INVESTIGATION: Hormuz, the naval powers reclaim their destiny

INVESTIGATION: Hormuz, the naval powers reclaim their destiny

Introduction: The sea as stage for rediscovered sovereignty

One strait, a world on hold

The Strait of Hormuz, that maritime choke point barely 33 kilometers wide at its narrowest, concentrates nearly 20% of the world's oil within its passage. Since the war between the United States, Israel, and Iran plunged this corridor into chaos in early 2026, thousands of commercial vessels have been sitting idle in Gulf waters, paralyzing the global economy. This is not a crisis like any other. It is the naval equivalent of a global cardiac arrest.

The E5 Berlin Summit of June 24, 2026, bringing together the leaders of France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and the United Kingdom — with the NATO Secretary General joining remotely from Washington — marked a decisive turning point. The Five reaffirmed their commitment to participating in the Franco-British Multinational Military Mission as soon as conditions allow. Concretely: a naval operation of a scale not seen since the Gulf War, led not by Washington, but by Paris and London.

Europe takes the helm

What is at stake here goes beyond naval logistics. This is a test of strategic identity for Europe. For decades, Europeans delegated their maritime security to the US Navy. The Iran war, combined with President Donald Trump's openly displayed disinterest in multilateral commitments, has brutally ended that comfortable dependency. French President Emmanuel Macron and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, as early as April 17, 2026, convened 51 nations in Paris to lay the foundations of this mission.

The Berlin joint declaration specifies that the mission will aim to "reassure the maritime industry and reopen the strait, particularly through mine clearance verification." This is not diplomatic language. It is a military operational brief. The HMS Dragon, a British air defense destroyer, is already en route. The nuclear carrier Charles de Gaulle is pre-positioned in the Arabian Sea. And 38 nations signed their political support for the initiative at the Defense Ministers' meeting of May 12, 2026.

The US-Iran memorandum: a fragile window

Trump, reluctant mediator

The US-Iran memorandum of understanding — hailed by the Berlin summit as a "window of opportunity to restore regional stability" — provides for the reopening of the strait within 30 days, with an additional 60 days to negotiate a broader agreement. It was President Trump, with his blunt methods and ill-timed phone calls, who wrested this result. Maximum irony: the necessary evil delivered the necessary good.

But the window is fragile. Iran agreed to clear its mines within a 30-day timeframe. That schedule is tight. Experts point out that demining such a strategically vital strait can take weeks after any agreement — each maritime corridor must be swept before insurers and shipowners are willing to resume navigation. That is precisely where the Franco-British mission enters the picture: verify, secure, convince.

Trump benevolent but disengaged

On June 16, at the G7 Summit in Évian, Trump told Macron he did not think he needed "a lot of help" because the deal, in his view, guaranteed the strait would open. But he added: "Having one or two ships here from some countries wouldn't be a bad idea." In Trumpian language, that is a blessing. Washington, through its Project Freedom operation, began escorting merchant vessels in the Gulf as early as May 4, but without assuming the demining mission that only a coalition can carry out.

The division of labor is therefore clear: the Americans fought the war, the Europeans will build the maritime peace. This unprecedented sharing of responsibilities fundamentally reshapes the transatlantic security architecture.

The Franco-British military machine

Assets on the ground

France pre-positioned the Charles de Gaulle, its frigates, and amphibious vessels in the Arabian Sea since mid-May 2026. The United Kingdom deployed the HMS Dragon, a Type 45 destroyer, along with autonomous mine-hunting systems. The Royal Air Force has Typhoon jets ready for aerial patrol missions over the strait. Both countries also provided anti-drone capabilities — essential in an environment where Iran has demonstrated its mastery of surface and underwater drones.

On the allied side, Italy committed two MLU-class mine hunters — the Rimini and the Crotone. Germany repositioned its mine hunter Fulda from the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean. Belgium diverted its mine hunter Primula toward the Eastern Mediterranean. Australia offered its E-7A Wedgetail surveillance aircraft. This is a variable-geometry coalition, but one with real and complementary capabilities.

The planning conference and its limits

Military planners from more than 30 nations gathered at Northwood, the British permanent joint headquarters, on April 22 and 23, 2026, to translate diplomatic consensus into a concrete operational plan. A Washington Institute report nonetheless highlights a weakness: the lag between the ceasefire announcement and the convening of the planning conference "raises legitimate doubts about the ability to deploy as fast as events demand." An honest critique that Franco-British military planners do not dispute.

But the Berlin summit changed the equation. By solemnly committing five major European powers at the highest level, it consolidated the political legitimacy of the mission and accelerated national constitutional procedures. NATO, through Secretary General Mark Rutte, declared readiness to play a role "if helpful and if requested." The coalition holds.

The economic stakes: 2,000 vessels waiting

The paralysis of world trade

According to sources consulted by Reuters, some 2,000 tankers and cargo ships are waiting for conditions to normalize before transiting the strait. The economic cost of this paralysis is colossal. Energy prices across Europe surged — eurozone inflation reached 3.2% in May 2026 — and global supply chains bear the scars of a closure lasting weeks. Every additional day of uncertainty costs billions.

For shipowners and insurance companies, an official reopening of the strait will not be enough. They need the physical guarantee that the channel is safe. That is the irreplaceable role of the demining mission: not only to eliminate explosive devices, but to certify each maritime corridor before global maritime insurers. Without that certification, even an officially open strait remains an uninsurable risk zone.

The stakes of a decentered world

The Hormuz crisis has revealed a truth the West preferred not to face: the security of global trade flows rests on a handful of ultra-vulnerable chokepoints. The Strait of Hormuz, the Suez Canal, the Strait of Malacca — these bottlenecks can be closed by a determined actor with asymmetric means. Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea fully understand this. Europe is only beginning to draw the strategic conclusions.

That is why the Franco-British mission transcends the immediate stakes. It lays the foundations for a permanent European capability to project naval power and secure commercial routes. If this coalition works, it will become the model for a European strategic autonomy in naval affairs — something that Macron's speeches had demanded for years without ever finding concrete form.

The mission seen from Tehran, Washington, and Moscow

Tehran: deconfliction and surveillance

The Berlin declaration specifies that the mission will be "distinct from any other military campaign" and will maintain "clear channels of communication and deconfliction with all states concerned." This language is directed squarely at Tehran. Military planners have clearly indicated that the Franco-British mission is prepared to "engage on operational matters" with Iran. It is diplomatically deft: confront nothing, work around everything.

But Iran remains a threat. Its fleet of maritime drones, its anti-ship missiles, its mine warfare capabilities are real and battle-tested. The IRGC — Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps — demonstrated throughout the conflict its ability to strike high-value naval targets. The Franco-British mission will operate in an environment where the asymmetric threat will remain even after a ceasefire.

Moscow: the interested observer

Russia watches this dynamic with a mixture of satisfaction and unease. Satisfaction, because the Hormuz crisis has weakened Western economies and distracted NATO from Ukraine. Unease, because an operational and credible European naval coalition, capable of projecting power into the Persian Gulf, is precisely the kind of capability Moscow does not want to see develop. If Europe learns to act alone at sea, it will tomorrow be capable of acting alone in the Black Sea or the Baltic.

For Moscow, the emergence of European naval sovereignty is bad news in the long run. That is precisely why the success of the Franco-British mission goes beyond the simple framework of maritime security. It sends a message to all revisionist powers: the West can project, coordinate, and act without America.

Constitutional procedures: Europe's Achilles' heel

When parliaments set the tempo

The Berlin declaration takes care to specify that participation will proceed "as soon as conditions allow and in accordance with respective constitutional requirements." This language is not incidental. In Germany, any military deployment requires Bundestag approval. In Italy, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni clarified that any Italian participation would require "parliamentary authorization." Lithuania, the smallest of the powers involved, voted on June 4 to authorize the deployment of 40 military personnel for Strait of Hormuz missions, with 78 votes in favor and 7 against — a model of democratic clarity.

This constitutional constraint is both a strength and a weakness. A strength, because it anchors military commitments in democratic legitimacy. A weakness, because it slows deployments in crises that do not wait for parliamentary calendars. Allied military planners know this: they must factor this reality into their operational timelines.

Toward a shared doctrine?

The Berlin summit laid another brick toward building a shared European security doctrine. The Five committed their countries to "intensify defense industrial cooperation," to "accelerate the joint development of long-range precision strike capabilities," and to "exploit emerging technologies." These are the components of a coherent European military architecture — something Macron's speeches at the Sorbonne and the Collège de France had theorized without ever being concretized at this speed.

The Hormuz crisis will have achieved what years of European diplomacy had failed to accomplish: forcing Europe to develop a common operational doctrine for maritime security. Sometimes it is crises that give birth to history.

NATO in the wings: support without command

Rutte plays the flexibility card

NATO Secretary General, Dutchman Mark Rutte, was carefully ambivalent about the Alliance's role. "If it's useful, of course we will play a role, but if they can do it without us, that is also fine," he declared before Alliance Defense Ministers on June 17, 2026. This clever formulation avoids creating a precedent for NATO engagement outside its zone in a war involving the United States — which would have been a legally and politically insoluble contradiction.

The Franco-British mission is deliberately designed outside NATO for two reasons: first, because NATO is constitutionally confined to the Euro-Atlantic area, and the Persian Gulf falls outside it; second, because a NATO-branded operation involving member states engaged in the conflict (USA) would have been legally untenable. The distinction between the coalition and the Alliance is essential for the mission to be perceived as neutral.

The paradox of a NATO strengthened by its absence

Paradoxically, by stepping back, NATO emerges strengthened from this crisis. European allies demonstrate they can act autonomously and effectively — exactly what Washington had been demanding for years. The pledge of 2% of GDP on defense, the commitments from the Hague summit on defense investment, the concrete deployments in the Gulf: all of this builds a credibility that Brussels palaver never produced. Europe learns to walk by acting, not by deliberating.

The Ankara summit, scheduled for July 7 and 8, 2026, will be a decisive test. It must ratify Berlin's commitments, formalize each country's contributions to the Hormuz mission, and draw the contours of a new Euro-Atlantic security architecture in which Europeans genuinely carry their share of the burden — in practice, not just in principle.

The Ankara summit in perspective: the coalition's next test

What NATO will expect in Ankara

The NATO summit scheduled for July 7 and 8, 2026 in Ankara will be the first major multilateral gathering since the E5 Berlin summit. It must transform Berlin's political commitments into concrete allocations: which countries send which ships, what rules of engagement, what operational command structure. Northwood planners are waiting for precise answers on each nation's contributions. The Berlin speeches were eloquent; the Ankara debates will be technical, hard-fought, and decisive.

Turkey, the summit's host country, plays a particularly delicate role. Ankara maintains commercial relations with Iran and did not join Western sanctions against Tehran. The question of Turkish participation — symbolic or substantive — in the Franco-British mission will be one of the fault lines of the summit. If Turkey abstains, the coalition will have a geographic and political gap in its fleet. If it participates, it sends a strong signal to Moscow and Tehran about Alliance cohesion.

Industrial consolidation and lessons for tomorrow

Beyond the immediate mission, the Ankara summit should also address the question of European industrial consolidation for mine warfare and demining capabilities. Europe has few modern mine hunters — Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom have some, but stocks are limited. If the Hormuz mission must last for months, the question of vessel rotation and maintaining operational readiness will become critical. This is as much an industrial dossier as an operational one.

European naval sector companies — Naval Group in France, BAE Systems in the United Kingdom, Fincantieri in Italy — have already received clear signals from defense ministries about accelerated orders for mine hunters and autonomous underwater drones. The Hormuz crisis will therefore leave two lasting legacies: an operational naval coalition and a finally serious European naval rearmament program.

Conclusion: France and the United Kingdom, global naval powers once more

A strategic renaissance

What the Strait of Hormuz has revealed is that France and the United Kingdom — the only two nuclear powers within the EU and European space — are the only states on the continent capable of projecting credible naval force 6,000 kilometers from their own shores. The Charles de Gaulle in the Arabian Sea, the HMS Dragon in transit, the Typhoons on alert: this is not a bluff. It is a real capability, rare in today's world.

The Berlin summit of June 24, 2026 consecrated this reality. By mandating Paris and London to co-lead the Multinational Military Mission, the Five acknowledged what history had written: only these two countries have the means, the will, and the legitimacy to represent Europe on the world's seas. That is a responsibility, not merely a privilege.

What history will remember

In ten years, if the mission succeeds and the Strait of Hormuz reopens its waters to world trade, the E5 Berlin summit will be remembered as the moment Europe decided to take its maritime destiny into its own hands. If it fails — due to parliamentary procedures, national rivalries, or an Iranian relapse — it will be a missed opportunity of a generation. The stakes are not only geopolitical. They are existential: who is Europe? A power that acts, or a forum that debates? The answer is being written right now, in the waters of the Persian Gulf.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Who I am and what my biases are

I am a columnist and geopolitical and defense analyst, with a declared interest in European strategic autonomy and naval policy. I am pro-Ukraine, convinced that the West's resilience in the face of Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean threats is an absolute priority. I view Trump as a necessary evil: his diplomatic brutality produced a US-Iran ceasefire that years of soft diplomacy had failed to deliver. I welcome that, while acknowledging the risks his unpredictability poses to the international order.

What I don't know

I do not have access to classified briefings from French and British general staffs. I do not know whether the coalition will hold under real operational pressure. I do not know whether Iran will respect its demining commitments on schedule. And I do not know whether popular support in member countries will survive the first potential casualties. I state this clearly: this investigation rests on open, verified, and cross-referenced sources, but it cannot anticipate the unpredictable.

Sources

Primary sources

French Diplomacy — E5 Berlin Declaration, Euro-Atlantic security commitment — June 26, 2026

GOV.UK — Joint Statement on the Multinational Military Mission for the Strait of Hormuz, 38 nations — May 12, 2026

French Diplomacy — France-UK Joint Statement on Hormuz, Paris summit 51 countries — April 20, 2026

gCaptain — UK mine-hunting force arrives in Middle East as Hormuz mission takes shape — June 24, 2026

Secondary sources

Breaking Defense — European coalition: destroyers, drones, and opening the strait — May 15, 2026

Anadolu Agency — Rutte: NATO ready to support if requested — June 17, 2026

ABC News — Demining and escort mission: what US allies are proposing — June 16, 2026