REPORT: RIMPAC and Valiant Shield: as the Pacific bristles with warships in China's shadow

REPORT: RIMPAC and Valiant Shield: as the Pacific bristles with warships in China's shadow

Introduction: An ocean transformed into a rehearsal room for the coming war

The Indo-Pacific under extreme military tension

Since June 22, 2026, two of the world's most important military exercises have been unfolding simultaneously in the Pacific. RIMPAC 2026 — acronym for Rim of the Pacific — officially began on June 24, bringing together 31 nations, approximately 40 warships, and nearly 25,000 military personnel in Hawaiian waters and beyond. Simultaneously, exercise Valiant Shield 2026, launched on June 22, mobilizes American forces and their allies in high-intensity scenarios across the Indo-Pacific. The confluence of these two exercises is not a scheduling coincidence — it is a geopolitical message of the highest importance, addressed directly to Beijing.

Analysts at ThinkChina noted on June 25, 2026 that naval density in the western Pacific is reaching levels unseen since the Cold War. To understand what this accumulation of force means, one must look simultaneously toward Taiwan — where tanks have been patrolling the streets since June 22 — and toward the strategy rooms in Washington, Tokyo, Canberra and Brussels. Something is being prepared in the Pacific. Something that very strongly resembles a rehearsal for a war that everyone still hopes to avoid.

The context: why now, why together

These exercises occur in a context of Sino-American tensions without precedent in decades. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) conducted its own exercises around the Taiwan Strait, explicitly designated as "real-war rehearsals". Beijing responded to the expansion of the American 1260H designation list with commercial countermeasures and export controls. And the bloc of Indo-Pacific democracies — with the growing support of European powers — chooses this precise moment to demonstrate its collective power projection capabilities.

This simultaneous orchestration is deliberate. The coincidence of dates between Chinese maneuvers around Taiwan, Taiwan's five-day ground exercises, and the large allied naval exercises RIMPAC/Valiant Shield signals a strategic coordination that goes beyond a mere routine calendar. The West and its regional partners are collectively demonstrating that they can project power, coordinate their operations, and operate together in the maritime spaces that China considers its exclusive sphere of influence.

RIMPAC 2026: the world's largest naval coalition in action

Thirty-one nations, one unified message

RIMPAC is the world's largest multinational naval exercise, organized every two years by the US Navy since the 1970s. The 2026 edition, running from June 24 to July 31, marks a new participation record with 31 nations involved. This figure is in itself a strong political signal. It demonstrates that the coalition of democracies and allied countries is not fragmenting — contrary to the narrative Beijing likes to project — but on the contrary broadening and consolidating.

Participants include the United States' traditional allies — Japan, Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, France — but also nations whose participation testifies to a growing awareness of Indo-Pacific stakes: countries from Southeast Asia, partners from the South Pacific, and European allies deploying naval assets thousands of kilometers from their own shores. This geography of participation speaks as much as the exercises themselves: Indo-Pacific security has become a global concern.

The scenarios practiced: beyond the show of force

Beyond the spectacle of 40 warships sailing together, RIMPAC 2026 practices precise operational scenarios that have real military value. Integrated missile defense exercises — coordinating the detection and destruction of ballistic missiles between naval platforms of several different nations — represent a considerable technical and tactical challenge. The ability to carry them out smoothly with 31 partners is a concrete operational advantage, not merely a photo opportunity.

Australian Collins-class submarines and their Japanese counterparts practice anti-submarine warfare maneuvers in complex waters, in coordination with surface and air forces. Coordinated strike exercises against fictional targets simulate the conditions of a high-intensity conflict. At-sea replenishment simulations test the logistics of a prolonged operation in an extended operational area — precisely the kind of operation that would be necessary if a conflict around Taiwan required a sustained naval presence.

Valiant Shield 2026: rehearsing a high-intensity conflict

An exercise designed for war against a rival power

If RIMPAC is the grand multilateral demonstration, Valiant Shield 2026 — launched on June 22 — is the American high-intensity exercise designed specifically for confrontation scenarios with a rival power possessing comparable military capabilities. The name itself — "Valiant Shield" — suggests a defensive posture, but the scenarios practiced include coordinated offensive strikes, access and area-denial operations, and simulations of prolonged carrier strike combat.

Valiant Shield notably mobilizes American aircraft carriers, their carrier strike groups, B-52 and B-2 bombers based in Guam, and nuclear-powered submarine forces. These assets are exactly those that would be deployed in case of conflict in the Taiwan Strait. By making them operate together in conditions close to the reality of high-intensity combat, the exercise prepares crews, tests command chains, and identifies capability gaps before they become fatal in an actual conflict.

Ukraine's lessons applied to the Pacific

American military planners have drawn valuable lessons from the Ukrainian conflict. The war in Ukraine demonstrated that air superiority is not established as easily as expected, that modern surface-to-air defenses can neutralize even significant air forces, and that drones are fundamentally changing the nature of ground and naval combat. These lessons are directly infusing the scenarios of Valiant Shield 2026.

The exercises integrate simulations of defense against drone swarms, intense electronic warfare scenarios, and degraded command protocols — that is, the ability to operate effectively when communications are disrupted by adversarial actions. These are precisely the conditions the PLA would seek to create in the first hours of a conflict: saturate, blind, disorganize. Valiant Shield trains American and allied forces to operate despite these disruptions — that is the capability that will make the difference.

Beijing's response: counter-exercises and countermeasures

The PLA orchestrates its own show of force

Faced with this accumulation of allied warships in the Pacific and Taiwan's ground exercises, Beijing did not remain passive. The PLA conducted its own exercises in the Taiwan Strait and in the South China Sea, those same ones explicitly designated as "real-war rehearsals". This martial rhetoric, deliberately provocative, constitutes a break with Beijing's traditional diplomatic language and signals a willingness for calculated escalation of pressure on Taiwan.

Simultaneously, as the ISW reveals in its update of June 26, 2026, Beijing responded to the expansion of the American 1260H list with targeted commercial measures: export controls on strategic components and a prohibition on Chinese government entities dealing with designated American companies. This technological and commercial escalation is the logical extension of military tensions — Beijing is fighting on all fronts simultaneously: military, economic, technological, informational.

The limits of China's demonstration

The numerical superiority of the PLA in waters immediately adjacent to China is real — it has an obvious proximity advantage over allies operating thousands of kilometers from their bases. But RIMPAC and Valiant Shield demonstrate precisely that this proximity advantage is not absolute. The United States and its allies have the ability to project massive naval power into the region, maintain logistical operations over long distances, and coordinate forces from multiple nations in complex operations.

Moreover, the allied exercises reveal a qualitative asymmetry that raw numbers do not fully capture: decades of joint exercises have created an operational interoperability between American, Japanese, Australian and other forces that no authoritarian regime can replicate in a few years. The alliance, when it is genuine and regularly exercised, is a force multiplier that Beijing can hardly counter.

Japan's role: a transformed ally that changes the equation

Tokyo assumes its new military posture

Japan's participation in RIMPAC 2026 takes on particular significance in the context of the major strategic transformation the country has been undergoing since 2022. Tokyo decided to double its defense spending to reach 2% of GDP by 2027 — a spectacular break with decades of constitutional pacifism. It has acquired long-range missiles giving it an offensive strike capability against mainland targets. It has militarily reinforced the Ryūkyū Islands, located less than 100 kilometers from Taiwan.

Within RIMPAC's framework, Japanese forces practice anti-submarine warfare scenarios, missile defense, and coordination with American carrier strike groups in high-intensity operations. This is no longer the Japan of "constitutional pacifism" participating in these exercises as a polite observer — it is a fully operational military ally that deeply integrates its forces into the planning of a potential regional conflict. This transformation may be the most important strategic change in the Indo-Pacific since the signing of the postwar security treaties.

The Ryūkyū Archipelago: the geographic bridge to Taiwan

The Ryūkyū island chain, stretching from Kyūshū down to Taiwan, represents a strategic position of extraordinary importance. Japan's military reinforcement of these islands — notably Ishigaki and Miyako-jima, less than 300 kilometers from Taiwan — creates a defensive chain that fundamentally changes the geography of a potential conflict. Anti-ship missiles deployed on these islands could threaten Chinese naval forces seeking to circumnavigate Taiwan to the north.

This geographical reality explains why coordination between Japanese forces and those exercising within RIMPAC's framework is so vital. In case of conflict, Japan would not be a spectator — it would be a central actor, with bases located at the heart of the potential combat zone. Current exercises prepare precisely this operational coordination between allies who would operate on the same waters, under the same skies. Japanese-American interoperability is the backbone of Taiwan's defense.

Australia and AUKUS: the submarine as a symbol of commitment

The AUKUS partnership reconfigures underwater geopolitics

Australia's participation in RIMPAC 2026 falls within the framework of the trilateral AUKUS partnership (Australia-United Kingdom-United States), whose flagship agreement is the delivery to Canberra of American and British conventionally-armed nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs). This agreement, announced in 2021, triggered a diplomatic crisis with France — whose conventional submarine contract was cancelled — and a furious reaction from Beijing, which saw in it the creation of a "hostile Cold War alliance."

Australia's presence at RIMPAC with its current naval forces — pending the nuclear submarines — represents a concrete operational commitment to Indo-Pacific security. Canberra has clearly identified China as its primary security concern in its official defense documents. Participation in RIMPAC is not symbolic — it is a progressive integration into a regional alliance system that will be the key to a collective response to any aggressive action in the western Pacific.

Long-range support logistics

Australia brings to RIMPAC a crucial logistical capability: deep-water bases, refueling infrastructure, and a geographical position that enables support for operations in the Coral Sea, the Timor Sea, and into waters near Taiwan. In a prolonged high-intensity conflict, logistics are often the determining factor — nations that can sustain their operations over time defeat those that rapidly exhaust their reserves.

At-sea replenishment exercises between Australian and American ships test precisely this logistical capability. An American carrier strike group operating thousands of kilometers from its Hawaiian or Japanese bases depends on these inter-allied support capabilities. RIMPAC is not just a combat exercise — it is a test of the entire logistical chain of a coalition, from ammunition to fuel to maintenance.

The Philippines in the equation: the ambiguous ally in the island arc

Manila between Washington and Beijing

The Philippines occupy an extraordinarily strategic geographical position — the archipelago forms the southern flank of the island arc that partially encircles China. Manila's position in any conflict in the western Pacific would be determinative. That is why the defense agreements signed in recent years between the United States and the Philippines — permitting access to additional bases in the archipelago — are strategically vital.

Yet the Philippines permanently navigate between attraction and repulsion toward China. Manila's economic dependence on Beijing — investments, development aid, trade — creates permanent internal tensions over foreign policy. The current Philippine president has hardened the posture against China in the South China Sea, where incidents between coast guards of the two countries have multiplied tensions in 2024-2026. But the consistency of this commitment over the long term remains to be proven.

The South China Sea: terrain of gradual confrontation

In the South China Sea, incidents between Philippine and Chinese vessels intensified in the months preceding RIMPAC. Chinese coast guard vessels used water cannons and military lasers against Philippine boats seeking to resupply their positions in the Spratly Islands. These actions — deliberately calibrated to remain below the threshold of an act of war — constitute precisely the type of grey-zone warfare that China has mastered to perfection.

The American response — regular naval patrols, joint exercises with the Philippine navy — is visible within RIMPAC's framework. But the question remains: if Beijing decides to cross a higher threshold in the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait, will the Philippines be up to their mutual defense commitments? That is the Philippine unknown — and in geopolitics, unknowns are paid for in lives.

French and European presence in the Pacific

France, an Indo-Pacific power regardless

France is, by far, the leading European naval power in the Indo-Pacific. With its overseas collectivities in French Polynesia, New Caledonia and Réunion, Paris holds an exclusive economic zone of several million square kilometers in the Indo-Pacific. Its regular participation in RIMPAC, its patrols through the Taiwan Strait, its joint exercises with Asian navies — all of this makes it a real, not merely symbolic, actor in regional security.

In 2026, France has maintained its "freedom of navigation" policy in contested waters, regularly sending frigates through the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, notwithstanding Chinese protests. In the context of the rare European warning about the Chinese threat against Taiwan — reported on June 24, 2026 — this French naval presence gives a minimum of military credibility to European political declarations.

Germany and the United Kingdom: symbolic presences or real capabilities?

Other European powers have signaled interest in the Indo-Pacific. The German frigate that transited the Taiwan Strait in 2024 — the first in decades — triggered a formal protest from Beijing. The United Kingdom deployed its aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth to the Indo-Pacific in 2021 and maintains a naval presence policy in the region. These deployments are real, but their operational reach remains limited compared to American or Japanese capabilities.

What matters nonetheless is the direction of movement. In 2015, no European navy regularly ventured through the Taiwan Strait. In 2026, several do so routinely. This evolution, however gradual, sends a lasting signal to Beijing: the legitimacy of freedom of navigation in these waters is defended not only by the United States, but by a growing ensemble of democracies. The geography of support for Taiwan is expanding — slowly, but irreversibly.

The figure that says it all: 25,000 military personnel exercising simultaneously

Human mass as a geopolitical signal

Twenty-five thousand military personnel within RIMPAC alone. To which are added the Valiant Shield personnel, the forces exercising in Taiwan, the ships of the US 7th Fleet that patrol the region permanently. The human mass mobilized in these simultaneous exercises exceeds what the majority of the world's countries can field with their entire armed forces. This is deliberate: the aim is to demonstrate not only quality, but also the quantity of allied power available.

For Beijing's strategists, this figure enters their deterrence calculations. A Taiwan invasion would not be an operation against the island alone — it would face a potential coalition of 31 nations, representing tens of thousands of military personnel trained together, capable of operating in a coordinated manner, possessing interoperability developed over decades of joint exercises. That is not a calculation that argues in favor of military adventurism.

The limits of exercise as a substitute for real commitment

But exercises have their limits. 25,000 military personnel training together do not constitute a guarantee of intervention in a real crisis. Military engagement decisions are political before they are military — parliaments must vote, coalitions must hold, public opinions must support. RIMPAC demonstrates capabilities; it does not politically bind governments.

That is the fundamental difference between exercise and binding alliance. NATO's Article 5 legally commits its members to mutual defense — no legal equivalent exists for Taiwan. The United States have the Taiwan Relations Act which commits them to sell defensive weapons to the island, but not to defend it militarily. This legal ambiguity is the crack in the deterrence edifice — and Beijing knows it perfectly. RIMPAC is the symbol of a collective will — but a will without formal commitment remains an option, not a certainty.

Beijing, RIMPAC and the rhetoric of "military provocations"

How China reads — and reframes — allied exercises

Every edition of RIMPAC generates an official Chinese reaction denouncing "military provocations", a "Cold War mentality", and the creation of a "hostile militarized alliance". This refrain is predictable, ritualized, and reveals as much about the regime's psychological state as about its communication strategy. Beijing cannot prevent these exercises — so it recodes them in a victimization narrative for its domestic audience.

This framing has an internal political utility in China: it reinforces the narrative that China is a peaceful power surrounded by malevolent enemies orchestrated by the United States. But externally, this narrative struggles to convince nations that have seen their own neighbors or waters threatened by unilateral Chinese actions. "Freedom of navigation" in international waters is not a provocation — except for the one seeking to close those waters. And that is precisely Beijing's project in the South China Sea.

The escalation of Chinese exercises as a reflexive response

Beijing's operational response to RIMPAC and Valiant Shield is predictable: reinforced PLA exercises in the Taiwan Strait and naval maneuvers in the East China Sea. This symmetrical escalation is partly reflexive — showing that China is not intimidated — but it also contributes to feeding the escalation spiral that both sides claim to want to avoid.

The dynamic is classic but dangerous: every allied exercise triggers Chinese counter-exercises, which justify new allied exercises, which again intensify Chinese counter-exercises. In this spiral, the risk of an involuntary military incident — an aircraft approaching too closely, a ship failing to respect safety distances, an officer giving the wrong order — increases with each turn. Great wars have often begun with minor incidents on tense seas. History taught us that — but are we in the process of forgetting it?

Financing deterrence: who pays for Taiwan's security

The American defense budget under pressure

RIMPAC and Valiant Shield are expensive. Military exercises of this scale mobilize considerable resources: naval fuel, training ammunition, flight hours, equipment maintenance. For the United States, financing these exercises falls within a defense budget under constant pressure, torn between needs in Europe (Ukraine support, NATO presence), commitments in the Indo-Pacific, and domestic modernization investments.

The Trump administration has maintained high levels of defense spending, but the stated priority for the Pacific — at the expense of Europe — creates tensions within alliances. Defense Secretary Hegseth is conducting a six-month review of American presence in Europe, with threats of reducing contributions — a pressure that forces Europeans to increase their own budgets and potentially frees resources for the Pacific. The geopolitics of defense is also a question of resources — and resources are finite.

Burden-sharing in the Indo-Pacific coalition

The question of financial burden-sharing in the Indo-Pacific coalition is a permanent tension. The United States bears the vast majority of operational costs — the aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, strategic bombers that form the backbone of deterrence. Japan, Australia and other allies contribute, but in lesser proportions.

The NATO summit in Ankara — scheduled for July 7-8, 2026 — will address precisely the question of defense spending with the objective of 5% of GDP. If European allies meet this target, they free American resources for the Pacific. If both the Indo-Pacific and Europe must simultaneously absorb massive spending increases, the question of budgetary sustainability becomes critical — even for the world's largest economy. Deterrence has a price, and that price must be shared.

Valiant Shield 2026: rehearsing high-intensity warfare

A scenario focused on high-intensity conflict

Valiant Shield 2026, launched on June 22, is distinct from RIMPAC by its nature: where RIMPAC is a multilateral coalition with varied objectives, Valiant Shield is a targeted American exercise designed to practice high-intensity conflict scenarios in the Indo-Pacific. It involves aircraft carriers, submarines, long-range bombers and integrated missile systems in engagement simulations against a peer competitor — a barely veiled euphemism for Chinese military capabilities. Every maneuver of Valiant Shield is designed to test engagement procedures that American commanders have not had to use since the Cold War.

What makes Valiant Shield 2026 particularly significant is its simultaneity with RIMPAC and Taiwan's ground exercises. American forces are not practicing the two exercises separately — they coordinate their efforts, share lessons in real time, and develop interoperability procedures that would allow different national forces to operate together under enemy fire. This operational integration is precisely what Beijing would fear most in case of conflict. A coalition that has trained together will fight better together.

The capabilities tested and their implications for Taiwan

Valiant Shield exercises include scenarios for suppression of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) defenses — exactly the systems that China has developed to prevent American forces from penetrating maritime zones close to Taiwan. The DF-21D and DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missiles, dubbed "carrier killers," are the centerpiece of China's A2/AD doctrine. Valiant Shield models responses to these threats: alternative approach trajectories, decoy systems, missile interception, emergency deployments from dispersed bases.

For Taiwan, these exercises represent a concrete operational assurance. If American forces have practiced procedures for penetrating into an A2/AD zone, they will arrive at combat with proven reflexes rather than untested theories. The difference can save lives — and victories. Intensive training transforms doctrine into instinct, and instinct survives the chaos of a conflict's first hours.

The information war: Beijing attempts to portray allied exercises as provocation

The "destabilization" narrative orchestrated by Beijing

As RIMPAC and Valiant Shield unfolded across the Pacific, China's official communication channels — Xinhua, Global Times, Foreign Ministry spokespersons — systematically presented these exercises as "deliberate military provocations" designed to destabilize the region. This rhetoric is a calculated strategy: by inverting the symbolic burden of provocation, Beijing attempts to position its own "real-war" exercises around Taiwan as mere defensive responses to Western aggression.

This information war targets several audiences simultaneously. Inside China, it fuels nationalism and legitimizes growing military spending. Internationally, it seeks to sow doubt in non-aligned countries about the true intentions of the United States and its allies. And in European capitals still hesitant about their Indo-Pacific engagement, it maintains a moral equivalence between aggressor and defenders that directly serves Beijing's interests. The autocrat who presents himself as a victim is a technique as old as autocracy itself.

Democracies' response to Chinese disinformation

Democracies' response to this information war remains insufficient. Allied governments document their exercises, publish factual press releases, and sometimes invite observers. But the Chinese disinformation machine, endowed with unlimited resources and centralized message discipline, operates at a tempo that free democracies — with their internal debates and independent media — struggle to counter. Every allied exercise becomes an opportunity for Beijing to populate global social networks with content that blurs responsibilities.

That is why the informational dimension of deterrence has become as important as the military dimension. RIMPAC must not only be conducted, but narrated — with clarity, transparency and precision — so that the global public understands the fundamental difference between defensive exercises in international waters and invasion maneuvers around a democratic island. Truth is a weapon — provided it is wielded with the same determination as the others.

Long-term financing of deterrence: sustainability and political will

The real cost of a credible military presence in the Pacific

Maintaining a deterrent military presence in the western Pacific costs tens of billions of dollars annually. The aircraft carriers participating in RIMPAC and Valiant Shield each represent investments of 13 billion dollars in construction alone — not counting operating and crewing costs running into hundreds of millions per year. Military bases in the Philippines, Japan and Guam mobilize thousands of personnel and infrastructure that three decades of post-Cold War peace dividend allowed to age. The wake-up call is brutal and costly.

Indo-Pacific allies have begun increasing their defense budgets: Japan targets 2% of GDP by 2027, Australia launched its AUKUS submarine program estimated at more than 200 billion Australian dollars, Taiwan maintains a defense budget of approximately 2.5% of its GDP. But these investments take time to materialize into operational capabilities. The vulnerability window — between the decision to invest and actual capabilities — is precisely where risk is highest.

The political sustainability of allied engagement

The challenge is not merely financial — it is political. Credible deterrence demands a sustained commitment over decades, not cyclical responses to Beijing's provocations. Every election in an allied country creates uncertainty about the continuity of commitment. The Trump administration has maintained pressure on China, but its successor may reassess priorities. European governments face their own budgetary pressures. And in all these democracies, isolationist political forces exploit every mishap or visible cost to question the necessity of military presence in the Pacific.

That is precisely why RIMPAC, with its 31 participating nations, is strategically valuable beyond its immediate operational worth. It creates institutional ties, habits of cooperation, documented common interests that transcend short-term political variations. A navy that has exercised with its allies for ten years will be more difficult to withdraw than one sent there for the first time. Deterrence is built over time — and RIMPAC is its annual cement.

Conclusion: 40 warships and a collective promise

Deterrence in action

Forty warships, 25,000 military personnel, 31 nations — RIMPAC 2026, combined with Valiant Shield and Taiwan's ground exercises, composes the most eloquent possible demonstration of democracies' collective resolve in the Indo-Pacific. It is not an absolute guarantee — no military demonstration is. But it is a signal that Beijing cannot ignore, one that enters its strategic calculations, and ideally deters.

Security in the western Pacific is not the exclusive problem of Taiwan or the United States. It is that of every democracy dependent on free maritime routes, secure supply chains, and an international order in which force does not systematically override law. The 40 ships of RIMPAC sail for all these principles — and for the 23 million Taiwanese who live under the permanent threat of seeing them trampled.

What the world must do now

Exercises are not enough. Credible deterrence requires firm political commitments, defense investments maintained over time, and diplomatic coordination that transforms military exercises into genuine alliances. The rare European warning on Taiwan, the increases in defense spending, the negotiations at the NATO Ankara summit — all of this must translate into real capabilities, not statements of intent.

The Pacific is not bristling with warships by whim. It is bristling because an authoritarian power has signaled its willingness to modify by force a regional order that decades of cooperation built. RIMPAC and Valiant Shield are the response — collective, determined, and profoundly necessary.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

My sources and their scope

This article relies on open sources dated June 22 to 26, 2026, primarily analyses from ThinkChina, official US Navy data on RIMPAC, and ISW updates on the China-Taiwan situation. I do not have access to classified operational planning documents from the exercises, nor to intelligence assessments of Chinese intentions. Everything I write on capabilities and scenarios is based on public sources and analyses from recognized think tanks.

I am an opinionated columnist, not a professional military analyst. My judgment on the strategic value of these exercises is that of an informed observer, not an expert in naval doctrine or military strategy. I strive to distinguish established facts from personal interpretations — but this distinction is not always perfect. Read me critically, consult primary sources, and form your own opinion.

What I don't know

I do not know whether RIMPAC 2026 will actually change Beijing's strategic calculation. I do not know whether the United States would intervene militarily in case of a Chinese attack on Taiwan. I do not know whether the current military capabilities of the allied coalition would be sufficient to repel a large-scale invasion. These fundamental uncertainties are precisely why exercises like RIMPAC are necessary — they test responses to questions for which no one yet has the right answers. In strategy as in science, experimentation precedes certainty.

I also acknowledge the bias of my own geographical and cultural position: I am a Western observer, shaped in a liberal democratic tradition that fundamentally values freedom, the sovereignty of states, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. This bias informs my reading of Sino-Taiwanese tensions — and I do not pretend to be free of it.

Sources

Primary sources

ThinkChina — Why the Pacific is filling with warships: RIMPAC and the new military contest — June 25, 2026

Institute for the Study of War (ISW) — China-Taiwan Update: June 26, 2026 — June 26, 2026

Washington Post — Taiwan launches a 5-day combat readiness exercise — June 22, 2026

Bloomberg — Taiwan maritime quarantine simulation exercise — June 25, 2026

Secondary sources

Yahoo News — European powers: rare warning on Taiwan — June 24, 2026

The Guardian — NATO concerns about American reliability — June 27, 2026