To Brazil, dear Marco Rubio, listen to your own allies

Introduction: a letter to a secretary of state who won't back down

A trade file turned diplomatic arm-wrestle

Dear Marco Rubio, I write this letter at the precise moment your administration is maintaining, against every call for restraint, the threat of a 25% tariff on a large share of Brazilian imports. This file, opened by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) in early June 2026 under a Section 301 investigation, has turned within a matter of weeks into a major diplomatic standoff between Washington and Brasília.

The U.S. Trade Representative, Jamieson Greer, concluded that Brazil was engaging in trade practices deemed "unreasonable" in six areas: digital commerce, electronic payments, preferential tariffs, protection of intellectual property, access to the ethanol market and illegal deforestation. A public hearing is scheduled for July 6, 2026 before the United States International Trade Commission, and Brazil has until July 15 to take what Washington calls "responsive action."

Why I am writing to you directly, Mr. Secretary

I am addressing this letter to you because I believe trade diplomacy should never turn into an instrument for settling electoral scores, yet that is precisely what several observers fear now that Brazilian senator Flávio Bolsonaro, a declared candidate for the presidential election of October 2026, has registered to personally testify at the July 6 hearing against a tariff he calls counterproductive for both countries.

Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has not minced words, calling the tariff "unjustified and politically motivated," and even branding you a "mortal enemy" of Latin America, according to several media outlets that have tracked this rare verbal escalation between two governments otherwise bound by decades of mutually beneficial trade.

What the Section 301 investigation on Brazil actually reveals

Six precise grievances, not a mere punitive posture

The investigation conducted by the USTR, launched in July 2025 on direct order from President Trump, led to conclusions documented in a notice published in the Federal Register on June 1, 2026: Brazil allegedly maintains discriminatory practices affecting electronic payment systems such as Pix, an application of preferential tariffs toward India and Mexico deemed unfair to American companies, along with insufficient enforcement of anti-corruption and anti-deforestation laws.

These grievances, however technical they may appear to the general public, represent, according to Washington, a real burden on American trade, a conclusion that legally opens the door to imposing punitive tariffs under the 1974 trade law.

A list of exemptions that limits the tariff's real reach

It should nonetheless be noted, for accuracy's sake, that the American proposal exempts more than 1,600 product categories, including some of Brazil's leading exports to the United States: coffee, beef, orange juice, rare earths and aircraft parts. According to economic estimates cited by several analysts, the measure would ultimately affect less than 30% of Brazilian exports to the American market.

This nuance is essential: it contradicts the image of a sweeping, blanket tariff that some commentators have tried to present, while doing nothing to lessen the political gravity of the move against a long-standing historical trade partner.

The Brazilian electoral context that complicates everything

Flávio Bolsonaro, a witness far from neutral

Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, son of former president Jair Bolsonaro, has requested a five-minute slot to testify personally at the July 6 hearing, arguing that this 25% tariff will fail to correct the practices it targets. In a letter addressed directly to you, Mr. Rubio, he formally reiterated his request that the United States abandon this measure, invoking a partnership "beneficial to both nations for more than 80 years."

This intervention is obviously not free of political calculation: as a declared candidate for the October 2026 presidential race, the senator is clearly positioning himself as Washington's preferred interlocutor against a Lula he is fighting head-on in Brazilian domestic politics.

The Lula government chooses the path of strategic absence

Notably: according to several sources, the Lula government does not plan to send official representatives to this July 6 public hearing, judging that the forum is aimed more at the private and civil sectors than at governments themselves. Brasília apparently prefers to communicate through written channels and more discreet diplomatic avenues rather than lend itself to a public exercise that could work to the political advantage of its domestic opponents.

This calculated withdrawal strategy illustrates the complexity of a trade file that has, in practice, largely turned into a matter of Brazilian domestic politics, blurring the line between economic diplomacy and electoral calculation on both sides of the Atlantic.

Brazil's reciprocity law, a double-edged weapon

Brasília reserves the right to retaliate

The Brazilian government has warned that it does not intend to passively absorb these measures, signaling that it could invoke its recently adopted reciprocity law, passed unanimously by the Brazilian Congress, a text allowing it to respond to tariffs deemed unfair under international trade rules. This law, passed in a rare moment of Brazilian political consensus, shows just how much the country's political class, across all leanings, perceives this American pressure as excessive.

A potential Brazilian retaliation could target strategic American sectors, turning this dispute into a bilateral trade war with potentially damaging consequences for companies in both countries, at a time when the global economy is already struggling to absorb the multiple tariff shocks launched by the Trump administration since its return to power.

An already weakened American legal context

It bears recalling that the United States Supreme Court ruled in February 2026 that President Trump had exceeded his authority by using a separate law, IEEPA, to impose sweeping tariffs on numerous trading partners, including Brazil. It is precisely this judicial ruling that pushed the administration to fall back on the slower but legally sturdier route of Section 301, requiring country-by-country investigations, consultations and public hearings before any implementation.

This procedural detour, though it slows the timeline, paradoxically confers greater legal legitimacy on the current approach toward Brazil, compared with the broad tariffs struck down by the courts just months earlier.

The legacy of an earlier 50% tariff that still weighs heavily

A sanction born of a Brazilian judicial dispute

This new trade dispute did not arise from nowhere: it continues a prior 50% tariff imposed by President Trump last year, largely as a sanction against the judicial prosecution targeting former president Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil. The newly proposed 25% tariff would partially replace that earlier measure, with a combined rate of 40% mentioned by some sources for goods covered by that initial political sanction.

This continuity between political sanction and documented trade grievance further muddies the reading of this file, with several analysts questioning the real share of economic motivation versus the purely punitive dimension against Lula's political camp.

A U.S. Senate that had already tried to rein in the executive

It should also be recalled that in October 2025, the U.S. Senate voted, with the support of five Republicans joining all Democrats, for a resolution to cancel the national emergency invoked by President Trump to justify these 50% tariffs on most Brazilian goods, including coffee, soybeans and beef. That vote, though largely symbolic given the presidential veto power, already reflected bipartisan unease over using tariffs as a diplomatic weapon.

This earlier Senate resistance casts a particular light on your administration's current persistence, Mr. Rubio, which appears determined to keep up pressure on Brasília despite signals of caution from within its own legislative ranks.

The tight timeline that heightens the pressure

A ten-day window between the hearing and the final decision

The timeline set by the USTR leaves little room to maneuver: after the July 6 public hearing, Brasília has barely nine days to take responsive action deemed satisfactory by Washington before the July 15 deadline. This accelerated timeline, consistent with the Trump administration's stated intent to run these Section 301 proceedings on an "accelerated schedule," leaves little room for in-depth negotiation.

This time compression worries several trade lawyers, who note that, unlike previous Section 301 proceedings, the USTR has not indicated it will accept rebuttal comments after the hearing, further limiting Brasília's opportunities to present additional arguments before the final decision.

A regulatory gray zone that should not be overlooked

There is also a regulatory gray area between July 15, the date the responsive action is expected, and July 24, the expiration date of the blanket 10% tariff currently imposed on Brazil under Section 122. This nine-day window could create considerable legal uncertainty for Brazilian exporters, who will not know exactly which tariff regime applies to their products during this transitional stretch.

This uncertainty, documented by several firms specializing in international trade law, illustrates the practical difficulties faced by companies caught between two overlapping American legal regimes.

The agricultural dimension of the file, an underestimated stake

Ethanol and soybeans at the heart of bilateral tensions

Beyond the digital and judicial questions, this tariff file directly touches the agricultural sector, with access to the Brazilian ethanol market identified as one of the six formal grievances retained by the USTR. American producers of corn and ethanol have for years accused Brazil of maintaining tariff barriers that put their exports at a disadvantage against local production, a technical but economically significant grievance for several American farm states.

This agricultural dimension, often overshadowed by the more spectacular aspects of the political dispute between Lula and the Trump administration, nonetheless reflects the concrete reality of this file: it is not merely a rhetorical confrontation, but precise sectoral economic interests that deserve to be handled with technical rigor rather than grandiose posturing.

Targeted exemptions protecting certain sensitive sectors

It is revealing that coffee and beef, two of Brazil's most important exports to the United States, are among the products exempted from the proposed 25% tariff, a decision suggesting a desire to limit the impact on American consumers themselves rather than a blanket economic punishment of Brazil as a whole.

This selectivity in the exemptions reveals an American administration conscious of the domestic political costs of a sweeping tariff on everyday consumer goods, while maintaining targeted pressure on the sectors identified as problematic by the Section 301 investigation.

The Brazilian business community's reaction to the uncertainty

Exporters caught in the crossfire

Brazilian business federations have expressed growing concern over this prolonged tariff uncertainty, with several industrial sectors denouncing an already measurable impact on investment decisions and medium-term export contracts to the American market. This anxiety within the business world contrasts with the more combative rhetoric adopted by the Lula government in public.

Several large Brazilian companies are reportedly holding discreet discussions with American intermediaries to try to secure additional exemptions before the final July 15 decision, an approach that illustrates the sometimes wide gap between official political posturing and the concrete economic interests of private actors.

Risks of relocation toward other markets

Some Brazilian economic analysts already point to the possibility that exporting companies could redirect part of their production toward other markets, notably European or Asian ones, should American tariff uncertainty persist beyond the July 15 deadline. This defensive diversification, while rational from the perspective of the companies involved, would further weaken the historical trade ties between the two countries.

This diversification dynamic, if confirmed in the months ahead, could have lasting consequences for the very structure of bilateral trade between the United States and Brazil, well beyond the mere outcome of this specific tariff dispute.

Historical precedents of U.S.-Brazil trade tensions

A bilateral relationship marked by cycles of friction

This dispute is not the first snag in the trade relationship between Washington and Brasília: over the decades, several cycles of friction have punctuated an otherwise broadly fruitful exchange, notably around steel, aluminum and the respective agricultural subsidies of both countries within the World Trade Organization.

This history of cyclical tensions is a reminder that the U.S.-Brazil relationship, though anchored in decades of economic cooperation, has never been free of sectoral disagreements, which should encourage both parties to favor faster and less spectacular resolution mechanisms than those currently at play.

An American trade surplus that weakens the punitive argument

It is worth highlighting a fact often overlooked in media coverage of this file: the United States has maintained a trade surplus with Brazil for a decade, which complicates the argument that Brasília is structurally harming American economic interests through its contested trade practices.

This statistical reality, documented by several independent economic analyses, considerably tempers the scope of the American trade grievance, without invalidating the more specific concerns regarding intellectual property or illegal deforestation identified by the investigation.

Dissenting voices within the Republican camp itself

American lawmakers worried for their own farm-belt constituents

Several Republican lawmakers representing American farm districts have expressed, privately according to certain journalistic sources, reservations about the potential impact of Brazilian retaliatory measures against American agricultural exports, particularly if Brasília were to target soybeans or meat in any tariff response.

These internal reservations, though rarely voiced publicly out of partisan loyalty to the Trump administration, reflect real concern over the concrete economic consequences American agriculture could suffer should this dispute degenerate into a prolonged trade confrontation.

The October 2025 Senate vote precedent that still weighs heavily

The fact that five Republican senators joined all Democrats in October 2025 to try to cancel the earlier tariffs on Brazil remains a significant political signal, revealing that the presidential party's displayed unity on this trade file remains largely superficial once the media spotlight fades.

This internal fracture, documented in the official voting records of the U.S. Senate, suggests that political pressure on the Trump administration could intensify should the negative economic consequences of this dispute begin to concretely materialize in the coming months for American farm-belt voters.

The position of European allies on this transatlantic dispute

A European Union watching closely

The European Union, itself engaged in complex negotiations with Mercosur, of which Brazil is the principal economic pillar, is watching this U.S.-Brazil dispute with particular interest, with some European diplomats seeing an opportunity to strengthen trade ties between Brussels and Brasília at Washington's expense.

This competitive dynamic among Western powers for economic influence over Brazil paradoxically illustrates a form of fragmentation within the Western camp itself, at a time when cohesion against China and Russia should instead take priority over internal trade rivalries.

A Mercosur-European Union deal that could benefit from this context

Several European negotiators believe that trade tensions between Washington and Brasília could accelerate the final ratification of the trade agreement between the European Union and Mercosur, a text negotiated over more than two decades that could offer Brazil a substantial trade alternative amid the current American uncertainty.

This prospect, should it materialize, would strengthen the European position in the region while illustrating the unintended consequences that an American trade diplomacy perceived as erratic can produce among its historical partners on the American continent.

Lessons to draw for the future of Western trade diplomacy

The need for a more predictable, less personalized approach

This Brazilian file illustrates a broader structural problem affecting contemporary American trade diplomacy: the excessive personalization of trade disputes, blending legitimate economic grievances with political grudges against specific foreign leaders, undermines the predictability that businesses and partner governments are entitled to expect.

A more institutionalized approach, less dependent on personal relationships between leaders, would likely allow these disputes to be resolved more quickly and at lower political cost for all parties involved, including American interests themselves in the long run.

A test of the West's credibility against emerging powers

Beyond the specific Brazilian case, this dispute stands as a revealing test of the West's overall credibility in its ability to deal fairly with the emerging powers of the Global South, without artificially pushing them toward Chinese or Russian orbits through excessive punitive rigidity.

This test, whose outcome will take shape in the weeks following the July 6 hearing and the July 15 deadline, could have lasting repercussions on how other emerging powers perceive the reliability of the West as a long-term trade partner.

What this means for the West with regard to its own partners

Brazil, a Global South partner not yet tilting toward Beijing

Dear Secretary of State, I remind you that Brazil remains a key player within BRICS, a bloc where China is actively seeking to expand its economic influence against a West sometimes perceived as arrogant or punitive toward emerging powers. Every uncontrolled tariff escalation against Brasília risks pushing this South American giant a little further into the arms of alternative trade partners, at the very moment the West should instead be consolidating its alliances against rising Chinese power.

This geostrategic dimension, often overshadowed by the technical details of trade investigations, deserves to be placed at the center of the debate: clumsy trade diplomacy toward a Global South partner objectively serves the interests of the West's strategic rivals far more than those of the American workers this tariff claims to protect.

A necessary firmness, but one that must stay targeted

I do not dispute, Mr. Rubio, the legitimacy of certain American trade grievances against Brazil: protecting intellectual property and fighting illegal deforestation are real issues that deserve a firm response. But legitimate firmness must remain distinct from electorally motivated punishment, and it is precisely this confusion of genres that worries even members of your own political majority.

Credible Western trade diplomacy must know how to distinguish real technical matters from political score-settling, or risk losing the trust of the very partners it legitimately seeks to hold accountable for their trade practices.

The role of Brazil's Congress in what comes next

A divided Congress united on the reciprocity law

The Brazilian Congress, split by deep political divisions between Lula's allies and those of the Bolsonaro family, nonetheless voted unanimously for the trade reciprocity law, a rare feat underscoring just how much this tariff question transcends the usual partisan divides of contemporary Brazilian politics.

This parliamentary unity, difficult to achieve on virtually any other issue in Brazil today, sends a clear signal to Washington: even Lula's political opponents are not willing to passively accept tariffs perceived as unjust to the Brazilian economy as a whole.

Further legislative consultations expected before July 15

Several Brazilian parliamentary committees specializing in international trade plan to hold additional consultations in the days leading up to the July 15 deadline, seeking to coordinate a coherent legislative response should the American administration actually impose the 25% tariff.

This Brazilian parliamentary mobilization, though largely unknown to the Western general public, could prove decisive in shaping a measured Brazilian response rather than an uncontrolled escalation, a scenario both parties would objectively have an interest in avoiding.

Conclusion: an outstretched hand, but with eyes wide open

What I hope for from the July 6 hearing

Dear Secretary of State Rubio, I sincerely hope the July 6 hearing will allow for a rigorous debate on the real trade grievances documented by the Section 301 investigation, without this forum turning into mere Brazilian electoral theater foreshadowing the October presidential race. Businesses and workers in both countries deserve a resolution grounded in verifiable economic facts, not partisan calculations on either side of the Atlantic.

I hope that this negotiating window, narrow as it is until July 15, produces a reasonable compromise that preserves both legitimate American trade interests and the historic relationship between the two largest democracies of the American continent.

A letter that closes with a call for clear-headedness

I close this open letter with the conviction that Western firmness toward unfair trade practices remains necessary in a world where China, Iran, Russia and North Korea watch for the slightest division within the Western camp and its natural partners. But that firmness must be exercised with discernment, never handing our strategic rivals, on a silver platter, a Global South partner the West has every interest in keeping within its economic and diplomatic orbit.

It is up to you, Mr. Rubio, to decide whether this Brazilian file will go down in history as an example of justified trade firmness, or as a missed opportunity to preserve a precious alliance against the true threats facing the Western international order.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Who I am and my acknowledged biases

I am a columnist, not an economist or a trade lawyer specializing in international law. I hold a bias favorable to Western cohesion against China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, which colors my judgment on the strategic value of preserving the alliance with Brazil. I am not affiliated with any government entity or company mentioned in this text.

What I don't know and my method

I do not have access to confidential diplomatic negotiations between Washington and Brasília, only to information made public by the USTR, the White House and specialized press. My method consisted of cross-referencing several independent sources, including official American documents, before formulating my conclusions and the personal opinion expressed in this letter.

Sources

Primary sources

USTR Section 301 Determination on Brazil's Unreasonable Acts — USTR, June 2026

Trump administration proposes 25% tariff to punish Brazil — Reuters, June 2, 2026

Brazil Trump tariffs trade — Associated Press

Secondary sources

Trump proposes 25% tariff on Brazil — CNBC, June 2, 2026

Results of US Section 301 Investigation into Brazil — Covington, June 2026

Brazil-US trade row deepens as Lula slams Rubio — IntelliNews

Brazil's Flavio Bolsonaro plans to testify against proposed US tariffs — Reuters, June 23, 2026