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The ColumnEditorial· No. 1086

EDITORIAL: Putin must make the first move — peace is not a favor

On June 26, 2026, from Kyiv, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky repeated what he has been saying for weeks: Ukraine is ready for meetings, but Russia must make the first move. This is not a capitulation, not a supplication — it is a diplomatically mature position from a country fighting for its survival for more than four years. Kyiv wants peace. But it is not begging for i

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Key takeaways
  1. On June 26, 2026, from Kyiv, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky repeated what he has been saying for weeks: Ukraine is ready for meetings, but Russia must make the first move. This is not a capitulation, not a supplication — it is a diplomatically mature position from a country fighting for its survival for more than four years. Kyiv wants peace. But it is not begging for i
  2. EDITORIAL: Putin must make the first move — peace is not a favor
  3. Introduction: Ukraine extends a hand, Moscow responds with missiles
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Facts, quotes, and cited links remain in the body. Interpretations are framed as analysis or opinion according to the format.

EDITORIAL: Putin must make the first move — peace is not a favor

Introduction: Ukraine extends a hand, Moscow responds with missiles

Zelensky, hand extended

On June 26, 2026, from Kyiv, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky repeated what he has been saying for weeks: Ukraine is ready for meetings, but Russia must make the first move. This is not a capitulation, not a supplication — it is a diplomatically mature position from a country fighting for its survival for more than four years. Kyiv wants peace. But it is not begging for it.

That same week, Vladimir Putin responded to these overtures by ordering ballistic strikes on Kyiv — two injured, a fire in the Darnytskyi district on June 25–26 — and by permitting fresh strikes on Zaporizhzhia, wounding at least 9 people. That is Moscow's answer to calls for peace: missiles. This fundamental contradiction tells us everything we need to know about the Kremlin's real intentions.

The window closing

Zelensky himself spoke of a "negotiation window open until winter 2026." This temporal framing is a signal of urgency. Fighting continues, losses mount, and the military dynamic is far from frozen. If serious negotiations do not begin in the coming months, the conflict risks settling into a new phase of intensification that no one controls. Ukraine is ready. The question is whether Putin is as well — or whether his horizon is simply to wait out Western exhaustion.

The Ukrainian position: clear and documented

Zelensky and the logic of the Russian first step

Zelensky clarified on June 26, 2026 why he is asking Russia to make the first move: it is not a question of protocol — it is a question of good faith. For negotiations to mean anything, Moscow must demonstrate a minimal willingness to engage seriously, not simply to dictate unacceptable conditions as a prerequisite for any dialogue. Putin has repeatedly stated that he is "ready to negotiate at any time" — according to Foreign Minister Lavrov on June 23, 2026 — but his conditions make any actual negotiation impossible.

Meanwhile, according to RBC-Ukraine on June 26, a meeting between Zelensky and Putin is "possible" according to certain sources — and Ukraine has transmitted official proposals to its partners and to "Putin's friends." Zelensky approved a 40-day influence operation aimed at pushing Russia toward negotiations. This is not the behavior of a leader who refuses peace — it is that of a man doing everything in his power to create the conditions for a halt to hostilities.

160 prisoners released: deeds, not words

Ukraine recently released and recovered 160 prisoners of war in a recent exchange with Russia. These exchanges, conducted despite the continuation of combat, show that communication channels exist, that both sides can speak on concrete matters. The question is whether this cooperation on prisoners can extend to broader discussions on a ceasefire and a peace framework.

What Putin demands: a disguised capitulation

The Istanbul conditions: the fiction of a balanced deal

Putin's position has been clear since his statement of June 23, 2026: Russia is ready for negotiations, "on the basis of the agreements reached in Istanbul and, let me remind you, initialed by the Ukrainian delegation." This formulation is a deliberate distortion of history. What Putin calls the "Istanbul agreements" of 2022 were not a balanced deal — they were a text elaborated under Russian military pressure during a partial occupation of Ukraine, containing conditions that Kyiv had begun to explore but never formally accepted.

According to Ukrainska Pravda, during the Istanbul meetings of May 2022, Russia's lead negotiator Vladimir Medinsky had threatened to "fight forever" and warned that Russia could seize the oblasts of Sumy and Kharkiv, declaring: "We fought Sweden for 21 years. How long are you prepared to fight?" That is not the language of a party seeking a fair deal.

The condition of "territory": amputating Ukraine

In addition to the "Istanbul agreements," Putin demands that negotiations reflect "realities on the ground" — meaning the de facto recognition of Russian occupation of parts of Ukraine, including illegally annexed Crimea since 2014 and the four partially occupied oblasts since 2022. According to Bloomberg, during a closed-door meeting in Istanbul in May 2022, Russian representatives had put as conditions that Ukraine renounce these territories and abandon any right to reparations.

Accepting these conditions means legitimizing territorial aggression — a catastrophic precedent for the entire international order. This is not a basis for peace — it is a basis for capitulation. Zelensky is right to reject this framework. Ukraine has the right to recover its territorial integrity, recognized by dozens of UN General Assembly resolutions.

Zelensky's diplomacy: a coherent strategy

Ukraine proposes, Moscow responds with bombs

Since the start of 2026, Zelensky has multiplied diplomatic initiatives. On June 4, 2026, he sent an open letter to Putin proposing a bilateral meeting to end the war — an offer supported by US President Donald Trump. On June 15, he proposed a meeting at the G7 summit in France. On June 25, Ukrainian missiles were striking a Russian arms factory in Volgograd. This is not a contradiction — it is the doctrine of "negotiating from strength."

Zelensky has understood that Putin will only accept serious negotiations if the cost of continuing the war becomes unbearable for Russia. Deep strikes on Russian territory — 660 drones launched according to WION on June 27, strikes on oil infrastructure (28 in June according to ISW), the strike on Vtorovo — are diplomatic tools as much as military ones. The signal is clear: Moscow can come and negotiate, or keep absorbing the blows.

Europe's role: actor or spectator?

The question of European representation in any eventual negotiations is central. Zelensky was clear on June 21, 2026 in an interview with TSN: "They [the Europeans] will decide the format, and ultimately Ukraine will determine who represents Europe in the negotiations. They will propose several options." This formulation — Ukraine has a veto over its European representative — is an assertion of sovereignty and dignity that some European partners have found difficult to accept.

The reason for this position is simple: if Russia imposes its representatives and if Ukraine has no say over who represents its allies, the imbalance at the negotiating table will be fatal. Ukraine learned from 2014–2015, from the Minsk agreements — signed under pressure, not applied by Moscow, then used to justify ever greater demands. There will be no acceptable second Minsk.

Lavrov's position: cosmetic peace, permanent war

"Ready at any time": the phrase that says nothing

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov declared on June 23, 2026 that Russia is ready for negotiations "at any time." This formula has become a mantra of Russian diplomacy — it allows appearing willing to engage while maintaining preconditions that make any engagement impossible. When pressed for specifics, the conditions emerge: Istanbul, "realities on the ground," exclusion of American representatives from certain discussions.

This Russian diplomatic strategy has been honed over years. It consists of saying "we are ready" while knowing that the preconditions set are unacceptable to the other party, thereby creating the illusion of Moscow's good faith while attributing the deadlock to Kyiv or the West. It is sophisticated political manipulation that the media and foreign ministries should no longer repeat without context.

The bluff of "Putin's friends"

Ukraine has transmitted official proposals not only to its direct partners, but to "Putin's friends" — countries that maintain relations with Moscow while remaining formally neutral: certain Gulf states, Turkey, India, China. This approach is pragmatic: if Moscow won't listen to Ukraine's Western allies, perhaps those with access to Putin can convey a different message. It is a multi-channel influence diplomacy that testifies to the strategic sophistication of the Zelensky team.

The conditions of a just peace

What Kyiv demands: territorial integrity and security guarantees

Ukraine's position on the conditions of a just peace has been consistent since 2022. It rests on several pillars: the withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukrainian territories occupied since 2022, recognition of Ukrainian sovereignty over its entire internationally recognized territory, solid security guarantees preventing further aggression — which in many minds implies membership in NATO or equivalent guarantee agreements — and reparations for the destruction inflicted on Ukraine.

These conditions are not unreasonable — they reflect international law and UN resolutions. What makes them unacceptable to Moscow is precisely that they imply Russia's political and symbolic defeat. Putin cannot return home having ceded territories he has annexed and presented as "eternal Russian lands." That is the crux of the problem: a just peace for Ukraine is Putin's domestic defeat.

The gray areas: the difficult compromises

I must be honest on this point: a resolution of the conflict will likely involve painful compromises. The military recovery of Crimea would be extremely costly in human lives. Formulas for freezing or neutralizing certain territories could be explored without constituting capitulations. These complex discussions can only take place at a serious negotiating table — not in press conferences where each side seeks to dominate the narrative. What I am defending is that this table open without unacceptable preconditions set by Moscow.

Ukrainian deep strikes: the language of pressure

660 drones and 28 oil infrastructure strikes

While Zelensky multiplies diplomatic gestures, Ukraine maintains growing military pressure on Russian territory. According to WION, on June 27, 2026, Ukraine launched an operation involving 660 strike drones — one of the largest campaigns of this type since the start of the conflict. These drones targeted military and industrial infrastructure inside Russia, leveraging Ukraine's ability to penetrate Russian air defenses.

The ISW (Institute for the Study of War) documented 28 strikes on Russian oil infrastructure in June 2026 alone — refineries, fuel depots, pumping stations. These targets are not chosen at random: oil revenues finance between 30 and 40% of the Russian military budget. Every successful strike reduces Moscow's resources for funding its operations in Ukraine and, indirectly, its transfers to North Korea. This is the "ultimate sanction" in Zelensky's own words — Ukrainian strikes as a tool of direct economic pressure.

The "negotiate from strength" strategy

The juxtaposition of Zelensky's diplomatic overtures with Ukrainian military deep strikes is not a contradiction — it is a doctrine. Ukraine is seeking to create the conditions where Russia perceives the cost of continuing the war as exceeding the expected benefits of victory. Every drone that strikes a Russian oil refinery strengthens Ukraine's argument at the negotiating table: the war is costing Moscow more than Putin anticipated, and it will cost more still if negotiations yield no results.

Analysts such as those at the Kyiv Independent documented in June 2026 that Ukrainian drones are increasingly penetrating Russian air defenses — adapting their trajectories, altitudes, and approaches to exploit gaps in detection systems. This growing capability changes the Russian strategic calculus: the depth of territory is no longer an absolute shield, and critical infrastructure hundreds of kilometers from the Ukrainian border is now within range.

What a just peace concretely entails

Security guarantees: the key to any lasting deal

Beyond territorial questions, the most fundamental condition for a lasting peace for Ukraine is a system of credible security guarantees preventing further aggression. The Budapest Memorandum of 1994 — in which Ukraine had renounced the Soviet nuclear arsenal it inherited in exchange for security guarantees from Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom — demonstrated catastrophically that a document without a binding enforcement mechanism is worthless against a determined aggressor. Ukraine draws the logical conclusion: the next guarantees must be fundamentally different.

The only guarantee that Kyiv considers credible is membership in NATO or an equivalent mechanism. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty — under which an attack on one member is an attack on all — has proven itself as a deterrent since 1949: no NATO member has been attacked by a foreign state since the Alliance's creation. For Ukraine, which has endured two Russian aggressions in eight years (2014 and 2022), it is the only guarantee that makes sense.

Reconstruction: the economic dimension of peace

The World Bank and Ukraine estimated in 2026 that the cost of rebuilding Ukraine exceeds 500 billion dollars — a figure that continues to grow with every Russian strike on civilian infrastructure. The question of who will pay for this reconstruction is inseparable from the question of Russian reparations. Ukraine demands that Russia contribute to reconstruction — either directly through reparations, or indirectly through the approximately 300 billion dollars in Russian assets frozen in the West since 2022. This question is a major sticking point in any potential negotiations.

The European Union took a first step by using the revenues from frozen Russian assets to fund military aid to Ukraine — a significant legal and political precedent. But using the frozen assets themselves as a reconstruction lever goes much further, and the question of the international legality of this approach remains debated. This legal debate is not trivial: the West's decision on this question will send a message about the capacity of international norms to adapt to unprecedented situations.

Conclusion: Peace will not be begged for

Ukraine has done its part

Ukraine has done its part. It has resisted four years of aggression that no one predicted it could withstand this long. It has lost tens of thousands of soldiers, entire cities reduced to rubble, millions of citizens displaced. And despite all of that, it maintains an open dialogue position — provided that dialogue is between equals, not between an attacked state forced to accept the dictates of its attacker.

The first step belongs to Moscow

The ball is clearly in Moscow's court. Zelensky has proposed meetings, sent letters, transmitted proposals through multiple channels. The Russian response has been missiles on Kyiv and meaningless declarations. Until Russia demonstrates minimal good faith — a partial ceasefire, a symbolic withdrawal, a halt to strikes on civilian infrastructure — Lavrov's words about "readiness to negotiate" will remain what they are: a propaganda posture. Peace is not a favor Ukraine must beg for. It is a right.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

My editorial commitment

This editorial expresses a clearly pro-Ukrainian position on the conditions for peace. I believe Ukraine has the right to its territorial integrity and to solid security guarantees. This bias is deliberate. It does not mean I believe the war has no resolution — but it does mean I refuse to present an unjust peace as an acceptable resolution.

What I do not know

I do not know the details of ongoing negotiations through informal channels. I do not know to what extent the positions of both parties are truly incompatible in private, as opposed to their public postures. The final compromises, if they come, will likely be more nuanced than public declarations suggest. I acknowledge this limit while maintaining that the principles I am defending are non-negotiable.

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Cite this article

Maxime Marquette (2026). EDITORIAL: Putin must make the first move — peace is not a favor. MadMax. https://mad-max.co/en/article/editorial-poutine-doit-faire-le-premier-pas-la-paix-n-est-pas-une-faveur

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Maxime Marquette
Independent columnist

Maxime Marquette writes most of the analyses and columns published on MadMax — geopolitics, technology, and current events, no filler.

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Editorial2671 words17 min read