Beijing, stop bullying Manila and Tokyo in the South China Sea

Introduction: a letter to those who patrol other people's waters

What I want to say to Beijing today

Dear government of Beijing, I am writing this letter because your patrols around Scarborough Shoal and your repeated warnings toward Japan and the Philippines no longer fool very many people: they look like plain intimidation, dressed up in international legal language (Reuters, June 30, 2026).

China stepped up its warnings in early July 2026, calling the maritime talks between Japan and the Philippines an "internationally illicit act," language that betrays more anxiety over losing the narrative than the strength of any real legal argument (Bloomberg, July 2, 2026).

Why an open letter, not a cold analysis

I chose the open letter format because this file deserves a direct address, not just a pile of distant facts. The people of the region, Filipino fishermen foremost among them, live the concrete consequences of these tensions far more than any Western commentator ever will.

This letter nonetheless remains rigorously sourced: every claim it contains rests on verifiable reporting from recent weeks.

What is really happening at Scarborough

Patrols that keep intensifying

On June 30, 2026, Reuters documented joint patrols by the Southern Theater Command of the People's Liberation Army and the Chinese coast guard around the disputed Scarborough Shoal, an area the Philippines considers part of its exclusive economic zone (Reuters, June 30, 2026).

These patrols come after the removal of a Chinese floating barrier from the same shoal, withdrawn in June following repeated protests from Manila, an apparent retreat that clearly did not end the broader tensions in the area (Philstar, June 17, 2026).

A cycle of provocation and calculated retreat

This cycle of provocation followed by partial withdrawal, followed by fresh provocation, resembles a deliberate strategy of testing limits, where each apparent retreat mainly serves to temporarily defuse international diplomatic pressure without abandoning the underlying objective.

Manila, for its part, already summoned the Chinese ambassador earlier this year to formally protest this repeated rhetorical escalation, a diplomatic gesture that clearly has not been enough to durably change Beijing's behavior.

The Japan-Philippines summit that set it all off

An alliance that worries Beijing

The summit between Japanese prime minister Sanae Takaichi and Philippine president Ferdinand Marcos Jr announced the opening of bilateral talks on maritime borders, an initiative that immediately triggered Beijing's official anger (SCMP, May 29, 2026).

This disproportionate reaction from China to simple bilateral talks between two sovereign democracies says a great deal about its real concern: watching a sturdier regional coordination take shape among countries that refuse its unilateral maritime claims.

The specter of Taiwan in Chinese warnings

According to Bloomberg, Chinese authorities also warned against any involvement of Taiwan in these broader maritime talks, an extension of the dispute that shows how Beijing systematically links every regional file to its central obsession with the democratic island (Bloomberg, July 2, 2026).

This drive to fold every regional discussion into the Taiwan lens confirms, if confirmation were needed, that China's strategy in the South China Sea is never limited to a single isolated reef.

What international law says, without ambiguity

The 2016 arbitral ruling, still valid

The Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague had already ruled in 2016 in favor of the Philippines against Chinese claims over most of the South China Sea, a decision Beijing continues to unilaterally reject despite its binding character under international law.

This persistent rejection of an international legal ruling by a power that otherwise claims to defend the international order is a contradiction this letter cannot ignore.

The Code of Conduct negotiated for years

ASEAN is aiming to finalize a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea by the end of 2026, an ambitious goal after years of laborious negotiations with Beijing on this file (Philstar, June 10, 2026).

The success of these negotiations, if they truly come to fruition, will depend largely on Chinese willingness to respect multilateral rules rather than keep imposing facts on the ground through naval patrols.

The Philippines, on the front line for years

A nation resisting with limited means

The Philippines, despite naval resources vastly inferior to China's, keeps publicly documenting every maritime incident, a transparency strategy aimed precisely at mobilizing international opinion against a far more powerful military adversary.

This asymmetry of power makes the Philippine persistence in defending its maritime rights all the more admirable, rather than simply yielding to the constant pressure exerted by its regional neighbor.

The role of American and Japanese support

Diplomatic and military support from the United States and now Japan for the Philippines constitutes a necessary counterweight to the power asymmetry that has characterized this regional dispute for decades.

This Western and allied support must never, however, substitute for the primary responsibility of the Philippines to defend its own maritime sovereignty, a delicate balance Manila manages with remarkable composure.

Why this file also concerns the West

A vital trade route for the entire world

The South China Sea sees trillions of dollars in international trade pass through it every year, which makes freedom of navigation there an issue that goes far beyond the sole territorial dispute between China and its immediate neighbors.

Any Chinese attempt to turn this crucial maritime route into a zone under unilateral control would directly affect Western economic interests, well beyond the Asia-Pacific region alone.

A test of credibility for the international order

This file is also a test of credibility for the entire rules-based international order, a principle the West defends rhetorically but must also back concretely when powers like China actively challenge it on the ground.

Letting Beijing impose facts on the ground without a firm response would send a dangerous signal to other revisionist powers watching the Western reaction to these repeated maritime provocations closely.

What Beijing should really fear

A regional coordination that keeps strengthening anyway

Paradoxically, Beijing's repeated intimidation seems to be accelerating exactly what it is trying to prevent: tighter coordination between Japan, the Philippines, and other regional partners worried about the same maritime intimidation tactics.

This counterproductive dynamic illustrates a classic strategic error: excessive pressure often ends up uniting its targets rather than dividing them, an effect diplomatic history documents abundantly.

The reputational price of repeated threats

Every new Chinese warning, every new patrol around disputed reefs, chips away a little more at Beijing's international credibility as a responsible actor in the regional order, a reputational cost that Chinese diplomacy seems to systematically underestimate.

This reputational cost, accumulated over several years of similar tensions, could eventually outweigh the limited territorial gains China hopes to secure through this strategy of sustained pressure.

A letter also addressed to the West

Not settling for statements of principle

This letter is also addressed, implicitly, to the West itself: statements of principle about freedom of navigation and international law are not enough if they are not paired with concrete, lasting support for the regional partners directly threatened.

Diplomatic support must translate into regular naval presence, credible joint exercises, and help strengthening Philippine and Japanese maritime capabilities against Chinese pressure that shows no sign of letting up.

Western consistency, an imperative

This Western consistency must also apply elsewhere: one cannot firmly denounce Russian aggression in Ukraine while remaining timid in the face of Chinese intimidation in the South China Sea, on pain of a double standard that would weaken the West's overall credibility.

It is this consistency, more than any one-off speech, that will determine whether the West retains its credibility as a sincere defender of the rules-based international order.

The human dimension behind the maritime maps

Fishermen caught between two powers

Behind the maritime maps and diplomatic statements, there are ordinary Filipino fishermen whose livelihoods depend directly on access to traditional fishing grounds, now contested by Chinese patrols.

These coastal communities, often modest economically, pay the daily concrete price of a geopolitical dispute that far exceeds their individual capacity for action or negotiation.

A reality too often forgotten in geopolitical analysis

It is easy, from a Western desk, to coldly discuss exclusive economic zones and international maritime law. It is harder to remember that these abstract discussions concretely determine whether a Filipino fishing family eats properly this month.

This human dimension deserves to be recalled regularly, at the risk of otherwise turning a daily-life issue into a mere intellectual geopolitical exercise, disconnected from the ground.

What Tokyo brings new to this equation

A more assertive Japan on the regional stage

Japan's direct involvement in maritime talks with the Philippines marks a notable shift in Tokyo's regional posture, traditionally more cautious on territorial files that do not directly concern it.

This more assertive Tokyo posture reflects growing Japanese concern over Chinese maritime ambitions, which also directly touch Japan in the separate but related matter of the Senkaku Islands.

A regional solidarity building gradually

This nascent solidarity between Tokyo and Manila on maritime issues could, if it consolidates over time, form a significant regional counterweight to Chinese ambitions, complementary to the already well-established American support in the region.

It is precisely this gradual consolidation that Beijing visibly seeks to discourage through its repeated warnings, apparently with little success so far.

The limits of this letter and what it does not claim to know

A fast-moving situation

This letter, written in early July 2026, reflects a situation that is by nature evolving: new patrols, new statements, or new diplomatic developments could arise quickly after its publication.

I do not claim, therefore, to offer a definitive judgment on the outcome of this maritime dispute, but rather an honest snapshot based on verifiable information available at this precise moment.

What I cannot state with certainty

I cannot state with certainty whether the Code of Conduct targeted by ASEAN for the end of 2026 will actually be completed within the announced timeline, nor whether current Chinese patrols will intensify or calm down in the coming weeks.

This honest uncertainty is an integral part of any serious geopolitical analysis, and I would rather own it than pretend to a clairvoyance current facts do not support.

A direct appeal for Chinese restraint

What Beijing would gain from de-escalation

Dear government of Beijing, a sincere de-escalation of your patrols around Scarborough and genuine respect for the Code of Conduct under negotiation would strengthen your international credibility far more than continuing a pressure strategy that, as shown above, mainly produces the opposite of the intended effect.

This de-escalation would not mean abandoning your territorial claims, but simply pursuing them through legitimate diplomatic and legal channels rather than repeated naval intimidation.

What the entire region would gain from it

A genuine de-escalation would benefit the entire region: Filipino fishermen who could resume their activities without fear, international trade passing through these waters, and the regional stability that every actor, including China itself, publicly claims to seek.

It is this vision of a stable and prosperous region, rather than one dominated by fear and intimidation, that this letter sincerely calls for.

What this letter concretely demands

Three specific demands addressed to Beijing

I am concretely asking three things of Beijing: stop the intimidating patrols around disputed reefs, respect the 2016 arbitral ruling without further conditions, and negotiate the Code of Conduct with ASEAN in good faith, without trying to strip it of its binding substance.

These three demands are not a maximalist anti-China stance, but simply the minimal respect for international law that China itself claims elsewhere, on other international files that suit it better.

What the West must demand of itself

At the same time, this letter asks the West to translate its rhetorical support for the Philippines and Japan into concrete, lasting commitments, rather than one-off statements that fade the moment the news cycle moves elsewhere.

It is this dual demand, toward Beijing and toward ourselves, that fundamentally structures this open letter.

What history will remember of this precise moment

A tipping point few notice yet

The year 2026 may, in hindsight, be remembered as the one when the coalition between Japan, the Philippines, and their Western partners stopped being a mere statement of intent and became a concrete security architecture in the South China Sea.

The joint patrols, the expanded military exercises, and the intelligence-sharing agreements signed in recent months are not mere diplomatic symbols: they are quietly but durably redrawing the regional balance of power against Beijing.

What the coming months will say about our collective resolve

The real question is no longer whether China will keep testing the limits of international law in the region, because it almost certainly will, but whether Japan, the Philippines, and the West can maintain their cohesion beyond the next headline incident.

It is this endurance, more than any one-off statement, that will determine whether this open letter turns out to have been a mere rhetorical exercise or the reflection of a genuinely embraced turning point.

Conclusion: a region that deserves better than fear

A file that will not close anytime soon

The maritime dispute between China, the Philippines, and Japan will probably not be resolved in the coming weeks, despite the ambitious deadline set by ASEAN for the Code of Conduct by the end of 2026.

What this letter hopes for, more modestly, is to help clearly name the respective responsibilities of each actor, without indulgence toward any side, including the West when it falls short of its own rhetorical commitments.

A final word for those who live on these coasts

For the Filipino fishermen, for the worried Japanese coastal communities, and for everyone who lives daily with the consequences of this geopolitical dispute, this letter hopes at least to bear witness that their situation is not forgotten by those who, from afar, observe and write about these issues.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Who I am and my limits

I am a columnist, not an academic specialist in international maritime law nor a military expert on the Asia-Pacific region. This letter rests on verifiable journalistic sources from recent weeks, not on privileged access to ongoing diplomatic discussions.

My acknowledged bias is pro-Western and critical of unilateral Chinese maritime claims; I state this explicitly so readers can weigh my analysis with full knowledge of that fact.

Method and limits of this file

This letter relies exclusively on dated, verifiable sources, explicitly cited at the end of the text. I invented no direct testimony from fishermen or government officials; any human reference remains general and is not attributed to specific individuals.

The situation described is evolving rapidly; this letter reflects the state of knowledge as of July 3, 2026.

Sources

Primary sources

The Star — China ramps up warnings to Japan and the Philippines — July 3, 2026

Reuters — China conducts patrols around Scarborough Shoal — June 30, 2026

Associated Press — Philippines and Beijing, disputes in the South China Sea — 2026

Secondary sources

South China Morning Post — China condemns Japan-Philippines maritime border talks — May 29, 2026

Philstar — Philippines targets end of 2026 for South China Sea Code of Conduct — June 10, 2026

Reuters — China threatens Taiwan, Japan strengthens its defense posture — June 11, 2026

Council on Foreign Relations — Tracking the territorial dispute in the South China Sea — 2026