COMMENTARY: EU Sanctions Against Russia Extended — Necessary, but Not Enough

June 25, 2026: A Decision Without Precedent in EU History

On June 25, 2026, the Council of the European Union extended its economic sanctions against Russia for twelve additional months, through July 31, 2027. What may appear as bureaucratic routine actually conceals a historic decision: it is the first time since these sanctions were introduced in 2014 that the EU has extended them for a full year rather than the usual six-month renewals. This decision, taken unanimously by all 27 member states at the European Council summit of June 18–19, 2026 — where President Zelensky was present — marks an important shift in political register.

For more than ten years, every six-month sanctions renewal was an occasion for latent crisis: Hungary under Viktor Orbán threatening a veto, Slovakia under Robert Fico reluctant, internal political bargains needed to secure unanimity. Moving to an annual renewal removes this sword of Damocles from the diplomatic calendar. It signals to Moscow that Europe is not on the verge of cracking every six months. This is good news — insufficient, but good.

What These Sanctions Actually Cover

The sanctions in force target key sectors of the Russian economy: trade, finance, energy, dual-use technologies. They include a ban on importing Russian crude oil transported by sea, the disconnection of several Russian banks from the SWIFT system, and the suspension of broadcast licenses for Kremlin propaganda media in Europe. These measures, progressively expanded since 2022 to now encompass 21 sanctions packages, constitute the most extensive punitive economic framework ever imposed by the EU against any third country.

Added to these are specific mechanisms against circumvention — sanctions evasion through third countries acting as intermediaries for Russia. Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and certain Central Asian countries have been significant conduits for evasion. The 21st and 22nd packages of sanctions, the latter currently being adopted, specifically target these escape routes.

I fully support these sanctions. They are necessary, morally justified, and symbolically important. But I refuse to present them as sufficient. Since 2014, and even more since 2022, sanctions have not stopped Putin from continuing his war. They must be one tool among several — not the only tool.

The End of the Hungarian Veto as a Structural Weapon

The shift to an annual renewal is also a symbolic victory against Viktor Orbán. For years, Hungary used the unanimity requirement for renewals as a negotiating lever — extracting concessions on unrelated issues in exchange for its vote. Moving to an annual schedule halves the frequency of these extortion rituals. It is not a total victory over Orbán-style obstruction — he can still block exemptions or modifications — but it is a useful simplification of governance.

Budapest had also been using the sanctions on oil and gas as a red line. Hungary remains dependent on Russian oil transported by pipeline — an exception the EU has maintained to avoid a full veto. This exception is a structural flaw in the framework, but a realistic one: forcing Hungary to support sanctions that would destroy its energy supply without a credible alternative is not high politics — it is misguided idealism.

A Signal Sent to Moscow, Beijing, and Washington

This extension simultaneously sends multiple signals. To Moscow: Europe will not tire over the next six months — count on at least a year of sustained pressure. To Beijing: the Western bloc remains unified on Russia, which says something about the potential solidity of a similar front in the event of Chinese aggression against Taiwan. To Washington and the Trump administration: Europe is taking its economic responsibilities in pressuring Putin, even as the United States reduces its military engagement.

The timing of the vote — days after Trump signaled his desire to lift some restrictions on arms exports to Ukraine, but in an overall context of American unpredictability — is not incidental. Europe is affirming its capacity to maintain a coherent policy toward Russia even in the absence of strong American leadership. This matters. Is it sufficient? No.

The real question no one asks loudly enough: at what point do sanctions become an end in themselves rather than a means of achieving a result? If Putin is still in power, the war still active, and sanctions still in force by 2030, will we have succeeded or failed?

The Real Impact on Russia's Economy

Sanctions have unquestionably affected the Russian economy. The IMF and the World Bank estimate that Russia has lost several percentage points of growth since 2022. Access to Western technologies — semiconductors, industrial equipment, software — is severely restricted. The ruble has experienced periods of turbulence. Russian inflation remains elevated. The banking sector is isolated from Western financial markets. These effects are real.

But they are not paralyzing. The Russian economy has shown greater resilience than many analysts predicted in 2022. Import substitution, the pivot toward China and India, a war economy that generates activity even under bombardment — all of this has allowed Russia to continue financing its war. Oil revenues, even reduced by the price cap, continue feeding the military budget. Sanctions erode Russia's long-term potential — they do not stop the war in the short term.

The Oil Price Cap: A Sophisticated but Imperfect Measure

One of the most innovative elements of the framework is the cap on Russian oil prices at $60 per barrel, implemented by the G7 and applied by the EU. The idea is to allow Russia to continue selling its oil — to avoid a shock on global markets — while limiting its revenues. This measure has had some effect: Russia does indeed sell a portion of its oil below the global market price.

But the "shadow fleet" of tankers operating outside the Western framework and enabling Russia to bypass the cap is well-documented. These vessels sailing under flags of convenience carry Russian oil to China, India, and other clients indifferent to the price cap. The 21st sanctions package specifically targets this shadow fleet. That is necessary. It is also a cat-and-mouse game requiring constant vigilance and considerable surveillance resources.

The price cap is conceptually brilliant — but its effectiveness depends on global enforcement that the United States, the EU, and the G7 cannot impose on China, India, or Gulf countries. As long as Moscow has solvent clients who ignore our rules, our rules have structural limits.

The Necessity of Military Support for Ukraine

Economic sanctions, however severe, cannot replace military support for Ukraine. This is the fundamental flaw in Europe's current strategy. If sanctions weaken Russia over the long term, only military support for Ukraine can change the immediate course of the war. And on this front, Europe remains insufficient — too slow to deliver, too cautious in its commitments, too attached to red lines that Russia has long since crossed.

President Zelensky was present at the European summit of June 18–19, 2026 where the sanctions extension was decided. His presence was symbolic: Ukraine is central to European decisions, but the decisions made are not enough to secure victory. Zelensky has always said — and he is right — that sanctions without sufficient military equipment are like building a dike with half-filled sandbags. Economic pressure and military pressure must go hand in hand.

The Risk of Permanent Crisis Management

There is a real danger in Europe's current strategy: transforming the war in Ukraine into a "managed crisis" rather than a war to be won. Sanctions extended every six months — now every year — weapons deliveries in dribs and drabs, red lines that shift slowly — all of this traces a long-term resistance strategy without a clear vision of victory. This approach may prevent Ukraine's defeat but does not lead to victory. And without clear victory, Putin can portray his war as a relative success over time.

The real political question Europe must ask itself is: what do we actually want to achieve? The mere survival of a diminished Ukraine? The restoration of 1991 borders? A negotiated peace? Depending on the answer, sanctions clearly fall short — or are just one element of a far more robust strategy. European leaders tend to avoid formulating this question clearly. That is their greatest strategic weakness.

"Managing the crisis" is the classic trap democracies fall into when facing dictatorships: preferring slow, diffuse pain to a clear, costly decision. Putin has decided. He has an endgame — annexation, attrition, neutralizing Ukraine. Europe must have one too, or time will work in Moscow's favor.

The Soldier Entry Ban Proposal

Even at the June 25 vote, EU internal divisions surfaced. A controversial proposal had been under discussion: barring former Russian soldiers who fought in Ukraine from entering the Schengen area. This measure, championed notably by the Baltic states and Poland, met resistance from other member states wary of legal and diplomatic complications. It was ultimately not adopted as a formal measure at the same time as the economic sanctions extension.

This episode illustrates the recurring tensions between an Eastern Europe (Poland, Baltic states) that lives the Russian threat on its immediate border, and a Western and Southern Europe where some states still prefer to maintain potential dialogue openings with Moscow. This geographic division is real and structural. It will not disappear with sanctions renewals — it will resurface at every future debate on escalation or de-escalation.

The 21 Packages and Their Blind Spots

With 21 sanctions packages on the table, the EU has been creative and persistent. But blind spots remain. Natural gas continues flowing to certain member states via long-term contracts that some have not yet fully severed. Russian diamonds took time to be sanctioned, creating an important revenue window for Moscow. China and India are buying the oil Europe no longer buys. Iran is supplying drones. North Korea is supplying ammunition. Russia's support network circumvents the sanctions network — and Europe cannot sanction China without provoking a global economic crisis.

These structural limits are not a reason to stop sanctioning — they are a reason to be clear-eyed about what sanctions can and cannot accomplish. And a reason to demand more on other fronts: accelerated military deliveries, pressure on China via trade relations, diplomatic support for Kyiv in international forums.

I find it morally intolerable that China and Iran can indirectly support Putin's war without paying any commercial price with the same European partners who sanction Russia. This is an incoherence that European leaders refuse to confront because the economic stakes with Beijing are too high.

Why Sanctions Also Have Symbolic Value

Beyond their economic effectiveness, sanctions carry an irreplaceable moral and symbolic dimension. They formally and publicly declare that Europe refuses to accept the invasion of a sovereign country as "normal." They preserve a principled line in a world where international norms are under pressure. They prevent a return to "business as usual" that would implicitly reward aggression.

This moral dimension is sometimes underestimated in purely economic analyses. For Ukraine, for its allies in the Baltic states and Poland, for the partners who have endured Russian pressure for years, knowing that Europe is maintaining its pressure on the Russian aggressor is not merely a cost-benefit calculation. It is an act of political solidarity. And this solidarity has intrinsic value, independent of its effect on Russian GDP.

European Responsibility in the Face of History

Europe has an appointment with its own history. It allowed invasions to happen — Georgia in 2008, Crimea in 2014 — without a sufficient response. It bought Russian gas for years, indirectly enriching Putin's war machine. It ignored the warnings of the Baltic states and Poland for too long. The year-long extension of sanctions does not redeem those past mistakes — but it shows the lesson has at least partially been learned.

Ukraine is fighting for its land, its freedom, its survival as a nation. The EU sanctions, maintained and reinforced, are Europe's economic contribution to that struggle. They must not become the alibi that excuses the lack of military contribution. Zelensky needs both. He deserves both. And Europe has the means to provide both, if it has the political will.

Zelensky is an exceptional leader in exceptional circumstances. He deserves a Europe that is equal to the task. Extended sanctions are good news — but they must not become an excuse for delaying heavy weapons deliveries, air defense systems, or Ukraine's accession to the EU and NATO.

Who Is Really Suffering Under the Sanctions?

The question of the humanitarian impact of sanctions on ordinary Russian citizens is one of the most delicate debates in this dossier. The available data, though imperfect, shows a nuanced reality. The Kiel Institute for the World Economy estimated in June 2026 that Western sanctions have reduced Russian GDP by roughly 8 to 10% compared to the trajectory it would have followed without the war — a real loss, but less than the West had initially hoped. Russian inflation exceeds 15% annually in 2026, and imported consumer goods have seen price increases of 40 to 60% since 2022.

But Putin has managed to transfer much of the economic cost to the most vulnerable populations — pensioners, workers in non-commodity-exporting regions, fixed-income households — while shielding the elites who depend on his system. This is the perverse logic of any sanction against an authoritarian regime: a leader indifferent to his population's suffering can redistribute the pain in ways that protect his political base while staying the course of his aggressive foreign policy.

Dissenting Voices Within the EU on Sanctions Effectiveness

Even among sanctions supporters, voices are questioning their design. Nobel economics laureate Daron Acemoglu, in an article in Foreign Affairs in May 2026, argued for sanctions far more targeted on oligarchs and regime financiers rather than broad restrictions on Russian exports that also affect civilian populations. His argument: current sanctions create a nationalist "besieged fortress" sentiment that strengthens Putin politically as much as it weakens him economically.

Other experts, such as those at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, maintain that the current sanctions, though imperfect, constitute the minimum political signal necessary to demonstrate that international aggression carries a cost. Weakening or lifting sanctions would send the opposite message — that the invasion of Ukraine is ultimately acceptable if one waits long enough. This academic debate has very concrete consequences for deliberations in the EU Council.

I understand the humanitarian argument. Truly. But there is a moral asymmetry in this debate that I cannot ignore: it is ordinary Russians who suffer from sanctions, yes. But it is also ordinary Ukrainians — civilians, children, families — who suffer from the absence of sufficiently deterrent sanctions. I refuse to treat these two forms of suffering as equivalent.

Political Support as Much as Economic Pressure

For Ukraine and its president Volodymyr Zelensky, every European vote on sanctions is not just an economic decision — it is a fundamental act of political solidarity. When the EU Council votes unanimously to extend sanctions, it sends a message to Putin: Europe remains united, despite pressure, despite fatigue, despite internal divisions. This message is worth as much as the economic content of the sanctions themselves. Zelensky said it explicitly at the Brussels summit of June 2026: "Every vote of the European Union is a vote for the lives of our soldiers and our civilians."

The psychological dimension for the Ukrainian people must not be underestimated. Four years of total war have morally exhausted a population fighting for its national survival. The certainty that Europe maintains its pressure on the Russian aggressor is an element of collective psychological resilience. Opinion surveys in Ukraine regularly show that the population considers European support — sanctions included — a key indicator of Western willingness not to abandon their cause.

What a Lifting of Sanctions Would Mean for Kyiv

International security experts are nearly unanimous on one point: lifting sanctions before any settlement of the conflict would be catastrophic for peace prospects. It would signal that pressure can be eased without conditions, encouraging Moscow to maintain its attrition strategy while waiting for Western fatigue to do the rest. The Royal United Services Institute in London published an analysis in June 2026 showing that the current sanctions regime, despite its limits, has nonetheless reduced Russian imports of dual-use components critical to its defense industry by 23%.

For Ukraine, sanctions continuity is necessary but not sufficient. What Zelensky has been calling for since 2024 is a reinforcement of the framework: coverage of third countries re-exporting to Russia, additional sectoral sanctions on Russia's civilian nuclear sector, progressive freezing and confiscation of Russian state assets to fund Ukrainian reconstruction. These demands still meet resistance from certain member states fearing commercial retaliation or maintaining economic interests in the third countries involved.

There is a phrase by Zelensky I cannot get out of my mind: "We don't want your pity. We want your weapons and your sanctions." That sentence says it all. Ukraine does not need Europe to explain the limits of sanctions. It needs Europe to do more, not less.

A Good Decision, a Dangerous Self-Satisfaction

The extension of the EU's economic sanctions against Russia through July 31, 2027 is a good decision. It is historic in its annual duration. It is symbolically important. It strikes the Russian economy in a real and cumulative way. It sends a strong signal of European unity. All of that deserves to be acknowledged.

But complacency would be dangerous. Sanctions without military pressure only manage the crisis — as I said at the outset — they do not resolve it. The EU must simultaneously accelerate its military deliveries to Ukraine, intensify its pressure on the third countries circumventing sanctions, build the sustainability of its support beyond 2027, and work toward a vision of the end state that is not simply "wait for Putin to tire." Lasting peace in Ukraine and in Europe requires Ukrainian victory — not shared exhaustion.

What 2027 Will Need to Bring

By July 2027, Europe will need to make new decisions. If the war continues, should sanctions be extended again? If peace negotiations are underway, will sanctions be a lever or an obstacle? These questions will arise, and they will reveal whether Europe truly has a strategy or is improvising from one decision to the next. The decision of June 25, 2026 is a step in the right direction. The road is still long. And Putin knows very well where he wants to go.

The vote of June 25, 2026 on the sanctions extension will be judged in the archives of this era as a moment of European cohesion. Not a victory — sanctions alone will not win this war. Not a failure — unanimity maintains the pressure. It is an act of minimum responsibility. And in the current political context, even the minimum deserves to be acknowledged.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

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