their own advantage.

The weight of the Structured Dialogue: 525 recommendations to rebuild the state

Six months of consultations, one hundred twenty Libyan voices

On June 7, 2026, at its final plenary session in Tripoli, the Structured Dialogue presented its final recommendations for holding national elections, unifying and strengthening state institutions, and addressing the deep, persistent root causes of the conflict. This process brought together roughly 120 Libyans from diverse backgrounds over six months, producing more than 525 recommendations spanning governance, the economy, security and national reconciliation.

While some disagreements emerged, notably on the governance track, the report was broadly well received by stakeholders, according to the United Nations, which now calls for translating it into a structured, sequenced implementation led by Libyans themselves.

What this report says about popular exhaustion

This volume of recommendations, impressive as it is on paper, mainly reflects one thing: the scale of institutional rebuilding still needed in a country fragmented since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. Holding a vote will not be enough: the elected institutions will also need real authority across the entire territory, including in the east controlled by forces loyal to Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar.

It's this structural dimension, often overlooked in media coverage fixated on election dates, that will determine whether the February 2027 vote, if it happens, leads to lasting stability or to a fresh legitimacy crisis.

The National Elections Commission: the decisive technical link

A reconstituted commission, an approved budget

An often-underestimated technical development concerns the reconstitution of the board of the High National Elections Commission (HNEC), an effort launched in late 2025 and continued through the 4+4 mechanism. The House of Representatives had already approved, on December 30, a proposed budget of 210 million Libyan dinars to cover the estimated costs of organizing national elections in 2026.

The HNEC itself has repeatedly reaffirmed its operational readiness, subject to three cumulative conditions: adequate funding, sufficient security guarantees, and a final agreement on electoral laws. It is this last condition that the 4+4 committee has just moved closer to resolving.

The judiciary's quiet but essential role

One technical detail deserves attention: the recommendation that the future president of the reconstituted HNEC be chosen from among magistrates recognized for their impartiality and competence, a decision entrusted to Attorney General Siddiq al-Sour. This choice to hand a key role to the judiciary, rather than to rival political blocs, is specifically aimed at limiting suspicions of manipulation of the electoral process.

It's an institutional detail that seems minor on paper but actually shapes the very credibility of the vote in the eyes of a Libyan population burned by years of broken promises.

The security obstacles that remain

A country still split into two armed camps

No roadmap, however well drafted, can erase the security reality of Libya in 2026: the country remains divided between the Government of National Unity based in Tripoli and the general command of the Libyan National Army, loyal to Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, based in the east. UNSMIL continues to facilitate what it calls the "Smaller Convening," a discussion format bringing together representatives of both camps.

According to the most recent briefings to the Security Council, these discussions have produced an agreement in principle on reconstituting the HNEC, but further progress is still needed on the electoral laws themselves and on the security guarantees surrounding the vote.

The sensitive issue of administrative-number holders

One specific point of friction concerns the status of people holding "administrative numbers," a file linked to populations whose civil identity has been affected by years of conflict and displacement. The advisory committee recommended that voter registration and candidacy be reserved for holders of a national identity number, while acknowledging the urgency of resolving this issue outside of any electoral or political pressure.

It's the kind of technical, almost bureaucratic detail that could nonetheless derail an entire electoral process if future authorities fail to handle it with the necessary rigor.

What Washington is watching from a distance

Discreet but present American diplomacy

According to information reported by specialized diplomatic intelligence services, the Trump administration's Africa adviser is reportedly examining an alternative option allowing the two rival Libyan factions to remain in place, recognized as legitimate, as part of a power-sharing arrangement within a reunified government whose mandate would not require a vote. This possibility, if confirmed, would contrast with the electoral approach favored by the United Nations.

I report this with the caution it demands: this is an option under consideration reported by a specialized source, not a settled decision. But it illustrates the ongoing tension between the democratic goal championed by UNSMIL and the short-term stability calculations that some outside powers may prefer.

Should the West push harder for real elections?

I'll say it plainly: favoring mere power-sharing without going through the ballot box would be a strategic mistake for the West, even if it seems simpler in the short term. Stability bought at the price of democratic legitimacy always costs more later, in countries like Libya where every facade agreement has ended up exploding into a new armed crisis.

Firmly backing the electoral process led by UNSMIL, rather than backroom arrangements between armed factions, should remain the priority of any serious Western diplomacy on this file.

China's position and Russia's relative silence

Beijing applauds, but stays in the background

It is telling that China's official press agency extensively covered the 4+4 committee's agreement, with China also praising the joint committee's work on electoral laws at the Security Council. This surface-level diplomatic support, however, masks concrete economic interests: Beijing is seeking to secure its presence in Libyan reconstruction and infrastructure, regardless of which camp ultimately holds power.

For its part, Russia maintains a discreet but real presence through mercenaries and logistical support to certain eastern Libyan factions, in an influence game that goes far beyond the electoral file alone and should raise more alarm in Western foreign ministries.

Why this rivalry for influence matters to us

Libya is not just an isolated regional file: it is also a battleground for influence between the West, China and Russia, in an oil-rich country strategically located facing southern Europe. Every election delay, every new institutional crisis, offers these rival powers additional room to consolidate their influence at the expense of stability aligned with Western interests.

That is, in my view, one more reason for Europe and the United States to invest more actively, not just rhetorically, in the success of this fragile electoral process.

What ordinary Libyans actually want

A weariness that transcends political divides

Beyond the diplomatic maneuvering, it's worth recalling what ordinary Libyans concretely want: an end to chronic power outages, a stable currency, functioning public services and the ability to travel from one region to another without fearing checkpoints run by rival militias. According to consultations conducted by UNSMIL itself, a majority of Libyans agree on the need to unify the government even before elections are held, given how much current divisions affect their daily lives.

This popular demand, documented by the UN mission's own polling and consultations, should weigh more heavily in diplomatic calculations than election-calendar considerations alone.

The risk of a fresh disillusionment

The country has already experienced the cancellation of the vote planned for December 2021, a disappointment that durably eroded popular trust in any newly announced timeline. Should the February 17, 2027 date also end up postponed, the risk of massive popular disengagement from any future democratic process would be real, with potentially explosive consequences for the country's stability.

It is this pressure of time, as much as the maneuvering among political elites, that should guide the international community's urgency on this file.

Why this letter is also addressed to Western diplomats

A call for consistency rather than cyclical indifference

Dear decision-makers in Washington, in Brussels, and in European capitals who follow this file only intermittently, I address this part of my letter directly to you: Libya does not deserve fitful attention, reactivated only during migration-crisis spikes or flare-ups of violence in Tripoli. It deserves steady support for the process led by UNSMIL, including when negotiations seem technical and unspectacular.

The 4+4 committee and the Structured Dialogue are moving forward precisely because international attention, even quiet attention, keeps constructive pressure on Libyan actors. Reducing that attention just as real progress is taking shape would be a major strategic mistake.

What I am concretely asking for

I am not asking for a diplomatic miracle, only for consistency: clear financial and logistical support for the reconstituted HNEC, continued diplomatic pressure to ensure the fifth round of the 4+4 committee planned for July produces concrete results, and a categorical refusal of any easy solution that would bypass the popular vote in favor of mere power-sharing between armed factions.

That is, in my view, the only path that honors both the memory of the Libyans who have died since 2011 and the legitimate hope of those who finally want to vote freely for their future.

Lessons from a decade of failures not to repeat

2021, the precedent that still haunts minds

It is impossible to discuss the 2027 timeline without revisiting the failure of the December 2021 vote, canceled at the last minute for lack of agreement on candidate eligibility criteria, notably the contested candidacy of the son of former leader Muammar Gaddafi. That failure left deep scars in popular trust and fueled additional years of institutional fragmentation.

The difference this time may lie in the method: unlike 2021, when electoral laws were cobbled together in a rush, the current process rests on more methodical work, sequenced over several months, with dedicated mechanisms like the 4+4 committee and the Structured Dialogue.

Caution remains warranted despite the progress

I nonetheless refuse to give in to blind optimism: Libya has repeatedly shown, since 2011, its capacity to derail processes that seemed well underway. The coming weeks, with the fifth round of the 4+4 committee planned for early July, will be a decisive test of whether this positive momentum holds or collapses, like so many before it.

It is this constant tension between cautious hope and informed skepticism that should, I believe, guide our collective reading of this file in the months ahead.

Libya's economy, a silent hostage of the political crisis

An oil-rich country paralyzed by division

Libya holds Africa's largest oil reserves, but that wealth remains largely trapped by the institutional divide between the country's east and west. The Central Bank of Libya, whose governor will now sit on the electoral oversight body called for by the June 18 roadmap, plays a pivotal role in distributing oil revenue among the country's various factions.

This direct involvement of the Central Bank in the electoral process is no small thing: it reflects the need to ensure that public funds, particularly revenue from oil exports, are not diverted to finance unfair election campaigns or armed militias hostile to the democratic process.

The currency, a thermometer of popular trust

The Libyan dinar remains highly volatile, reflecting persistent political uncertainty. Every new announcement of diplomatic progress, like the 4+4 committee's in late June, sends positive but fragile signals to the informal currency markets that dominate ordinary Libyans' daily economy. Lasting political stabilization would be the best possible lever to restore a monetary trust eroded long ago.

It is this concrete economic reality, more than abstract diplomatic maneuvering, that will determine whether the population keeps supporting the electoral process or gradually turns away from institutions unable to improve their daily lives.

Mediterranean Europe's role in this file

Italy and France, directly concerned neighbors

Among Western powers, Italy and France remain particularly attentive to the Libyan file, given their geographic proximity and the migration stakes directly tied to the country's instability. A stabilized Libya with legitimate institutions would be a far more reliable partner for managing migration flows across the Mediterranean than a country fractured among rival militias.

These two European countries have, in the past, adopted sometimes diverging positions on Libya, backing opposing camps to varying degrees. This historic European division has itself helped weaken the credibility of Western mediation in the country, a point few Western analysts like to acknowledge publicly.

An opportunity to mend European policy

The current moment, with tangible progress driven by UNSMIL, offers a rare opportunity for the European Union to finally speak with one voice on the Libyan file, rather than letting each capital pursue its own interests separately. A unified European position would considerably strengthen the West's diplomatic weight against the competing ambitions of China and Russia in the region.

It is a test of diplomatic maturity for a Europe that has too often let its internal divisions serve the interests of outside powers hostile to its own strategic priorities.

The Tunisian precedent: why Tunis matters so much in this story

A choice of neutral ground that has proven itself

The choice of Tunis as the venue for 4+4 committee negotiations is no accident. The Tunisian capital has for several years hosted the main inter-Libyan talks, offering neutral, secure and logistically accessible ground for delegations from both eastern and western Libya. This recurring diplomatic choice reflects the relative trust both camps place in Tunisia as a discreet facilitator.

Tunisia's relative stability itself, despite its own internal political tensions, makes it a valuable partner for UN diplomacy in the region, a role Tunis appears to embrace with calculated discretion since the start of the UNSMIL process.

An example for other regional mediations

The Tunisian facilitation model, combining geographic proximity with a deliberate political neutrality, could inspire other mediation processes in similar regional conflicts, where the choice of negotiation venue often influences, in underestimated ways, the parties' willingness to engage seriously in dialogue.

For Libya, this geographic continuity of negotiations in Tunis also offers a welcome form of institutional predictability in a process otherwise marked by numerous twists and calendar changes.

Conclusion: a letter ending on a cautious glimmer of hope

What I take from this pivotal moment

At the end of this letter, what I take away is that Libya, in late June 2026, is living through a rare pivotal moment: a technical consensus on the presidential election law, a calendar roadmap endorsed by the country's three main institutions, and foundational work carried out by the Structured Dialogue to rebuild solid institutional groundwork. These are not guarantees, but they are verifiable progress, documented by the United Nations itself.

The February 17, 2027 date remains fragile, hanging on the goodwill of actors who have historically often favored their short-term interests over Libya's national interest. But for the first time in years, this date rests on an institutional architecture sturdier than mere statements of intent.

A final word to those who have lost hope

To you, Libyan citizens worn down by a decade of broken promises, I can offer no certainty. But I can tell you that this process, this time, is being built with more method, more verification mechanisms and more documented international attention than before. It will be up to you, and to your institutions, to turn this window of opportunity into concrete electoral reality.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Who I am and my acknowledged biases

I sign this open letter as a columnist who champions a vision in which the West must remain a central actor for international stability, and in which democratic processes must take precedence over power arrangements between armed factions. This acknowledged bias shapes my judgment on the Libyan file, notably my skepticism toward any solution that would bypass the popular vote.

I am not an academic specialist on the Maghreb nor a field diplomat: my role is to synthesize and contextualize verifiable public information for a readership that doesn't have time to follow every United Nations Security Council briefing.

What I don't know and my method

I cannot guarantee that the fifth round of the 4+4 committee, planned for early July 2026, will produce a further agreement, nor that the February 17, 2027 date will actually be met. Information about a possible alternative option reportedly under review by the American administration remains, at this stage, reported by a single specialized source and deserves cautious treatment.

My method rests on official UNSMIL statements, public briefings before the Security Council, and recognized press agencies, cross-checked before any claim is presented as an established fact.

Sources

Primary sources

China.org.cn (Xinhua) — Libyan rival factions agree on presidential election law in UN-brokered dialogue, June 25, 2026

UNSMIL — Structured Dialogue concludes, presents final recommendations for Libya's political process, June 7, 2026

United Nations — Speakers in Security Council Urge Concrete Progress on Elections in Libya, June 18, 2026

Secondary sources

LibyaReview — UN facilitates new round of Libya political talks in Tunis

Africanews — Libya's main governing bodies agree to hold elections, June 18, 2026

Council on Foreign Relations — Global Conflict Tracker: Civil War in Libya

Africa Intelligence — Internal rivalries resurface in Dbeibeh and Haftar election talks, June 4, 2026