DECODING: Navalny's torturers under EU sanctions — FSB, judges and surveillance algorithms

A targeted sanctions package, two years after Navalny's death

On June 15, 2026, the Council of the European Union adopted a so-called "mini" sanctions package against Russia, hitting a total of 34 individuals and 47 entities. Among the most symbolically charged measures is Decision (CFSP) 2026/1363, which specifically targets 15 individuals and 1 entity directly implicated in the persecution, poisoning and death of Alexei Navalny, who died in detention on February 16, 2024.

This action did not come out of nowhere. It follows a joint statement published in February 2026 by the United Kingdom, Sweden, France, Germany and the Netherlands, asserting that Navalny had been poisoned with the toxin epibatidine. Brussels followed with concrete restrictive measures: asset freezes and travel bans for the named individuals.

The mechanics of EU anti-Navalny sanctions

These sanctions are adopted under the EU's specific human rights regime for Russia (Decision 2024/1484 and Regulation 2024/1485), which allows the EU to target individuals responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia without waiting for consensus on a global package. This distinct legal mechanism allowed Brussels to act quickly on this specific dossier.

The designated persons are subject to an asset freeze in EU member states and a visa ban. EU companies and organizations may no longer provide them with funds or economic resources. In the case of an entity like IPJSC NTK, this means the impossibility of conducting trade with any European actor.

Two years after Alexei Navalny's death, the European Union finally names the torturers. It's better than nothing. But I cannot help thinking that these sanctions arrive with a delay that speaks volumes about Brussels' political hesitancy toward Moscow — and about the difficulty of publicly naming agents of the intelligence services of a nuclear-armed state.

FSB agents at the heart of the case

Among the 15 sanctioned individuals, several are FSB agents (Federal Security Service, successor to the KGB) involved in the campaign of persecution and the poisoning of Alexei Navalny. The FSB is the institution that conducted operational surveillance of Navalny for years, coordinated the poisoning teams, and orchestrated the multiple attempts to eliminate the principal opponent of Putin's regime.

Investigations by the Bellingcat network and the journal The Insider had in 2020 exposed in detail the FSB's operation targeting Navalny, identifying the agents involved and retracing their movements. These investigations provided the EU with a factual foundation for its designations. Alexander Gutsan, Prosecutor General of Russia, also figures among the personalities sanctioned in this broader June 15 package.

Judges, prosecutors and complicit medical personnel

Beyond the FSB, the sanctions target judges who handed down repeated convictions against Navalny in trials that international observers unanimously described as politically motivated. These judges mechanically applied instructions from the top of the state, turning courtrooms into instruments of repression.

Prosecutors and members of medical personnel who obstructed investigations into the circumstances of Navalny's death are also on the list. This last point is particularly revealing: by sanctioning doctors who blocked post-mortem investigations, the EU implicitly acknowledges that Navalny's death is the subject of a deliberate institutional cover-up at the highest levels of the Russian state.

There is something profoundly disturbing about sanctioning doctors for concealing the cause of a prisoner's death. The Hippocratic oath, in their hands, became an instrument of concealment in the service of the state. This corruption of medicine by the regime is one of the most insidious forms of Russian tyranny.

A facial recognition company at the service of repression

The entity IPJSC NTK is the only non-governmental or non-judicial organization to appear in the Navalny-linked sanctions package. Its designation carries considerable significance: this commercial company supplies Russian authorities with facial recognition systems used to monitor, identify and arrest political opponents and independent journalists in Moscow.

The systems deployed by IPJSC NTK allow Russian law enforcement to automatically identify participants at public gatherings, cross-reference their faces against databases, and carry out targeted arrests within a very short time after a demonstration. This technology was used systematically to repress Navalny's supporters and memorial gatherings after his death.

Technology as an instrument of state terror

Large-scale facial recognition surveillance is not unique to Russia — but its systematic use to target identified political opponents constitutes a flagrant violation of the right to privacy and freedom of assembly. Moscow possesses one of the densest surveillance camera networks in the world, with tens of thousands of cameras equipped with facial recognition software.

By designating IPJSC NTK, the EU sends a clear signal to technology companies worldwide: providing surveillance technologies to authoritarian regimes that use them to repress their opposition can trigger Western sanctions. This is an important precedent that extends well beyond the Russian case.

The decision to sanction IPJSC NTK interests me particularly because it acknowledges what we have long known: technology is not neutral. A facial recognition algorithm sold to an authoritarian regime becomes an instrument of repression as effective as a police baton. Brussels was right to name it clearly.

A "mini package" but a substantive action

This June 15, 2026 sanctions package is described as "mini" because it is limited to new designations — asset freezes and travel bans — without new sectoral measures. It fits into the policy announced by the European Commission to impose sanctions on a "rolling" basis, without waiting for major comprehensive packages negotiated over months.

In parallel, a 21st comprehensive sanctions package — targeting banks, oil traders, refineries and cryptocurrency platforms — was under discussion among member states at the same date, with adoption targeted before July 15, 2026. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas estimated that the sanctions imposed since 2022 have cost the Russian economy between 1 trillion and 1.3 trillion dollars.

The other targets of the June 15 package

Beyond the Navalny-related sanctions, the June 15 package targeted the Russian military-industrial complex (7 individuals and 21 entities, including drone suppliers and two Chinese companies), the oil shadow fleet (2 individuals and 24 entities including Lukoil-Western Siberia), and pro-Kremlin propagandists (10 individuals and 1 entity, including Orthodox bishop Georgiy Shevkunov, often described as Putin's "personal confessor").

This multidimensional architecture illustrates the growing sophistication of European sanctions, which no longer limit themselves to targeting oligarchs and their yachts, but now go after propaganda vectors, surveillance technology and energy sanctions-evasion networks.

Sanctioning Putin's "personal confessor" is a politically bold gesture — and probably as symbolic as it is concrete. But the inclusion in the same package of drone component suppliers and shadow fleet companies shows that Brussels is beginning to understand that Putin's war is an integrated system that must be struck at all its nodes.

Epibatidine: a toxin, an accusation, a diplomatic declaration

The joint declaration of February 2026 signed by the United Kingdom, Sweden, France, Germany and the Netherlands asserts that Alexei Navalny was poisoned with the toxin epibatidine, an extremely potent alkaloid. This chemical identification is crucial: it establishes that Navalny's death was not a natural medical failure but a deliberate act of poisoning.

It is this factual basis — confirmed by the intelligence services of 5 major European countries — that allowed the EU to designate specific individuals with sufficient legal legitimacy to withstand potential challenges before the Court of Justice of the EU. By adopting these sanctions, Brussels officially and collectively acknowledges that Navalny was murdered by the Russian state.

The slow death of an opponent — a chronology of repression

Alexei Navalny had survived a first Novichok poisoning attempt in August 2020, been treated in Germany, and returned to Russia in January 2021, knowing full well what awaited him. He was immediately arrested. The following years saw an escalation of convictions in show trials — the same judges now sanctioned by the EU handed down increasingly heavy prison sentences, progressively isolating him under the harshest conditions of the Russian penal system.

His death on February 16, 2024 in penal colony IK-6 in Kharp, in the polar region of Yamalo-Nenets, occurred in circumstances that Russian authorities refused to explain convincingly. The adoption of these sanctions by the EU constitutes the most forceful collective European response to this state murder.

Navalny returned to Russia knowing he was risking his life. He went to die in prison defying Putin to the end. That extraordinary courage deserved a far swifter and stronger collective response from the West. Two years later, symbolic sanctions on the torturers: it is insufficient. It is also, sadly, everything the West can do without risking direct escalation.

A specific legal instrument, adopted in 2024

The EU human rights sanctions regime on Russia, established by Decisions 2024/1484 and Regulations 2024/1485, is relatively recent. It allows the Union to target natural and legal persons responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, outside the framework of the geopolitical sanctions linked to the war in Ukraine.

This dual regime — sanctions for aggression against Ukraine on one side, sanctions for human rights violations within Russia on the other — allows the EU to adopt more targeted and flexible measures. It also signals that Europe distinguishes between war crimes abroad and the internal repression of Putin's regime — two distinct realities that deserve distinct responses.

The difficulty of establishing legal proof to target intelligence agents

Sanctioning FSB agents poses considerable legal challenges. These individuals operate under cover, their true functions are often concealed, and evidence of their involvement in specific operations is difficult to make public without compromising intelligence sources. This is one reason why these sanctions took two years to be adopted after Navalny's death.

The investigative work of organizations like Bellingcat, The Insider and CNN — which in 2020 exposed and named the FSB agents who had followed Navalny and participated in his first poisoning — provided a base of public evidence that governments were able to use to justify their designations before courts.

I must acknowledge here a limit to my analysis: I do not know the full names of all 15 individuals sanctioned in the Navalny-linked package — not all were immediately made public in accessible sources. This lack of transparency is itself problematic — if Europe is sanctioning torturers, it should have the courage to name them publicly.

Have sanctions changed Russian behavior?

The question of the effectiveness of European sanctions against Russia divides experts. On one side, Kaja Kallas claims they have cost the Russian economy between 1 trillion and 1.3 trillion euros — a considerable figure. On the other, Russia continues to fund its war machine, imprison its opponents, and conduct poisoning operations abroad.

The Russian economy has adapted with a resilience that few anticipated: import substitution, development of alternative circuits with China, India and Gulf countries, circumvention via the shadow oil fleet precisely targeted by this June 15 package. Sanctions have constrained and slowed Russia — but they have not stopped it.

Targeted sanctions on individuals: a different objective

Sanctions targeting specific individuals — such as those aimed at FSB agents or judges linked to the Navalny case — pursue a different objective than sectoral sanctions. They do not seek to destroy the Russian economy. They seek to establish personal accountability, to create international law precedents, to prevent EU assets from being used by accomplices of crimes, and to signal to those serving Putin's regime that their actions may have consequences.

On this more limited but real level, targeted sanctions have an undeniable utility. They document crimes, make them official in the eyes of international law, and close doors to individuals who might one day wish to travel, invest, or put their children in school in the West.

Individual sanctions are long-term weapons. They do not destroy a regime overnight. But they create a form of historical and legal accounting that will serve the day Russia must face its crimes. And these officials who serve Putin today now know their name is in an international register. That may be insufficient. It is nonetheless real.

24 entities targeted for oil sanctions evasion

The most economically significant portion of the June 15 package concerns the Russian shadow fleet: 24 entities and 2 individuals were designated for helping Russia export its oil by circumventing the G7-imposed $60-per-barrel price cap. Among the entities are companies based in Russia, Azerbaijan, Liberia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and Hong Kong.

The designation of Lukoil-Western Siberia, a major production branch of the Russian oil giant Lukoil, is particularly significant. Lukoil had until now partially escaped the harshest sanctions compared to Rosneft and Gazprom. This change signals that the EU is tightening its grip on the entire Russian energy sector.

The race between sanctions and their circumvention

The Russian shadow fleet — hundreds of vessels operating under flags of convenience, with opaque insurance and concealed owners — is the main vehicle for circumventing oil sanctions since 2022. This fleet allows Russia to sell its oil to Asian, African and Middle Eastern buyers without going through Western intermediaries subject to sanctions.

Each sanctions package designates new entities involved in these circuits. Russian operators circumvent others. It is a permanent, asymmetric and costly race on both sides. The EU itself acknowledges that this battle is far from won — but it maintains pressure that forces operators to take increasingly greater risks.

The shadow fleet is the Achilles' heel of oil sanctions against Russia. As long as China, India and other major consumers refuse to apply the G7 price cap, Russia will find buyers for its oil. European sanctions are necessary but not sufficient without global coordination that the West cannot manage to impose.

Ten propagandists designated, including an Orthodox bishop

The June 15 package also includes sanctions against 10 pro-Kremlin propagandists — journalists, social media influencers, state media directors — as well as against the entity Presidential Foundation for Cultural Initiatives, created by decree of Vladimir Putin. These designations target individuals who "justify, promote or legitimize" Russia's aggression against Ukraine.

The designation of Orthodox bishop Georgiy Shevkunov — described by Russian media as Putin's "personal confessor" — carries strong symbolic weight. It shows that the EU no longer distinguishes between secular propaganda and religious propaganda when both serve the same objectives of legitimizing the regime and its war.

The fight against disinformation as a component of sanctions

By incorporating anti-propaganda measures into its sanctions packages, the EU acknowledges that the information war waged by Russia is a pillar of its aggression — as real as its missiles and tanks. Influence operations, disinformation campaigns and manipulation of Western public opinion are an integral part of the Russian strategy, and the people who conduct them deserve to be designated and sanctioned.

This approach is still relatively new in the Western sanctions arsenal. It risks raising questions about freedom of expression — but the distinction between journalism and state-coordinated, Kremlin-funded propaganda is clear enough that the designations should be legally defensible before European courts.

Sanctioning journalist-propagandists raises legitimate questions about press freedom. But when Anatoly Kuzichev or Maria Volkonskaya are not independent journalists — they are instruments of a state apparatus that funds and directs their work to legitimize a war of aggression — they cannot hide behind the principle of press freedom. They are functionaries of the information war.

A comprehensive package under negotiation in June 2026

Alongside the June 15 designations, the European Commission had on June 9, 2026 proposed a 21st comprehensive sanctions package, even more ambitious. This package, under discussion among member states in mid-June, would specifically target banks, oil traders, refineries and cryptocurrency platforms used to circumvent existing sanctions.

The goal is adoption before July 15, 2026, the date of a review of the G7-imposed price cap on Russian oil. This coordination between the two processes illustrates the growing sophistication of the Western sanctions strategy — which now seeks to anticipate and close circumvention circuits before they are fully operational.

The internal political challenges within the EU

Each new sanctions package is the subject of difficult negotiations among the EU's 27 member states, some of which remain more reluctant than others to adopt measures that affect their own economic interests. Viktor Orbán's Hungary has regularly attempted to block or weaken packages. The shift to annual renewal (rather than semi-annual) of comprehensive sanctions at the June 18-19, 2026 European Council is precisely an attempt to limit the impact of obstructors.

These internal tensions are known and exploited by Moscow, which invests heavily in influence networks targeting political parties and European officials who might block sanctions decisions. Sanctioning Russian propaganda while remaining exposed to Russian influence within its own institutions is one of the fundamental contradictions the EU must resolve.

The fact that the EU was able to adopt this sanctions package unanimously — despite the usual reluctance — is in itself remarkable. But I remain skeptical about the ability of European institutions to maintain this cohesion over time, in the face of economic pressures and Russian influences that never stop working on public opinion across Europe.

The ICC, the aggression tribunal and criminal accountability

Economic sanctions are tools of political pressure, not verdicts of criminal justice. They do not establish guilt in the legal sense and do not sentence their targets to imprisonment. For that, the mechanisms of international criminal justice are required — the ICC, special tribunals, ad hoc chambers.

The EU reiterated at the OSCE Annual Security Review Conference in June 2026 its support for criminal accountability for crimes committed in Ukraine. The investigative work of the ICC, UN commissions of inquiry, and digital war crimes archives form the foundation on which genuine justice may one day be rendered — even if that day may be very far off.

Sanctions as a provisional substitute for criminal justice

Pending effective criminal justice that could take a generation, individual sanctions perform a partial but real function: they document, they punish economically, they isolate diplomatically, and they signal to future perpetrators that their actions can carry personal consequences. It is imperfect. It is insufficient. But it is what democracies can do today.

For Alexei Navalny's loved ones, these sanctions represent an official and collective acknowledgment that their father, husband or friend was murdered by the Russian state, and that the perpetrators are identified and pursued — at least to the extent permitted by current diplomatic tools. It is little. It is also, for now, all that Europe can offer.

I think of Yulia Navalnaya, Alexei Navalny's widow, who continues to fight for the truth about her husband's death from the international stage. These sanctions do not give her back her husband. But they mean that Europe names the killers. That is an act of collective dignity not to be underestimated, even as we can and must demand more.

Toward greater coherence between sanctions and accountability

The integration within a single sanctions package of measures targeting the military-industrial complex, the oil fleet, propaganda and the internal repression of opponents represents a major evolution in Western sanctions policy. It acknowledges that these different dimensions are facets of the same authoritarian and criminal system — and that they all deserve to be targeted simultaneously.

This greater coherence is the product of years of learning and adaptation in the face of Russian circumvention strategies. The first sanctions of 2014 following the annexation of Crimea were modest and largely symbolic. Those of 2022 and subsequent years have progressively targeted the entire economic and institutional system sustaining Putin's regime.

The challenge of coordination with non-EU allies

The effectiveness of European sanctions depends in part on their coordination with American, British, Canadian and Australian sanctions. On the Navalny file, convergence between the EU and its Anglo-Saxon allies is strong. On other issues — notably the enforcement of the oil price cap and sanctions against Asian intermediaries — gaps persist.

China and India, two of the largest buyers of Russian oil since 2022, continue to circumvent Western sanctions without direct EU sanctions against their intermediaries — at least not yet at the scale required. This is the structural limit of a sanctions policy that remains essentially Western in a world that no longer is entirely so.

The real long-term challenge of sanctions policy is that the multipolar world Putin aspired to build is partially a reality — and in that world, Western sanctions have real but limited effects. China and India buy Russian oil at a discount. As long as that continues, Moscow will have the means to wage war.

A structural turning point in continental security relations

The developments described in this article are part of a broader transformation of European security architecture. The European Union, long perceived as an essentially normative and economic power, is acquiring a real and substantial military dimension. The instruments created since 2022 — SAFE, APF, reinforced PESCO, bilateral industrial cooperation — together constitute an institutional foundation for a European defense that did not exist five years ago.

This structural change is irreversible insofar as it responds to real, documented and growing security needs. As long as Putin's Russia maintains an aggressive posture and the democracies on Europe's eastern periphery are threatened, the movement toward a more robust European defense will continue. Debates over national sovereignty, cost-sharing and national priorities will remain — but they will not reverse the underlying trend. Collective security requires collective structures. And Europe is building them.

What this evolution means for Ukraine

For Ukraine, these developments are directly linked to its immediate security and long-term future. In the short term, every billion invested in European defense, every military capability developed, every contract signed with Ukrainian producers strengthens its capacity to resist. Over the longer term, a solid European defense is the best guarantee that Western support for Ukraine will not evaporate with the next change of government in the United States or elsewhere.

Ukraine is not only a beneficiary of these developments — it is also an essential driver of them. Its combat experience, its growing industries, its technological innovations in drones and electronic warfare systems directly feed the investment choices and operational doctrines of the allies. Europe learns from Ukraine as much as it provides to it. And that mutual learning partnership is one of the most enduring legacies this war will leave to the continent's collective security.

In this conflict, every detail matters. Every figure, every decision, every tactical or diplomatic development is a piece of a mosaic that, assembled, outlines the final outcome. Observing that mosaic with rigor and honesty — that is the columnist's role. And in this particular war, it is also an act of resistance against the disinformation seeking to blur the lines between the aggressor and the aggressed.

Allies facing the evolving situation

Ukraine's Western partners have followed recent developments with close attention. European chancelleries, NATO general staffs and allied intelligence services have integrated this information into their analyses and planning. The decisions described in this article are not made in a strategic vacuum — they are part of a permanent dialogue between Kyiv and its partners, a technical, political and military dialogue conducted through dozens of formal and informal channels.

That dialogue has produced concrete results visible in weapons deliveries, soldier training programs, intelligence sharing and coordinated diplomatic decisions. The institutional framework of this support — NATO, EU, bilateral coalitions — has expanded considerably since 2022 and today operates with an effectiveness no one would have predicted at the start of the conflict. Ukraine is no longer alone. And that reality fundamentally changes the strategic equation vis-à-vis Russia.

Future commitments: durability and depth

The durability of Western support is a legitimate question Ukraine raises regularly. Political changes in allied democracies — elections, changes of government, popular pressure on budgets — can cause fluctuations in the level of engagement. This is why Ukraine seeks to institutionalize support through bilateral treaties, multi-year industrial contracts and financing mechanisms with long-term commitments that transcend electoral cycles.

In this conflict, every detail matters. Every figure, every decision, every tactical or diplomatic development is a piece of a mosaic that, assembled, outlines the final outcome. Observing that mosaic with rigor and honesty — that is the columnist's role. And in this particular war, it is also an act of resistance against the disinformation seeking to blur the lines between the aggressor and the aggressed.

Investment in the Ukrainian defense industry, pilot training on Gripens, 45-year SAFE financing guarantees — all these decisions pursue exactly this objective: creating irreversible commitments that can only be undone by a costly and deliberate political decision. That is conscious institutional strategy. And it reflects the maturity that Ukrainian decision-makers and their partners have acquired since the start of the conflict.

Naming the perpetrators — a necessary but insufficient step

The June 15, 2026 sanctions package is an important step in Europe's response to the murder of Alexei Navalny and the systematic human rights violations committed by Putin's regime. By naming FSB agents, judges, prosecutors, complicit medical personnel and a surveillance company, the EU collectively asserts that these acts are not unassailable state decisions but individual crimes with identifiable perpetrators.

That is a political and legal declaration of significance. It does not bring Navalny back to life. It does not stop the Russian repressive machine. But it builds, stone by stone, the case for international accountability — and sends regime officials the message that their actions may carry lasting personal consequences.

Europe must go further, faster

Navalny's death in February 2024 should have triggered an immediate and more severe European response. It took two years and a declaration from five governments for targeted sanctions to be adopted. That delay is a weakness Moscow noted and exploited. Europe must improve its capacity to respond quickly to the most flagrant crimes of the Russian regime — without waiting for laborious political consensus reached after months of negotiation.

The 21st package in preparation, sanctions against the shadow fleet, ongoing designations under the human rights regime: these efforts are pointing in the right direction. They must be accelerated, broadened and more closely coordinated with allies. Peace will not be built with good intentions — it will be built with sustained, coherent and uncompromising pressure on the regime that refuses it.

This war has no easy or quick ending. It will end when one side has exhausted its will to fight or its capacity to do so. For Ukraine, the will is intact. Capacity depends on Western support. For Russia, Putin's will is strong, but industrial and economic capacity is slowly eroding under the combined weight of sanctions, Ukrainian strikes, and the human cost of the war. Continuing to document, analyze and understand that evolution is also, in its own way, a contribution to the victory of truth.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between verified facts and interpretive analysis. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under Sources, never here.

Primary source families used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

Secondary source families: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under Sources.

Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a critical, contextual synthesis based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.