OPINION: Two years of the Moscow-Pyongyang alliance — the friendship of tyrants

A pact signed in Pyongyang before the world

On June 19, 2024, in the grand ceremonial hall of Pyongyang, Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un signed the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty between Russia and North Korea. This document included a mutual defense clause obligating each party to provide military assistance "without delay" in the event of aggression. Two years later, that treaty is no longer a statement of intent — it is an operational reality proven by thousands of North Korean soldiers fighting alongside the Russian army in Ukraine.

On June 19, 2026, to mark the second anniversary of this pact, the official newspaper of the Korean Workers' Party, the Rodong Sinmun, published a statement hailing the treaty as "an essential legal weapon" promising "a new world order." The phrasing is revealing: this is not a defensive alliance — it is a project for transforming the international order, for overturning the liberal world that emerged after the Cold War.

Two years of faithful execution

In two years, this treaty has produced concrete results. North Korea has supplied Russia with artillery shells by the millions, KN-23 ballistic missiles, multiple rocket launchers, and between 14,000 and 15,000 soldiers deployed in Kursk according to Seoul's estimates. In return, Russia has supplied military technologies, financial support circumventing sanctions, energy and food. It is the most concrete and operational pact between two authoritarian regimes in decades.

Two years of alliance and already thousands of soldiers dead in a war not their own. Two years of technology exchanges making the world more dangerous. Two years of open defiance of the international order. The "friendship" of Putin and Kim carries a cost paid by others — Ukrainians, unwitting North Korean soldiers, civilian populations.

Article 4: the clause that changes everything

Article 4 of the treaty — the mutual defense clause — stipulates that if one party "finds itself in a state of war," the other shall "provide military and other assistance with all the means at its disposal without delay." This formulation, modeled on the Soviet-North Korean treaty of 1961, was analyzed by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) as the reestablishment of a Cold War-type alliance, founded not on shared ideology but on a shared opposition to the United States and the liberal West.

The treaty goes beyond mutual defense. It calls for cooperation in military, foreign policy, and commercial domains. It commits the two countries to take "binding measures" — a term referring to the international sanctions imposed on both regimes, signaling their coordinated intention to resist them. It is an explicitly anti-Western alliance, designed to last.

Ratification and entry into force

The treaty was ratified by North Korea in November 2024 and officially entered into force on December 4, 2024 after the exchange of instruments of ratification. In April 2026, during the visit of Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov to Pyongyang, the two countries concluded a new military cooperation plan for the period 2027–2031. The 2024 treaty is therefore not a ceiling — it is a floor on which a long-term architecture of military cooperation is being built.

That 2027–2031 plan is what strikes me most. This is not a circumstantial relationship tied to the war in Ukraine — it is a structural alliance, planned five years ahead. Kim and Putin are building something durable. And the democracies are responding as if it were a temporary phenomenon.

The April 2026 memorial ceremony

In April 2026, a Russian delegation led by Defense Minister Belousov traveled to Pyongyang to participate in the inauguration of a memorial complex dedicated to North Korean soldiers killed in Russia. Kim Jong-un praised his country's soldiers who had fought "on foreign soil" for Russia. The Russian State Duma Speaker for his part thanked Kim for the "liberation of Kursk."

Behind this glorifying rhetoric lie devastating numbers. South Korean intelligence estimates approximately 2,000 North Korean soldiers killed since the start of the deployment. The BBC reported a similar estimate. The ISW assesses total losses — killed and wounded — at between 6,000 and 7,000 soldiers. These men, sent to fight without fully understanding the nature of the war they were entering, died for the imperial ambitions of a foreign leader and for the strategic gains of a regime that treated them as a negotiable asset.

The doctrine of the forced martyr

North Korean soldiers deployed in Russia had been ordered to self-detonate with a grenade rather than allow themselves to be captured. This is not an exceptional measure — it is the North Korean army's standard doctrine for protecting military secrets and avoiding the shame of capture. In April 2026, Kim Jong-un had officially confirmed a "self-detonation policy" for his soldiers at risk of capture, according to press reports.

This doctrine reveals what the Pyongyang regime truly thinks of its soldiers: they are resources to be exploited and expended, not citizens to be protected. The friendship between Putin and Kim is built on the deaths of soldiers whom neither truly regards as full human beings.

The order to self-detonate rather than be captured — I must pause on this reality. Democratic governments train their soldiers to survive, to surrender if necessary, to be protected by the Geneva Convention. Kim Jong-un trains his to die so that no one can reveal that North Koreans are present in Russia. The difference between these two doctrines says everything about the nature of these regimes.

Pyongyang glorifies, the UN can do nothing

On June 19, 2026, the Rodong Sinmun described the treaty as providing "a powerful legal framework" for resisting a "confused and volatile international situation." This description illustrates how Pyongyang perceives the treaty: not as a circumstantial alliance, but as a pillar of its long-term political project. North Korea "has pledged to actively support" Russian policies under the treaty.

The UN, supposed to be the guarantor of the international order, is structurally incapable of responding. Russia, a permanent Security Council member, vetoes any meaningful condemnation resolution of the North Korean deployment or the treaty itself. By violating the sanctions it helped to adopt against North Korea, Moscow is methodically destroying the credibility of the international non-proliferation mechanism.

The international community's response: fragmented

The United States, South Korea, Japan, and their allies have condemned the treaty and imposed additional sanctions. But these measures bump up against the reality of a bilateral Russian-North Korean relationship that has freed itself from multilateral constraints. Russia is using its international position to protect Pyongyang from the consequences of its actions. Beijing maintains a discreet complicity. The result is de facto impunity for both regimes.

I have no miracle solution to offer for this institutional impasse. What I can say is that the West must stop treating the UN as if it were still functioning normally on these files. It is blocked. Alternative coalitions and pressure mechanisms outside the UN framework must be built. That is less elegant, but it is realistic.

What Pyongyang has gained

In two years of alliance, North Korea has reaped considerable benefits. On the financial side, substantial revenues circumventing sanctions, estimated by some analysts at several billion dollars in equivalent value transfers. On the technological side, KN-23 improvements, electronic warfare systems, air defense technologies, and satellite program support. On the operational side, real combat experience for thousands of soldiers who returned as instructors.

On the political side, de facto international recognition as a first-rank military actor, validation of its doctrine of alliance with a major power, and the signal sent to South Korea and the United States that Pyongyang is no longer alone. The symbolic value of all this for Kim's regime is immense — and the concrete benefits are equally so.

What Moscow has gained

Russia for its part has obtained massive quantities of ammunition at a critical moment of the war in Ukraine. According to several estimates, millions of North Korean artillery shells have replenished Russian stockpiles, helping to maintain the tempo of strikes on Ukraine. North Korean soldiers have provided additional manpower on difficult fronts. And the relationship with Pyongyang reinforces the image of a Russia capable of building alternative alliances to the West — a political narrative useful for Putin domestically.

This cold calculation of mutual benefits is what makes this alliance durable. It is not the friendship between two leaders — it is an agreement of well-understood interests. And as long as those interests converge, the alliance will hold. The question is how to alter the calculations — making the benefits too costly for one or the other.

Iran, an attentive spectator

The Russian-North Korean alliance is being watched with interest by other authoritarian actors, starting with Iran. Tehran has already supplied Shahed drones to Russia and has received in return military technologies and economic support. The bilateral exchange model circumventing sanctions works — and others could imitate it. The axis of sanctioned regimes is becoming a mutual support network that is progressively weakening the effectiveness of Western sanctions.

China, for its part, maintains an ambiguous position: officially neutral on the Ukrainian conflict, it observes and benefits from the destabilization of the West without taking direct risks. Beijing is not supplying lethal weapons to Russia, but its trade with Moscow provides the economic and civilian technological resources that indirectly fuel the Russian war effort. This complicity through commerce is less visible but equally real.

The authoritarian axis as a structural phenomenon

What we are observing is not a series of opportunistic alliances — it is the emergence of a structural authoritarian axis that shares a vision of the world: one of a multipolar order in which major autocratic powers hold unchallenged spheres of influence, in which liberal international norms are tools of Western oppression to be rejected, and in which regime sovereignty trumps individual rights. This coherent political project deserves a coherent response from the democracies.

Two years after the signing of this treaty, I am struck by the speed with which an alliance was able to become operational and productive for its members. Democracies often take years to conclude cooperation agreements. Putin and Kim transformed a pact into a military reality in a matter of months. This authoritarian efficiency is a lesson that democracies would do well to take to heart.

The NPT Treaty and its practical limits

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has been the pillar of the international non-proliferation regime since 1968. North Korea withdrew from it in 2003. But the NPT also prohibits member states from transferring nuclear technologies to non-member states. Russian transfers to Pyongyang — whether concerning missiles, electronic warfare, or satellites — fall into a legal gray area that Moscow is deliberately exploiting. By helping North Korea improve conventional delivery vehicles capable of carrying nuclear payloads, Russia is undermining the spirit of the NPT while maintaining plausible legal deniability.

Russia's complicity in improving North Korea's military capabilities represents a systemic attack on the international non-proliferation framework. For other states that have renounced their nuclear programs in exchange for security guarantees — such as Ukraine with the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 — this development sends a clear signal: guarantees are worthless against a determined adversary, and the only way to guarantee one's security is to possess one's own weapons. This is a catastrophic precedent for global stability.

The response of threshold countries: proliferation cascade?

The erosion of the non-proliferation regime through Russian-North Korean complicity creates a risk of proliferation cascade. Countries such as Iran, which already possesses the technical capabilities for a nuclear weapon according to several IAEA analyses, are observing the strategic advantages North Korea derives from its arsenal. South Korea itself is experiencing a growing internal debate about the merits of developing its own nuclear capabilities — a shift in opinion documented by several 2024–2026 polls showing a majority of South Koreans in favor of this option.

Washington has so far managed to maintain its extended deterrence commitment — the "nuclear umbrella" — as an alternative to proliferation for its allies. But the Trump administration, with its rhetoric about "fair burden-sharing" and its partial troop withdrawal decisions, has sown doubt about the long-term credibility of this commitment. If American extended deterrence becomes less credible, the proliferation calculus for allies shifts radically.

A nuclear proliferation cascade is the most nightmarish scenario international politics can produce. And we are moving toward it, slowly but surely. Every Russian-North Korean technology transfer, every doubt about the credibility of the American umbrella, every unpunished success by Kim Jong-un brings that scenario closer to reality. That is why the stakes extend far beyond the Korean Peninsula.

Internal tensions within the Russian-North Korean axis

The Russia-North Korea alliance is robust in the short term because it satisfies the immediate interests of both parties. But structural tensions could emerge over the long term. Pyongyang will want to avoid a permanent dependence on Moscow that would compromise its strategic autonomy — North Korea has always jealously preserved its independence of judgment, even vis-à-vis its former Soviet patron. Moscow, for its part, will have to manage growing demands from Pyongyang as North Korea comes to understand its own value in this alliance.

A key factor is the outcome of the war in Ukraine. A Russia weakened by years of conflict, subject to growing economic sanctions and unsustainable military expenditure, will be a less generous partner than a victorious Russia. If the war drags on or if Russia is forced into an unfavorable agreement, the resources it can offer Pyongyang will diminish. Kim Jong-un is aware of this — it is probably one of the reasons he is seeking to maximize technology transfers now, while Moscow still needs his soldiers.

Evolution scenarios for democracies

For the democracies facing this alliance, several scenarios are possible. The optimistic scenario: growing economic sanctions on Russia, combined with military setbacks in Ukraine, reduce Moscow's capacity to support Pyongyang, slowing technology transfers. The median scenario: the alliance holds at its current level, transfers continue at a controlled pace, and democracies manage a growing threat without major escalation. The pessimistic scenario: a Russia stabilized after a ceasefire in Ukraine has more resources to support Pyongyang, accelerating North Korean modernization at a pace that outstrips allies' response capabilities.

Democratic policy must aim to maximize the probability of the first scenario while preparing for the second and building barriers against the third. This requires maintaining strong economic pressure on Russia, supporting Ukraine with the necessary resources to impose military costs on Moscow, and strengthening defensive cooperation between European and Asian allies so that both faces of the authoritarian axis know they are contained.

Two years after the signing of the treaty, one thing is clear: this alliance will be very difficult to break from outside. It can, however, wear down from within — if the interests of the two parties diverge sufficiently, if the costs become greater than the benefits. The democracies have the power to alter this calculus. The question is whether they have the will to do so.

A functional but fragile alliance over the long term

The Russian-North Korean alliance is robust in the short term because it serves the immediate interests of both parties. But over the long term, tensions could emerge. Pyongyang will want to ensure that the technologies obtained from Moscow do not create a permanent dependency. Moscow will have to manage growing demands from Pyongyang — unbalanced alliances generate escalating demands. And a Russia weakened by the war in Ukraine will be a less generous partner than a victorious Russia.

What democracies must do

Two years of the tyrants' friendship, and here is what I observe: they advance, they build, they organize. Facing them, democracies debate, hesitate, and arrive late. This asymmetry must stop. Not by abandoning our values — but by defending them with the same strategic determination that our adversaries bring to attacking the order those values built.

Democracies must respond to this alliance with their own reinforced cohesion. That means unwavering support for Ukraine, whose resistance is the first line of defense against the authoritarian axis. It means closer coordination between European and Asian allies — the North Korean threat and the Russian threat are two faces of the same challenge. And it means the political will to respond to provocations with real costs, not merely rhetorical condemnations. The second anniversary of this treaty is a reminder that time works against passivity.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

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