REPORT: BALTOPS 2026: 20 Warships and 6,000 Sailors to Hold the Baltic

Gdynia, departure port of a historic demonstration

On June 4, 2026, the Polish port of Gdynia, in the Bay of Gdańsk, watched an armada leave that the Baltic Sea had not seen in years. 20 NATO warships weighed anchor simultaneously, launching the 55th edition of BALTOPS — Baltic Operations — the most significant annual naval exercise in the region. On board: approximately 6,000 sailors and marines representing 15 allied nations, from Denmark to Turkey, from Estonia to the United States. It was the first edition of BALTOPS commanded from a NATO command structure since 1972.

This detail, seemingly technical, carries deep significance: for the first time since the start of the Cold War, the US 6th Fleet has operated in formal collaboration with the Joint Force Command Brunssum (JFC Brunssum), within the Alliance's integrated command structure. This is not an administrative evolution — it is the affirmation that the Baltic Sea is now treated as a NATO inland lake, to be defended collectively with all the Alliance's resources.

A context of maximum tensions

The context in which BALTOPS 2026 unfolded is eloquent. The war in Ukraine has lasted more than four years. Russia multiplies provocations in the Baltic space — GPS jamming, interference with air navigation, attempted intimidation of the Baltic states. The littoral countries — Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, Sweden — are all now NATO members. This nearly enclosed sea, ringed by allies on all sides except the Russian, has become one of the most politically charged maritime spaces in the world.

The exercises ran from June 4 to 19, 2026, covering the western, southern and central Baltic from Skagen to the Gulf of Riga. Ships began with maneuvers in the western Baltic before moving east toward the Swedish island of Gotland — a strategic node whose control is recognized as decisive for access to the eastern Baltic. The exercise concluded on June 19 in Kiel, Germany, coinciding with the start of Kiel Navy Week.

When I look at BALTOPS 2026 in its context, I see something other than a routine military exercise. I see an Alliance telling Russia, clearly and without ambiguity: this sea is our sea. The symbolism of departure from Gdynia — a Polish port, a state bordering the Kaliningrad enclave — escapes no one.

Why quality matters more than size

Observers noted that BALTOPS 2026 was approximately twice as small as the previous edition in terms of personnel. The reason is pragmatic: a portion of allied naval forces is engaged in other operations, notably in the Strait of Hormuz and in the Arctic. Germany contributed with the frigate Sachsen-Anhalt, the corvettes Braunschweig and Erfurt, the submarine U34 and a maritime patrol aircraft. The USS Mount Whitney, flagship of the US 6th Fleet, normally stationed in the Mediterranean, provided overall command.

A senior German official was direct with the media: the reduction in size does not mean a reduction in Alliance commitment. "It is not because of a decrease in support for the Alliance, but because some naval forces are involved in other operations," he clarified. Vice Admiral Jeffrey Anderson, commander of the US 6th Fleet, added that the war in the Middle East was serving as "proof of concept" for naval strategies aimed at deterring Russian aggression in critical maritime chokepoints like the Baltic Sea.

The 15 participating nations: a full allied spectrum

The 15 nations that participated in BALTOPS 2026 cover a remarkable geographic and capability spectrum: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. This list includes two of the Alliance's most recent members — Finland and Sweden — who bring unique expertise in Baltic and Arctic naval operations. The presence of Turkey, often at the center of internal Alliance tensions, is symbolically significant.

In total, more than 30 ships and aircraft participated, according to official data from US Naval Forces Europe. The CTF Baltic (Commander, Task Force Baltic) command and the Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 1 also participated in the exercises. A complete naval ecosystem deployed in the Baltic — demonstrating the Alliance's ability to operate in an integrated manner in a dense and complex maritime space.

What strikes me about the composition of BALTOPS 2026 is the presence of Romania and Portugal — countries that are not littoral Baltic states. Their participation is not purely symbolic: it demonstrates that Baltic security is a shared responsibility for the entire Alliance, not just the coastal nations. Collective defence in action.

Anti-submarine and mine warfare: vital competencies

Training during BALTOPS 2026 covered a spectrum of operations particularly suited to the realities of the Baltic Sea. Anti-submarine warfare was front and center: the Baltic, with its shallow depths and characteristically brackish waters, creates complex acoustic conditions that complicate submarine detection. Russia maintains a submarine fleet in the region, and their potential neutralization is a major tactical challenge for the Alliance.

Mine warfare was also at the heart of the exercises. The Baltic is historically one of the most heavily mined seas in the world — remnants of two world wars still litter its seabed. In a crisis, the laying of defensive and offensive mines could rapidly transform this sea into a deadly trap for commercial and military navigation. The Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 1 conducted in-depth exercises in the detection, identification and neutralization of mines, using next-generation unmanned underwater vehicles.

Surface drones and new technologies

A notable innovation in BALTOPS 2026: the participation of the US Navy's Unmanned Surface Vessel Squadron 3, based in San Diego. These crewless surface vehicles provided participating allied ships with training in countering surface drones — an emerging threat that the war in Ukraine made concrete, with Kyiv's effective use of maritime drones against Russia's Black Sea Fleet. A K3 Scout drone was deployed in the port of Gdynia on June 12 during a public demonstration.

Amphibious operations also featured in the program, demonstrating the Alliance's ability to land and sustain ground forces from the sea. This competency is particularly relevant in the Baltic context, where several strategic islands — including Gotland, Bornholm and the Estonian islands — might require rapid reinforcement by sea in a crisis. Expeditionary logistics were rehearsed in detail, including replenishment at sea and remote maintenance.

The surface drone training in BALTOPS 2026 is directly inspired by what Ukraine accomplished against the Russian fleet in the Black Sea. This ability to rapidly integrate battlefield lessons into Alliance exercises is, to my mind, one of NATO's real advances in recent years. The war in Ukraine has become a real-time laboratory from which everyone draws lessons.

The Swedish island at the heart of naval strategy

The Swedish island of Gotland, at the center of the Baltic Sea, occupies a premier strategic position in the BALTOPS 2026 exercises. Allied ships maneuvered around Gotland to practice the protection and maintenance of free maritime routes — a task the Alliance considers fundamental to freedom of navigation in the Baltic. In a conflict, whoever controls Gotland effectively controls access to the eastern Baltic, where the Baltic states and the Polish coast are located.

Sweden, having become a NATO member in 2024, reinforced its permanent garrison on Gotland and redeployed air defense and anti-ship missile systems there. The reintegration of Gotland into the Alliance's operational planning fundamentally transforms the military geography of the Baltic. What was once a potentially contested zone is now integrated into the collective defensive posture — a strategic change of great magnitude that BALTOPS 2026 clearly put into practice.

Maritime lines of communication: an absolute priority

One of the main objectives of BALTOPS 2026 was to practice protection of maritime lines of communication in the Baltic. In a conflict, supplying the Baltic states and Poland by sea would be crucial — land routes could be cut or threatened. Convoy protection, securing the Baltic straits and anti-submarine warfare to guarantee freedom of navigation are competencies that demand intensive and regular training.

The experience of the war in Ukraine reinforced NATO planners' awareness of the critical importance of logistics. Sustaining modern defence requires continuous flows of munitions, fuel, equipment and personnel reinforcements. Any choking of these flows — maritime, land or aerial — creates strategic vulnerabilities that an adversary can exploit. The supply route protection exercises in BALTOPS 2026 are therefore directly connected to the Ukrainian lesson on war logistics.

Gotland as the pivot of Baltic security — this is one of those geographic realities that strategists on both sides know perfectly well but that the general public often ignores. When Sweden joined NATO, it brought this strategic island with it. It was one of the most valuable military gifts the Alliance has ever received.

Trump and NATO: tensions in the background

BALTOPS 2026 unfolded in a particularly complex political context within the Alliance. US President Donald Trump continues to openly criticize NATO and condition American engagement on allied financial contributions. His Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, announced a six-month review of the US military presence in Europe. 4,000 American troops cancelled for Poland in mid-May sparked intense concern in Eastern European capitals.

In this context, the presence of the USS Mount Whitney as the flagship of BALTOPS 2026 carries a dual political significance. On one hand, it confirms that the United States still participates in key multilateral exercises. On the other, European allies know this presence could be reduced in the coming years if Washington decides to lighten its commitment. This is precisely why the build-up of European naval capabilities — German, Norwegian, French, British — is an urgent strategic priority.

A message of unity despite internal fractures

Despite the tensions, Rear Admiral Stephan Haisch of the German Navy affirmed that BALTOPS sends a clear message: "Ships, vessels, naval aircraft and unmanned systems will all be deployed." The stated objective is to "demonstrate robust deterrence" and maintain freedom of navigation in the Baltic. Admiral Anderson was explicit: the exercise aims to deter Russian threats in the region and to "strengthen Alliance cohesion."

This cohesion is precisely what Moscow seeks to crack. Russian information operations target public opinion in member countries to sow doubts about the reliability of American security guarantees. Provocations in the Baltic airspace and maritime space regularly test the Alliance's responses. In this context, each edition of BALTOPS is a practical rebuttal to Russian narratives about Western division. Twenty ships in the same formation in the Baltic Sea are more eloquent than any speech.

I believe the political significance of BALTOPS 2026 far exceeds its military dimension. At a moment when Alliance unity is questioned by Trump on one side and Putin on the other, watching 15 nations deploy 20 warships together is a first-order political act. Deterrence works first in the mind.

Russian surveillance: within historical norms

Admiral Anderson confirmed that Russian activity near BALTOPS 2026 — including in previous years tailing and overflights of American and NATO ships — was "consistent with historical norms." Russia systematically monitors these exercises, collecting intelligence on procedures, tactical formations and allied ship capabilities. These observations feed Russian defensive and offensive planning.

What has changed since 2022 is the context. Russia observes these exercises from the position of an aggressor state already condemned to diplomatic isolation and subjected to lasting economic sanctions. Its access to the Baltic is now encircled on all sides by NATO member states. The Kaliningrad enclave, wedged between Poland and Lithuania, is increasingly vulnerable to a potential maritime blockade. In this context, each BALTOPS exercise reminds Moscow of the extent of its strategic isolation in the region.

The hybrid threat in the Baltic

Beyond the conventional threat, Russia wages permanent hybrid warfare in the Baltic Sea. Sabotage of underwater communication cables and offshore energy infrastructure has been attributed to actors linked to Moscow. Russia's shadow fleet — tankers sailing under flags of convenience to circumvent sanctions — generates collision and pollution risks in Baltic waters. GPS signal disturbances regularly create problems for air and maritime navigation in the region.

Nations participating in BALTOPS 2026 are also implicitly training to deal with these hybrid threats. Cooperation between allied naval forces extends to the exchange of intelligence on suspicious activities, monitoring of shadow fleet movements and protection of critical underwater infrastructure. The Baltic Sea has become a multidimensional strategic competition space where naval exercises like BALTOPS play a role far beyond conventional combat.

The hybrid dimension of the Baltic confrontation — sabotaged cables, jammed GPS, shadow fleet — is what concerns me most. These are threats difficult to attribute, difficult to respond to publicly, but whose cumulative effects on critical European infrastructure can be devastating. BALTOPS alone is not sufficient to address them.

Why JFC Brunssum command changes everything

For the first time since 1972, BALTOPS 2026 was commanded from Joint Force Command Brunssum (JFC Brunssum), in the Netherlands. This is not a simple administrative change — it is a deep doctrinal shift. It means that BALTOPS is now fully integrated into the Alliance's command structure, rather than being directed solely by the US Navy. The 6th Fleet retains a central role, but now operates within an institutionalized multinational framework.

This evolution reflects the NATO 3.0 doctrine — the transatlantic rebalancing in which Europeans take greater responsibility for collective defence, particularly for the conventional defence of Europe. With uncertainty about long-term American engagement, this institutionalization of command is a form of insurance: exercises and operational planning no longer depend solely on Washington's political will at any given moment.

Interoperability as the central objective

The heart of BALTOPS is interoperability — the capacity of 15 national navies with different doctrines, equipment and languages to operate together as a coherent force. This requires years of joint training, standardized procedures, interoperable communication systems and mutual trust built through the frequency of exercises. Each edition of BALTOPS since 1972 has contributed to this progressive construction. This is not a showcase exercise — it is foundation work that creates real operational coherence between very different forces.

The participation of nations like Romania and Portugal, geographically distant from the Baltic, illustrates the collective nature of allied defence. These navies send ships into waters they do not know intimately, operating under multinational command, in often difficult weather conditions. This is exactly the type of experience that would enable a rapid and coherent response in the event of a real crisis in the region.

Interoperability is not decreed — it is practiced. Every time navies from 15 different countries maneuver together for two weeks in the Baltic, they build something that summit speeches cannot create: operational trust. This is the invisible work that makes deterrence credible.

Naval drones and asymmetric warfare

The war in Ukraine has delivered a spectacular lesson on naval drones: relatively inexpensive devices can inflict considerable damage on costly warships. Russia's Black Sea Fleet, decimated by Ukrainian maritime drones, is living proof. BALTOPS 2026 explicitly integrated this lesson, with counter-naval drone training provided by American unmanned surface vehicles. Allied navies must learn to detect, track and neutralize swarms of maritime drones in a dense maritime environment.

The Ukrainian Navy, with modest means but remarkable tactical creativity, demonstrated that an inferior maritime power can inflict disproportionate losses on a larger fleet through innovative use of unmanned systems. This lesson has direct implications for Baltic defence: in a conflict scenario, asymmetric naval forces could effectively contest control of Baltic waters, considerably complicating Russian operations in the region.

Protection of critical underwater infrastructure

The sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines in 2022 and of communication cables in the Baltic in recent years highlighted a major Alliance vulnerability: critical underwater infrastructure is difficult to protect. BALTOPS 2026 included exercises for the protection of this infrastructure, with unmanned underwater vehicles dedicated to monitoring and securing cables and pipelines. This is a domain where allied navies must develop new capabilities and shared procedures.

Several recent incidents — some attributed to actors close to Russia — temporarily disabled communication cables between the Baltic states and Scandinavia. These acts of sabotage, difficult to formally attribute, create disruptions in military and civilian communication systems that can have significant strategic effects. The response lies in improved underwater surveillance and rapid restoration procedures — competencies that BALTOPS contributes to developing.

Underwater infrastructure — communication cables, pipelines, power interconnectors — is the invisible nervous system of modern Europe. Its protection is one of the blind spots of European defence. I am relieved to see that BALTOPS 2026 integrated it into its exercises, even if I doubt that the capabilities developed are yet sufficient.

Missiles and aerial drones over the Baltic

Maritime air defence was one of the major focus areas of BALTOPS 2026. The Baltic Sea is a relatively narrow space, dominated from multiple sides by Russian missile systems — from Kaliningrad, from St. Petersburg and from nearby Russian air bases. In a conflict scenario, anti-ship missiles and drones could be launched with little warning time, demanding extremely rapid responses from embarked defence systems. The exercise staged scenarios of simultaneous saturation by drones and missiles.

Air defence frigates — such as the German Sachsen-Anhalt, equipped with the ESSM (Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile) system — played a central role in these scenarios. Coordination between the various detection and engagement systems embarked on ships from different nations, with potentially incompatible computing architectures, is one of the most technically complex challenges of naval interoperability. BALTOPS is one of the rare forums where these challenges can be tested at full scale.

NATO facing Russian A2/AD in the Baltic

The Russian concept of Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) — aimed at denying an adversary's forces access to a zone through missile systems, drones and electronic warfare — is a central concern for NATO planners in the Baltic. The A2/AD bubble around Kaliningrad, with its S-400 systems and Iskander missiles, covers a large portion of the Baltic. Penetrating this bubble in a conflict would require either the prior suppression of these defenses or contested entry approaches.

BALTOPS 2026 exercises tested contested entry procedures, without however venturing into the details of a direct confrontation with Russian A2/AD capabilities — a prudent limit of public exercises. The real capabilities developed in this domain remain classified, but attentive observers can note in public exercises the indicators of the contested entry doctrine the Alliance is developing for the Baltic.

The Kaliningrad A2/AD bubble is the elephant in the room of every discussion about Baltic defence. It considerably limits NATO's freedom of maneuver in the eastern part of the sea. That the Alliance continues to train despite this reality is proof of a determination worth noting.

Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania: navies in development

The three Baltic states — Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania — do not field significant navies, but their participation in BALTOPS 2026 illustrates their growing integration into the Alliance's naval planning. Their primary contribution is geographic and intelligence-based: they know the Baltic waters intimately, the Russian navigation patterns and the hybrid warfare tactics Moscow deploys in their immediate neighborhood. This operational knowledge is valuable to the entire Alliance.

For the Baltic states, the BALTOPS exercise is not merely training — it is a political and psychological demonstration of allied solidarity that directly benefits the resilience of their societies. The presence of warships from 15 nations in their immediate sea sends a strong signal to their populations and deters any Russian adventure. In a context where Latvian intelligence warns of a possible Russian provocation, this naval presence has direct deterrent value.

Poland, the strategic host

The choice of Gdynia as the departure port for BALTOPS 2026 — "a symbolic recognition of Poland's role as a key participant and frontline NATO state" — is significant. Poland, which shares a land border with the Kaliningrad enclave and is investing massively in its defence, has become one of the pillars of security on the Alliance's eastern flank. Its navy, though modest, contributes to surveillance of the southern Baltic waters and the protection of the Suwałki Gap by sea.

Poland is in the process of deploying a permanent NATO brigade in Lithuania — with a German contribution — and is investing in coastal missile systems capable of threatening ships in Baltic waters. This capability, combined with similar systems deployed in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, creates a coastal missile zone that considerably complicates any Russian naval operation in the eastern Baltic. BALTOPS 2026 fits into this context of multidimensional Baltic security reinforcement.

Poland, I must say, is one of the Alliance's most invested and determined partners in Eastern Europe. Its financial, capability and political commitment far exceeds what many other allies are doing. Gdynia as the departure port for BALTOPS is not a geographic accident — it is deserved recognition.

Reduced numbers: a trend to watch

The halving of BALTOPS 2026's personnel compared to the previous edition raises legitimate questions about the exercise's future trajectory. If allied naval resources are increasingly drawn to other theaters — Hormuz, Indo-Pacific, Arctic — the capacity to maintain a robust presence in the Baltic could diminish. The answer to this dilemma lies in increasing European naval capabilities — investments in shipyards, orders for new frigates, training of sailors.

Several European nations have announced naval expansion programs. Germany is developing new F126-class frigates. Norway is ordering new submarines. Poland is investing in coastal missiles and frigates. These programs will take time to become operational, but they reflect an awareness that Baltic maritime security cannot indefinitely rest on a predominant American presence.

Long-term political coherence

The value of BALTOPS lies in its regularity — the same demonstration, year after year, since 1972. This consistency sends a durability message that one-off exercises cannot convey. Maintaining this commitment over the long term, through political fluctuations, changes of administration and budgetary pressures, is perhaps the most difficult challenge the Alliance must meet. Presence in the Baltic must not be perceived as optional or conditional — it must be structural and unconditional.

European allies, who long benefited from the American security umbrella without proportionally assuming its costs, now face the imperative to invest seriously in their naval capabilities. The objectives of 5% of GDP in defence spending set for 2035 are ambitious but necessary. Without these investments, the capacity to maintain a credible naval presence in the Baltic — not just for two weeks a year during BALTOPS — will be compromised.

The reduction in BALTOPS 2026's size is understandable in the context of an Alliance juggling multiple theaters simultaneously. But it foreshadows a structural challenge: how to maintain a credible naval presence in the Baltic when resources are limited and global demand is growing? The answer is only possible with much stronger European navies.

Climate change and maritime security

Climate change is progressively modifying operational conditions in the Baltic Sea. Less severe winters reduce the duration of ice periods that historically limited navigation in parts of the eastern Baltic. This evolution modifies schedules and windows of opportunity for military operations, affecting both defensive and offensive planning. The correlated melting of Arctic ice is opening new maritime routes that Russia and China seek to control.

These climate developments create new vulnerabilities and new opportunities for naval forces operating in the region. FLF Finland and BALTOPS 2026 are two sides of the same coin: the securing of the full spectrum from the North Sea to the High Arctic, in a geopolitical and climate context undergoing accelerated change. The Alliance must plan for an operational environment that will be significantly different in ten years.

Baltic-Arctic interconnection

The security of the Baltic Sea and that of the Arctic are deeply interconnected. Arctic maritime routes, if they become year-round navigable, could allow Russia to circumvent sanctions on its hydrocarbon exports. China is interested in access to these routes to reduce its transit times to Europe. In both cases, securing the Baltic and the Arctic is a linked strategic priority. Ships training in BALTOPS are also those that might be called to operate in the Arctic in a crisis.

NATO's Arctic Sentry mission and BALTOPS exercises are part of a security continuum the Alliance must maintain across the entire northeastern flank, from the eastern Baltic to the Barents Sea. This extended geographic vision imposes significant capability requirements in terms of ships, maritime patrol aircraft and underwater surveillance systems. It is a considerable investment, but it is the price of security in a world where Russian and Chinese ambitions in this region show no sign of weakening.

I am not a climate scientist, but I am convinced that geostrategic analyses that ignore the climate dimension are incomplete. The melting of Arctic ice is not only an ecological problem — it is a geopolitical multiplier that will redraw power balances in the North. BALTOPS must take this into account.

The 55th edition and those to come

The 55th edition of BALTOPS confirms that this exercise has survived decades, changes of administration, budget cuts and Alliance reconfigurations. Since 1972, it has seen Finland and Sweden move from observer status to full participants. It has seen the Alliance expand from 15 to 32 members. It has seen threats evolve from conventional Cold War confrontation to hybrid conflicts and autonomous drones. Its capacity for adaptation is one of its greatest strengths.

Future editions will need to more deeply integrate counter-surface drone capabilities, underwater cable protection missions, coordination with space-based surveillance systems and cyber operations. The Baltic Sea is a full-spectrum competition space, and the Alliance must train to operate there in all its dimensions. The BALTOPS exercise, which has evolved with threats for more than five decades, has everything it needs to succeed.

An irreplaceable strategic asset

BALTOPS is far more than a military exercise: it is a strategic Alliance asset, a credibility routine that accumulates edition by edition since 1972. Its continuity, regularity and adaptation to new realities are a priority that all participating nations must defend collectively. In a world where Russia and China seek to demonstrate the fragility of democratic alliances, the persistence of BALTOPS is itself a response: the West can, collectively, maintain its commitments over time.

The 20 ships that left Gdynia on June 4, 2026 carried with them this history and this future. They also carried something more concrete: the promise that if an adversary dared to threaten freedom of navigation in the Baltic or the territorial integrity of a littoral allied state, it would face not one country, but fifteen nations bound by treaty and trained together for more than half a century.

BALTOPS is an institution. And like all institutions, it can become routine, bureaucratic, insufficiently innovative. The real challenge for future editions is maintaining the exercise's operational relevance against threats that evolve faster than training cycles. A BALTOPS that permanently adapts to the reality of new Russian threats is a BALTOPS that retains its purpose. A BALTOPS that repeats the same scenarios for five years is a BALTOPS that loses it.

The language of deterrence: visible presence and demonstrated capabilities

BALTOPS exercises speak the language of deterrence that Moscow understands better than diplomatic speeches. Twenty warships from 15 nations, 6,000 personnel engaged in realistic scenarios of submarine warfare, mine neutralization and maritime air defence — this is a signal that cannot be reduced to words but translates into verifiable capabilities. Every American P-8 Poseidon that overflies Baltic waters in the context of BALTOPS is a reminder to Russia's Baltic Fleet at Kaliningrad that its submarines are tracked, identified, potentially neutralizable. The demonstration is the message.

The psychological dimension of these exercises is inseparable from their military dimension. Kremlin analysts study each BALTOPS carefully: which nations participate, which weapons systems are deployed, which scenarios are exercised, which gaps are perceptible. In 2026, they observed a 55th edition smaller in size but dense in operational sophistication — an ambiguous signal that a NATO under budgetary pressure compensates in quality for what it cannot maintain in quantity. This ambiguity itself is a strategic data point that Moscow analyzes with interest.

What 2026 changes compared to pre-war exercises

There is a fundamental difference between a BALTOPS before 2022 and BALTOPS 2026: the exercise is no longer hypothetical. Participants are training with war lessons drawn from a conflict in progress less than 2,000 kilometers from their own coasts. The mine-clearing techniques practiced correspond to real mines that have been used in the Black Sea. The submarine warfare scenarios reflect a Russian navy that has suffered documented losses. Maritime air defence protocols incorporate lessons from Ukrainian naval drones that sank Russian warships. BALTOPS 2026 is an exercise steeped in the reality of a neighboring war.

This transformation profoundly changes the seriousness with which allies approach the exercise. In 2016, participating in BALTOPS was an obligation of good allied citizenship, often treated as a military public relations exercise. In 2026, it is operational preparation directly connected to scenarios that are no longer theoretical. The crews training near Gotland and in the Gulf of Finland know that the capability they are developing could be mobilized for real at very short notice. This awareness transforms the quality of each participant's engagement — and that is precisely what Moscow must see.

There is something profoundly different in the atmosphere of a military exercise when all participants know the war is real, close, and the scenarios are not invented. I did not participate in BALTOPS 2026 — I read the reports, analyze the data, speak with experts. But even at this distance, I sense this change in tone. This is no longer simulation — it is preparation.

The permanent exercise of deterrence

BALTOPS 2026 concluded on June 19 in Kiel. The ships returned to their home ports. The sailors went back to their bases. But the value of these two weeks does not evaporate with the return to port. It accumulates in doctrine databases, in the operational reflexes of sailors trained together, in integrated communication systems, in the mutual trust between officers from 15 different nations who maneuvered together in the difficult waters of the Baltic.

Deterrence is not a state — it is a process. It demands a continuous demonstration of the will and capacity to honor commitments. BALTOPS is that demonstration. Twenty ships, six thousand sailors, fifteen nations, two weeks: this is the price of peace in the Baltic Sea in 2026. A price that the Alliance, despite its internal tensions and budgetary challenges, accepted to pay once again.

The Baltic as the Alliance's laboratory

The Baltic Sea has become one of NATO's most active laboratories — a space where new capabilities, new doctrines and new partnerships are tested under conditions close to operational realities. The lessons drawn from BALTOPS 2026 — on naval drones, underwater infrastructure protection, integrated air defence — will feed the capability developments of the coming years. The Baltic held, deterrence strengthened, the message sent: BALTOPS 2026 will have fulfilled its mission.

BALTOPS 2026 is behind us. But the Baltic itself remains a theater of permanent operations — not in an immediate military sense, but in the sense that every day, Russian ships, submarines, reconnaissance aircraft define the framework in which Baltic democracies live. Two weeks of exercises against 365 days of continuous pressure. This is the reality of living on NATO's eastern flank. I do not forget it.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

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