INVESTIGATION: Iran on the Strait of Hormuz — the silent maneuver changing the Gulf

Introduction: When a memorandum clause becomes a geopolitical weapon

The most watched strait on the planet

It measures barely 39 kilometers at its narrowest point. Every day, before the war struck, roughly 20% of the world's oil supply passed through it — millions of barrels exported from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Iraq and Iran itself. The Strait of Hormuz is the throat of the global economy. And since the United States and Israel struck Iran on February 28, triggering a war that paralyzed those strategic waters for more than one hundred days, the question of who controls it has become the most explosive geopolitical question on the planet.

Now that the guns have fallen silent — provisionally — and a memorandum of understanding between Washington and Tehran has been signed in Islamabad, the real battle begins. Not with missiles and drones anymore, but with quiet diplomatic negotiations, meetings in Muscat, declarations by heads of government mid-flight, and clauses inserted into documents that nobody reads carefully enough. Iran is playing a long-game geopolitical chess match — and according to analysts at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Tehran is advancing its pieces with formidable precision.

Clause 5 of the memorandum: Iran's masterstroke

At the heart of this investigation lies a specific document: Clause 5 of the Iran-US memorandum of understanding signed in Islamabad. This clause charges Iran with "discussing the future management of the Strait of Hormuz with Oman and other Persian Gulf riparian states." On its surface, it is one maritime management provision among others. In reality, according to ISW's analysis published on June 24, 2026, Iran is using it as a lever to establish a durable regional architecture that would guarantee it permanent influence over the throat of the world's economy.

On June 23, 2026, Iranian Parliament Speaker and chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf — accompanied by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi — was in Muscat to meet Sultan Haitham bin Tarik of Oman and his foreign minister. A joint declaration was published. An Iran-Oman joint working group on managing the Strait of Hormuz was created. The discussions covered "maritime services and associated costs." Those three words — "associated costs" — are at the center of everything.

The context: a war that changed everything

One hundred days of global maritime paralysis

The scale of the shock needs to be understood. When Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz in retaliation for the American-Israeli strikes of February 28, 2026, the world did not simply lose a maritime corridor — it lost the main artery of its energy system. Oil prices surged. Marine insurance companies suspended their coverage. Tankers were immobilized for months in the Gulf. More than 11,000 sailors were stranded in the region, according to the International Maritime Organization (IMO).

According to data from maritime firm Kpler reported by the Anadolu agency, more than 20 tankers carrying some 35 million barrels have transited the strait since the signing of the Iran-US agreement. Two Qatari LNG vessels — the Bu Samra and the Patris — made their first transit after months of blockade. Brent crude fell below $72.50 per barrel as hopes of normalization took shape. But an attack on a cargo vessel near Oman on June 25 immediately suspended the IMO's evacuation plan, revealing just how fragile that recovery is.

Iran: a military defeat converted into a diplomatic lever

On the military battlefield, Iran lost this war. Its nuclear facilities were struck, its military apparatus damaged, its economy ravaged. But on the diplomatic chessboard, Tehran is now playing what it has left: the irreplaceable geographical position of the two states sharing the strait's shores. Iran and Oman hold both banks of that narrow maritime corridor. No international agreement can guarantee free navigation through the strait without their cooperation — at least tacit.

That is the paradox Iran is exploiting. By accepting to discuss the "future management" of the strait within the memorandum framework, Tehran obtained an implicit recognition of its right to participate in the governance of this international waterway. Ghalibaf was explicit on June 23 in stating that Iran is "ready for security agreements with Gulf states that are made durable through economic cooperation." That is the Iranian doctrine in one sentence: make its influence structurally indispensable economically so it becomes irremovable politically.

The Muscat meeting: what actually happened?

A joint declaration with carefully weighed words

The Iran-Oman joint declaration published on June 23, 2026 deserves careful reading. Both parties affirm their "commitment to safe and toll-free transit passage consistent with applicable international law". On the surface, it is a reaffirmation of maritime law principles. But the wording is precisely designed to preserve Iranian ambiguity.

Iran has always drawn a distinction between "transit fees" and other types of charges — "environmental service fees," "navigation fees," "security fees." Omani Minister Badr Albusaidi stated after the meeting that Muscat supports "safe, toll-free passage" — but only "tolls" in the strict sense. According to ISW, the wording chosen in the joint declaration "does not explicitly oppose other arrangements that could still be favorable to Iran and give it a say in the future of the strait." That is a calculated — and meaningful — silence.

Ghalibaf in flight: a statement that sounds like a warning

According to Middle East Eye, it was on his return flight from Switzerland that Ghalibaf spoke the words that froze Gulf capitals. "The management of the Strait of Hormuz will never return to its pre-war situation," he stated. He described the outcome of the Geneva negotiations as "a significant diplomatic achievement," congratulating Iran for having been able to "lift the blockade through diplomacy rather than military means." He also reiterated Iranian distrust of the United States and stated that Israel "opposes the negotiation process because it sees it as contrary to its interests."

This statement is not improvisation. It is a summary of Iran's position: Iran used control of the strait as a weapon of war, it obtained recognition of its right to participate in the strait's future governance, and it has no intention of relinquishing that strategic advantage. The fact that Ghalibaf said this publicly, on a return flight, captured by Iranian media, is itself a diplomatic act — a warning addressed to all actors that the game is now being played on that terrain.

Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE: the Gulf is reshaping itself

The Qatari prime minister opens a door others prefer closed

One of the most significant revelations of the week of June 22-26 came from Qatar. Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al Thani told the Financial Times on June 24 that Doha was "open to discussing Iran's plans to co-administer the strait alongside Oman." He also stated that he would "not approve a plan in which the Persian Gulf would be 'controlled' or subjected to a toll system". But he did not explicitly rule out other arrangements that could give Iran a role in strait governance.

According to a diplomat briefed on Thani's visit to Muscat as reported by Reuters, Qatari and Omani officials discussed initiating negotiations involving Iran, Iraq and Arab Gulf states on the Strait of Hormuz. The same diplomat noted that Gulf states intend to push for "no transit fees" — but that Iran "might" push for environmental, navigation and security service fees. The distinction is crucial: refusing "tolls" while accepting "service fees" may be precisely the compromise position Iran is seeking to obtain.

Saudi Arabia prepares a separate reconciliation summit

According to a diplomat familiar with the situation as reported by AFP on June 24, Saudi Arabia is preparing a "reconciliation summit" between Iran and Arab Gulf states, separate from the Iran-US negotiations. No date had been set at the time of publication. That project reveals the complexity of regional dynamics: Gulf states want their own direct channel of dialogue with Iran — one not entirely mediated by Washington and one that allows them to manage their own security and economic interests.

Iran and Saudi Arabia had normalized their relations in 2023 under Chinese mediation. That reconciliation reduced tensions but did not eliminate fundamental disagreements over Iranian regional influence. The 2026 war worsened those tensions, as Gulf states bore the direct consequences of the strait blockade. According to Euronews, at the GCC-US summit in Manama on June 25, Gulf states expressed their "economic urgency" to restore free navigation through the strait — an urgency Iran is well positioned to exploit as a bargaining chip.

International law at stake: UNCLOS and its limits

The Strait of Hormuz under the freedom of navigation regime

The Strait of Hormuz is an international waterway governed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Under that foundational text of international maritime law, vessels of all nations enjoy a "right of transit passage" through straits used for international navigation. This right is stronger than the mere right of innocent passage applicable in territorial waters: it cannot be suspended by riparian states.

According to ISW, "any effort to place the strait under the control of one or several states would erode longstanding international norms and maritime law." That is the central issue: if Iran manages to establish a "management" mechanism for the strait that confers decision-making power over transit, even dressed up as "service fees," it constitutes a de facto violation of the UNCLOS regime. And once such a precedent is established, it will be extremely difficult to reverse.

The "service fees" formula: the magic phrase that circumvents UNCLOS

Iran has a sophisticated legal formula to justify what it wants to do. Officially, Tehran is not demanding "tolls" — a term prohibited under UNCLOS. It speaks of "environmental, navigation and security service fees." The distinction seems technical, but it is fundamental. If Iran can have it recognized that "service" fees are legitimate — that ships pay for a pilotage service or security guarantee provided by riparian states — then it has a mechanism of economic control over transit without formally violating freedom of navigation.

The GCC-US joint declaration published after the Manama summit on June 25 was explicit on this point, rejecting "all tolls, fees, or attempts to assert control" over the strait. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio sought to downplay tensions by stating that "whether you call it a toll or a fee, it is a matter of semantics" — a formulation his Gulf allies probably found less reassuring than he hoped. Iran, for its part, responded on June 26 by reaffirming its right to "control" transit and warning Gulf states against aligning themselves with the United States.

The IRGC defies the memorandum: an attack on a cargo vessel

The Revolutionary Guards playing their own tune

An essential element of this investigation is the internal Iranian fracture between the Pezeshkian government, apparently ready to negotiate, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which has its own agenda. On June 25, according to Reuters and data cited by Euronews, a cargo vessel was struck by an unidentified projectile in the Gulf of Oman — two official American sources indicated that Iran had fired on the ship. The IMO immediately suspended its evacuation plan for the 11,000 sailors stranded in the region.

The IRGC also issued warnings to ships transiting the strait without Iranian authorization, demanding that vessels follow routes "designated by Tehran." That position directly contradicts the Iranian government's commitments in the memorandum of understanding. But the IRGC does not fall under the direct authority of the government — it answers to Supreme Leader Khamenei. This dual political architecture allows Iran to say one thing in negotiations and do another on the ground, while maintaining plausible ambiguity.

The "Persian Gulf Strait Authority": an institution built from scratch

Iran has created an entity called the "Persian Gulf Strait Authority" — charged with managing transit requests through the strait on Iranian terms. According to Reuters, this authority declared that "passage through unauthorized routes would be the responsibility of the vessel's owner, operator and captain." That language implies that "unauthorized" passage — meaning passage without going through Iranian procedures — exposes the vessel to risks Iran does not guarantee to cover.

This institution is itself a preemption: by creating a management authority before the negotiations on the strait's future governance are even concluded, Iran is establishing an institutional fait accompli. When formal discussions begin between Iran, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and others, Iran will arrive at the table with an already-operational institution. That is a classic negotiating tactic — but an effective one.

The GCC-US response: a unified front, underlying fractures

The Manama summit: a common front, but a fragile one

On June 25, 2026, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with the foreign ministers of the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in Manama, Bahrain. The joint declaration was firm on principle: "free, unconditional and unrestricted navigation, including the right of transit passage guaranteed by international law" in the Strait of Hormuz, with no tolls or attempts to assert control. A shared objective of preventing Iran from ever acquiring a nuclear weapon was also reaffirmed.

But behind that displayed unity, according to Euronews, fractures persist. Gulf states "expressed their economic urgency" to reopen the strait — an urgency that makes them vulnerable to compromises with Iran. A state like Qatar, whose prime minister clearly signaled openness to talks with Tehran, might seek its own bilateral arrangements. The United Arab Emirates, which has already taken steps toward rapprochement with Iran through meetings between senior security officials, is also playing its own game.

Rubio reassures but does not draw a line

Rubio's statements during this Gulf tour were remarkably vague on the central question of Iranian fees. His formulation that "whether you call it a toll or a fee, it is a matter of semantics" alarmed several Gulf partners. If they accept that Washington treats the distinction between "toll" and "service fees" as a semantic debate, then American protection against Iranian claims becomes considerably thinner.

According to ISW, Rubio nonetheless sought to reassure allies by stating there would be "no part of this agreement" that would compromise the "security, stability or prosperity" of America's regional partners. But Gulf allies have long since learned that American assurances can be revised. American commitment to the region has been inconsistent — and that is precisely what Iran is trying to exploit by offering Gulf states a regional alternative to dependence on Washington.

Iran's long-term strategy: reducing American presence in the Gulf

A regional architecture without the United States

Iran's strategic objective reaches far beyond the day-to-day management of the Strait of Hormuz. According to ISW, Iran is seeking to use the strait discussions to "spark wider conversations about limiting American and Israeli influence in the Gulf." This ambition is consistent with Iranian doctrine since 1979: Iran wants a region free of American military presence, with regional security architectures in which Tehran plays a central role.

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei was explicit on June 24: "As long as the United States militarily interferes in the region, the Middle East will never achieve lasting peace." That is the narrative framework within which Iran places all its diplomatic moves: American military presence is the source of instability, and accommodation with Iran — rather than dependence on Washington — offers Gulf states more durable stability. ISW previously assessed that Iran seeks to "persuade Gulf countries that accommodation with Iran offers greater stability than reliance on American and Israeli security partnerships."

The economic dimension: Tehran proposes a win-win framework

Ghalibaf's framing is revealing: Iran is "ready for security agreements with Gulf states that are made durable through economic cooperation." That is the key to the strategy: tying security to economics to make Iranian influence structurally indispensable. If Iran becomes an indispensable commercial partner for Gulf states — in sectors such as energy, transportation and trade — its geopolitical position in the region strengthens organically.

Iranian officials have also met with senior Emirati security officials, according to ISW, as part of a rapprochement Iran had repeatedly sought. The United Arab Emirates, despite its GCC membership and formal alignment with Washington, has always maintained discreet channels with Tehran — particularly to protect its economic interests and its large business communities of Iranian origin. That ambivalence is what Iran is now seeking to deepen.

Pakistan, Qatar, Iraq: the mediators in the game

An unexpected mediator: Pakistan

A detail revealed by the diplomat who briefed Reuters deserves attention: Pakistan has been proposed as mediator for the multi-actor negotiations on the Strait of Hormuz involving Iran, Iraq and Arab Gulf states. That designation is interesting on several counts. Pakistan was one of the facilitators of the Iran-US peace negotiations — its mediator role is already recognized by both parties. But Islamabad also maintains close relations with China, whose growing influence in Gulf affairs is a strategic variable Washington is watching carefully.

According to Al Jazeera, the Geneva negotiations between Iran and the United States led to a "roadmap agreement" and the creation of a "deconfliction cell" involving the United States, Iran, Lebanon, Pakistan and Qatar. This cell is tasked with monitoring ceasefire violations and managing incidents in the strait. It is a multilateral mechanism — but Iran is inside the mechanism, not simply subject to its oversight.

Iraq as a silent actor

The mention of Iraq in negotiations about the Strait of Hormuz may seem surprising, since it is not directly a riparian state. But Baghdad is a Persian Gulf coastal state with maritime access passing through the region's waters. More importantly, Iraq has been under considerable Iranian influence for decades. By including Baghdad in the strait discussions, Iran broadens its network of allies at the negotiating table and makes any agreement harder to challenge unilaterally by pro-American Gulf states.

According to Arab News, the Muscat meeting of June 23-24 also established the framework for potential separate negotiations in Saudi Arabia. These diplomatic circles overlap and feed each other — a complexity Iran has every interest in sustaining. The more forums multiply, the more positions intermingle, the harder it becomes for Gulf states to maintain a clear unified line against Iranian claims.

The global economic stakes: 20% of oil, 30% of LNG

Numbers that make freedom of navigation non-negotiable

The figures need to be stated with precision to measure what is at stake. Before the war, the Strait of Hormuz was the transit corridor for 20 to 21 million barrels of oil per day — some 20% of global supply. Qatar, the world's top exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG), ships roughly 30% of global LNG through this strait to Asia and Europe. The United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq all depend on this same maritime corridor for their energy exports.

The partial reopening of the strait since the memorandum's signing has had an immediate market impact: according to Kpler, more than 20 tankers carrying 35 million barrels have transited since the agreement. Brent crude fell below $72.50 as the prospect of normalizing flows became more concrete. But every incident — like the cargo vessel attack on June 25 — is enough to trigger immediate market nervousness. Oil price volatility tied to Hormuz uncertainty represents a systemic economic risk for the global economy.

The alternatives to tankers: a world without a reliable Hormuz

The vulnerability created by the 2026 war accelerated pre-existing discussions on alternatives to Hormuz. Saudi Arabia has a pipeline allowing oil to be exported to the Red Sea bypassing the strait. The UAE has its Habshan-Fujairah pipeline. But these alternatives have limited capacity and cannot replace the volume that transits through Hormuz. For Qatari LNG, there is no viable short-term alternative — Qatar simply cannot ship its liquefied natural gas without going through the strait. That is why Doha is particularly vulnerable — and perhaps why the Qatari prime minister chose to remain open to talks with Tehran.

Economic dependency is symmetrical: Iran also needs Hormuz to function to export its own oil, and resumed Iranian oil exports are a crucial part of the agreement with Washington. The US Treasury has issued a temporary general license of 60 days authorizing the production and sale of Iranian oil — until August 21, 2026. That deadline is additional pressure on Tehran not to sabotage the process. But it is also pressure on Washington to quickly reach a permanent agreement on the strait.

The limits of Iran's maneuver: obstacles to overcome

The collective resistance of Gulf states

Iran's strategy runs into real limits. At the GCC-US Manama summit, the six GCC members presented a common front — however imperfect — against Iranian claims to control transit. The joint declaration was explicit: "the ministers rejected all tolls, fees, or attempts to assert control over the strait." This unanimous position is an important signal: even states that maintain more flexible relations with Iran are not prepared to formally accept Iranian governance of the strait.

Saudi Arabia is preparing its own reconciliation summit with Iran. But Riyadh has also been one of the most direct victims of Iranian missiles and its proxies for years. Saudi distrust of long-term Iranian intentions will not disappear with a reconciliation summit. According to analysts, Saudi Arabia's objective in that summit is to obtain guarantees of Iranian behavior — not to hand Tehran a blank check over the strait.

The inherent fragility of the memorandum itself

The Iran-US memorandum is an interim agreement, not a definitive peace treaty. It opens a 60-day window to reach a final agreement on far more complex questions: Iran's nuclear program, IAEA inspections, sanctions, support for proxies in the region, the IRGC's status. Technical negotiations continue in Switzerland. According to Al Jazeera, disagreements persist over financial incentives for Iran, nuclear inspections and the situation in Lebanon.

If negotiations break down on these issues — which is entirely possible — the entire agreement architecture collapses, including the commitments on the strait. That risk weighs on all actors. That is why Gulf states are seeking to establish their own arrangements with Iran in parallel to the Iran-US negotiations — to have a safety net if the overall agreement goes off the rails.

The strategic implications for the West

Hormuz as a test of American credibility in the Gulf

For Washington, the Strait of Hormuz question is a critical credibility test. The United States has spent decades guaranteeing freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf — it is the foundation of their regional security architecture. If Iran manages to obtain recognition of its role in strait governance, even under legally ambiguous forms, it would signal that American military presence in the region was not sufficient to defend a fundamental principle.

That signal would be heard far beyond the Gulf. China is closely monitoring what unfolds in the Strait of Hormuz — not only because it imports massively from the Gulf's oil, but also because the dynamics of this conflict will inform its own calculations in other straits, notably the Taiwan Strait and Malacca. If a regional power can erode the principle of free navigation through skillful diplomatic mechanisms, China draws lessons from that.

An opportunity for the West to reinforce its principles

There is, however, an opportunity within this crisis. The Iranian threat over Hormuz has forced Gulf states and the United States to publicly and firmly reaffirm their shared commitment to freedom of navigation and international maritime law. The GCC-US Manama declaration is, on that point, a useful document. If that position is maintained — and if it is translated into concrete policy terms (refusing to fund Iranian "service fees," supporting the IMO for security corridors, reinforcing American naval presence in the strait) — Iran will find its options more constrained.

The key is consistency. Rubio cannot say in the same week that the distinction between toll and fee is "semantic" and claim to firmly defend freedom of navigation without tolls. That ambiguity is exactly the kind of breach Iran knows how to exploit. The West — in the broadest sense — must be as precise in its principles as it is in its economic interests.

Oman: the key actor too often overlooked

Muscat's singular position

Oman is the indispensable riparian partner for any solution on the Strait of Hormuz. Unlike its GCC neighbors, Oman has always kept open channels of communication with Iran — even during periods of sharpest tension. Muscat has served as a mediation venue in several past Iran-US crises. Minister Albusaidi stated after the June 23 meeting that Oman supports "safe, toll-free passage" — a position that seems firm on the letter, but flexible on the spirit.

The Iran-Oman joint declaration of June 23 mentions discussions on "maritime services and associated costs" — wording that leaves a door open to Iranian service fees. Oman also announced "temporary routes for Hormuz transit" on June 24, according to Arab News. Are these temporary routes a neutral transitional mechanism or a step toward codifying Iranian claims over navigation? The answer is not yet clear — and that is precisely the problem.

The IMO and sailor safety: a humanitarian emergency

Amid all these geopolitical maneuvers, there are 11,000 sailors stranded in the region for months. The International Maritime Organization had developed an evacuation plan — then suspended it on June 25 following the cargo vessel attack. IMO Secretary-General Arsenio Dominguez stated the plan would remain on hold until there was "more clarity on the security situation." These sailors — predominantly Filipino, Indian, Egyptian, Ukrainian and Bangladeshi — are the most concrete victims of this geopolitical confrontation. Their fate rarely makes the headlines, but their situation illustrates the real human cost of the Hormuz paralysis.

According to maritime humanitarian organizations, several weeks of confinement under difficult conditions — intense Gulf heat, limited supplies, uncertainty over return dates — have put some crews in serious distress. Resuming navigation is as much a humanitarian emergency as a geopolitical question. And that human dimension carries weight in negotiations — the states whose nationals are among those sailors are pressing all parties to normalize transit as quickly as possible.

The global economic impact: when 20% of oil is at risk

The numbers that make Hormuz irreplaceable

To measure the real stakes of the Strait of Hormuz, it suffices to look at the raw economic data. Before the 2026 war, roughly 21 million barrels of oil transited this narrow corridor every day — approximately 20% of global consumption. Qatar, the world's top exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG), ships about 30% of global LNG through this strait to Asia and Europe. The United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq all depend on this same maritime corridor for their energy exports.

The partial reopening of the strait since the memorandum's signing has had an immediate market impact: according to Kpler, more than 20 tankers carrying 35 million barrels have transited since the agreement. Brent crude fell below $72.50 as the prospect of normalizing flows became more concrete. But every incident — like the cargo vessel attack on June 25 — is enough to trigger immediate market nervousness. Oil price volatility tied to Hormuz uncertainty represents a systemic economic risk for the global economy.

The cost of closure: a lesson from more than one hundred days

During the more than one hundred days of effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz between late February and mid-June 2026, the world measured in concrete terms what losing access to this corridor means. Marine insurance premiums reached unprecedented levels. Refineries in Southeast Asia cut production for lack of supply. Countries like India, Japan and South Korea — heavily dependent on Gulf oil — had to activate strategic reserves. The global cost of that interruption runs into hundreds of billions of dollars for the world economy.

It is in this context that Gulf states feel an "economic urgency" to restore free navigation — as Euronews put it in citing discussions at the GCC-US Manama summit. This urgency is real and understandable. But it creates exactly the kind of vulnerability Iran is seeking to exploit: partners economically pressed to normalize the situation will be more inclined to accept compromises on fees and governance to avoid a new blockade. Iran knows this — and that is precisely why it will not be in a hurry in these negotiations.

Conclusion: The Strait of Hormuz, terrain of the next regional cold war

The stakes reach far beyond "service fees"

What is playing out at the Strait of Hormuz between June and August 2026 will determine Gulf geopolitics for the next decade at minimum. The formal question — "tolls or service fees?" — matters less than the underlying question: who will have a say over transit through the most strategically vital strait on the planet? If Iran manages to institutionalize its role — even under forms diplomatically acceptable to its Gulf partners — it will have converted a military defeat into a durable geopolitical victory. That is a precedent the West cannot afford to accept without fighting it.

The coming weeks will be decisive. The Switzerland negotiations must produce a final agreement before the 60-day memorandum window closes. Gulf states must decide how far they are willing to accommodate Iranian demands in exchange for normal transit resumption. And the United States must decide whether its "no tolls" position is an absolute red line or a starting point for negotiation. American clarity on that point is the most important — and the most uncertain — variable.

An uncertain future for the world economy's vital corridor

Iran demonstrated in this war that it can close Hormuz. Even partially, even temporarily, that capability is a formidable weapon. The international community must now build a legal and diplomatic framework that renders that weapon unusable — not by defeating Iran militarily once more, but by making the cost of closing Hormuz unacceptable even to Tehran. That requires solid multilateral mechanisms, credible international naval presence and, above all, unwavering consistency from Western actors on the principles of international maritime law.

The geography will not change. Iran will remain a riparian state of the Strait of Hormuz forever. No military victory, no diplomatic agreement can erase that fundamental fact. The question is what role that geographical reality will grant Tehran in the international system — the role of a responsible actor constrained by international law, or the role of a state that monetizes its geographical position to extend its political influence. That choice depends in large part on what the next 60 days of intensive diplomacy produce — or fail to produce.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

Sources and methodology

This investigation is based on primary and secondary sources published between June 22 and June 26, 2026, including reports from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), the agencies Reuters, AFP, Al Jazeera, Euronews, Arab News, Iran International, Xinhua and others. The Iran-Oman joint declaration of June 23 was directly consulted. No fact is invented or extrapolated beyond what the sources allow.

Editorial positioning

I believe in freedom of navigation as a founding principle of international maritime law. That position informs my analysis, but has not led to distorting the reported facts. Editorial passages are clearly identified in italics. My analysis of Iran's strategy is based on ISW assessments and other specialized sources — not on speculation.

Sources

Primary sources

ISW — Iran Update Special Report, June 24, 2026 — Fiona Noonan — June 24, 2026

ISW — Iran Update Special Report, June 23, 2026 — June 23, 2026

Omani Ministry of Foreign Affairs — Iran-Oman Joint Declaration — June 23, 2026

Al Jazeera — US-Iran agree on roadmap towards final deal in Switzerland talks — June 22, 2026

US News / Reuters — Iran insists on right to control shipping in Strait of Hormuz — June 26, 2026

Secondary sources

Euronews — Gulf states weigh living side by side with Iran — June 26, 2026

Arab News — Iran-Gulf-Iraq talks to focus on future Hormuz operations — June 24, 2026

Iran International — Iran, Oman form joint committee on Strait of Hormuz — June 23, 2026

Middle East Eye — Ghalibaf says Strait of Hormuz will not return to pre-war status — June 23, 2026

Anadolu Agency — Morning Briefing June 26, 2026 (GCC-US statement, oil prices, IMO) — June 26, 2026