INVESTIGATION: France and Italy block entry ban for former Russian soldiers

INVESTIGATION: France and Italy block entry ban for former Russian soldiers

Introduction: Two countries playing the pragmatism card

The 21st EU sanctions package and its Lebanese knot

On June 25, 2026, as the Council of the European Union had just adopted the decision to extend economic sanctions against Russia from 6 to 12 months for the first time since 2022, discussions on the 21st sanctions package were hitting an unexpected obstacle. The package's flagship proposal would ban former Russian combatants who participated in the war against Ukraine from entering EU territory. The logic is airtight: men who participated in a war of aggression against a European state should not be free to walk the streets of Paris, Rome, or Athens. The idea commands consensus in Northern and Eastern Europe. But two countries oppose it: France and Italy.

According to Bloomberg and Euronews, citing multiple diplomatic sources, Paris and Rome are expressing "legal and technical reservations" about the entry ban proposal. But behind that diplomatically polished language lie economic and political realities far less noble than concern for legal consistency. These two countries alone receive the largest number of Russian tourists in Europe — and they have no immediate interest in seeing that revenue stream cut off further.

Russian tourism figures: an economic interest hard to ignore

In 2025, France issued nearly 180,000 visas to Russian nationals, and Italy approximately 160,000. Spain and Greece round out the list of countries most generous with Russian visas. By comparison, Poland and the Baltic states have been issuing almost none since 2022. This massive disparity creates what Eastern and Northern European countries call "visa shopping": Russian nationals obtain their visas in the most accommodating countries and then travel freely throughout the Schengen zone, which has no internal border controls.

In total, more than 470,000 tourist visas were issued to Russian citizens in 2025, despite years of war, sanctions, and efforts to restrict entries. While Russian missiles continued to strike Ukrainian civilians, Russian tourists were sunbathing on French and Italian beaches. This contradiction is what eleven European countries — Sweden, Poland, the Baltic states, Finland, Denmark, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Iceland, and Norway — denounced in a letter sent to the European Commission in early June 2026.

The official arguments of Paris and Rome

Legal objections: real but contested

The official position of France and Italy is not to reject the idea of a ban on former Russian combatants. It concerns the proposed mechanism. According to diplomatic sources cited by Ukrainska Pravda and RBC-Ukraine, Paris and Rome argue that the ban should fall under visa policy — a power shared between the EU and member states — rather than under sanctions, which are a more coercive foreign policy instrument and harder to target precisely. The argument is technically defensible.

A second argument concerns practicability: the proposal would require each member state to determine for itself who participated in the hostilities and who did not. France and Italy contend that this verification is extremely complex without access to Russian military records, which are naturally unavailable. How does one distinguish a former combatant from an ordinary civilian in a visa application? This is an argument that even some supporters of the ban acknowledge as non-trivial.

What the technical objections conceal

But the technical objections tell only part of the story. According to Euronews, citing three separate diplomatic sources, Paris and Rome fear that the ban on former combatants would "pave the way" to a total ban on all Russian nationals — something they oppose. This concern reveals the true underlying logic: these two countries believe that maintaining contacts between Europeans and ordinary Russian citizens has intrinsic value, that exposing Russians to European life can influence Russian public opinion over the long term. This is an argument with a certain logic — but it applies poorly to former soldiers.

There is also an economic dimension that diplomats do not openly acknowledge. France and Italy are the two EU countries processing the largest number of Russian visa applications. A restrictive policy would strengthen the competitiveness of countries that already refuse Russian visas — like Denmark, the Baltic states, or Finland — freeing them of an administrative burden with no costs. For Paris and Rome, giving up Russian tourism without the other countries doing the same represents a competitive disadvantage. That is the naked truth.

Bulgaria: the unexpected disruptor of the 21st package

Kirill, Alekperov, and the Bulgarian veto

France and Italy are not the only obstacles to the 21st sanctions package. Bulgaria, under its new less-Atlanticist government, is blocking part of the package for very different reasons. Sofia opposes the inclusion of Patriarch Kirill, head of the Russian Orthodox Church, on the list of sanctioned individuals. It also opposes sanctions against Vagit Alekperov, the billionaire founder of Lukoil — a company that owns a major refinery in Bulgaria and represents a significant share of Bulgarian fuel supplies.

Bulgarian President Rumen Radev stated unambiguously: "We will not allow the sanctions package to pass in this form. We have a vote, and we will use it." This is a position that echoes Hungary's tactic under Viktor Orbán — using veto power to protect particular economic interests tied to Russia. It is worth noting that Kirill had already been targeted by a sanctions attempt in 2022, blocked at the time by Hungary. Four years later, it is Bulgaria picking up the torch of Russian ecclesiastical protection within the EU.

The unanimity principle: the Achilles' heel of European sanctions

Adopting European sanctions against Russia requires unanimity among 27 member states. This rule, designed to protect the sovereignty of smaller members, has become the main leverage point that pro-Russian states — or those with Russian economic interests — use to dilute or block sanctions packages. Hungary under Orbán used this mechanism systematically since 2022. Slovakia under Fico followed. Bulgaria now appears ready to join this club.

There are discussions within the EU about the possibility of modifying the unanimity rule for sanctions — allowing qualified majorities rather than full unanimity. But this change would itself require unanimity or treaty revision, which is even harder to achieve. The paradox is total: to reform the rule that allows blockages, you need the agreement of those who have an interest in keeping it.

The North-South-East fracture within the European Union

The Russian visa frontline: a map that speaks

The map of Europe viewed through the lens of Russian visas tells a story of two Europes. To the East and North — Poland, Baltic states, Finland, Sweden, Denmark — Russian tourist visas have barely been issued since the start of the large-scale invasion in 2022. These countries bear the direct costs of geographical proximity to Russia — reinforced border surveillance, Russian espionage, infrastructure sabotage, instrumentalized migrant flows — and reject the schizophrenia of a policy that sanctions Russia on one side while welcoming its tourists on the other.

To the West and South — France, Italy, Spain, Greece — the economic logic of tourism still prevails. These countries have no border with Russia. They do not face the same direct threats. And they have tourist industries that partly depend on wealthy Russian visitors. The letter from eleven European countries in early June 2026 explicitly named this disparity: frontier countries "bear all the costs and all the risks, while others profit from Russian tourism."

The European Commission: between promises and delays

The European Commission responded to the demands of the eleven signatory countries on June 5, 2026 with a promise of "targeted restrictive measures" on visas. But spokesperson Markus Lammert clarified that these measures would come as part of the revision of the Visa Code — scheduled for early 2027 — and would therefore not apply for the summer season of 2026. In other words: a promise for next year, while French and Italian beaches remain accessible to Russian tourists this summer.

The Commission's logic is understandable: any change to European visa law requires a rigorous legislative process and time. But for Eastern European countries that carry a disproportionate share of the confrontation with Russia, this slowness is experienced as a betrayal. The cohesion of the EU is being tested not only by external Russian pressure, but by the internal fragmentation of its economic interests.

Former Russian combatants: a real security threat

The tangible security risk

Beyond the economic and political arguments, supporters of the ban raise a concrete security argument. Former Russian combatants on European soil represent a real and documented security risk. European intelligence services have recorded an increase in sabotage acts attributed to Russian networks on European soil — warehouse fires, attempted attacks on public figures, disinformation operations. Individuals with a Russian military background are potential recruits for these networks.

Estonia, a pioneer in this area, is pushing other member states to establish blacklists of Russian veterans and ban their entry into the Schengen zone. The proposal in the 21st sanctions package — which delegates to each member state the responsibility of determining who participated in the hostilities — may be imperfect. But the argument that implementation difficulty justifies complete inaction is equally indefensible. Imperfect technical solutions are better than no solution at all when facing a documented threat.

A precedent that matters

The question of the entry of Russian nationals into the Schengen zone has a symbolic dimension that goes beyond the practical question of tourism. If the EU cannot ban entry to men who bore arms against a European partner state, it sends a message of weakness that Moscow will not fail to exploit. The right to free movement in the Schengen zone is a European value — but this value cannot apply to individuals who actively contributed to the destruction of Ukraine. The moral coherence of the Union is at stake.

The final adoption of the 21st sanctions package — possibly in amended form — is playing out in the coming weeks. Negotiations between the ambassadors of the 27 member states will continue to seek a compromise. But that compromise risks resembling all previous European compromises on the Russian visa question: hollow enough to satisfy Paris and Rome, not strong enough to satisfy Warsaw and Tallinn.

The 21st sanctions package: content, ambitions, and compromises

What the 21st package actually contains

The European Union's 21st sanctions package against Russia, adopted in June 2026, is the most extensive since the start of the war. It includes new restrictions on exports of dual-use goods — technologies that could have military applications — targeting in particular companies in third countries that serve as platforms for circumventing controls on electronic components. The list of sanctioned entities has grown considerably, including Chinese, Emirati, and Turkish companies involved in documented circumvention networks.

The package also integrates measures on former Russian combatants and establishes a framework for funding Ukraine's reconstruction from the revenues of frozen Russian assets. This last point is particularly significant: it transforms Russian assets blocked in Europe — estimated at approximately €300 billion for the Russian central bank's reserves alone — into a funding source for Ukrainian needs, without formally confiscating these assets.

Behind-the-scenes negotiations: compromises and concessions

The adoption of the 21st package required several weeks of intense negotiations among the 27 member states. The unanimity rule on EU foreign policy gives each country a potential veto. Bulgaria obtained exemptions on certain trade restrictions with Russia by invoking transitional economic constraints. France and Italy softened restrictions on certain consumer goods, preserving commercial interests in their luxury and agri-food sectors.

These compromises are frustrating for proponents of maximum sanctions — primarily the Baltic states, Poland, and other Central and Eastern European member states with Russia on their doorstep. But they are politically inevitable in a decision-making system requiring unanimity. The real question is whether these exemptions create exploitable loopholes that significantly reduce the package's impact — and that assessment can only be made in practice.

Sanctions circumvention: a global industry and Western responses

Circumvention networks: mapping a systemic problem

The circumvention of Russian sanctions has become an organized global industry. Shell companies registered in dozens of countries — UAE, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Georgia, China — serve as intermediaries to channel toward Russia electronic components, CNC machines, integrated circuits, and other dual-use goods. These sanctions-circumventing supply chains have been documented by organizations like the CSIS, Kyiv School of Economics, and investigative journalists.

Circumvention effectiveness varies by product category. For high-end semiconductors and advanced manufacturing equipment, American and European export controls are relatively effective — global manufacturers depend on Western markets and cannot afford to ignore sanctions. For more standard components — less advanced chips, mechanical equipment, vehicles — non-Western alternatives are more numerous and control is harder.

Enforcement tools: secondary sanctions and pressure on third parties

The Western response to the circumvention problem increasingly relies on secondary sanctions — penalizing entities in third countries that help Russia circumvent primary sanctions. The United States has the most developed tradition in this area: the threat of cutting foreign entities from the American financial system is a considerable lever. The European Union is less advanced in this domain, but the 21st package marks a step in that direction by explicitly targeting non-European entities.

Diplomatic pressure on facilitating states is the other tool. Direct conversations with Ankara, Abu Dhabi, and Astana have produced partial results — these governments have no interest in being officially designated as sanctions facilitators. But they also have real economic interests in trade with Russia and are not prepared to sacrifice those interests entirely. The result is partial and selective compliance that reduces but does not eliminate circumvention.

European unity against Russia: four years of sanctions — a balance sheet

The achievements: unprecedented cohesion despite tensions

Four years after the start of the large-scale Russian invasion, the balance sheet of European cohesion on sanctions is more positive than many would have predicted in February 2022. Twenty-one packages adopted, progressively tightened export control regimes, collective funding of the Ukrainian war effort through the European Peace Facility and confiscated funds — all of this represents a collective effort without precedent in the history of European foreign policy.

This cohesion has survived considerable pressures: energy crises, recessions, the rise of pro-Russian parties in several member states, government changes in Hungary, Slovakia, and other countries. The fact that the EU maintains a collective position in the face of these pressures testifies to the robustness — imperfect, negotiated, contested, but real — of European governance in foreign policy.

The flaws: Hungary, internal division, and the risk of fatigue

The picture is not entirely positive. Hungary under Orbán has been the most consistent point of resistance, using its veto to negotiate exemptions and delay the adoption of certain packages. Slovakia under Fico has taken positions increasingly aligned with Budapest. Divisions persist between the ardor of Baltic and Polish countries and the caution of some major Western member states.

Over the longer term, the risk of "sanctions fatigue" is real. The economic costs of the sanctions regime — even if far less significant than initially anticipated — accumulate. Political parties campaigning for "normalization" of relations with Russia are gaining ground in several countries. If the war continues without prospect of resolution over the next two or three years, pressure for sanctions easing will intensify. Maintaining European cohesion is a permanent political effort, not an acquired asset.

Conclusion: The EU in the mirror of its own contradictions

An investigation that reveals more than a visa question

Behind the seemingly technical question of an entry ban for former Russian combatants, this investigation reveals the deep tensions running through the European Union vis-à-vis Russia. This is not simply a difference of opinion on a diplomatic instrument. It involves divergent economic interests, different perceptions of the Russian threat, and a chronic inability to translate declaratory solidarity into consistent concrete policies.

The 12-month extension of sanctions is progress. Bulgaria's threat to block the 21st package is a step backward. France and Italy's opposition to the ban on former combatants is a moral disgrace dressed in legal argument. The European Union can be strong and coherent in its response to Russia — it has demonstrated this since 2022 on many fronts. But this investigation also reveals the cracks that Moscow is actively exploiting and that Brussels cannot indefinitely mask with compromises.

What Eastern European countries expect from their partners

The countries that share a border with Russia or directly bear the cost of this war — Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland — expect something simple from their European partners: consistency. Not solidarity speeches followed by policies that contradict that solidarity. Not sanctions ceremonies followed by tourist seasons in which Russian visas continue to be issued in mass. Not declarations on collective security followed by blockages on entry bans for soldiers who fought against a European state. The EU's credibility against its own stated values depends on that consistency.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Sources and biases

This investigation draws on diplomatic sources reported by Bloomberg, Euronews, Ukrainska Pravda, RBC-Ukraine, RFERL, and official documents from the European Commission. My bias is clearly pro-Ukraine and pro-restrictive policy toward Russia. I acknowledge this. I have tried to present the arguments of Paris and Rome fairly, even though my view of their sufficiency is clear.

Limits of this investigation

I did not have access to the detailed positions of the French and Italian delegations in Council negotiations. Information on the objections from Paris and Rome comes from anonymous diplomatic sources. The situation of the 21st package negotiations is evolving rapidly and some elements of this article may have been superseded by events at the time of publication.

Sources

Primary sources

Euronews — EU ban on Russian combatants faces resistance from France and Italy — June 26, 2026

RBC-Ukraine — Two EU countries oppose entry ban on Russians who fought against Ukraine — June 25, 2026

Ukrainska Pravda — Two EU countries resist entry ban for Russians who fought against Ukraine — June 25, 2026

Secondary sources

RFE/RL — EU States Push For Tougher Rules To Deny Russians Tourist Visas — June 4, 2026

Euronews — EU vows targeted restrictions on Schengen visas for Russians — June 5, 2026

The Moscow Times — EU Countries Demand Stricter Visa Rules for Russians — June 4, 2026

Washington Times — Several European countries want a visa ban for Russian tourists — June 5, 2026