EDITORIAL: Twenty-first package: Europe must stop bargaining

Four years of war — how many more packages?

Since February 24, 2022, the European Union has stacked twenty sanctions packages against Russia. Twenty packages, twenty rounds of negotiations, twenty repetitions of the same bargaining scenes between capitals. And now the 21st package is on the table, officially proposed on June 27, 2026. Meanwhile, Vladimir Putin is increasing war spending by an additional four to five trillion rubles in 2026, according to Bloomberg. The equation is simple, brutal — and Europe pretends not to see it.

Russia's budget deficit has admittedly surpassed 80 billion dollars, according to United24 Media. Russian government bonds have collapsed, with yields approaching 15%. But Putin keeps financing his war machine. Why? Because Europe still leaves taps open, still hesitates over a total oil embargo, and grants delays that Moscow converts into oxygen.

The 21st package: promise or alibi?

This new package arrives in a context where the Baltic states — Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania — have been pressing Brussels for months to accelerate the Russian oil embargo. The Kyiv Post reports that these three nations are pushing for a faster, more comprehensive ban. The EU itself has only just extended its existing sanctions by one year instead of six months — on June 19, 2026 — as though such a gesture deserved applause. Euromaidan Press confirms: the wall of economic sanctions holds until 2027, but gaps remain.

I will say what many are thinking quietly: this 21st package risks being, like its predecessors, a catalogue of overly timid measures negotiated downward to satisfy the most hesitant members. Can Europe still look Ukraine in the eye and claim it is doing the maximum?

What I feel watching this new round of European economic diplomacy is a weariness mixed with a deep, slow-burning anger. We are bargaining with the executioner. We are negotiating the terms of our own security. And meanwhile, Ukrainian soldiers are dying. Every additional week of negotiation is a week gifted to Putin.

The figures of Russia's paradox

The Kiel Institute speaks of «structural exhaustion» of the Russian economy. Russia's GDP contracted by 0.2% in the first quarter of 2026, and the IMF has revised its forecast downward to 0.8% annual growth. The Economist ran the headline on June 22, 2026 that Russia's war economy has problems but is not about to crash — and that is precisely where the danger lies. A wounded but functioning economy remains a war economy.

Zelensky's sanctions adviser declared on June 26, 2026 that the Russian economy has reached a dead end, according to RBC-Ukraine. But a dead end is not a collapse. Putin can hold for years in a dead end if the West does not push harder. Russia's regions, meanwhile, are drowning in debt because of the war, confirms the portal dn.gov.ua. The social cost is real. But the regime absorbs the blows by redistributing the pain onto the periphery.

War rubles and their limits

Increasing military spending by four to five trillion rubles when the currency is under pressure and bond yields are spiking to 15% is playing with fire. Independent Russian economists — those who can still speak — raise the specter of monetary overheating. Inflation is gnawing at the purchasing power of ordinary Russians. The Russian Central Bank keeps punishingly high benchmark rates to contain the spiral.

And yet Putin holds on. He holds on because oil and gas revenues, though reduced, continue to flow. He holds on because countries like China, India, and Turkey absorb Russian oil at cut-rate prices, cheerfully circumventing Western sanctions. That is where Europe must look. That is where the 21st package must strike.

The Russian economy is like a boxer who has been absorbing punches for rounds — bleeding, staggering, but still standing, because its opponent refuses to put its full weight behind the blows. Europe can win this economic fight. But it needs to stop boxing with velvet gloves.

Three small states that see further than the large ones

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania do not need anyone to explain to them what imperial Russia means. They lived it — in their bones, under their feet. These three nations have been pushing for a total oil embargo for a long time, well before the major European capitals deigned to give it serious thought. Their position is clear, without ambiguity: you cannot claim to sanction Moscow while continuing to buy its energy in disguised forms.

The Kyiv Post of June 27, 2026 documents their pressure on Brussels: the Baltics want an accelerated embargo, without the usual delays that allow Russia to adapt. Their argument is airtight: every delay is a strategic gift to Putin. The EU must listen to those who understand the enemy, not to those who still hope to do business with it tomorrow.

Geography as a moral compass

There is something profoundly revealing in the fact that the states closest to Russia are the most determined to sanction it. Poland, the Baltic states, Finland — all understand that the current EU softness is not only morally indecent but strategically suicidal. When the states most exposed to the Russian threat demand more firmness, and the most sheltered states dig in their heels, there is a fundamental problem of perception.

France, Germany, Hungary — for very different reasons — have too often played the moderators. France out of diplomatic ambition, Germany out of historical dependence on Russian hydrocarbons, Hungary out of open complicity under Orbán. The result: twenty diluted packages instead of unrelenting maximum pressure.

Geography does not lie. The Baltics, who live a few kilometers from Russian military bases, have understood what certain Brussels bureaucrats appear to ignore: Putin is not a difficult partner — he is an active enemy. Treating your economic partners as enemies is a courageous decision. Refusing its consequences is weakness.

The June 27 proposal: progress or repetition?

According to Daily Finland of June 27, 2026, the EU has officially proposed its 21st package of sanctions against Russia. The precise details are still under negotiation, as always. But the outlines are taking shape: new restrictions on imports, expansion of blacklists of individuals and entities, measures against circumvention of sanctions via third countries. On paper, it looks serious. In practice, everything depends on the ambition of the measures ultimately adopted.

Because the history of previous packages is eloquent: at every announcement, the rhetoric is strong. Then come the negotiations, the exemptions, the transition periods. The final package is always less biting than the initial draft. It is a well-oiled mechanism that Moscow has learned to anticipate. Russian strategists know the European rhythm better than some Members of the European Parliament.

The two countries opposing entry bans for Russians

Pravda Ukraine of June 25, 2026 reveals that two EU member states still oppose the entry ban for Russian nationals. The fact that these countries refuse to submit to this symbolic measure illustrates how sharply interests diverge within the Union. This is not a question of considerable economic sacrifice — merely a firm stance on the free movement of citizens of a state waging a war of aggression.

This type of internal resistance undermines the European unity that Moscow is precisely trying to erode. Every exception, every postponement, every derogation is a victory for Russian propaganda proclaiming that the West is divided and weak. And, to be honest, that propaganda is not entirely wrong when one observes certain European behaviors.

Two EU countries opposing entry bans for Russians in 2026, four years after the full-scale invasion — it is beyond comprehension. This is not a question of diplomatic nuance. It is a question of where you stand morally in this conflict. And some are still struggling to choose a side.

Russian oil still circulating

Despite the sanctions, Russian oil continues to move. The shadow fleet — those vessels transporting Russian crude by circumventing controls — has become an industry in its own right. Hundreds of old tankers, operating under flags of convenience, channel Putin's oil to Asian refineries that in turn resell refined products into Europe and the West. The circuit is known. The tools to block it exist. The political will is insufficient.

The 21st package should, according to early reports, include additional measures against this shadow fleet. But "include measures" is a formulation that can cover a great deal. Symbolic sanctions against a handful of vessels, or a genuine offensive against the entire network? The difference is considerable, and Moscow monitors every detail with the attention the EU should impose on itself.

Russian military spending: a signal that must not be ignored

When Putin announces an increase in military spending of four to five trillion rubles, he sends a clear message: he is not looking for an exit. He is accelerating. This decision, in the context of a budget deficit already exceeding 80 billion dollars, is not that of a leader who senses defeat. It is that of a man betting that the West will tire before he does.

This bet is not irrational. Europe has demonstrated in the past a remarkable capacity to grow weary, to seek compromises, to want to "de-escalate." Putin is counting on that. The answer must be to show him that this calculation is wrong — and that requires a 21st package that truly strikes, not a catalogue of good intentions.

Putin increases military spending despite a colossal deficit. That is the most important signal Europeans seem unwilling to read. This man is not looking for a way out. He is preparing the next round. And Europe — Europe is preparing its next working session.

The oil embargo: the decisive measure

Economists, strategists, and geopolitical analysts broadly agree: a total oil embargo on Russian oil is the most effective available measure. Oil revenues still represent a substantial share of the Russian federal budget. Cutting them — or drastically reducing them — directly strikes Putin's ability to finance his war. The Baltic states have understood this. It is time the rest of Europe joined them.

The argument that a total embargo would be too painful for European economies has lost its substance. Europe has diversified its energy sources since 2022. American and Qatari liquefied natural gas has partially replaced Russian flows. The transition, though costly, has been accomplished. There is no longer any valid economic excuse for failing to go all the way.

Secondary sanctions: hitting those who help Russia

A 21st package worthy of the name must also include robust secondary sanctions against entities enabling Russia to circumvent existing restrictions. Companies in Turkey, China, the United Arab Emirates, Kazakhstan, and elsewhere serve as conduits for the Russian war economy. Secondary sanctions allow them to be targeted directly — at the risk of creating diplomatic tensions, certainly, but that is the price of coherence.

The European Union has too long feared applying this type of sanctions for fear of antagonizing commercial partners. But the question is no longer about preserving trade relations with countries that help Putin finance his war against Ukraine. The question is whether Europe is serious about its commitment to defending its values.

Secondary sanctions are the real red line. Hitting Chinese, Turkish, or Emirati companies that help Russia circumvent sanctions means accepting a real diplomatic cost for a real strategic result. That is precisely the kind of courage Europe has been lacking for far too long. And that is precisely what the 21st package should embody.

The slow tempo of bureaucracies versus the rapid pace of war

The rhythm of European negotiations is fundamentally incompatible with the rhythm of a war. Ukraine loses men every day. The front lines shift every week. Russian military capacity — financed by revenues that Europe still contributes indirectly to generating — strikes civilian infrastructure continuously. Meanwhile, Brussels organizes expert meetings, sends diplomatic notes, and waits for consensus.

This temporal disconnect is a form of passive complicity. Not from malicious intent — I do not attribute sinister ulterior motives to our European diplomats. But from an institutional incapacity to match the urgency. European treaties were designed to manage trade disputes, not to respond to wars of aggression. And this structural inadequacy is costing Ukraine dearly.

Aid fatigue: a trap that must be refused

A narrative is beginning to circulate in certain European capitals: "aid fatigue" for Ukraine. Too much money, too many weapons, for too long. This narrative is dangerous, and it must be named for what it is: a rationalization of abandonment. Ukraine is not asking for a favor. It is fighting for values that Europe claims to defend — sovereignty, international law, democracy.

Abandoning Ukraine midway would not only be a moral betrayal. It would be a first-order strategic error. A victorious Russia would not stop at Ukraine. The Baltics, Poland, the Scandinavian countries — all understand that the current boundary of the conflict is their own line of defense. The 21st package is not merely an economic tool: it is a declaration of intent on what Europe is willing to defend.

Aid fatigue for Ukraine is a moral luxury Europe cannot afford. When I hear political leaders talking about "finding an exit" or "not humiliating Russia," I wonder whether they have looked at what this war has done to Mariupol, to Bucha, to Kharkiv. Fatigue, here, would be capitulation dressed as pragmatism.

Moscow has learned to read sanctions before they are even adopted

Russia has since 2022 developed a formidable expertise in anticipating and circumventing sanctions. Its economic teams monitor European negotiations, identify probable exemptions, and set up alternative circuits even before measures come into force. By the time a package is adopted, the workarounds are already in place. That is why the speed of adoption is as important as the content of the measures.

The 21st package must be designed with this reality in mind. The drafters of the sanctions texts must work from sufficiently broad legal bases to cover foreseeable circumventions. Designation lists must be updated quickly and regularly. And enforcement mechanisms must be given adequate resources — something the EU has often neglected, resulting in well-drafted but poorly enforced sanctions.

Closing the gaps before they are exploited

One of the lessons from previous packages is that gaps identified at the time of adoption — negotiated exemptions, transition periods, sectoral derogations — are systematically exploited to the maximum by Russia and its partners. A six-month transition window becomes a six-month preparation window for sanctions-busters. A limited sectoral exemption becomes an entry point for much larger flows.

The European Commission and the member states must therefore adopt a radically different approach for the 21st package: minimize exemptions from the design stage, provide enhanced monitoring mechanisms for residual gaps, and include automatic adjustment clauses if data shows circumvention occurring. This is a more ambitious standard than previous packages. It is precisely what the situation demands.

Russia anticipating European sanctions even before they are adopted — that is the result of four years of learning. Europe has been predictable, methodical, sometimes naive about the ingenuity of those who evade. The 21st package should be designed not as a political statement, but as a precise economic weapon — with circumvention engineers sitting across the table in the drafting room.

Twenty packages were not enough: the twenty-first must be different

The European Union has demonstrated since 2022 that it can act with a unity and speed that was previously unknown. The first twenty sanctions packages, imperfect as they are, represent an unprecedented effort in the history of multilateral economic sanctions. But the adversary has adapted. Circumvention networks have organized. The Russian economy has absorbed the shocks — at the cost of massive distortions, to be sure, but it has held.

The 21st package must be of a different nature. Not a catalogue of symbolic measures designed to show that Europe is "active." A coordinated economic offensive, with teeth, with secondary sanctions, with a muscular oil embargo, and with the political will to enforce it even against internal resistance and the protests of third-party partners. Europe has the tools. It must find the will.

Zelensky deserves better than renewed promises

Volodymyr Zelensky has transformed Ukraine into a symbol of resistance. His country absorbs daily strikes on its infrastructure, its cities, its civilians. He holds on, with a dignity and determination that few leaders would have shown. What Europe owes him in return is not a twenty-first package accompanied by a press conference. It is a real, quantified, binding commitment to economically suffocate the war machine that terrorizes his people.

Stopping the bargaining over sanctions means stopping the bargaining with our own values. Europe cannot define itself as a community of values while continuing to leave taps open that feed a war of aggression. The moment has come. The 21st package must be the turning point, not the twenty-first episode of an endless series.

Twenty-one sanctions packages — twenty-one times Europe had the chance to do better. This is not the twenty-first opportunity to replay the same timid scenario. It may be the last chance to act before the strategic window closes. I say this with all the solemnity the situation demands: the time is now.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

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