OPINION: Former Russian Soldiers Banned from the EU — Paris and Rome Block, the Signal to Moscow Is Ambiguous

OPINION: Former Russian Soldiers Banned from the EU — Paris and Rome Block, the Signal to Moscow Is Ambiguous

Introduction: A Good Idea That Europe Is Already Complicating

The proposal: keeping the perpetrators out of our cities

The idea is simple, direct, morally unassailable: ban entry into the European Union for former Russian soldiers who fought in Ukraine. Ursula von der Leyen put it on the table on June 9, 2026 as part of the 21st sanctions package: anyone who has served in Russian armed forces since the war began should be barred from European capitals, beaches, and city centers. Approximately 1.5 million veterans potentially affected. A clear, readable measure that sends a powerful political signal to those who took up arms against the Ukrainian people and participated in documented crimes.

But of course — as so often with the European Union — a good idea quickly collides with bureaucratic complexity, national interests, and the irrational fears of certain governments. Member states met on June 26, 2026. And there, two countries that could have led by example chose instead to obstruct: France and Italy.

Paris and Rome: afraid of the political signal

According to European diplomatic sources cited by Bloomberg, Paris and Rome are not fundamentally opposed to keeping former Russian combatants out. Their objection is more subtle — and more revealing. They worry that the current wording of the proposal might eventually open the door to a blanket ban on all Russian citizens. Each member state would need to determine who did or did not serve — an assessment "far from simple," according to their sources. This complexity, they argue, should fall under visa policy rather than a sanctions package.

A seemingly legitimate argument. But in practice? These same objections have been raised since 2022 to slow every measure that might actually be effective. It is not the first time that Paris or Rome has hit the brakes on pressure against Moscow. And it will probably not be the last.

The Numbers That Make You Step Back

670,000 visa applications from Russians — and the opposition camps

The available figures cast the reticence of Paris and Rome in a different light. Last year, Russian nationals submitted more than 670,000 Schengen visa applications. France, Italy, and Spain alone accounted for three quarters of all those applications. The tourist, economic, and personal interests at stake are not negligible. Some of these Russians traveling to Europe are dissidents, journalists, and opponents of the Putin regime. An overly broad ban would affect them unjustly.

That is not what von der Leyen proposed. The proposal specifically targets former military personnel who fought in Ukraine — not the Russian population as a whole. But the fear of a future extension, a gradual scope creep, seems sufficient to paralyze two of the EU's largest member states. The concrete result: a measure that could mean something stays trapped in the limbo of European negotiation.

1.5 million Russian veterans — the scope of the measure

Approximately 1.5 million Russian veterans would be potentially subject to this ban. That enormous figure reflects the scale of Russia's war effort. Russia has mobilized hundreds of thousands of soldiers since 2022, including through controversial partial mobilizations. Many of these men participated in operations documented as war crimes: executions of civilians, bombardment of civilian infrastructure, forced deportation of Ukrainian children.

The idea that a significant number of these individuals could obtain a Schengen visa and walk freely through Paris, Milan, or Berlin is not abstract. Documented cases have already emerged. The proposed ban is a proportionate response to this reality. It does not solve everything — fraudsters will always exist — but it sends a clear signal: Europe will not be a refuge for those who took up arms against Ukraine.

The Broader Context of the 21st Sanctions Package

Oil, cryptocurrencies, shadow fleet

The former-combatant measure is only one element of a larger, more ambitious package. The 21st sanctions package proposed by the European Commission includes an adjustment to the Russian oil price cap — set at 15% below the average Urals crude price, which brought the current cap to $44.10 per barrel. A July review could push it up to at least $65, above the previous cap of $60. The goal is to continue cutting into Moscow's energy revenues that finance its war machine.

Added to this are restrictions targeting banks, cryptocurrency operators, and oil companies helping Russia circumvent existing sanctions. Thirty additional vessels would be added to the blacklist of Russia's shadow fleet — those tankers transporting Russian oil under flags of convenience to evade controls. Export controls on companies in China, India, Turkey, and Central Asia accused of supplying Russian weapons manufacturers are also under consideration.

A package diluted in negotiations

The recurring problem with European sanctions packages is their progressive dilution under pressure from member states with particular interests to protect. Hungary has long been the primary obstacle — but it is no longer alone. France and Italy on the combatants issue, others on the oil cap, still others on trade measures: every significant measure finds opponents within the EU itself.

The result is a package whose international signaling effect is often more significant than its actual impact on the Russian economy. Russia has learned to adapt to European sanctions precisely because they arrive incrementally and with enough advance notice to allow adjustments. A more cohesive and faster-moving European Union would be a more effective one in the face of Russian aggression.

France and Italy — The Problem of Consistency

Allies who support... up to a point

Neither France nor Italy is an opponent of supporting Ukraine. Paris has delivered Caesar howitzers, Scalp missiles, air defense systems. Rome has provided weapons, equipment, and principled political support. But on certain specific measures — particularly those touching on relations with Russian society or economic interests — their enthusiasm noticeably cools.

This ambivalence has consequences. It sends Moscow the signal that European unity has limits, that certain measures will always be blocked by at least one or two large member states. Putin reads these signals and factors them into his strategic calculations. Every crack in European cohesion is useful intelligence for the Kremlin.

The responsibility of the EU's large countries

France and Italy are two of the largest economies in the European Union. Their influence in negotiations is considerable. When they block or slow a measure, they do not do so without consequences — they effectively define the limits of what Europe is capable of doing. This responsibility should come with greater awareness of the signals they send, both to Kyiv and to Moscow.

There is a coherence to defend: either one considers that former Russian soldiers who fought in Ukraine constitute a particular category, or one does not. The European Commission's proposal says yes. Paris and Rome say maybe, under certain conditions, with guarantees. That conditional response is politically problematic at a moment when Ukraine expects its allies to offer unequivocal solidarity.

The Legal Precedent and Its Future Implications

A measure that sets a precedent in EU law

The ban on entry into the European Union for former combatants of the Russian armed forces who fought in Ukraine since 2022 establishes an important legal precedent. For the first time, combatant status in a specific war would become a criterion for exclusion at European borders. This precedent could have implications for EU migration and security policy in other future conflicts.

The measure also raises non-trivial questions of practical implementation. How do you verify that a person fought in Ukraine? Russian military identification databases are not accessible to European authorities. Indirect indicators — presence in certain regions of origin, Russian military decorations, unit tattoos — can provide clues but do not constitute sufficient legal proof for a systematic entry refusal. The effective implementation of this measure is therefore more complex than it appears.

The French and Italian resistance: a political reading

The reluctance of Paris and Rome to fully support this measure reveals specific domestic political calculations. In France, part of the electorate and the political class remains sensitive to the idea that overly aggressive measures against Russia could foreclose a diplomatic exit. This sensitivity — inherited from a long tradition of East-West dialogue — complicates clear-cut positions even when they are morally justified.

In Italy, Ukraine policy remains complex in a landscape where some governing parties have historically maintained close ties to Moscow. These internal political nuances translate into hesitation at the European level on the most symbolically forceful measures. This is a democratic reality with which Ukraine must contend — without validating the idea that moderation toward aggressors is a sustainable long-term position.

What This Measure Says About European Foreign Policy

An EU that acts, but with persistent reservations

The former-combatant entry ban, even imperfect in its application, illustrates a deeper trend: the European Union is laboriously building a more muscular foreign and security policy. This process is slow, often frustrating for the more proactive allies like Poland and the Baltic states. But the direction is right — toward greater coherence and greater collective capacity to act in the face of threats.

The recurring problem is unanimity. European foreign policy decisions require agreement from twenty-seven member states — a system designed to guarantee democratic legitimacy but that favors the lowest common denominator on difficult decisions. Institutional reforms allowing qualified majority voting on certain foreign policy questions have been under discussion for years. The Ukraine dossier has revealed their urgency — without unlocking the political consensus needed to adopt them.

Solidarity as a response to the threat

Beyond institutional debates, the measure on former Russian soldiers sends a political signal that transcends its practical limitations. It tells Russia — and the world — that Europe will not remain passive in the face of the conflict's consequences. It tells Ukraine that its European partners take seriously the demand for accountability for Russian military actions. And it tells Russian soldiers themselves that there are personal consequences to participating in a war of aggression.

This last dimension may be the most important in the long run. If enough Russian soldiers know they will never be able to visit Paris, Rome, or Berlin because of their participation in the war in Ukraine, it creates individual pressure on those who might hesitate before enlisting. It is not sufficient deterrence to stop the war — but in the complex machinery of systemic pressure, every lever counts.

The States That Are Applying It: The Pioneers

The Baltic states and Poland leading the way

While Paris and Rome hesitate, the states most vigorously applying the ban on former Russian combatants are unsurprisingly those most directly exposed to the threat: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. These countries did not wait for a European directive to tighten their border controls and refuse entry to individuals showing indicators of service in Russian armed forces that fought in Ukraine.

Their approach is pragmatic and based on their national intelligence services maintaining databases on individuals at risk. Without direct access to Russian military registers, they use combinations of indicators: travel to identified conflict zones, social circles, presence on Russian social media, known brigade tattoos, visible decorations. This profiling is imperfect but operational — and it sends a clear signal to those seeking entry that surveillance is real.

The Baltic model as a reference for the EU

The Baltic states' approach could serve as a model for a more coherent European policy. They have developed risk assessment tools tailored to the specific threat posed by former Russian combatants: detailed questionnaires, thorough background checks, coordination with partner intelligence services. These tools are not perfect, but they are more effective than a complete absence of specific measures.

The political will to apply them — including at the risk of diplomatic friction with Moscow — reflects the strategic culture of these countries: having lived under Soviet occupation, they understand viscerally that weakness in the face of Russian threats does not buy peace — it encourages it. This is a lesson that Western European countries need to integrate into their own calculations, even if their history has conditioned them less directly toward this vigilance.

What It Takes for This Policy to Work

A shared database and stronger intelligence sharing

For the ban on former Russian combatants to be effective across the European Union, it requires an implementation infrastructure that the EU does not yet fully possess. A shared database between member states, fed by contributions from national intelligence services and verified open-source information, would be the central tool of a coherent policy. Without it, each member state applies the measure with its own data — creating gaps in coverage.

Strengthening intelligence sharing within the EU on Russian combatants in Ukraine is a broader project than just the question of territorial entry. It also concerns detecting espionage networks, identifying high-risk individuals in Russian diaspora communities, and monitoring Russian attempts to influence European political processes. The former-combatant measure is a political entry point toward a broader strengthening of European intelligence cooperation.

The human rights dimension: no collective discrimination

Any border control policy based on membership in a group — even one as specific as veterans of a war of aggression — must be accompanied by guarantees against collective discrimination. Not all Russian citizens are combatants. Not all former Russian military personnel participated in operations in Ukraine. Any implementation of this measure must rigorously distinguish between targeted individuals and the Russian population as a whole.

This distinction is not just a human rights legal requirement — it is also a political necessity. A policy perceived as collective anti-Russian discrimination would play into Moscow's propaganda, which seeks to portray the West as hostile to all Russians. The objective is to target precisely those who participated in illegal acts — not to punish a nationality collectively. This precision is as indispensable as it is difficult to maintain in practice.

Conclusion: The Signal Sent and What It Costs

What this hesitation tells Ukraine

For Ukraine, watching these European negotiations from its battlefield, the message is clear: united Europe remains an unfinished project. You can count on certain allies — the Baltic states, Poland, the Nordic countries — for unconditional solidarity. Other partners remain in comfort zones, supporting Ukraine in words but fumbling when measures carry a cost — even a merely political one.

This hesitation is not fatal. Ukraine will survive this latest delay in the 21st sanctions package. But it accumulates. Every delay, every diluted compromise, every measure abandoned under pressure from Paris or Rome is a lesson Kyiv draws about the long-term reliability of its allies. And these lessons influence Ukrainian diplomatic strategies at the moment when peace negotiations are beginning to appear on the horizon.

The measure will eventually pass — but at what cost?

The history of European sanctions packages teaches us that most measures are eventually adopted, if belatedly and in weakened form. The former-combatant ban will likely follow the same path: gradual adoption, with national application clauses vague enough to satisfy Paris and Rome. Better than nothing. But less than the situation demands.

Europe can do better. It has the institutions, the legal tools, the economic power to exert far stronger pressure on Putin's Russia. What it sometimes lacks is consistent political will. And that will, in the face of the largest act of aggression on European soil since the Second World War, should not be optional.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Assumed biases and methodology

I am pro-Ukrainian and in favor of stronger European sanctions against Russia. This position influences my treatment of French and Italian hesitations, which I interpret as an obstacle to a more effective policy. I acknowledge that these countries have legitimate considerations — particularly the protection of Russian dissidents and the administrative complexity of such a measure. My treatment privileges the Ukrainian perspective and the case for European firmness.

The figures on visa applications and the number of Russian veterans come from the sources cited. I was unable to verify them independently. They should be treated as estimates, even though they come from generally reliable sources.

What I do not know

I do not know whether French and Italian objections evolved after June 26, 2026. I do not know the final outcome of negotiations on this sanctions package. I do not know to what extent such a ban would be technically applicable in the daily practice of European immigration services. These uncertainties are inherent in covering an ongoing European legislative process.

I have no direct contact with French or Italian negotiators and cannot represent their arguments in their full complexity. My analysis is based exclusively on publicly available information in the sources cited.

Sources

Primary sources

Euromaidan Press — Russia's former soldiers may face a locked EU border — if France and Italy stop balking — June 26, 2026

Euronews — EU ban on Russian combatants faces resistance from France and Italy — June 26, 2026

RBC Ukraine — Two EU countries oppose entry ban on Russians who fought against Ukraine — June 25, 2026

Secondary sources

Ukrainska Pravda — Russian attack in Zaporizhzhia: one killed, 15 injured including two children — June 28, 2026

Euromaidan Press — Russo-Ukrainian war, day 1581 — June 24, 2026

United24Media — Ukraine launches record wave of strikes on Russia's defense industry in June — June 28, 2026