DECODING: The Gdańsk Conference — €10 billion to rebuild Ukraine under the bombs

DECODING: The Gdańsk Conference — €10 billion to rebuild Ukraine under the bombs

Introduction: Gdańsk, city of resistance, city of reconstruction

The geopolitical symbolism of choosing Gdańsk

There is a deep irony — or perhaps a calculated intention — in the fact that the 5th International Conference on the Reconstruction of Ukraine was held in Gdańsk, from June 25 to 26, 2026. This Polish port city is the birthplace of Solidarność, the labor movement that cracked the Soviet bloc and planted the seeds of the fall of the Berlin Wall. Choosing Gdańsk to bring together Ukraine's reconstruction partners is sending a message that even the most tepid diplomatic communiqués cannot erase: freedom has to be built. And it takes time.

The 160 agreements signed, representing more than €10 billion in commitments, are the culmination of a conference that was as much diplomatic as it was financial. Yulia Sviridenko, Ukraine's First Deputy Prime Minister and reconstruction coordinator, led the negotiations with a precision that stood in stark contrast to the scale of the challenge. Because rebuilding Ukraine today is not rebuilding after the war — it is rebuilding during the war, under the bombs, with construction workers who are also soldiers.

The context of an Ukraine that rebuilds under fire

Since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022, damage to Ukrainian infrastructure is estimated at more than $500 billion, according to assessments by the World Bank and the Ukrainian government. Every reconstruction conference held before peace is therefore both an act of faith in future victory and an immediate operational necessity — certain critical infrastructure must be repaired while the war continues for the country to function.

Poland, the host country, is not an incidental choice either. It shares a border with Ukraine, hosts millions of Ukrainian refugees, and has a particular historical relationship with resistance to Russian domination. Warsaw is invested in Ukrainian victory not only out of solidarity, but out of security calculation: if Ukraine falls, Poland is on the front line.

The 160 agreements — anatomy of an unprecedented commitment

What those 160 signatures actually represent

One hundred and sixty agreements signed in two days. The number is impressive but demands to be unpacked. It is a mix of government commitments, public-private partnerships, and sectoral agreements covering energy, transport, agriculture, information technology, and the reconstruction of civilian infrastructure. Among the signatories: European Union governments, international financial institutions, private European businesses, and investment funds specializing in post-conflict reconstruction.

First Deputy Prime Minister Sviridenko emphasized that these agreements do not constitute mere funding promises — they involve implementation partnerships, technology transfers, and training commitments. Meaning Ukraine is not just looking for money: it is looking to build the institutional and industrial capacity that will allow it to manage its own reconstruction over the long term, without permanent dependence on foreign donors.

The sectoral breakdown of commitments

Energy represents the absolute priority. Ukrainian electrical infrastructure has been systematically targeted by Russian strikes since the winter of 2022-2023, and every winter without full reconstruction represents an existential vulnerability for the civilian population. The energy agreements signed at Gdańsk include the rehabilitation of thermal power plants, the accelerated deployment of decentralized renewable energy — more resilient to targeted strikes — and the construction of new interconnection lines with the European electrical grid.

Transport and logistics represent the second major sector. The grain corridors, rail links to Poland and Moldova, and rehabilitation of ports on the Danube are essential not only for the Ukrainian economy but for global food security. Ukrainian agriculture feeds millions of people in Africa and the Middle East — every ton of grain blocked by infrastructure damage translates into food vulnerability thousands of kilometers away.

The European Union's role — €3.2 billion as a first installment

The Ukraine Facility and its reconstruction dimension

The European Union confirmed at Gdańsk the first disbursement of €3.2 billion as part of a total envelope of €90 billion earmarked for Ukrainian reconstruction through 2027. This amount falls under the Ukraine Facility mechanism, established in 2024 to replace annual funding through budget cycles and political crises with a predictable multi-year commitment. The principle is that of a 21st-century Marshall Plan: disbursements tied to reforms and governance milestones, not blank checks.

France, Germany, and Poland are among the most active contributors in structuring these mechanisms. Paris has notably supported agreements in the defense industrial sector and in the reconstruction of judicial institutions — a critical domain for future EU accession negotiations. Berlin, despite its own internal political turbulence, has maintained its financial commitment to Ukraine — an important signal in a context where allied fatigue is a genuine concern.

The governance conditions attached to European funds

EU funds are not unconditional. They are tied to measurable progress on anti-corruption, judicial reform, and regulatory alignment with European standards. These conditions are sometimes criticized as ill-adapted to a wartime context — how can a country under daily bombardment reform its judicial system while simultaneously defending its territory? Ukraine's answer, thus far, has been to advance on both fronts simultaneously, with uneven but real results.

The European Commission acknowledged at Gdańsk that timelines and conditions must be adapted to the reality of war. Flexibility mechanisms have been introduced to allow accelerated disbursements on priority projects — particularly in energy and transport infrastructure — without waiting for the full completion of reform processes. This is a delicate balance between the requirements of good governance and the humanitarian urgency of populations lacking electricity and clean water.

The Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund — the financial vehicle that changes the rules

A fund ready to deploy €500 million in 2026

One of the most concrete announcements of Gdańsk is the imminent launch of the Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund (URIF), a hybrid public-private financing mechanism designed to mobilize institutional capital that would not normally flow through governmental channels. The fund aims to deploy approximately €500 million during 2026, with a medium-term target of several billion. Its structure is designed to reduce perceived risk for private investors, using public guarantees to cover potential first losses.

The concept is that of blended finance: public money serves as a magnet for private money by absorbing a portion of the risk. This is the same logic used in post-conflict or development contexts, such as in Rwanda after its brutal conflict period or in certain African post-conflict countries. For Ukraine, the challenge is to convince institutional investors — pension funds, insurers, infrastructure funds — that Ukrainian risk is manageable and that expected returns justify the exposure.

The obstacles to private capital mobilization

Mobilizing private capital for the reconstruction of a country at war is one of the most complex challenges in international finance. Political risk insurers — such as the American DFC or the World Bank's MIGA — play a crucial role by offering coverage that makes Ukrainian investments acceptable to boards that must answer to their risk committees. Without such coverage, few institutional investors can justify exposure to a country under active bombardment.

The question of continuity of property rights is also fundamental. Some Ukrainian regions are occupied, others have seen property destroyed or seized. Before investing in reconstruction, private investors need a clear legal framework on ownership, mining rights, and infrastructure concessions. Ukraine has made progress on this framework, but gaps remain — and every gap is a potential brake on the capital mobilization that Kyiv desperately needs.

The "toloka" — the Ukrainian concept at the heart of the reconstruction model

One word, one philosophy of communal solidarity

First Deputy Prime Minister Sviridenko used a Ukrainian word that deserves particular attention: toloka. This term refers to a traditional Ukrainian practice of collective work — communities gathering to help a neighbor build or rebuild, with no expectation of payment, out of mutual solidarity. By applying it to the framework of international reconstruction, Sviridenko expresses something profound about the Ukrainian vision of this process: it is not a unilateral transfer from the wealthy to the needy, it is a shared enterprise, an international community building together.

This philosophy has practical implications. It means that Ukraine does not want to be a passive recipient of international funds — it wants to be an active driver of its own reconstruction, an equal partner in the design of projects, a country building its own institutional and industrial capacities instead of perpetually depending on foreign expertise. This is a message of national dignity that resonates deeply in a context where the war itself is a struggle for sovereignty and self-determination.

Reconstruction as a vehicle for national transformation

Reconstruction is not merely a question of infrastructure — it is an opportunity for structural transformation. Kyiv has chosen to approach it as such: rebuilding electrical grids while modernizing them to integrate renewables and decentralization; rebuilding cities while integrating European urbanism standards; rebuilding institutions while aligning them with European governance standards. This is not rebuilding identically — it is rebuilding better, leapfrogging a generation of development.

Countries like Japan after 1945 or West Germany at the same time demonstrated that complete destruction, however terrible, can be followed by reconstruction that surpasses the pre-war state in quality and economic performance. Ukraine has this ambition. And it has something that the Germans and Japanese did not: a direct institutional connection to the European Union, the world's largest single market, as an integration horizon.

Key partners — France, Germany, Poland and their specific commitments

The Franco-German-Polish triangle in reconstruction

France, Germany, and Poland form the geopolitical triangle structuring European engagement in Ukrainian reconstruction. Paris distinguished itself through commitments in the defense and institutional resilience sectors — notably in reinforcing Ukrainian police and judicial capacities, essential for the fight against corruption and preparation for EU accession. Berlin maintained substantial financial commitments, despite a fragile coalition political context in Germany.

Poland, as host country and Ukraine's direct neighbor, may be the most strategically invested partner. Warsaw has developed a close economic relationship with Kyiv since the start of the war — Polish logistics corridors have become a vital artery for Ukrainian imports and exports. The agreements signed at Gdańsk include investments in these corridors to strengthen and sustain them, in the mutual interest of both countries.

US and UK commitments

The United States maintained a presence at the conference, but its direct reconstruction commitments remain below its economic weight. The Trump administration has signaled a preference for reconstruction models based on trade agreements and natural resource concession arrangements rather than direct government subsidies. Negotiations on an agreement covering Ukrainian mineral resources — rare earths, lithium, titanium — remain ongoing, with important implications for the long-term financing of reconstruction.

The United Kingdom was present at Gdańsk with substantial commitments in the energy reconstruction sector and in support of Ukrainian defense industry. London maintains a particularly close bilateral relationship with Kyiv since the start of the war — the British-Ukrainian Bilateral Security Treaty of 2024 includes reconstruction provisions that are materializing through the Gdańsk agreements.

The challenge of rebuilding under fire — logistics of the impossible

Rebuilding on the front line: the operational paradoxes

How do you rebuild a bridge when the first one will probably be targeted again? How do you rebuild a power plant when Russian strikes systematically target energy infrastructure? This operational paradox is at the heart of the Ukrainian reconstruction challenge. Engineering and construction teams operate under conditions no civil engineering manual covers — under the threat of drones, with delivery timelines disrupted by power cuts, in zones where demining must precede construction.

Innovative solutions have emerged from this constraint. Ukraine has developed expertise in modular and decentralized construction — small dispersed energy plants rather than one large central installation, communication networks with multiple redundancy, infrastructure designed to be rapidly rebuilt after a strike. This doctrine of resilience through dispersion is a direct response to Russia's strategy of systematically targeting infrastructure nodes.

The reconstruction workers: between laborers and soldiers

Ukrainian reconstruction confronts an unprecedented demographic and human challenge. Millions of Ukrainians are either in the armed forces, abroad as refugees, or in regions too close to the front to work on civilian construction sites. The labor market in construction is under extreme tension — wages have exploded in reconstruction-related sectors, creating competition with the defense sector for an already reduced skilled workforce.

The Gdańsk agreements include accelerated training and certification programs to rapidly create new skilled workers in construction trades. Partnerships with vocational schools in Poland, Germany, and other European countries allow Ukrainians to train abroad and return with transferable skills. This is also a way to facilitate the return of refugees — by offering them not only a Ukraine to rebuild, but a specific, skilled job within that reconstruction.

European accession as the horizon — rebuilding to integrate

EU accession negotiations and their impact on reconstruction standards

Ukraine has been an official candidate for European Union membership since June 2022. Accession negotiations are progressing — slowly, but genuinely. Reconstruction is intrinsically linked to this process: rebuilt infrastructure must meet European standards, rebuilt institutions must conform to EU governance standards, businesses participating in reconstruction become accustomed to the procedures and requirements of the European single market. In other words, reconstruction is the construction site of Ukraine's future European integration.

Negotiations on Cluster 1 — justice, freedom and security — recently advanced, with the formal opening of this negotiation chapter. Other clusters covering the economy, environment, and digital markets are being prepared. Each opened chapter is a step in a process that, under optimistic estimates, could lead to accession within the next 5 to 10 years. Rebuilding infrastructure to European standards shortens this timeline by eliminating technical and regulatory obstacles that would otherwise need to be addressed separately.

The Western Balkans model and its lessons for Ukraine

The experience of the Western Balkans in their EU accession process offers valuable lessons — and warnings. Countries like Serbia, Montenegro, and Albania have been negotiating for more than a decade without yet having acceded. The obstacles are often as political as they are technical: judicial reforms blocked by entrenched interests, questions of systemic corruption, bilateral territorial disputes. Ukraine shares some of these structural challenges, compounded by the wartime context.

But Ukraine benefits from a level of political sympathy and geopolitical urgency that the Balkans have never possessed to the same degree. The Russian threat has transformed Ukrainian accession into a European security question, not merely a technocratic process. That urgency should — in theory — accelerate timelines. The question is whether the EU's institutional structures, designed for slow and methodical processes, can adapt to the urgency of a country at war.

The risks of diversion and corruption — the elephant in the room

The transparency challenge in €10 billion flows

Ten billion euros committed in two days. That figure both impresses and worries. Ukraine has structural corruption problems that have historically slowed its development and European integration. In a wartime context, with weakened oversight structures and an urgency that pushes toward rapid action, the risk of reconstruction fund diversion is real and must be named frankly. This is not an attack on Ukraine — it is a reality that Ukraine acknowledges itself.

Control mechanisms have been put in place: the Ukrainian Court of Audit, strengthened, works in coordination with European and international auditors. The NABU (National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine) has demonstrated real capabilities, with significant convictions of mid-level officials. But large reconstruction contracts, with their multi-zero figures, also attract interests that know how to circumvent formal controls. Vigilance must be proportional to the amounts at stake.

Technological tools for transparency — the ProZorro system

Ukraine has developed since 2016 an electronic and transparent public procurement system called ProZorro, which has been cited as a global model of digital good governance. This system allows any citizen or journalist to track public procurement calls, contract awards, and payments. In the context of reconstruction, ProZorro is the first line of defense against corruption — by making processes visible, it makes diversions harder to conceal.

International donors require that all reconstruction funds flow through digital traceability systems equivalent to or better than ProZorro. Partnerships with consulting firms specialized in post-conflict reconstruction management have been established to support Ukrainian oversight capacities. This is not perfect — corruption adapts to control systems, as always — but it represents measurable progress over reconstruction contexts where no systemic mechanism existed at all.

Rebuilding the martyred cities — Mariupol, Bakhmut, Kherson

Cities razed to the ground waiting for their renaissance

Mariupol is the most painful symbol of this war. Besieged, bombed to its foundations, occupied by Russian forces since May 2022, it is inaccessible to Ukrainian and international reconstruction teams. But its case illustrates the core problem underlying any discussion of reconstruction: as long as occupied territories remain under Russian control, reconstruction cannot begin where it is most needed. The Gdańsk agreements plan for the aftermath — for the day when these territories are liberated and fast reconstruction will be required.

Bakhmut, partially liberated then retaken by Russian forces, symbolizes the destructive cycle of positional warfare. Kherson, liberated in November 2022 but still under regular strikes from the opposite bank of the Dnipro, represents another type of challenge: rebuilding in a liberated city still under direct threat. Thousands of civilians have returned to Kherson despite the risks, in partially destroyed buildings, without running water or reliable electricity. Their needs are immediate — not in five years, now.

Emergency planning versus sustainable reconstruction

The tension between emergency response and sustainable reconstruction is one of the most difficult questions at the Gdańsk conference. Humanitarian organizations push for rapid solutions — prefabricated housing, mobile generators, decentralized water purification. Urbanists and architects push for sustainable solutions that do not create permanent temporary housing ghettos. Financiers push for projects with clear returns on investment. These visions are not always compatible in the short term.

Ukraine has chosen not to rebuild identically. Destroyed cities have been redesigned by renowned European and Ukrainian architects, with plans integrating more green spaces, better transport networks, and more energy-efficient housing. This risky gamble — repair quickly but also repair better — may be the only way to justify reconstruction financed on an international scale. If reconstruction produces something mediocre, international donors will have difficulty defending future commitments.

Reconstruction as a strategic message — what €10 billion means for Moscow

Investment as a signal of Western perseverance

Moscow is watching Gdańsk closely. The €10 billion signed are not only a financial commitment to Ukraine — they are a message to Russia: the West is not tiring. Russia's strategy in this war includes a calculation about duration — the hope that the fatigue of Western allies will eventually reduce support for Kyiv to an insufficient level to sustain resistance. Every reconstruction conference that produces substantial commitments is a direct refutation of that calculation.

Putin's logic is one of attrition — destroy fast enough that reconstruction cannot keep pace, drain the Western budget with growing demands, fragment the international coalition with peace proposals that divide. The Gdańsk conference, by producing 160 agreements and €10 billion, answers this logic directly: no, you are not destroying faster than we rebuild, and no, the coalition holds.

Reconstruction as a peace negotiation tool

In the context of still-hypothetical discussions about peace talks, reconstruction is also a negotiation tool. A Ukraine whose reconstruction is well underway, with institutional investments and durable partnerships, is a Ukraine that can negotiate from a position of relative strength — not militarily on all fronts, but economically and diplomatically. It demonstrates that its partners support it not only to defend itself, but to prosper.

Russia has attempted, in certain negotiation proposals, to include clauses that would give it a role or influence in the reconstruction process. These attempts have been firmly rejected by Kyiv and its partners. The reconstruction of Ukraine will happen without Russia — that is a line clearly drawn at Gdańsk. Moscow will have no share in the future Ukraine it is trying to destroy.

Lessons from post-conflict reconstructions — what history teaches

The Marshall Plan as a model and its limits

The reference to the Marshall Plan is unavoidable in any debate on Ukrainian reconstruction. From 1948 to 1951, the United States injected the equivalent of $150 billion in today's money into the reconstruction of Western Europe. The result — the Thirty Glorious Years and the construction of the European project — is the most compelling argument in favor of massive and rapid investment in a post-conflict country. But the conditions of 1948 are not those of 2026: the war is not over, Ukrainian institutions are more fragile than postwar European institutions, and investments must be made in a context of ongoing security risk.

The limits of the Marshall model for Ukraine are equally important to understand. The Marshall Plan unfolded in countries where the war was over, where basic economic structures existed, and where stable governments could manage financial flows. For Ukraine, the combination of active war, mass population displacement, and occupied territories creates constraints that the 1948 model cannot fully address.

Contemporary post-conflict reconstructions — Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo

Contemporary examples — Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo — offer more directly applicable lessons, and they are sobering. In Afghanistan, more than $120 billion was invested over 20 years in reconstruction with insufficient results — an international bureaucracy disconnected from local realities, endemic corruption in fund management, and an aid dependency that never produced an autonomous economy. In Iraq, reconstruction projects were abandoned midway when funding dried up, leaving communities with half-built infrastructure, sometimes worse than before.

Kosovo offers a more encouraging example — reconstruction that progressed significantly with strong European institutional framing and an active local civil society. The difference from Afghanistan and Iraq? The existence of a clear vision of regional integration, capable local institutions, and a population whose aspirations were aligned with reconstruction objectives. Ukraine shares more with the Kosovo-European model than with the Afghanistan-American model. That is a reason for measured optimism.

The role of Ukrainian civil society — the forgotten actors of reconstruction

NGOs, municipalities, and local entrepreneurs

International reconstruction conferences naturally focus on major players — governments, financial institutions, multinationals. But the real reconstruction of Ukraine also plays out at much smaller scales: mayors of destroyed cities organizing communal construction sites, local NGOs distributing building materials in frontline villages, small entrepreneurs repairing residential buildings with available resources. These ground-level actors are the first to understand what communities actually need — and the first to be forgotten at major conferences.

Organizations like World Central Kitchen, Médecins Sans Frontières, and dozens of Ukrainian NGOs have developed rapid community reconstruction models that adapt to wartime conditions. These models deserve to be directly funded, without passing exclusively through governmental mechanisms that can be slow and bureaucratic. Some Gdańsk agreements include direct funding mechanisms to civil society actors — a positive development that deserves to be amplified.

Women as the driving force of reconstruction

A fact systematically underreported in discussions of Ukrainian reconstruction: Ukrainian women have become the pillar of the civilian economy while the men fight. They run family businesses, maintain municipal services, organize local reconstruction efforts. In cities and villages far from the front but affected by strikes, it is often women who coordinate emergency repairs, organize the demining of community gardens, manage shelters for internally displaced people.

The Gdańsk agreements include specific programs to support women's entrepreneurship in reconstruction — training, access to credit, integration into the value chains of large projects. This is an investment in the social cohesion of the post-war period as much as in the economic efficiency of reconstruction. A reconstruction that marginalizes the women who carried the country during the war would not only be unjust — it would be strategically incoherent.

The question of Russian reparations — a legal framework taking shape

Frozen Russian assets as a potential financing source

Three hundred billion dollars. That is the approximate value of Russian Central Bank assets frozen in the West since the 2022 sanctions. These assets are at the center of a complex legal and political debate: can they be used to finance Ukrainian reconstruction? The EU has taken a first step by using the profits generated by these assets — approximately €3 billion per year — to finance military aid to Ukraine. The seizure of the principal itself is a more complex question, with implications for international law and the stability of the global financial system.

The principle is nonetheless simple: if Russia is responsible for the destruction, Russia should contribute to the reconstruction. This is the principle of war reparations, enshrined in international law. The practical problem is that Russia acknowledges neither its responsibility nor its defeat — and imposing reparations on a sovereign state without a credible international enforcement mechanism is legally and practically complex. The frozen assets are the only available lever in the immediate term.

Building the international legal framework for reparations

The International Commission on Damages for Ukraine (CDI), established in 2023 at the initiative of the Council of Europe, documents and registers compensation claims for damages caused by Russian aggression. More than 300,000 claims have already been registered. This legal framework, still incomplete, lays the foundations for a reparations process that could, if a peace agreement is signed or if Russia is compelled by other mechanisms, force Moscow to financially contribute to what it has destroyed.

The Gdańsk conference reaffirmed the principle that the reconstruction of Ukraine should not rest exclusively on Western taxpayers — Moscow must pay. This is not rhetorical posturing: it is a legal principle under construction that, if defended consistently, could become an important precedent for the accountability of aggressor states in 21st-century international law.

Conclusion: Gdańsk as a promise — now it must be kept

From promise to execution — the real test begins

Reconstruction conferences have a well-known tendency to produce solemn commitments followed by disappointing execution. The 1st Ukraine Reconstruction Conference in Lugano in 2022, the 2nd in London in 2023, the 3rd in Berlin in 2024, the 4th in Rome in 2025 — each produced significant announcements, but the rate of commitment fulfillment remains a concern. Gdańsk and its €10 billion are only worth something if contracts are signed, work begins, and money actually arrives in Ukrainian accounts.

Follow-up mechanisms put in place after Gdańsk include a monthly dashboard of commitments versus disbursements, accessible to the public. Quarterly reviews between Kyiv and the main donors will allow bottlenecks to be identified and unblocked. These accountability tools are necessary — not sufficient, but necessary. The difference between a fine conference and a real turning point in reconstruction will be measurable in twelve months.

The hope built at Gdańsk — a bet on Ukraine

The 5th International Conference on the Reconstruction of Ukraine in Gdańsk is, despite everything, a sign of hope. It demonstrates that the coalition supporting Ukraine holds — that after four years of war, strikes, and fatigue, Kyiv's partners are still there, with money and commitments. It demonstrates that Ukraine itself has the institutional capacity to negotiate and sign 160 agreements in two days — no small feat for a country at war. And it lays the groundwork for a reconstruction that, if executed seriously, could transform a national tragedy into the engine of a historical transformation.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Sources and limitations

This article draws primarily from reports of the 5th International Conference on the Reconstruction of Ukraine in Gdańsk (June 25-26, 2026), the statements of First Deputy Prime Minister Yulia Sviridenko, and European Union announcements regarding the Ukraine Facility mechanism. Data on infrastructure damage comes from World Bank/Ukrainian government assessments. Information on frozen Russian assets comes from official European Commission sources. I do not have access to the full texts of the 160 agreements signed, and precise sectoral details of commitments remain to be verified as official documents are published.

The historical comparisons (Marshall Plan, Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo) are analytical interpretations based on academic and journalistic sources. They constitute analytical frameworks, not deterministic predictions about the outcome of Ukrainian reconstruction.

Stated biases

I actively support the reconstruction of Ukraine and Western engagement in this process. I consider Ukrainian resistance legitimate and its European aspiration genuine. I am critical of Russia's strategy of systematic destruction of civilian infrastructure, which I consider a war crime. These positions are editorial judgments distinct from the factual analyses contained in this article.

Sources

Primary sources

Fakti.bg — Ukraine signs agreements worth over €10 billion at reconstruction conference — June 25, 2026

Ukraine.ua — Ukraine Recovery Conference 2026 Gdańsk — official results — June 26, 2026

European Commission — Ukraine Facility — multi-year financing mechanism — 2024-2027

Secondary sources

Kyiv Independent — Gdańsk Reconstruction Conference: key results — June 26, 2026

The Guardian — Ukraine reconstruction follow-up 2026 — June 2026

Euromaidan Press — Ukraine reconstruction: €10 billion at Gdańsk, analysis of commitments — June 26, 2026

World Bank — Ukraine Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment — 2025