REPORT: Taiwan in the Vise: Drills, Incursions, and Fraying Nerves

Hours, not days: the new defensive calculus

One of the most alarming findings in an analysis by the Modern Diplomacy Research Center published on June 24, 2026 concerns the evolution of the response window available to Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack. With the intensification of PLA air and naval operations around the island, the effective buffer zone Taiwan had to detect and anticipate an offensive has shrunk considerably. Analysts estimate that in certain scenarios, Taiwan could have only a few hours — no longer several days — to detect the start of a genuine offensive and activate its defensive forces.

This is precisely the finding that has reshaped the immediate combat readiness drills of June 2026. The objective is no longer to rehearse theoretical defensive maneuvers. It is to simulate the transition from peacetime to combat readiness under the most compressed conditions possible. Entire brigades must go from peaceful garrisons to deployed combat positions in a matter of hours, with all the logistics that entails — fuel, ammunition, secure communications, decentralized command. The Ukrainian lesson is clear: the first hours are decisive. Had Ukrainian forces been unable to hold their initial positions in the first 72 hours, Kyiv could have fallen.

Taiwan learning from Ukraine how to resist — that is one of the most striking examples of how this war is reshaping global balances. An island threatened by China observes a nation threatened by Russia and draws concrete operational lessons from it. If the international community genuinely wanted to support these two democracies, it would systematically fund and facilitate this transfer of defensive knowledge.

The PLAN — the world's largest navy by vessel count

To understand why Taiwan's drills are so urgent, one must look at the trajectory of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). According to Pentagon data, the PLAN has become — by vessel count — the world's largest navy, with more than 370 combat ships, surpassing the US Navy. This does not yet represent qualitative superiority in every domain. But it is a quantitative reality that American and Taiwanese strategists cannot ignore. The more-than-40-day deployment of the aircraft carrier Liaoning — its longest to date — in the South China Sea and the Western Pacific is not a routine exercise. It is a demonstration of operational endurance capacity.

The Washington Times, on June 25, 2026, citing independent military analysts, reported that regular PLAN patrols around Taiwan are not merely presence demonstrations. They are blockade rehearsals. The geography of the patrols — their routes, duration, and spacing — exactly replicates the patterns that would be needed to establish a maritime cordon around the island, cutting off its imports of oil, food, and armaments. A blockade of Taiwan does not necessarily require a large-scale amphibious invasion — infinitely more costly and risky. It requires the capacity to cut the island's maritime lines of communication long enough to create unbearable economic pressure.

Blockade rehearsals — that is the most alarming thing I read while preparing this report. A blockade is not war in the traditional sense. It is a slow asphyxiation. And a slow asphyxiation does not generate a clear casus belli for Taiwan's allies. That is deliberate. China is building a toolkit of coercion that always stays just below the threshold of direct military response.

AUKUS and Australia's nuclear submarines

The response to China's buildup in the Indo-Pacific is taking shape through new security architectures. The AUKUS agreement — between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States — provides for the delivery to Canberra of nuclear-powered submarines, radically transforming Australian naval capabilities in the region. These submarines — quiet and high-endurance — would be major assets in any scenario involving the defense of Taiwan or resistance to a Chinese blockade. The QUAD — the strategic partnership between the United States, Japan, India, and Australia — represents another layer of the regional response, with joint naval exercises and intelligence sharing.

The notification to the US Congress of a weapons sale to Taiwan, confirmed by a senior American diplomat on June 26, 2026, is a positive signal. But Taiwan needs not only weapons, but the capacity to use them effectively — which requires training, joint exercises, and intelligence cooperation that current diplomatic constraints still limit. The doctrine of the "strategic porcupine" — equipping oneself with defenses that would inflict unacceptable losses on any attacker — is Taipei's central strategy. It depends on concrete, sustained Western support to remain credible.

The "strategic porcupine" doctrine for Taiwan — making invasion so costly that Beijing calculates it is not worth it — is intellectually attractive. But it has one limit: it depends on Chinese leaders being rational actors. Authoritarian regimes, in their most catastrophic decisions, do not always follow cost-benefit logic. Deterrence never works 100% of the time.

Five days of drills, an entire island on alert

From June 22 to 26, 2026, Taiwan conducted its immediate combat readiness drills — five intense days during which the armed forces simulated an ultra-rapid transition from peacetime to wartime. Armored vehicles patrolled transportation nodes around Taoyuan, the northern city hosting the country's busiest international airport. Special forces rehearsed defensive operations around port infrastructure. All of this, while aircraft from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) continued their daily sorties around the island.

This is not paranoia. It is calibrated military reality. Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense stated it explicitly: in a context of near-daily Chinese air and naval operations, Taiwan will have less time to respond to an actual crisis. The drills are no longer parade maneuvers — they simulate scenarios where the PLA could turn a routine gray-zone activity into a large-scale military operation within hours.

The immediate context: a series of escalating incursions

These drills did not occur in a vacuum. In the days before and after their launch, data from Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense recorded significantly elevated levels of Chinese military activity. On June 25, 2026, 14 PLA aircraft sorties were detected around Taiwanese territory, with 10 crossing the median line and entering the northern and southwestern portions of the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). On June 4, a peak had been recorded: 32 PLA aircraft sorties, with 25 of 32 crossing the median line.

These figures are not incidental. The median line of the Taiwan Strait is an informal demarcation that served for decades as a mutually acceptable friction line between the two sides. Its repeated violation is not a navigation error. It is a deliberate message: China no longer recognizes this line as a boundary it must respect.

I look at these incursion numbers — 10 aircraft crossing the median line in a single day — and I think of the Taiwanese pilots scrambling daily, year after year, to respond. This deliberate psychological and operational war of attrition against Taiwan's armed forces is intentional. China is wearing down the defenders before a single shot is fired. It is a strategy of sustained pressure that deserves to be recognized for what it is: a pre-war.

A new model of maritime assertion

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) published a key analysis on June 26, 2026 on the evolution of Chinese tactics. Since June 1, 2026, Chinese coast guard vessels (CGC) have been patrolling almost continuously in the waters east of Taiwan — a zone historically less contested than the strait itself. Between June 16 and 18, a Chinese natural resources survey ship, the Xiang Yang Hong 22, conducted a "marine environmental survey" in these waters under Chinese coast guard escort.

The ISW clearly identifies the intent: China seeks to normalize its presence in the waters east of Taiwan to establish the principle that it considers this zone its "coastal waters." The social media account Yuyuan Tantian, affiliated with Chinese state television CCTV, confirmed this framing in explicit terms, invoking a "coastal governance model" for this new activity — the same term that had been used to describe the patrols around the Kinmen islands since 2024.

The "Kinmen model" exported eastward

The "Kinmen model" is a strategy of progressive fait accompli. Since 2024, Chinese coast guard vessels have established a regular presence in the restricted waters surrounding the Kinmen archipelago, administered by Taiwan but located just kilometers from the Chinese mainland coast. This presence, initially sporadic, has become a de facto accepted routine. Beijing is now attempting to apply the same logic east of Taiwan — a strategically far more important zone, as it provides access to the Western Pacific.

If China succeeds in "normalizing" its presence east of Taiwan, it will have effectively encircled the island from three cardinal maritime directions. This progressive normalization is more dangerous than an open confrontation because it does not trigger the alert and response mechanisms of defense alliances. Each individual step seems "manageable"; it is the accumulation that creates the fait accompli.

The strategy of progressive fait accompli — one incursion at a time, one vessel at a time, one "environmental survey" at a time — is perhaps the most insidious tactic Beijing employs. It never gives the adversary a clear casus belli. It erodes Taiwanese sovereignty in millimeters, not kilometers. And when you look back after ten years, you realize the encirclement is almost complete. The question is whether Washington, Tokyo, and European capitals see it early enough.

The first official image of a hypersonic vector

On June 22, 2026, the PLA Daily — the official publication of the Chinese military — published the first official imagery of the intermediate-range ballistic missile DF-17 equipped with the DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle. The timing is not coincidental. This publication comes at the precise moment Taiwan is conducting its combat readiness drills and tensions in the strait are reaching a new level of intensity.

The DF-17 with DF-ZF is designed to target enemy air defense networks. Its unpredictable trajectory, speed exceeding Mach 5, and in-flight maneuvers make it extremely difficult to intercept with current air defense systems. According to the ISW, the PLA could use these missiles to neutralize Taiwanese defenses in a first strike, opening the way for subsequent air and amphibious operations. Publishing these images is not military transparency — it is a deterrence message addressed directly to Taipei and Washington.

The EU confirms China trained Russian soldiers

Meanwhile, a revelation from Kaja Kallas, the EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs, adds an explosive dimension to the strategic picture: the EU has confirmed that China trained Russian military personnel in mine-clearing and drone operations. These revelations, published in the ISW's China-Taiwan update of June 26, suggest that Beijing is not merely observing the war in Ukraine — it is actively participating in improving Russian combat capabilities, indirectly testing its own equipment and doctrines under real combat conditions.

This convergence between Russia and China — a Russia providing energy resources and combat experience, a China providing technology and training — constitutes an authoritarian axis that represents the gravest geopolitical threat to the liberal international order since the end of the Cold War.

China training Russian soldiers in drones and mine-clearing — techniques being tested in Ukrainian trenches — is information that should reverberate through every Western capital. This is not commercial cooperation. It is a transfer of military know-how from one dictatorship to another, to the direct detriment of Ukrainian defenders and, indirectly, to the security of Taiwan. The Moscow-Beijing axis is no longer a geopolitical theory. It is an operational fact.

Toward a military capable of rapid deployment

The June 2026 combat readiness drills are a prelude to the major annual Han Kuang exercises scheduled for August 2026. But their very design marks a break from the past. Taiwan has decided to move from large-scale display exercises to realistic operational training that tests rapid peacetime-to-wartime transitions, combined-arms operations, command and control, and logistics preparedness.

This shift in military philosophy is a direct response to observations of Russian operations in Ukraine and analysis of Chinese invasion scenarios. The lesson from Ukraine is clear: the first hours and days of an invasion are decisive. Forces that can deploy rapidly, maintain their lines of communication, and coordinate under pressure outperform larger but less agile armies. Taiwan is drawing lessons from this war in real time.

Taiwan's first domestically built submarine

As a symbol of this buildup, Taiwan continued in June 2026 with sea trials of its first locally built submarine. Emerging from the port of Kaohsiung for diving tests, the vessel represents a symbolically crucial program for Taiwanese defense autonomy. For decades, Taiwan had faced enormous difficulties acquiring submarines abroad — potential suppliers fearing Beijing's reactions. Building its own sends a dual message: Taipei can defend itself without depending entirely on outside suppliers, and the country is investing in capabilities that would make any Chinese amphibious invasion infinitely more costly.

Taiwan's 2026 defense budget, representing roughly a 20% increase over 2025 and targeting military spending at approximately 3.3% of GDP according to President William Lai Ching-te's goals, is nonetheless stalled in Parliament due to opposition parties holding a chamber majority. This budgetary deadlock, documented by the ISW, represents a domestic political vulnerability that Beijing is actively exploiting through influence operations targeting pro-dialogue parties.

Taiwan's opposition parties — with ties to Beijing — blocking the defense budget is democracy being used against itself. China does not need to invade Taiwan if it can paralyze its deliberative institutions from within. It is the same scenario seen in Europe with far-right parties funded by Moscow. Democratic subversion is less visible than an amphibious landing, but it can be just as effective over the long term.

Washington between caution and firmness

The American administration navigates a constant tension between its economic relations with China and its defense commitments to Taiwan. On June 25, 2026, a senior American diplomat confirmed that a Congressional arms sale notification for Taiwan was underway, while specifying it was "not conditioned" on ongoing discussions with Beijing — contradicting a suggestion from President Trump himself. This public divergence between the executive and the State Department on Taiwan policy illustrates the internal American contradictions that delight Beijing.

The Pentagon, for its part, expanded its list of Chinese military companies to include 65 new entities, including tech giants like Alibaba and Tencent, effective June 30, 2026. China retaliated by imposing export controls targeting 10 American companies. This technology and trade war is the economic counterpart of the military pressure on Taiwan.

UK, France, and Germany sound the alarm on Chinese carrier movements

According to available sources, Britain, France, and Germany expressed concerns about the movements of the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning, which returned to its home port of Qingdao on June 23 after a deployment of more than 40 days in the South China Sea and the Western Pacific. This prolonged deployment is the longest ever recorded for this vessel. European capitals, traditionally less engaged on Indo-Pacific security questions, are beginning to watch China's naval buildup with growing alarm — particularly in the context of their support for Ukraine against a Russia that Beijing quietly backs.

This convergence of attention — Washington, London, Paris, Berlin — toward the Western Pacific is not trivial. It signals that the transatlantic community is beginning to treat the Chinese threat to Taiwan not as a regional Asian question, but as a global security issue directly linked to the international order it has committed to defending in Ukraine.

France sending aircraft carriers to the South China Sea, Germany expressing concerns about the Liaoning — there is something paradoxical about countries that spent decades refusing to acknowledge Russia as a threat now waking up to China. But better late than never. If the West does not consolidate a firm position on Taiwan now, it risks finding itself in the same situation it faced in 2021 regarding Ukraine: overtaken by events it could have foreseen.

The island that resists and adapts

Taiwan is becoming one of the most important military laboratories in the world. Its immediate combat exercises, domestic armament programs, and gray-zone response strategies are all being observed and analyzed by military staffs in Washington, Tokyo, Seoul, Canberra, and increasingly Brussels. The way a 23-million-person island democracy resists daily pressure from the world's second-largest army is a real-time lesson in democratic resilience.

The implications extend further than the immediate theater. Patterns established now — in doctrine, in international behavior, in allied resolve — will shape the next crisis as surely as the current one. That is why the detail matters: not as trivia, but as precedent.

The front line of global democracy

Taiwan is not merely a geopolitical stake. It represents a fundamental moral question: is the international community prepared to defend a prosperous, peaceful democracy against the coercion of an authoritarian regime? The answers given to that question — in terms of weapons sold, political declarations, naval presence, and trade sanctions — will determine whether Beijing calculates that direct military action is too costly, or whether Western resolve is weak enough to risk it.

I close this report with a haunting question: are we repeating history? In 2021, we watched the signals of a Russian invasion of Ukraine and told ourselves he probably would not do it. In 2026, we watch the signals of Chinese preparation — the daily incursions, the simulated blockade patrols, the publication of the DF-17, the training of Russian soldiers — and some are saying he probably would not do it. I do not know whether history will repeat itself. I know we cannot afford to be as unprepared a second time.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

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Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a critical, contextual synthesis based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.