EDITORIAL: Hormuz Reopened, Fake Peace: Why the West Must Not Lower Its Guard on Iran

EDITORIAL: Hormuz Reopened, Fake Peace: Why the West Must Not Lower Its Guard on Iran

Introduction: the strait that makes the global economy tremble

Hormuz: the keystone of global hydrocarbon trade

The Strait of Hormuz is one of the most vital arteries of the global economy. Approximately 20% of world oil trade and a significant fraction of global liquefied natural gas pass through this roughly twenty-kilometer-wide passage wedged between Iran and Oman. When Iran threatens to close Hormuz — and it has done so repeatedly since the 1979 revolution — global oil markets react immediately and economies dependent on these supplies begin calculating the cost of the disruption.

That is why the agreement reached in June 2026 between the United States and Iran — a «roadmap» for a final deal within 60 days, including a communication line on Hormuz and talks in Geneva — generated palpable relief in some capitals. A communication line on Hormuz is a promise that the strait will not be deliberately closed during the negotiation period. That is useful. That is good. And it is largely insufficient grounds for the West to breathe easy and lower its guard on Iran.

An agreement born in ambiguity and perhaps dying in the details

The first day of U.S.-Iran talks in Geneva immediately revealed the fundamental fault lines. Nuclear inspections: the two sides offer contradictory accounts of what was agreed, according to several media outlets including Al Jazeera and the Washington Times. Rubio affirms there will be «no tolls» in the strait, but the Iranian position on this point remains ambiguous. The $12 billion in frozen assets claimed by Iran has disputed terms of access. In other words: a 60-day deal to find a real deal, with fundamental disagreements already visible on day one. That is not an encouraging start.

This editorial is not against diplomacy. I believe diplomacy is preferable to war. But diplomacy requires from both parties a minimum of good faith, a genuine willingness to compromise, and an institutional capacity to honor commitments made. On these three criteria, the Iran of the Islamic Republic has a track record that commands vigilance rather than enthusiasm.

The Iranian nuclear program: where things actually stand

Uranium enrichment and proximity to the threshold

Iran has considerably advanced its uranium enrichment program since the American withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018. In June 2026, Iran is enriching uranium to purity levels approaching 60%, well above the 3.67% threshold set by the JCPOA and significantly below the 90%+ required for a military weapon, but with capabilities that would theoretically allow reaching the military threshold within weeks to months according to available estimates.

This proximity is the most important geopolitical fact in any discussion of Iran and the Geneva negotiations. Iran today is a threshold nuclear power — without an officially declared bomb, but with the knowledge, centrifuges, and materials to build one within a relatively short timeframe if the decision were made. This is what is called «breakout capacity» — the ability to rapidly exit the non-proliferation regime. The objective of any serious negotiation is to reduce that capacity or place it under rigorous international verification.

Inspections: the heart of the disagreement

Nuclear inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are the cornerstone of any non-proliferation agreement. They are what allows verification that paper commitments match the reality of nuclear installations. And yet the Geneva negotiations immediately ran aground on this issue: the United States and Europeans demand robust, unimpeded inspection access; Iran seeks to limit its scope, citing sovereignty and national security concerns.

This divergence on inspections is not a technical detail: it is the fundamental disagreement. Without credible, unimpeded inspections, no agreement can be verified, and no unverifiable agreement deserves to be signed by Western democracies. The history of Iranian nuclear negotiations is rich with examples of agreements that provided for inspections but whose implementation was obstructed by Iran. That history must be factored into the evaluation of any new agreement.

The "Islamabad" MOU: what this mysterious document contains

The 14 points of the memorandum of understanding

A memorandum of understanding, sometimes called the «Islamabad MOU», was reportedly developed within the framework of Pakistani and Qatari mediation. According to information available via Ground News of June 23, 2026, this 14-point document would cover ambitious elements: $300 billion in reconstruction, the reopening of the Hormuz strait, lifting of the blockade, and mediation by Pakistan and Qatar.

These figures are staggering in their ambition. $300 billion in reconstruction — more than the Marshall Plan adjusted for inflation. Where does this sum come from? Who finances it? What conditions are attached? These questions find no clear answers in available sources, and the absence of answers to such fundamental questions is itself revealing. Agreements that announce astronomical figures without credible financing mechanisms are generally instruments of domestic political signaling rather than serious economic plans.

The role of Pakistan and Qatar as mediators

Pakistan and Qatar as mediators between the United States and Iran reflect the complex geopolitics of the region. Qatar has long mediation experience — it hosts an American military base while maintaining relations with Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood. Pakistan shares a border with Iran and has interests in regional stability. These countries can facilitate communications that direct American-Iranian channels do not permit.

But the value of any mediation depends on the trust the parties place in the mediators and their capacity to guarantee commitments made. Neither Qatar nor Pakistan has the capacity to compel Iran to honor its commitments if Tehran decides to deviate from them. They are communication facilitators, not enforcement guarantors. And in a negotiation as complex and historically charged as the one over the Iranian nuclear program, the difference between the two is decisive.

American policy on Iran: between pragmatism and structural naivety

The Trump administration and Iran: a cycle of pressure-negotiation

The Trump administration has a complex relationship with Iran. Trump's first term saw withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 and a «maximum pressure» policy with severe sanctions. This second term appears to be exploring a different path: direct negotiations, a roadmap, a communication line on Hormuz. This shift may reflect an assessment that maximum pressure has reached its limits without producing the expected change in behavior, and that an even imperfect agreement is better than perpetual impasse.

That assessment is not unreasonable in principle. But it requires particular vigilance on the terms: if a deal with Iran is concluded too quickly, with concessions on inspections and insufficient guarantees on the ballistic weapons program, the result could be worse than no deal at all — an Iran relieved of economic constraints while maintaining its progression toward the nuclear threshold. That is the most problematic scenario the Trump administration must avoid.

Rubio and the hard line on Hormuz: credible or rhetorical?

Marco Rubio, U.S. Secretary of State, declared there would be «no tolls» in the Strait of Hormuz — rejecting any notion that Iran could legitimately restrict the passage of commercial vessels. This position is consistent with international maritime law and the American principle of freedom of navigation. But between a statement of principle and its concrete implementation, there is often a gap that Tehran has learned to exploit.

Iran has, in the past, harassed commercial vessels in the Persian Gulf and near Hormuz: seizures of oil tankers, threatening maneuvers by Revolutionary Guards speedboats, drones monitoring convoys. These actions, technically below the threshold of a formal closure of the strait, nonetheless create real pressure on economic actors assessing transit risks. Rubio's hard line on principle must be backed by a credible naval presence in the region to be effective as deterrence.

Frozen assets and the $12 billion: the nerve of the financial war

What Iran claims and what is legally available

Iran is claiming access to approximately $12 billion in frozen assets held in accounts abroad, blocked under American and international sanctions. These assets — primarily oil revenues frozen in banks in third countries that respected American sanctions — represent an absolute priority for Tehran, whose economy suffers considerably from restricted access to international financial markets.

Partial or full access to these assets is a major American negotiating lever. But it carries a real risk: if these funds are released too quickly and without verifiable conditions, they could finance the Iranian weapons program, the Revolutionary Guards, Iranian proxies in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Iraq. Past experience with partial releases of Iranian funds is not reassuring: Tehran used these resources in ways that aggravated regional destabilization rather than directing them toward economic development.

The escrow for American grain purchases: an innovation to watch

One proposal advanced in the negotiations calls for an escrow account specifically designated for purchasing American grain — a way to unblock part of Iranian funds under restricted use conditions. It is a creative approach that acknowledges Iranian humanitarian needs (Iran imports significant quantities of grain) while seeking to prevent diversion of funds toward military uses.

But escrow mechanisms have their limits. Money is fungible: if Iran can use escrow funds to buy grain, it frees up other resources for other uses. This budgetary substitution is difficult to control, and Iran has demonstrated in the past a great skill at exploiting the gray zones of financial agreements it signs. Rigorous verification of the ultimate use of any unblocked funds, as constraining as possible, is essential for this mechanism not to become a disguised back door out of sanctions.

Iran and Russia: an alliance that disrupts Western strategy

Iranian drones in Ukraine: a documented contribution

While Iran negotiates a deal with the United States, its Shahed-136 drones continue striking Ukrainian cities. This reality, documented and confirmed by Ukrainian and Western military sources, creates a fundamental contradiction in any attempt to address the Iranian file in isolation: you cannot normalize economic relations with a state that is actively supplying weapons for the destruction of a country you are also supporting.

Iranian drone production for Russia has been ramped up since 2022. Factories in Russia are producing copies of Iranian drones with the support of Iranian technicians and engineers, according to intelligence published by Western governments. This military-industrial cooperation represents a direct Iranian contribution to the Russian war of aggression — one that the Geneva negotiations cannot ignore.

Conditions on the Iranian contribution to the war in Ukraine

A credible U.S.-Iran agreement must include explicit conditions on the cessation of drone supply and military technology transfers to Russia. The absence of such conditions in publicly available elements of the Geneva negotiations is concerning. If Iran can sign an agreement with the United States while continuing to supply drones that kill Ukrainians, that agreement weakens the coherence of Western policy rather than strengthening it.

This dimension of the Iranian question — the link to the war in Ukraine — is often treated as a separate file in American diplomacy. That is a mistake: the issues are interconnected. An Iran relieved of certain sanctions while maintaining its military cooperation with Russia is worse than an Iran under maximum pressure. Ukraine has every right to demand that its Western allies integrate this dimension into their negotiations with Tehran.

Iranian policy toward its neighbors: a track record of destabilization

Iran's regional proxies

Iranian foreign policy rests on a network of proxies — armed groups supported, funded, and equipped by Tehran — that destabilize countries across the region: Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen, Shiite militias in Iraq, pro-Iranian groups in Syria. This network is the pillar of Iran's strategy of «resistance» against Israel and American interests in the region.

No agreement with Iran can be considered serious if it does not address this regional dimension. And yet nuclear negotiations have historically separated the proxy question from the nuclear program question, on the grounds that both files are too complex to address together. This artificial separation has allowed Iran to advance on both fronts simultaneously: progressing its nuclear program while its proxies continued their destabilizing activities.

Yemen and the Houthi record since 2023

The Houthis of Yemen, backed by Iran, have since late 2023 launched repeated attacks against commercial vessels in the Red Sea, significantly disrupting global trade routes and contributing to increases in maritime insurance costs. These attacks forced Western navies to deploy substantial forces to escort convoys and defend commercial ships. This low-level conflict in the Red Sea is directly tied to Iranian policy — without Iranian support, the Houthis would have neither the missiles nor the drones to conduct these operations.

Any agreement with Iran that does not provide for a cessation of Iranian support for the Houthis will allow Tehran to continue disrupting global trade routes, including those that supply Europe. European economic interests in the stability of the Red Sea are direct and considerable. It is an additional reason for Europe to pay close attention to the terms of U.S.-Iran negotiations, even if it is not directly a party to them.

The 60 days: a countdown to what, exactly?

What can realistically be negotiated in 60 days?

The «roadmap» for a final deal in 60 days is a political promise more than a diplomatic reality. Iranian nuclear negotiations — in all their iterations since 2003 — have shown that the issues at stake require months, even years of detailed technical discussions on inspections, enrichment levels, sanctions to be lifted, and verification mechanisms. Claiming that a «final» agreement can be concluded in 60 days either grossly overestimates the simplicity of the issues or prepares the ground for signing an insufficient deal.

This 60-day deadline has a clear political function: it creates time pressure that favors parties prepared to make concessions to meet a deadline, at the expense of thorough reflection on the terms. In this context, the parties most accustomed to playing the clock — and Iran has long experience with diplomatic procrastination — can use this timeline to their advantage by letting the 60 days expire while having already extracted preliminary concessions.

Lessons from the 2015 agreements and their implications

The 2015 JCPOA — the «historic» agreement on the Iranian nuclear program — was concluded after years of grueling negotiations. It provided for limitations on the Iranian nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. The American withdrawal in 2018 under Trump, followed by the «maximum pressure» policy, led to the framework's collapse. Since then, Iran has considerably advanced its enrichment, finding itself in a better nuclear position than before the JCPOA — raising the question of whether the 2015 negotiations ultimately benefited Iran more than the parties seeking to constrain it.

Drawing lessons from the JCPOA does not mean never negotiating with Iran again. It means negotiating with eyes open: by demanding robust verification mechanisms, by tying sanctions relief to verifiable progress rather than promises, and by including in discussions elements the JCPOA left aside — the ballistic missile program and the activities of regional proxies.

The position of European allies: between caution and economic opportunism

Europe and Iran: economic interests complicating the principled position

European countries — notably Germany, France, the United Kingdom — have genuine economic interests in normalizing relations with Iran: a market of 85 million people, oil and gas resources, industrial opportunities. These economic interests sometimes create a temptation to prioritize commercial normalization over rigor in nuclear and regional demands.

That temptation must be resisted. Regional security in the Middle East directly affects European security: migration flows, stability of Mediterranean neighboring countries, freedom of navigation in the Red Sea — all are tied to Iranian policy. Accepting an insufficient agreement with Iran to gain access to its market would be repeating the mistake of dependence on Russian gas: short-term economic benefits traded for long-term strategic vulnerability.

E3+3 or bilateral format: the question of the negotiating framework

The Geneva negotiations are proceeding primarily in a bilateral U.S.-Iran format, with Swiss mediation and Pakistani and Qatari contributions. The multilateral format of previous negotiations — involving the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, China, and Russia (P5+1 or E3+3) — has been largely set aside. This bilateralization is problematic: it excludes European allies who have direct interests in the outcome, and it gives actors like China and Russia less incentive to support the agreement.

European allies have expressed their desire to be informed and consulted on the negotiations, but their capacity to influence the terms of a bilateral U.S.-Iran agreement is limited. This partial exclusion of Europeans from the negotiating process is a structural flaw that the United States should correct — not out of diplomatic courtesy, but because the robustness of an agreement depends on the number and solidity of its signatories.

What history teaches about agreements with Iran

The negotiation-violation-renegotiation cycle

An honest examination of the history of negotiations with Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution reveals a recurring cycle: an agreement negotiated under international pressure, partial implementation by Iran, progressive violations of commitments, crisis, then renegotiation. This cycle has repeated itself on questions of hostages, human rights, nuclear proliferation, and support for terrorism.

This track record does not mean that negotiation is useless or that any agreement with Iran is doomed to fail. It means that the design of the agreement — the verification mechanisms, the automatic snapback sanctions clauses in case of violation, the precise timelines and conditions — is as important, if not more so, than the general principles it enunciates. A well-designed agreement can hold. A poorly designed one will give rise to the usual cycle.

Changes in Iranian leadership: opportunity or mirage?

Some analysts point out that changes in Iranian leadership since the death of President Raisi might offer an opening for a more substantive agreement. President Pezeshkian, elected in 2024, had displayed more pragmatic positions on economic negotiations. The reality of power in Iran, however, is that foreign policy and the nuclear program are largely determined by Supreme Leader Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards, not by the president.

The assessment of the «opportunity» represented by a change in Iranian leadership must therefore take into account who actually holds decision-making power on nuclear questions in Iran. The answer is that Khamenei remains the ultimate decision-maker, and his positions on the nuclear program have not fundamentally changed. It is toward him that signals must be sent, not only toward the negotiating teams who, technically, can only commit within the limits Khamenei sets for them.

Hormuz reopened: the good news and its limits

What the Hormuz communication line actually achieves

The Hormuz communication line provided for in the U.S.-Iran roadmap is a minimal confidence-building measure: it creates a direct communication channel to prevent incidents and accidental escalations in the strait. That is useful, pragmatic, and welcome. It is not a guarantee against the strait being closed if Iran one day decides that option serves its strategic interests.

Real protection of the Strait of Hormuz is not a phone line: it is the certainty that the international community would respond decisively to any closure attempt. That certainty depends on maintaining a credible naval presence in the region, consistent American and allied political signals, and the solidity of the sanctions that constitute the counterpart of any normalization with Iran. On these three dimensions, the current record is uneven.

The regional escalation scenario: still possible

The Persian Gulf region remains a theater of multiple tensions: between Iran and Israel, between the Houthis and a regional coalition, between Iranian ambitions and the security interests of Gulf Arab states. The signing of a U.S.-Iran roadmap does not defuse these tensions. It can even exacerbate them if certain actors — notably Israel — judge that the deal offers Iran sanctions relief without sufficient constraints on its nuclear program and destabilizing regional activities.

The risk of unwanted regional escalation remains high as long as the fundamental disagreements on inspections and the nuclear program are not resolved verifiably. A 60-day roadmap that produces an insufficient agreement could ironically increase the risk of escalation — by prematurely reassuring some and legitimately alarming others — compared to a clear impasse that at least creates no false expectations.

What the West must demand as minimum conditions

The list of non-negotiable requirements

For a U.S.-Iran agreement to deserve the label «progress» rather than «missed opportunity», certain minimum conditions must be met. First, unlimited nuclear inspections with immediate, unimpeded access to all declared and suspected sites under IAEA supervision. Second, a verifiable and irreversible reduction of enriched uranium stockpiles to levels above documented civilian needs. Third, a cessation of drone supply and other military equipment to Russia, with a verification mechanism.

Fourth, a measurable reduction of Iranian support for armed groups attacking Western interests or disrupting commercial navigation. These conditions are not exhaustive, and some are more realistic than others to obtain in a single agreement. But they define the red lines below which an agreement would be dangerous rather than stabilizing. American negotiators and their European allies must hold these lines, whatever the pressure for a quick conclusion.

Vigilance as a permanent virtue

Western policy toward Iran must be guided by a simple principle: permanent vigilance is more valuable than situational optimism. Imperfect agreements can be worse than an impasse, because they create illusions of security that skilled adversaries exploit. Vigilance is not hostility: it is the recognition that in a file as complex and historically fraught as the Iranian nuclear question, good faith must be earned progressively and verified continuously — not simply declared and accepted.

The West can and must engage diplomatically with Iran. But it must do so with eyes open, with clear lines, with robust verification mechanisms, and with the willingness to return to increased pressure if commitments are not honored. Hormuz can stay open and peace can remain possible — but only if vigilance does not relax at the first sign of an Iranian opening that may be nothing more than tactical.

The ballistic threat and the proxies: what the agreement does not resolve

Iranian ballistic missiles: a capability outside the nuclear framework

The agreement being negotiated between Washington and Tehran concerns the nuclear program — centrifuges, enrichment, IAEA inspections. What it does not cover, and what the West must not forget, is Iran's ballistic missile arsenal. Iran possesses one of the most significant missile programs in the Middle East, with delivery systems capable of reaching Israel, American bases in the region, Gulf capitals, and certain parts of Southeastern Europe according to defense analyst estimates. These missiles exist independently of any potential atomic bomb.

In June 2026, Iran continues to develop combat drones it supplies to Russia for striking Ukrainian cities, and missiles that benefit its proxies — Hezbollah, the Houthis of Yemen, pro-Iranian militias in Iraq and Syria. An agreement that freezes the nuclear program but does not touch this regional power projection capacity eliminates only one dimension of the Iranian threat. It would be naive to present it as a complete victory for Western security.

The proxy network: Tehran's real power structure

Iran's true geopolitical power does not lie in its centrifuges — it lies in its network of armed proxies across the Middle East. Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria, the Houthis in Yemen, Islamic Jihad in Gaza, Popular Mobilization Units in Iraq — these forces constitute a distributed army that Tehran has commanded, funded, and armed for decades. This distributed power architecture allows it to project influence and generate regional instability without directly engaging in conflict, maintaining a level of ambiguity that complicates any Western response.

A nuclear agreement that releases frozen assets, lifts sanctions on Iranian oil exports, normalizes economic relations with Tehran — can involuntarily strengthen this proxy infrastructure by increasing Iran's financial resources. That is precisely what happened after the 2015 JCPOA: the partial sanctions relief was followed by intensified Iranian support for Hezbollah and the Houthis. Any new diplomacy with Tehran must draw that lesson from recent history.

The European Union and Iran: the limits of a purely economic approach

European commercial interests facing security imperatives

The European Union has a complicated relationship with Iran. On one hand, member states like Germany, France, and Italy have historically had significant commercial interests in Iran — energy, infrastructure, industry. On the other, Iran produces drones that kill Ukrainian civilians, missiles that strike Tel Aviv through its proxies, and continues to violently repress all domestic dissent. Reconciling these two realities into coherent policy is the impossible task the EU has been attempting for years.

The European temptation is to separate the files: treat the nuclear program as an international security problem, and the proxies and human rights as distinct problems that should not block nuclear diplomacy. This compartmentalization is politically understandable — but strategically incoherent. Tehran uses precisely this compartmentalized logic to its advantage: it negotiates on the nuclear program to obtain economic concessions, without any counterpart on its regional behavior. The West would gain from addressing these files in a more integrated manner, even if diplomatically more difficult.

European credibility at stake on the Iran file

Europe's credibility in managing the Iranian file has been severely eroded over the years. The INSTEX mechanism created to maintain trade with Iran despite American sanctions never functioned effectively. The Vienna negotiations stalled for years without conclusion. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom — the famous «E3» — maintained a dialogue, but without the credible threat leverage that alone forces Tehran to make real concessions. Without concrete pressure capacity, European diplomacy on Iran sometimes looks more like a façade management exercise than effective negotiation.

In 2026, the context has changed: Iran has been designated by several European governments as co-responsible for the war in Ukraine through its drone deliveries. This designation creates an opening for a firmer European posture that explicitly ties economic normalization to binding commitments on proxies and drones. If Europe does not use this window of opportunity, it will leave the United States to conduct the diplomacy with Tehran alone — and will lose its relevance on this file for a generation.

Conclusion: peace with Iran is not decreed, it is negotiated with exigence

60 days to build or to squander a historic opportunity

The 60 days of the U.S.-Iran roadmap will pass quickly. At their end, either a serious agreement will have been drafted with robust verification mechanisms and concrete commitments on the nuclear program and regional behavior, or we will have another insufficient agreement that prolongs uncertainty and creates new loopholes to exploit. The choice belongs to the negotiators, but citizen and journalistic vigilance over this process is a condition of the quality of the result.

Iran is a real power, with legitimate interests, a population suffering under sanctions, and a sophisticated diplomatic culture. These realities deserve recognition. But recognizing Iran's complexity cannot translate into naivety about its nuclear intentions or blindness to its destabilizing regional activities. Both realities coexist, and Western policy must address them both simultaneously.

What Ukraine, Taiwan, and Hormuz have in common

Ukraine, Taiwan, and Hormuz are three pressure points on the same system: the liberal international order built after 1945 to which the West owes its level of prosperity and security. These pressure points are exploited by powers — Russia, China, Iran — that want to revise that order to their benefit. The response cannot be fragmented, with files treated in separate silos. It must be coherent, coordinated, and sustained by a political resolve that the West will need to find within itself — beyond electoral cycles and immediate economic interests.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Editorial position and important nuances

This editorial is clearly skeptical of progress in the U.S.-Iran negotiations and favorable to a firm position on nuclear inspections and Iran's regional behavior. I am not opposed to diplomacy with Iran in principle: I am skeptical of agreements that are insufficiently verifiable. This position is grounded in the history of Iranian nuclear negotiations and the documented behaviors of Iran regarding violations of commitments. Other analysts may have a different assessment — some believe an imperfect agreement is preferable to no agreement. I present my point of view as an argued editorial position, not as objective truth.

The data on the Geneva negotiations comes from open sources: WWNO/NPR, Al Jazeera, Washington Times, Ground News. Ongoing diplomatic discussions likely contain non-public elements I am not aware of. My analysis is necessarily limited to publicly available information.

What I do not know

I do not know the full terms or any potential secret guarantees of the U.S.-Iran roadmap. I do not know whether robust verification mechanisms are being negotiated confidentially. My skepticism is based on the past and on current public elements, not on knowledge of confidential negotiation details. If a serious agreement with genuine verification guarantees were to emerge within the 60 days, I would revise my assessment accordingly.

I also acknowledge that my editorial may come across as one-dimensionally hostile to Iran. The reality is more nuanced: the Iranian population genuinely suffers under sanctions, and there are actors within the Iranian system who would prefer a rapprochement with the West. My skepticism targets the regime and its behaviors, not the Iranian people.

Sources

Primary sources

US and Iran agree to a roadmap for a final deal within 60 days — WWNO/NPR, June 21, 2026

US and Iran at odds over nuclear inspections and Hormuz — Al Jazeera, June 24, 2026

What the US and Iran agreed and disagreed on at the first day of talks — Al Jazeera, June 23, 2026

Islamabad MOU: 14 points, $300 billion, Hormuz reopening — Ground News, June 23, 2026

Secondary sources

US and Iran offer different accounts of nuclear inspections — Washington Times, June 23, 2026

Ukrainian drones at 1,300 km: the Iran-Russia link and the war — Euromaidan Press, June 25, 2026

ISW: analysis of connections between the Iran file and the Ukrainian conflict — ISW, June 23, 2026